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§1 Short Introduction to the Subject and Thesis 
Constituent power is the authority to frame or to amend a particular 
text, superior to other laws, called the constitution. What distinguishes 
framing power from amending power is that the latter changes the 
constitution in ways provided therein, while the former amends it 
outside any precedent constitutional framework. Most modern states 
have adopted written and rigid constitutions. According to Sieyès1 -the 
first to present a sophisticated theory of constituent power- ‘une 
constitution suppose avant tout un pouvoir constituant’, as 
distinguished from other constituted powers created by the constitution 
itself. Since a constitution is the highest Law in the state, constituent 
power must invest those entitled to sovereignty. To close the vicious 
cycle, most constitutions provide that those entitled to sovereignty are 
the people, and consequently, entitled to constituent power.  
Constituent power presupposes the ability of a society to develop its 
capacity to act as a collective, in order to gain (or regain) an active role 
in the organization of individuals’ lives and their social relationships 
with each other. Here, several approaches are possible, depending on 
the concept of nation, and thus on culture. For Arab nationalists, the 
(Arab) nation exists as a human group with its own characteristics, such 
as language, history and traditions. Attempts to unite ended in failure, 
and Arab nationalism began to exist within Arab territorial states. The 
ethnic concept of nation initially helped to justify a revolution against 
other Muslims, but it was unable to distinguish individual Arab peoples 
or justify territorial Arab states. What makes a Jordanian different from 
a Palestinian, a Lebanese from a Syrian? Adopting the concept of 
nation as demos was indispensable, since the nation embraces all 
citizens living under the same laws, within state borders.  
                                               
1  Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1748-1836). 
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Most of those states adopted written constitutions in which they 
declared that sovereignty belongs to the people. Recently, the Arab 
world witnessed a development in relation to constitutionalism, and the 
constitutional movement which began then, has continued to the 
present day. Nevertheless, one should not be deceived into thinking that 
the norms contained in the constitution correspond to constitutional 
law. There is a need, in fact, to study the constitutional text in light of 
the enforced and applied legislation in every Arab state.  
The relation between Arab ‘nation’ and a single Arab ‘people’ may not 
be clearly understood by using concepts such as ‘nation’ and ‘people’. 
In fact, these two concepts have to be understood in the light of the 
wider concept of umma2, originally used to indicate the Islamic 
community, or the community of believers. There is no Islamic or Arab 
state that embraces all Islamic or Arab umma; those populations need to 
deal with territorially defined states. In contemporary Arab states, there 
is a partial return to shari’a and an increasing reference to Islam as a 
justification for the state’s authority or its rejection, made respectively 
by the state apparatus and by fundamentalist groups.  
In contemporary Arab states, the relation between these three concepts 
(the Islamic nation, the Arab nation and the Arab people as a single 
whole) is becoming increasingly problematic. According to Islamic 
law, sovereignty belongs to God: no state has the right to exercise 
authority except in subordination and in accordance with the Law 
revealed by God and his prophet. The Pakistani, Sayyid Abul A'la 
MAUDUDI (the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan)3 invented 
a new concept: ‘al-hakemmeyya’ meaning sovereignty in reference to 
God, while ‘seyyada’ (also translated as sovereignty) referring to the 
people’s power.4  
I will present, first, the classical theory of constituent power since its 
inception until recent times. We will notice that this theory was not 
                                               
2  For more details about the concept of ‘umma’, see session 8.3.  
3  Sayyid Abul A'la MAUDUDI (1903-1979), the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic 
Party) of Pakistan.  
4  For complete analyses, see 10.1.2. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 3 
arrived at suddenly, but was formed over a period of time and followed 
the constitutional developments of concerned states. Two different 
approaches are presented: the formal and the material conceptions: both 
have their own consistency (Part I).  
Knowing that the theory was ‘invented’ in the USA and France and that 
this was possible only following philosophical and political revolutions 
that resulted in switching the bearer of sovereignty: the nation became 
the source of all legitimate power since people are sovereign, not the 
monarch or God. Now, is it possible to read the theory of constituent 
power in ‘Arabic’ terms? The principle of popular sovereignty is 
included in most of the Arab constitutions, which adopted written and 
rigid constitutions. However, in the Arab world, there is a 
contradiction: an increasing attachment to territorial states, in spite of a 
general discontent for the regimes by the people; and the legitimization 
of the authority, in some instances based on Arab or Islamic nationalist 
discourses (Part II).  
In taking Palestine as a case study (Part III), we find that the 
Palestinians already had a rich constitution-making process, 
characterized by local and international interest and support. More than 
seven drafts of Basic Law (BL) were drafted before being adopted by 
the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 1997 and endorsed by the 
Palestinian Authority’s (PA) ra’ees5 in 2002; besides, three draft 
constitutions were prepared for the Palestinian state; drafting a 
constitution was part of the Road Map obligations. The first problem is 
to discover who is/are that/those entitled to constituent power, what is 
its legitimacy, and what are the limits of those entitled to that power? 
Any attempt to enact or elaborate a constitution shall secure the 
reconciliation of the different processes that are enacted in the 
Palestinian territories: those of nation-building, peace and democracy.  
These instances correspond respectively to the moment of self- 
awareness, awareness of the other and awareness of the international 
                                               
5  Arabic word that means President and Chairman; it was used in the Oslo 
Agreements to qualify the person heading the PA. This was as a compromise 
between the Palestinians (who insisted to use President) and the Israelis (who 
insisted to use the term chairman). 
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community. The correlation between these three processes is not always 
peaceful for Palestinians, the competent handling of these issues means 
an assured peace based on national rights, realised through bilateral 
negotiations within the norms of international legitimacy.  
§2 Preliminary Clarifications 
Before we take a closer look at the classical theory of constituent 
power, it is necessary to clarify the terminology used in this thesis, and 
to give two preliminary remarks.  
First, a difference exists in the English and French terms used to define 
constituent power. What are usually called ‘framing power’ and 
‘amending power’ in English refer respectively to the following French 
concepts: ‘pouvoir constituant originaire’ (original constituent power) 
and ‘pouvoir constituant dérivé’ (derived constituent power). The 
English terms do not express exactly the same meanings as the French 
ones, which are in our personal opinion, more appropriate. 
Accordingly, original constituent power and derived constituent power 
shall be privileged. Nevertheless, in this thesis we will use the English 
and/or French terms interchangeably, as they will have the same 
connotation; only when a precise definition is required, will the specific 
terms be utilized.  
Second, in contemporary use, the reference to Islam is made assuming 
that it has a universal meaning for everyone. This may lead to its 
misuse and confusion between its credo and its history. Now, the term 
shari’a, which means ‘the way revealed by God’, has sometimes been 
translated as Islamic law, tout court, may have three different 
connotations that should be borne in mind. In a very broad sense, 
shari’a means a religious rule, including dogma, rituals, moral and 
juridical precepts revealed to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, alike. In a 
narrower sense, it only concerns Muslims, and indicates both the 
internal and external forum by which all Muslims should conduct their 
lives. Strictly speaking, it means the way or ‘religious rule’ solely 
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revealed to Muslims for the purpose of regulating the ‘external forum’ 
only: in this case, shari’a coincides with fiqh.6 7  
To avoid misunderstandings, one shall keep in mind the following 
remarks:  
First, In no way, does this thesis insinuate that problems regarding 
democracy or the respect of human rights is linked to the cultural 
particularity of Arabs; nor does it suggest that the solution to such a 
situation is the return to pre-Islamic concepts such as ‘asabeyya (social 
cohesion), to which Ibn Khaldûn dedicated some of his analyses.8 The 
situation in the Arab world is predominantly the result of its recent 
history, beginning with the four centuries under the Ottoman Empire, 
but also to European colonialism by the end of the nineteenth century.  
Second, we refer to Arab countries as if they reflect a general situation. 
This is partially mistaken. We are conscious that every Arab state 
reflects a particular history developed over a period of time. In fact, the 
commonness with other Arab countries in relation to language, culture, 
history, habits… did not hinder the growth of territorial nationalism; 
rather it encouraged and favoured its development.  
§3 Methodology 
The comparative approach will be adopted in this thesis in order to 
cover the multifaceted subject of the different analyses. This tactic will 
                                               
6  CASTRO F., Diritto Musulmano e dei Paesi Musulmani, p.1. 
7  In Arabic, there is a distinction between shari’a and fiqh, both translated with 
‘Islamic law’, or ‘droit musulman’. As rightly outlined by LAGHMANI, “Il n’existe 
pas de concept arabe correspondant exactement à l’expression française « droit 
musulman ». Littéralement, cette expression pourrait être rendue par quânûn islâmi 
ou tashrî ‘islâmi. Or, si ces locutions correspondent effectivement à un usage 
courant et contemporain, elles ne font pas partie de « l’appareil conceptuel » de ce 
qui s’est historiquement établi et constitué comme étant le « droit musulman ». A 
considérer cet appareil, on découvre deux termes spécifiques: sharî’a et fiqh. Si 
maintenant on tente une approche interne de ces deux concepts, on se rend 
immédiatement compte qu’ils ne correspondent pas parfaitement au mot droit dans 
son acceptation moderne”. LAGHMANI S., Les écoles juridiques du Sunnisme, 
p.23.  
8  Ibn Khaldun, (1332-1406) is best known for his Muqaddimah (Prolegomena).  
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rely mainly on macro comparison, in so far as the basic structure of the 
states and legal systems will be considered.  
Besids, thes analyses will use a contextual approach taking into account 
law and legal theory, together with history, political science and 
sociology. The contextual background may help us to understand why 
developments took place at a certain time in a certain way.  
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THE INVENTION OF CONSTITUENT 
POWER 
 
Most of the manuals of Constitutional law dedicate a small chapter to 
present the so-called ‘constituent power’.9 Some authors define it as 
follows:  “Le pouvoir constituant dérivé [est] le pouvoir des organes 
compétents pour modifier la constitution, par opposition au ‘pouvoir 
constituant originaire’, celui des organes qui ont adoptés la 
constitution”.10 Prof. Claude KLEIN11 says it differently: “Constituent 
power deals with the Power to frame a very particular norm, namely 
the Constitution as well as with the power to amend that norm”.12 Some 
other authors consider a Constitution as a human being, where framing 
power signs the very beginning of the constitution.13  
                                               
9  BURDEAU G., HAMON F. TROPER M., Droit Constitutionnel, p.40; PACTET P., 
Institutions politiques Droit Constitutionnel, p.69; HAURIAOU A., GICQUEL J., 
Droit Constitutionnel et Institutions Politiques, p.332; GUCHET Y., CATSIAPIS J., 
Droit Constitutionnel, p.18; GICQUEL J., Droit Constitutionnel et Institutions 
Politiques, p.162; PORTELLI H., Droit Constitutionnel, p.22; JOSEPH-
BARTHÉLEMY, DUEZ P., Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, p.189.  
10  BURDEAU G., HAMON F. TROPER M., op. cit., p.40. In this thesis, the 
expression ‘op. cit.’ sends back to a reference that was already cited. In case two 
references are done to the same author, the terms ‘op. cit.’ refer to the last reference 
(backward) that was done for the same author. The term ‘idem’ sends back to the 
same author and book cited in the precedent footnote; the term ‘ibidem’ sends back 
to the same page and reference cited in precedent footnote. 
11  Claude Klein, Professor. Former dean of the faculty of Law at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem (1978-1981); former Chairman of the Israeli Association for 
Public law (1995-2001); dean of the faculty of Law at Ramat Gan (since 2001). 
Research interests include constitutional theory and comparative law. Recent books 
include: Theorie et Pratique du Pouvoir Constituant, Paris Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1996; La Démocratie d'Israël, Le Seuil, Paris, 1997; Israël, Etat en quête 
d'identité, Castermann, Paris, 1999. Source: http://law.mscc.huji.ac.il/  
12  KLEIN C., Théorie et Pratique du Pouvoir Constituant, p.4.  
13  GICQUEL J., op. cit., p.162.  
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It is not easy to define constituent power in a way that satisfies 
everyone, since the terminology is misused.  
Some authors, for example, use the term to refer to the power of the 
organs that adopt and amend the constitution and others to the organs 
themselves.14 Others speak about constituent power and constituted 
powers without really distinguishing between them.15  
In fact, there are two doctrinal approaches to constituent power: the 
first proposes a formal criterion of distinction that is represented by 
positivist authors such as Raymond Carré de MALBERG,16 Georges 
Burdeau and Roger Bonnard while the other proposes a material 
criterion represented by non positivist authors such as Carl SCHMITT17 
and more recently Olivier Beaud.  
The positivists distinguish between framing power and amending 
power by the form: if it is enacted outside a constitutional framework it 
is a (constituent) framing power, while it is a (constituent) amending 
power when it is enacted inside a constitutional framework. On the 
contrary, the non-positivists distinguish between the two concepts by 
their objectives: if it changes the constitution or the national 
sovereignty of the people, it is a constituent power; otherwise it is the 
amending or revising power. 
This part is divided in four sections. In the first we will consider the 
classical theory of constituent power, its origins and implications. The 
second and third sections are totally dedicated to present the two 
approaches that can be made in relation to constituent power (the 
material and formal conceptions). In the last section we will endeavour 
to make a comparison between them, followed by our personal 
appreciation of both theories.  
  
                                               
14  BURDEAU G., HAMON F. TROPER M., op. cit., p.40.  
15  See e.g. JOSEPH-BARTHÉLEMY, DUEZ P., op. cit., p.189.   
16  Raymond Carré de Malberg (1861-1935).   
17  Carl Schmitt (1888-1985).  
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§4 Classical Theory of Constituent Power 
The phenomena of written and rigid constitutions have spread all over 
the world. It is true that a written document has no greater force than 
that to which persons in authority are willing to attribute to it.18 
Nevertheless, it was thanks to the adoption of written and rigid 
constitutions that it was possible to speak about the theory of 
constituent power, because it was originally related to the power that 
creates a particular document called the constitution, which has 
superiority over other laws. Consequently, it is imperative to 
distinguish between ordinary laws and constitutional laws, and in the 
procedures to amend both of them.19  
Accordingly, if there is no written constitution there is no place for a 
framing power; and if the written constitution is not rigid, then there is 
no place for amending power.  
In this section we will begin by presenting the different concepts of 
constitution for an obvious reason: if constituent power is to frame or to 
amend a constitution, it is necessary to define constitution. Only after 
that can the different concepts of ‘constituent power’ be explored; in 
order to do that, it will be necessary to present the origins of that 
doctrine and the differences between the positivist and naturalist 
schools. 
4.1. The Definition of the Constitution  
There are two different approaches to the constitution: To begin with, 
the Constitution, in its material sense, refers to “[t]he whole system of 
government of a country, the collection of rules which establish and 
regulate or govern the government”.20 According to this definition, 
                                               
18  WADE E.C.S., PHILLIPS G.G., Constitutional and Administrative Law, p.2. 
19  In any case, the spread of written and rigid constitutions did not prohibit 
development, other than the formal constitution or against its provisions, for an 
unwritten constitutional law. In other words, besides the formal constitution, the 
development of unwritten constitutional rules continued. JELLINEK G., L’Etat 
Modern et son Droit, p.214. 
20  WADE E.C.S., PHILLIPS G.G., op. cit., p.1.  
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constitutional law is that part of the legal system which regulates the 
structure of the principle organs of the state, their relationship to each 
other and to the citizen, and determines their main functions.21 Second, 
the constitution, in its formal sense, means a document having a special 
legal inviolability which sets out the framework and the principal 
functions of the organs of the state, and declares the principles by 
which those organs must operate.22 
For JELLINEK, every state needs a constitution that guarantees the 
minimum of unity; otherwise, there is anarchy, and therefore no state.23 
In this case, the wider (material) sense of constitution covers also the 
narrower (formal) one but not vice versa; besides, every state by 
definition has a constitution in its material sense (a comprehensive 
system of government) but it may not have a constitution in its formal 
sense (one document declared to be supreme).24  
4.1.1. Origins of the Constitution 
It is commonly admitted that it was only in the late eighteenth century 
that the word ‘constitution’ first came to be identified with a single 
document, mainly as a result of the American and French 
Revolutions;25 nevertheless, its origins are much older. According to 
JELLINEK, it was in the sixteenth century that the concept of lex 
fondamentalis appeared; the lex fondamentalis was more powerful than 
                                               
21  Idem, p.5. The authors use the expression ‘organs of the government’. We prefer to 
use ‘organs of the state’. The government is distinguished from the state; now, the 
constitution regulates the organs of the state, and not of the government.  
22  Idem, p.1.  
23  For the same author, the constitution in the material sense was first known by the 
Greeks. The Romans also distinguished between the constitution of the state, called 
‘rem publicam constituere’ and particular legal dispositions. The power to modify 
the constitution, in decisive moments of Roman history, was assigned to constituent 
power of extraordinary magistrates who concentrated in them the unlimited powers 
of the community. JELLINEK G., op. cit., pp.169-171. 
24  Consequently, although a state such as the United Kingdom does have a constitution 
in the material sense, it does not have one in the formal sense. WADE E.C.S., 
PHILLIPS G.G., op. cit., p.1.  
25  WADE E.C.S., PHILLIPS G.G., op. cit., p.2. 
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other laws since the king himself was bound by it and could not amend 
it of his own will.26  
Even so, according to Hobbes, it was not possible at the time to find 
any definition for the so-called ‘fundamental law’ that was related to an 
idea of a contract between the rex and the regnum (the transportation of 
the ecclesiastic image of alliance between God and his people, as it was 
taught by Calvin).27 In England, there was a tentative move to impose a 
written constitution in 1647, called the People’s Agreement. For the 
first time, the idea of a fundamental contract appeared –which would 
serve as a constitution- and which would have a more relevant nature 
rather than other laws based on that contract.28 In harmony with the 
sense of democracy of that period, such contract is based on unanimity, 
a repudiation of the majority system.29  
JELLINEK traced the doctrinal origins of modern constitutions; for him 
it was the theory of natural law that initiated, for the first time, the 
examination of fundamental law, and England was the first country to 
make this study. Nevertheless, it was in the American colonies that the 
idea of a written fundamental law, and a constitutional charter was of 
practical importance.30  
Hobbes admits the existence of a fundamental law; for him, the 
destruction of that law means the destruction of the social body; and 
therefore, leads to complete anarchy. For him, fundamental law is 
nothing more than a contract on which the state is based; that contract 
remains as long as the state exists. This contract obliges the people to 
obey and submit themselves to the prince which the majority has 
chosen. Locke gives to that same idea a democratic tone saying that 
                                               
26  JELLINEK G., op. cit., p.174. 
27  Based on these ideas, the American colonies, for example, entered into contracts of 
colonization that were signed by masculine adults. Idem, p.175. 
28  Idem, p.177. 
29  Idem, p.179. 
30  Idem, p.182. 
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individuals have to obey the will of the majority as if it was their own 
will.31  
A different idea of fundamental law was developed in the German 
school of natural law; for Pufendorf, only those who subscribed to the 
union contract were obliged to recognize the decretum of the majority. 
This idea was further developed by Bohmer and Wolff. For them, 
fundamental law is not only the constitutional law but it is also the 
limitation of power for the prince; changing those fundamental laws 
requires the decision of the people and the consensus of the king.32  
For Rousseau, ideas developed differently; according to him, there is no 
conception of limitation to the sovereign, since the general will can not 
make an obligation to itself. Based on this premise, individuals remain 
free since they obey their own will; therefore, for Rousseau, all laws 
should be unanimous and equal; effectively, admitted that a simple 
majority was sufficient for ordinary legislation. Only the social contract 
needed unanimity and this idea touched on constitutional laws.33  
For the same author it was in France, influenced by the American 
experience and brothers-in-arms that agreed with the idea for the need 
of a written constitution that would serve as the foundation of the state. 
This idea was based on the concept of popular sovereignty reformulated 
also by Sieyès, in the theory that constituent power resides in the 
people.34  
According to ESMEIN, the eighteenth century concept of constitution 
as a fundamental and systematic written law is based on three ideas: 
first, The superiority of a written law over a customary one was 
generally agreed on at the time: the same should apply to constitutional 
                                               
31  Idem, pp.179-180. 
32  Idem, p.180. 
33  Idem, pp.181-182. JELLINEK concludes: "Ainsi, se combinant d’une part la 
doctrine à la fois religieuse et politique qui fait du Covenant la base de l'Etat et 
d'autres part les conceptions du droit naturel, répandues par la littérature; l’on 
aboutit ainsi à la conclusion que l’Etat tout entier repose sur une constitution issue 
de la volonté populaire". Idem, p.185. 
34  Idem, p.193. 
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law; second, the people of the eighteenth century Revolution 
considered a new constitution, edited by national sovereignty, as a true 
renewal of the social contract: as such, it was necessary to register the 
clauses of that contract in the most solemn and complete form; third, 
they thought that a clear, systematic presentation of such a document in 
a clear and systematic way would provide an excellent means of 
political education, since it would provide the citizens with the 
knowledge and desire for their rights.35  
The American and French model of a written constitution was adopted 
by states worldwide; nevertheless, that constitutional law was 
distinguished from ordinary law in its particular nature and obligatory 
character. The constitution, in fact, was considered the initial act of 
national sovereignty, while the other acts were only the consequence.36  
The first European constitutional charter was the French Constitution, 
painstakingly prepared and voted for during the years 1789/1791; it was 
finally produced as a single Act and promulgated on 3 September 
1791.37 For JELLINEK, the French Constitution was modelled on the 
American one, but certain differences distinguished them: for example, 
France was a unitary monarchy while the USA was a Federal Republic; 
in fact, the position of the king in France was less favoured than the 
President of the Republic or a Governor, in the new American 
federation. Both Constitutions declared that the separation of powers 
constituted the basis of the constitution. Nevertheless, in France, 
executive power was totally subordinate to legislative power. Besides, 
the legislature was composed of one Chamber and it was the unlimited 
sovereignty of the Parliament that won. According to the theory of 
                                               
35  ESMEIN A., Eléments de Droit Constitutionnel français et comparé, pp.603-604. 
36  According to JELLINEK: "C'est en Amérique qu'il faut chercher l'origine de notre 
constitution écrite actuelle; on devrait donc étudier d'une manière plus attentive les 
constitutions américaines. La Révolution française reçoit l'idée américaine et cette 
idée se répand de 1a France dans les autres Etats européens".36 Idem, p.607. 
37  Although the Polish Constitution was introduced on 5 May 1791, it was not 
preceded by any other institutions and it was mostly based on French constitutional 
laws that were already published. Besides, it was the 1791 French Constitution 
which influenced other European constitutions, including successive French ones. 
Idem, pp.194-196. 
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Montesquieu, it was forbidden for the members of the National 
Assembly to become ministers. This contributed to the acceleration of 
anarchy and the collapse of the constitution in France.38  
For JELLINEK, constituent power in France was not attributed to the 
general assembly of the people, but exclusively to the Parliament. 
Nevertheless, they were anxious to give the constitution some stability 
and for this reason, people were given the opportunity of participating 
in the revision process of the constitution: it was forbidden to change 
the constitution for two subsequent legislatures; in fact, the changes to 
the constitution were adopted by a more numerous assembly, elected 
for that purpose, during the fourth legislature. Successive revolutionary 
constitutions emphasized the logic of popular sovereignty, requiring a 
popular vote for every new constitution. Accordingly, the substance of 
constituent power, inherent in the nation itself, and not only the 
exercise of it, is also considered here.39  
For Carré de MALBERG, the most efficient way to limit the 
sovereignty of Parliament is through the subordination of the power and 
the activity of the assemblies to a superior law, “…fixant et arrêtant 
leurs pouvoirs, une loi qu'il ne dépende pas de ces assemblées de 
modifier par elles-mêmes. Cette loi supérieure c'est la constitution”.40  
In fact, if sovereignty resides in parliament, then, there is no need to 
establish a constitution, since there is no need to limit parliament by a 
law that determines its powers. If, on the contrary, the sovereignty of 
the state is shared by the three powers, which are separated and not 
necessarily hierarchically graded, then a constitution is necessary to 
limit those powers and establish the relationship between them. This is 
why, in a country like England, there is no need for a constitution, 
whereas in countries like France and the USA, it is essential.  
Consequently, it is completely logical that in the English system there 
is no need for constituent power, since the power to issue laws, 
                                               
38  Idem, p.195. 
39  Idem, pp.195-196. 
40  AVRIL P., La Séparation des Pouvoirs Aujourd’hui, p.299. 
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organize the state and limit the power of its organs, is totally left to 
parliament.41  
4.1.2. The Constitution as an Order or as a Norm  
According to Paolo COMANDUCCI,42 there are three constitutional 
models: 1) axiological – in which the constitution is conceived as a 
natural order; 2) descriptive – in which it is conceived as an artificial 
order; and 3) descriptive – in which it is conceived as a law (norm).43 
For the same author, there is a difference between being the norm and 
being an order. Constitutional law is (and shall be) the expression or the 
reflection of constitutional order; constitutional law forms and 
determines -and must do so- constitutional order.  
The constitution as a natural order: the constitution here refers to the 
social phenomenon which may have intrinsic value, or may be the only 
creator of norms which are referred to indirectly. On the other hand, it 
does refer directly to a system that is a structure of the society and/or of 
the state. That system creates norms that are fundamental 
(hierarchically superior). Here, the constitutional law is the expression 
                                               
41  Carré de MALBERG wrote: “Le droit public anglais ne connaît pas de pouvoir 
constituant. On peut dire qu'en Angleterre, cette question du pouvoir constituant, 
qui, en France, a soulève tant de discussions, n'existe même pas. Chez les Anglais, le 
Parlement possède, dans toute sa plénitude, l'exercice de la souveraineté législative, 
qu'il s'agisse de 1ois ordinaires ou de lois relatives à l'organisation des pouvoirs. Il 
y a un dicton anglais qui spécifie, à cet égard, que « le Parlement peut tout faire »: 
ce qui signifie, en particulier, que les Chambres, agissant avec la sanction du roi, 
peuvent modifier les lois concernant les pouvoirs publics, au même titre qu'une loi 
ordinaire. Les Anglais se sont, en effet, placés à ce point de vue que le Parlement 
est, en tout temps et en toutes choses, l'organe étatique chargé d'exprimer la volonté 
nationale". CARRE DE MALBERG R., Contribution à la Théorie Générale de 
l’Etat, Tome II, p.541. 
42  Paolo COMANDUCCI is a Professor of Philosophy of Law and General Theory of 
Law at the University of Genova (Italy). He published an article within the acts of 
the colloquium held in Paris (2-4 March 1989), on the occasion of the bicentenary 
commemoration of the American and French Constitution under the auspices of the 
French Association of Political Science. The colloquium was entitled: 1789 and the 
invention of the constitution. 
43  For more details, see COMANDUCCI P., Ordre ou Norme? Quelques Idées des 
Constitution au XVIII siècle, pp.23-43.  
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 16 
of a constitutional system, but it cannot and should not determine the 
constitutional system.  
The constitution as an artificial order: the constitution here refers to 
the gathering of social phenomena, but it does not have any intrinsic 
value, neither is it a creator of norms. It merely means a stable situation 
of the social and political relations of power in a given moment; the 
constitution is simply the crystallization of the fundamental structure of 
the society and/or the state. 
The Constitution as a norm: the constitution here refers to the 
gathering of positive juridical rules which are expressed in a document 
or customary laws that are fundamental in their relation to other 
juridical rules. This concept of constitution is that of the liberals and the 
democrats of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Here, the 
constitution refers to a particular normative text: the formal 
constitution, or the constitution in its formal sense.  
COMANDUCCI continued in his attempts to trace the doctrinal origins 
of those three different concepts of constitution in the eighteenth 
century. The constitution as a natural or artificial order can be found in 
the writings of the traditional and anti-revolutionary philosophers, such 
as Burke and Maistre. It can be also found in the significance of 
fundamental laws in its original meaning and in some interpretations of 
the ‘spirit’ of the nation of Montesquieu and in some interpretations of 
Rousseau ‘spirit of the laws’.44  
For Burke, the constitution is the fundamental structure of a society and 
of a state; an artificial structure, conforming to the nature that was 
developed over long periods of history.45 Consequently, the English 
Constitution is: a) An order which conforms to its nature;46 b) An order 
                                               
44  Idem, p.35. 
45  Idem, p.29. 
46  He wrote: “Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry 
with the order of the world and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent 
body composed of transitory parts”. Cited in: Idem, p.30. 
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that endures for a long period.47 As for Maistre, the constitution is 
presented as a natural order that was formed slowly over time. He 
wrote:  
La philosophie moderne est toute à la fois trop matérielle et trop 
présomptueuse pour apercevoir les véritables ressorts du monde politique. 
Une de ses folies est de croire qu'une assemblée peut constituer une nation, 
qu'une constitution, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des lois fondamentales qui 
conviennent à une nation, et qui doivent lui donner telle ou telle forme de 
gouvernement, est un ouvrage comme un autre, qui n'exige que de l'esprit, des 
connaissances et de l'exercice; qu'on peut apprendre son métier de 
constituant, et que des hommes, le jour qu'ils y pensent, peuvent dire à 
d'autres hommes: Faites-nous un gouvernement, comme on dit à un ouvrier: 
Faites-nous une pompe à feu ou un métier à bas.48  
As such, the constitution as a norm is only a lifeless piece of paper. 
Contrary to that, a natural constitution refers to those laws that one shall 
discover - not invent - and record in a document; he wrote:  
Étant données la population, les mœurs, la religion, la situation géographique, 
les relations politiques, les richesses, les bonnes et les mauvaises qualités 
d'une certaine nation, trouver les lois qui lui conviennent.49  
It is clear that this model of constitution is in complete contradiction 
with the concept of constitution as the norm which began to appear, 
following the American and the French Revolutions. This first model of 
the constitution finds its origins in traditional philosophers such as the 
Aristotelian model of politics, in contradiction to the model of Hobbes. 
According to that model, some philosophers considered that every law 
–and as such the constitution as norms- is bad whenever it is opposed to 
the fundamental structure of the society, constituted over time. This 
position can be found in some interpretations of Montesquieu, such as 
those made by Louis Althusser, who wrote: "Dans l'Esprit des lois le 
                                               
47  He continued: “Old establishments are tried by their effects. If the people are happy, 
united, wealthy, and powerful, we presume the rest. We conclude that to be good 
from whence good is derived”. Idem, p.29. 
48  Cited in: Idem, p.31. 
49  Cited in: Idem, p.32. 
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«principe» de chaque gouvernement détermine en dernier ressort la 
«nature» du gouvernement même, et l'essence du «principe» est 
constituée par ce que Montesquieu appelle l' «esprit» d'une nation".50 
Now, the spirit of the nation which determined the form of government 
and legislation, had the same characteristics of constitution as ‘order’, 
similar to that presented by Burke and Masitre. According to 
COMANDUCCI, the same can be said about the concept of fundamen-
tal laws, at least at the time of its appearance in the fifteenth and the 
sixteenth centuries.51  
On the other hand, the third model of constitution, as a positive 
juridical norm, had developed mainly in North America and France. 
One of the most exhaustive definitions of the constitution in the 
eighteenth century, as a written fundamental norm, is that presented by 
Thomas Paine, in his response to the reflections made by Burke. For 
Paine, the standard significance that one should attribute to the word 
‘constitution’ is the following:  
A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. It has not an ideal, but a 
real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is 
none. It is the body of elements, to which you can refer, and quote article by 
article; and which contains the principles on which the Government shall be 
established, the manner in which it shall be organised, the powers it shall be, 
the mode of elections the duration of Parliaments, or by what other name such 
bodies may be called; the powers which the executive part of the Government 
shall have; and in fine, everything that relates to the complete organisation of 
a civil Government, and the principles on which it shall act, and by which it 
hall be bound.52 
In North America, the concept of ‘constitution’ began to have a specific 
content at the same time as the Federal Constitution was adopted. 
Authors outline the role of the foundation of the state that the 
constitutions accomplish; sometimes they refer to the goals constitu-
                                               
50  Idem, p.33. 
51  Idem, p.35. 
52  Cited in: Idem, p.38. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 19 
tions have to realize; sometimes they make the connection between 
frame of Government and Bill of Rights, envisaging that the state 
structure shall guarantee respect for the Bill of Rights. 
According to COMANDUCCI, the emergence of the third model of 
constitution in the documentation and doctrine came a little bit later in 
France. The author makes different citations of Sieyès to prove his 
thesis.53 In fact, in his ‘Qu’est-ce le Tiers Etat?’, Sieyès does not deny 
the existence of an English Constitution; now, the English Constitution 
is not –or at least, not only- a collection of norms, but also a system or 
an order of society and state. In fact, the author made different citations 
in which the constitution refers sometimes to an order, and at other 
times, to norms.54 
Since the eighteenth century, the diffusion of modern, written 
constitutions, based on the American and French examples, has 
extended all over Europe. Nevertheless, between law theorists, there 
were different ideas that helped that diffusion. For COMANDUCCI 
those ideas are:55 first, lex naturae, as perceptions that contrive to 
regulate human behaviour, including that of those who exercise 
political power; second, Social Contract, as a pact that is in conformity 
with natural law, which contrives to regulate the organization of the 
state, the relationships between citizens and the state, and fundamental 
relations among the citizens. 
4.1.3. Why Write a Constitution? 
According to Dieter GRIMM, the act of promulgation of a constitution 
served to separate sovereignty from the governing power; these two 
concepts were considered as being identical. Sovereignty is no longer a 
right to govern but rather the legitimate source of governing power.56  
                                               
53  Idem, p.40. 
54  Idem, p.39.  
55  Idem, p.41. 
56  GRIMM D., Souveraineté et Checks and balances, p.228. 
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Claude KLEIN dedicated an article to answer one question: ‘pourquoi 
écrit-on une constitution?’57 For him, there are three situations in which 
this question may be posed and need to be answered: 1) at the moment 
of the creation of a new state; 2) after a revolutionary interruption of the 
existing constitutional order; and 3) when a historical situation that 
determined the absence of the constitution is questioned.58  
Writing a constitution when a new state is born: the question of 
writing or not writing a constitution is posed immediately when a new 
state is born; nevertheless, KLEIN poses another question: is it 
necessary for a new state to adopt a written constitution? In the case of 
the English ex-colonies that gained independence, the problem is 
different since they had had constitutions before their independence; in 
other words, the constitution is anterior to the state; accordingly, the 
question is whether to maintain the anterior constitution or to write a 
new constitution. Besides, the new born state shall take much urgent 
decisions related to the new legal system; these decisions may be 
expressed already in the same declaration of independence. In this case, 
writing a constitution may be deferred. Nevertheless, the new born 
states continue to pose the question of the constitution and give it 
symbolic attributes that is related to sovereignty. 
KLEIN mentioned some reasons why a new state adopts a constitution: 
it can be related to the Will to affirm the existence of the new state, its 
political regime and its ideology. Here there is sometimes confusion 
between the constitutive act of the state and constituent power. In a 
Federal State, such as the USA, it is difficult to dissociate the two acts. 
So, what happens in the case of unitary states? For him, nothing 
prevents a state from simply deciding not to adopt a written 
constitution: this decision can be made for historical reasons (United 
Kingdom) or accidentally adopted (Israel). 
                                               
57  This article was published within the acts of the colloquium held in Paris (2-4 March 
1989), on the occasion of the bicentennial commemoration of the American and 
French Constitution, under the auspices of the French Association of Political 
Science. The colloquium was entitled: 1789 and the invention of the constitution. 
58  KLEIN C., Pourquoi écrit-on une Constitution? pp.89-99. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 21 
KLEIN concludes that today, unitary and federal states may decide not 
to write a Constitution. Nevertheless, it seems difficult not to do so. In 
fact, new states have the tendency to search for a high degree of 
recognition, stability, continuity and respectability: a written 
Constitution, with its solemnity, seems to offer precisely that.59 
Writing a Constitution in a case of a new political regime 
succeeding another: here, the constitution is revised totally or partially 
in a different way than that provided by the constitution; writing a 
constitution serves to proclaim a new legal and political order. Writing 
a constitution provides a new legitimacy and regulates the enactment of 
constituent power and precise the interpretation of the new order. A 
written constitution seems indispensable for new regimes in order to 
oppose preceding regime and to confirm the new one. Besides, a 
written constitution has a kind of pedagogic role.60  
Writing a constitution in a system where there is no written 
constitution: the question here is different since we have a comprehen-
sive system of government, without a written constitution: why then 
write a constitution? In the classical case of Great Britain, the main 
problem is that of Parliamentary sovereignty. According to this 
principle, Parliament cannot tie itself and its successor without touching 
its sovereignty.  
For KLEIN, writing a constitution may occur only after achieving a 
legal revolution (révolution juridique). For Israel it is not so; when the 
first Knesset was elected as a Constituent Assembly, it was dissolved 
without adopting a constitution, in fact, it left that task for successive 
Assemblies. Successive sessions of the Knesset had adopted different 
fundamental laws, which may constitute the main core of the future 
constitution of Israel.61  
                                               
59  Idem, pp.93-94. 
60  Idem, pp.94-96. 
61  Idem, pp.96-98. 
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4.2. The Origins of the Theory of Constituent Power  
The theory of Constituent Power appeared almost simultaneously in 
North America and in France. Although it is true that it was the 
American Constitution that gave birth to constituent power, jurists have 
no doubts that Sieyès , with his book “Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat?” 
(1788-1789), is the real father of the theory of constituent power.62 
Indeed, the American precedent is related to the terms and reality of 
things; according to ESMEIN, the idea on which this theory rests is 
much older, and only received its first positive application in North 
America. The first constitutions of the emancipated English colonies 
were redacted in this way; the same can be said for the constitution of 
the Confederation from 1787-1789.63  
Still, Sieyès’s contribution was in making a sophisticated presentation 
of the theory of constituent power, making the distinction between 
constituant-constitué.64 Sieyès himself considers it as the product of 
French national genius.65 According to Carré de MALBERG, Sieyès 
was wrong when he considered the distinction between constituent-
constituted as having its origins in France; according to Les Mémoires 
de la Fayette it was first practiced in America although the French 
Revolution helped only in its worldwide manifestation.66 
Sieyès was the first one who explored the concept of constituent power 
and distinguished it from constituted powers; nevertheless, he is not the 
father of the distinction between the pouvoir constituant originaire and 
the pouvoir constituant dérivé. In fact, one can not find any reference to 
the distinction between the two concepts in his book; furthermore, 
Sieyès’s theory does not conceive of a constituent power (dérivé) that is 
subject to the limits of the same constitution since the nation may not 
                                               
62  KLEIN C., Théorie et Pratique du Pouvoir Constituant, p.8.  
63  ESMEIN A., Op. cit., p.613. 
64  KLEIN C., op. cit., p.15.  
65  Discours à la Convention du 2 thermidor an III (Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur, 
t. XXV, p.293), ESMEIN A., Op. cit., p.613. 
66  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.511. 
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be subject to any constitution. As such, the nation is totally free and 
independent of any legal limitations to change the constitution 
whenever it deems it necessary. For him, there is only the pouvoir 
constituant originaire and this power is permanent.67 
The ‘discovery’ of the distinction between the pouvoir constituant 
originaire and pouvoir constituant dérivé, in fact, dates to the twentieth 
century only, with the systematic developments made by Raymond 
Carré de MALBERG; still, he is not the inventor of this terminology. It 
was in 1942, when Roger Bonnard denominated these two constituent 
powers: pouvoir constituant originaire and pouvoir constituant 
institué.68 Since then, it became classical in French doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, although the pouvoir constituant institué was re-
baptized as the pouvoir constituant “dérivé” by Georges Vedel.69  
4.3. Constituent power and Constituted Powers  
The origins of constituent power were related to the necessity of 
limiting the legislative power and to protect fundamental rights. This 
theory distinguished between constitutional laws and ordinary laws. 
Constituent power, in fact, is what makes the constitution; the other 
powers are those created by the constitution and include the three main 
powers of the state: the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. 
According to this distinction: first, constituent power comes prior to 
constituted powers; secondly, constituent power creates the constitution 
wherein constituted powers find their origin in the same constitution; 
thirdly, constituent power is hierarchically superior to constituted 
powers; fourthly, constituent power is the only sovereign, not 
constituted powers.70  
                                               
67  GÖZLER K., Pouvoir constituant, p.8.  
68  This is also the position of Prof. MAZIAU. See e.g. MAZIAU N., Les Constitutions 
Internationalisées, Aspects Théoriques et Essai de Typologie, p.1, footnote 5.  
69  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.9. 
70  Idem, p.3.  
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According to Carré de MALBERG, “la théorie de la séparation des 
pouvoirs ouvrait la voie à la théorie du pouvoir constituant”.71 In fact, 
the separation of powers has no explanation without admitting the 
existence of a power that is superior and anterior to them, and which 
may operate the division between these powers.72 The separation of 
powers, in its turn, founds its origin in the ideas of Montesquieu rather 
than in Rousseau although, Montesquieu admits and requests the 
separation of the state powers, but he decomposes it, ab initio, into 
three powers, without showing any preoccupation for the state unity 
from one side and the necessary association that the three separated 
powers have with the unique power of state, from the other.73  
For this reason, Sieyès comes to a simple –but a revolutionary- 
conclusion: “Une Constitution suppose, avant tout, un pouvoir 
constituent”. For him, the separated powers created by the constitution 
are multiple but find their unity in constituent power which is superior 
and unique since “tous, sans distinction sont une émanation de la 
volonté générale, tous viennent du peuple, c'est-à-dire de la nation”.74  
Accordingly, constitutional laws are not fundamental because they 
become independent from national sovereignty but because the bodies 
created and organized by them can not affect them.75 In his Droit des 
Gens, Vattel says: “c'est de la Constitution que ces législateurs tiennent 
leurs pouvoirs. Comment pourraient-ils la changer sans détruire le 
fondement de leur autorité?”76  
Carré de MALBERG analyzes the theory of organs made by M. Duguit. 
For him, the organs that are created by the constitution, cannot explain 
the constitution itself.77 Now, the logical result of such a theory is the 
                                               
71  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.515. 
72  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.1.  
73  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.515. 
74  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.2.  
75  ESMEIN A., Op. cit., p.608. 
76  Idem, p.607. 
77  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.484. 
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immutability of the constitution; this immutability cannot be absolute 
since history pushes towards progress and necessary changes to the 
constitution. The theoreticians of the revolutionary era did not join an 
agreement; there are different options which will be examined in the 
following paragraphs including the ‘discovery’ of amending power, 
which is a constituent power in nature and a constituted power in 
function.  
Furthermore, the second logical consequence of such a theory is the 
necessity to protect the constitutional laws through judicial review, that 
includes the control of laws and acts of government that are in 
contradiction to constitutional laws. Here, ESMEIN presents the two 
different systems; in North America, it was through the judicial branch, 
headed by the Supreme Court, in which, a judge does not nullify the 
laws or the acts of government but simply refuses to apply them.  
In Europe, in order to emphasize the separation of powers, judges are 
usually prevented from appraising them since they are there to apply 
the laws not to judge them; the Europeans, in fact, do not want to give 
the judges a kind of ‘political’ role, as it is in America; neither do they 
want the judges -unelected individuals- to limit the representatives of 
the nation; what should they do then? The solution was in finding a 
kind of constitutional Jury that was, for Sieyès, the conservator 
Senate.78 Other constitutions adopted different means to control the 
constitutionality of laws and the acts of government but this is not our 
main subject under consideration here.  
4.4. Framing Power and Amending Power  
A dilemma existed which the theoreticians of the eighteenth century 
tried to resolve: constituent power is the origin of the constitution; the 
constitution provides the foundations for constituted powers; 
constituted powers (legislative, executive and judicial) could not 
change constitutional laws; constitutional laws required amendment; so, 
who was/were that/those entitled to do so, and how? 
                                               
78  ESMEIN A., Op. cit., p.626. 
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4.4.1. The Constitution needs to be amended 
Aside from the changes made to the constitution through interpretation 
or adaptation, what is of interest here is the way in which the 
constitution could be officially and solemnly amended. ESMEIN, in his 
‘Eléments de Droit Constitutionnel français et Comparé’ distinguished 
the following three options:79 
First, in order to change constitutional laws, unanimity of all citizens is 
required. Here the constitution is assimilated with the Social Contract. 
Of course, unanimity is impossible to realize, consequently, the 
constitution would be eternal and immutable. Some authors (such as 
Vattel) moderated this absolutist theory, recognizing the right to change 
the constitution for the majority of citizens, with the right of minorities 
to leave that society if the fundamental pact is not respected. 
Secondly, this option is developed by Sieyès; for him constitutional 
laws regulate and limit constituted powers but not the nation from 
which it emanates. The nation, in other words, is free from any form; 
the Will of the nation is the supreme law and the source of every other 
law. Now, the Will of the nation may be expressed by those elected to 
the Assembly, to change the constitution; as such, those elected 
representatives have to be free of any form and limitations. In other 
words, Sieyès did simply change those entitled of sovereignty; what 
was the prerogatives of the monarch were switched to the nation.  
Thirdly, this is the option that became largely accepted with the passing 
of time. The constitution may be amended only by the authority and the 
procedures provided by the constitution itself. The originator of this 
idea is Jean Jacques Rousseau.80 After long deliberations, the French 
                                               
79  Idem, p.608. 
80  Not in his Contrat Social but in his Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne 
et sur la Réformation Progettée en 1772 wherein he wrote: "Il faut bien peser et 
méditer les points capitaux qu'on établira comme lois fondamentales, et l'on fera 
porter sur ces points seulement la force du liberum veto. De cette manière on rendra 
la Constitution solide et ses lois irrévocables autant qu'elles peuvent 1'être; car il 
est contre la nature du corps sociale de s'imposer des lois qu'il ne puisse révoquer; 
mais il n'est ni contre la nature ni contre la raison qu'il ne puisse révoquer ces lois 
qu'avec la même solennité qu'il mit à les établir. Voilà toute la chaîne qu'il peut se 
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Constitution of 1791 adopted this position and dedicated a chapter to 
revision of the constitution; in fact, in the name of national sovereignty, 
those who defended this option justified the inclusion of clauses that 
would regulate the revision. 
What distinguishes, then, legislative power from amending power? The 
difference is mainly in the function: the first amends ordinary laws, the 
second amends constitutional laws. It is clear that there is no need to 
establish a distinct Assembly from legislative power, although it is 
always a possibility; nevertheless, the same Assembly may acquire 
legislative power once it has amended ordinary laws and may acquire 
constituent power once it amends the constitutional laws. Both are 
regulated by the form and procedures provided by the constitution. 
There is also a difference in the nature: the first is a constituent power, 
since it creates new constitutional laws, the second is a constituted 
power, since it creates ordinary laws.  
4.4.2. The Distinction between Framing and Amending Power 
Constituent power is different regarding the elaboration of a constit-
ution in a legal vacuum (framing power) and modifying a stipulation of 
the existing constitution (amending power).81 Framing power is the 
establishing power of fundamental rules in relation to the devolution 
and the existence of political power. In other words, it concerns 
elaborating the constitutional text that will form the foundation of a 
new legal order. That is why it is presumed that the previous legal order 
has disappeared or collapsed, and become a legal vacuum.82  
Framing power is possible only when there is no constitution in 
force as in the case of a newly born state, or when independence is 
recently obtained, or when there are dramatic regime changes, 
following a coup d’état or a revolution as in the case of Russia in 1917, 
and Egypt in 1952.83 In other words, revolutions change political 
                                                                                                       
donner pour l'avenir". Considérations sur le gouvernement de la Pologne, ch. IX, p, 
377, 388 cited in: Idem, p.611.  
81  GUCHET Y., CATSIAPIS J., Droit Constitutionnel, p.18.  
82  PACTET P., Op. cit., p.69.  
83  SHIBA I., Le Pouvoir Constituant, pp.99-101.  
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institutions in ways that are not sanctioned by those institutions; 
whereas constitutional amendments change political institutions in 
ways authorized by the constitution.84 In fact, amending power is the 
one competent in amending the constitution; it presupposes the 
existence of a constitution that empowers constituent power -rightly 
known as derived or amending power- to modify the constitution, 
following a procedure which may vary from one country to another, but 
which has in common, a precise regulation in order to avoid an 
indefinite constitutional revision process.85  
Although division of constituent power is generally accepted, there is 
no unanimity with regard to the nature of the two constituent powers, 
and this fact explains the different denominations given for this 
concept.  
In the French constitutional doctrine for example, the first type of 
constituent power is usually called ‘pouvoir constituant originaire’ but 
some other authors use alternative expressions such as ‘pouvoir 
constituant initial’ or ‘pouvoir constituant stricto sensu’, or ‘pouvoir 
constituant’ tout court. The second type of constituent power is usually 
called ‘pouvoir constituant dérivé’. Other authors prefer ‘pouvoir 
constituant institué’, ‘pouvoir constituant constitué’, ‘pouvoir de 
révision constitutionnelle’, ‘pouvoir de révision de la constitution’ or 
simply ‘pouvoir de révision’.86  
Regardless of the terminology, the real problem is to be aware of the 
criteria distinguishing them which depend essentially on different 
concepts of constituent power: this will be the subject of the following 
paragraphs. 
4.5. Constituent Power: is it Permanent? 
The main question here is the existent connection between the original 
constituent power and the derived constituent power or amending 
                                               
84  PREUSS U.K., Constitutional Powermaking of the New Polity: Some Deliberations 
on the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution, p.157. 
85  SHIBA I., Le Op. cit., pp.107-114. 
86  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., pp.7-8. 
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power (the power to revise the constitution). If the permanency of 
original constituent power is acknowledged, then there is no place for 
the other. At the first beginning of a state, when it is established, there 
is no problem because there is no constitution, and the only power that 
is enacted, inevitably, would be the original constituent power. 
Nevertheless, once established, a constitution would need to be revised 
and adapted to new circumstances. Here, there is a problem: which 
power would be enacted, the original constituent power or the derived 
constitutional power?  
Four possible answers that express the different types of interrelation 
between framing and amending power:87  
i) The existence of framing power and the absence of amending 
power  
It was the theory defended by Sieyès which does not admit the 
existence of an amending power, different from (original) constituent 
power that is sovereign, permanent and exclusive. According to this 
conception, there is no possibility of limiting constituent power since it 
is sovereign; consequently, 1) those entitled to constituent power (the 
people) can never be subjected to the constitution; 2) amendments to 
the constitution are always free of any legal limitations.  
Sieyès wrote:  
A nation can neither alienate nor waive its right to will; and whatever its 
decisions, it cannot lose the right to alter them as soon as its interest requires. 
Secondly, with whom would this nation have entered into such a contract? I 
see how it can bind its members, its mandataries, and all those who belong to 
it; but can it in any sense impose in itself duties towards itself? What is a 
contract with oneself? Since both parties are the same will, they are obviously 
always to free themselves from the purported engagement.88 
The reference to the Convention of the American Constitution and to 
the French Revision Assembly is meant to show that constituent power 
                                               
87  Idem, pp.52-55. 
88  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.158.  
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 30 
does not fully vanish through the very act of constitution making. 
Nonetheless, it is domesticated; it loses its unfathomable and formless 
character and acquires a quasi-constituted status.89 In other words, the 
constitution is not a suicide pact. It must be possible to release itself in 
an emergency: society must not be constricted.90 
This first position cannot be accepted for the simple reason that most 
constitutions provide the way for their own revision.  
ii) The absence of framing power and the existence of amending 
power  
This answer excludes the permanence of the original constituent power 
and considers it as temporal. In other words, the original constituent 
power disappears when it establishes the constitution and leaves a place 
for amending power in order to revise it when necessary, following the 
procedures that the same constitution provides.  
This option has not solid basis since the constitutions themselves do not 
-and can not- prohibit the exercising of framing power since this act –
by definition- is outside any constitutional framework. 
iii) The existence of a framing power and the existence of an 
amending power 
This means the coexistence of the framing and amending power; 
consequently, both are permanent. In this case, this solution responds to 
the need of stability for the institutions without putting limits on the 
original constituent power.  
This position can be easily criticized asserting that a co-existence of 
framing power and amending power has no solid foundation, since in 
exercising the first obviously means the disappearance of all constituted 
powers included framing power.  
iv) The absence of framing power and amending power 
                                               
89  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.159. 
90  ELSTER J., Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris, p.62.  
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This fourth possibility is irrelevant here since we would have no object 
for our study.91  
Dr. Kemal GÖZLER, a Turkish researcher, dedicated part of his Ph.D. 
thesis to this question.92 After having exposed the different options, he 
concludes as following:  
Quel que soit le bien-fondé de ces trois thèses, pour nous, il y a un pouvoir 
constituant originaire et un pouvoir de révision constitutionnelle. Le pouvoir 
constituant originaire, après avoir fait une nouvelle constitution, se retire de 
l'exercice, mais il ne disparaît pas éternellement. Il pourrait toujours 
réapparaître. Pour cela il lui suffit d'abroger ou de déconstitutionnaliser la 
constitution en vigueur, ainsi que d'anéantir le pouvoir de révision 
constitutionnelle en place. Alors, tant que la constitution n'est pas abrogée ou 
déconstitutionnalisée, elle ne peut être révisée que par le pouvoir de révision 
conformément à la procédure prévue par la constitution à cet effet. Mais une 
fois que la constitution a été abrogée ou déconstitutionnalisée, le pouvoir de 
révision constitutionnelle disparaît, seul le pouvoir constituant originaire 
reste. Comme on le voit, en tout état de cause, le pouvoir constituant 
originaire subsiste. Ce pouvoir est donc permanent, même s'il n'est pas 
toujours en exercice.93 
4.6. Constituent Power: is it Unlimited?  
The classical theory of constituent power considers framing power as 
unlimited by definition, since it does not follow a legal order, but rather 
creates a new one ex nihilo.94 This theory contradicts with new realities 
and new constitutions. Constituent power is, in fact, increasingly 
limited, especially by international law. According to VERGOTTINI, 
every time a constitution is adopted, the deciding organ is not legally 
bound by precedent legal rules. This does exclude limits which have a 
                                               
91  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.77. 
92  The thesis was published in a book Pouvoir Constituant, Bursa, Ekin Kitabevi, 
1990. We had used part of his analyses in the limits of our research interests.  
93  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.77. 
94  “The power to make a constitution is the power to create a political order ex 
nihilo”. PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.143.  
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political nature.95 Still, for him, there are some shared principles and 
values in some systems of liberal derivation which a constitution 
includes in its text but always reflect a decision of the constituency.96  
Besides, amending power may be limited by the same framing power, 
in its form (delays, circumstances, procedures…) and in its substance 
(limits in amending special provisions of the constitution).97  
For some authors, substantial limits are not restrictive since the clauses 
that prohibit the amendment of the republican form of the state, for 
example, can be amended first, and followed by subsequent ones like 
adopting the monarchy for example.98 Rightly, others may urge that in 
case this happens, they can be challenged as fraudulent amendments to 
the constitution. 
The constituent power is either original or derived. As such we may 
divide the question into two: first, is original constituent power 
unlimited? Secondly, is amending power (either considered as derived 
constituent power or simply the power to revise the constitution) also 
unlimited? Therefore, it is necessary to study those two questions 
separately. This oneness of constituent power does not contradict the 
distinction between original constituent power and derived constituent 
power.99  
4.6.1. Original Constituent Power: is it Unlimited?  
Again, there are two possibilities: either it is limited or it is unlimited. 
Authors are divided in to two groups: the jus-naturalists who consider 
the original constituent power as limited and the jus-positivists who 
consider it as unlimited.  
                                               
95  VERGOTTINI G., Diritto Costituzionale Comparato, p.166. 
96  Idem, p.168. 
97  BURDEAU G., HAMON F. TROPER M., Op. cit., pp.40-41.  
98  Idem, p.41 
99  Accordingly, it must be kept in mind, that constituent power is one, although, it is 
once original and other derived. In this sense, it is clear that the limits to constituent 
power will depend on the approach that authors have towards it (formalist or 
materialist). 
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Original Constituent Power is Limited: the authors who consider the 
original constituent power as limited do not explain why and how it is 
limited but rather they present what limits it. Some speak about the 
principles of natural law, others about Human Rights (HR) and the 
general principles of law. These limits, in other words, will have a 
supra-constitutional value.100 Others see in the same existence of 
amending power a limit to the original constituent power. This is not 
true because the original constituent power when it establishes a 
constitution guarantees its respect but not its indefinite maintenance.101  
Original Constituent Power is Unlimited: the unlimited character of 
the original constituent power means that it has not an obligation to 
conform to any precedent legal rule when it establishes or creates a new 
constitution. This happens when there is an existing legal vacuum when 
one is created: first, when it creates the first constitution of the country, 
then the original constituent power is unlimited because there is no 
precedent constitution; second, when it abrogates an existing 
constitution, then the original constituent power is unlimited because 
the precedent constitution is no longer in force.102 
According to such reasoning, authors finish up by confirming that the 
original constituent power –by definition- is unlimited since the original 
constituent power can not be limited by any precedent legal rule 
because it is the creator of these rules; the creator can not be limited by 
his creation. 
4.6.2. Amending power: is it Unlimited? 
Here also we have two possibilities: either we consider amending 
power as unlimited or we consider it as limited.  
Amending Power is Unlimited: The authors who consider amending 
power as unlimited are presenting their approaches on two different and 
contradictory bases: those who deny the constituent nature of an 
                                               
100  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.81. 
101  Ibidem. 
102  Idem, p.82. 
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amending power and those who do not deny its constituent nature but 
deny the possibility to limit it.  
A. Those who deny the constituent character of amending power 
Some authors deny the existence of a derived constituent power that is 
the power to amend or to revise the constitution rather than the original 
constituent power. Since the original constituent power is unlimited, 
then, the power to amend the constitution is unlimited.103  
B. Those who deny the limitations to amending power  
Other authors do not deny the existence of an amending power but they 
refuse the possibility to limit it since it will be no longer a constituent 
power. Besides, there are different arguments such as: there is no way 
for a generation to limit the future generations; there is no way to 
prohibit a revolution; the limitation of amending power is in 
contradiction to popular sovereignty; the constitution, like every law 
can and needs to be adapted to new circumstances; there is always the 
possibility to surpass the limitations imposed by the constitution 
through double revision (by first amending the clause that disallows the 
amendment).104 
Amending Power is Limited: those who accept the existence of two 
constituent powers and make a distinction between them have no 
problem in considering the second as limited since it is in fact limited 
by the original constituent power; the last provides the modalities, the 
procedures and the institutions necessary to amend the constitution. 
Those authors consider this limited character as logic and normal since 
amending power is, as for its organization, a constituted power and, 
consequently, it is limited by the original constituent power.105 The 
problem here is to determine the content of these limits; this will 
depend on the concept of law that is adopted: the jus-positivist and the 
jus-naturalist authors.  
                                               
103  Idem, p.84. 
104  We do not share this position; we will expose the reasons in the conclusion of Part I.  
105  Idem, p.86. 
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A. The Jus-Positivist Foundation  
For these authors, amending power is limited only by those limitations 
included in the constitution; this was the position of Carré de 
MALBERG for example that considered amending power as an organ 
of the state, and as such, limited by the constitution itself.106 A similar 
position was adopted by Georges Burdeau (in his doctorate thesis); for 
him, amending power was subordinate to the conditions that were 
imposed by the first Constitutional Act since amending power is a state 
power and as such is organized by the constitution.107 Now, what are in 
concreto the limits to amending power? For the previous authors, it was 
necessary to refer to the constitution of every state in order to find these 
limits. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to distinguish between formal 
limits and material limits. For the above authors, amending power is 
materially unlimited although these limits are present in the same text 
of the constitution.108  
B. The Jus-Naturalist Foundation  
The main point here –which is what essentially distinguishes these 
authors from positivists authors- is that they defend the thesis in which 
there are limits to amending power not only within the text of the 
constitution but also external to it. For them, there are principles or 
norms that are superior to other norms present in the constitution, 
generally referred to as supra-constitutionality, or the ‘spirit’ of the 
constitution for example. Some of those jus-Naturalist authors are: 
Maurice Hauriou, Georges Burdeau (in his treaty), Carl SCHMITT and 
d'Olivier Beaud.109  
 
                                               
106  Idem, p.88. 
107  Idem, p.89. 
108  Idem, pp.89-92. 
109  Idem, pp.92-99. 
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§5 The Formal Conception of Constituent Power 
A general presentation of the Formal conception of constituent power 
will be made, followed by that of the doctrine of Carré de MALBERG.  
5.1. A general Presentation 
According to the formal conception of constituent power we can 
distinguish between framing power and amending power as follows:  
First, framing power (pouvoir constituant origianaire) is the power that 
establishes a constitution when there is no constitution or no longer a 
constitution in force; in other words, framing power appears in a legal 
vacuum while the amending is the power to revise the constitution 
under the fixed rules that the constitution itself establishes.  
Secondly, framing power is a pure fact; it has, by definition, no legal 
nature and it is unlimited while amending power has a legal nature 
since found its source is derived from the same constitution itself.  
Thirdly, the determination of those entitled to framing power and the 
methods of exercising it depend on the circumstances of force whilst 
those entitled to amending power and methods of exercising it are 
determined by the same constitution.  
Fourthly, framing power knows no limits since it works externally from 
the existing legal order whilst amending power is limited by the same 
conditions imposed by the constitution.  
Fifthly, framing power is not limited by a specific modality in order to 
enact it whilst amending power follows the modalities established in 
the constitution.110  
For the positivists, framing power and amending power are materially 
identical since both produce constitutional laws which have the same 
value. In fact, both framing and amending powers creates constitutional 
laws; as such, they, both, form constituent power although the first acts 
outside a constitutional framework whilst the second acts within it. 
Besides, framing power can be considered a constituted power for its 
                                               
110  For more details, see: Idem, pp.10-24. 
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organization whilst it is to be considered a constituent power regarding 
its function. For this reason, it is of great importance to keep clear the 
formal distinction between the framing and amending powers.  
Le pouvoir constituant originaire est celui d'établir une Constitution alors qu'il n'y 
a pas ou qu'il n'y a plus de Constitution en vigueur. Ce pouvoir apparaît dans le 
vide juridique. Il est de nature non juridique et illimitée. Son titulaire et les modes 
de son exercice se déterminent par les circonstances de force.111 
Le pouvoir constituant dérivé est le pouvoir de réviser la Constitution suivant les 
règles fixées par celle-ci à cet effet. Ce pouvoir s'exerce dans le cadre d'une 
Constitution en vigueur. Il est de nature juridique. Son titulaire et les modes de son 
exercice sont déterminés par la Constitution 112.  
The distinction between framing power and amending power made by 
positivists in a formal concept can be illustrated as follows:  
 FRAMING POWER AMENDING POWER 
Origin 
The power that establishes a 
constitution when there is no 
constitution or no longer a 
constitution in force 
The power which revises the 
constitution following the fixed 
rules that the constitution itself 
establishes. 
Nature 
A pure fact; it has, by 
definition, no legal character 
and it is unlimited  
has a legal nature, limited by 




depend on the circumstances of 
force  
are determined by the same 
constitution 
Limitations 
Knows no limits since it acts 
externally from any legal order 
Limited by the same 
constitution 
Modalities 
Knows no specific modality to 
enact framing power  
Follows the modality 
established by the constitution 
                                               
111  Idem, p.21. 
112  Idem, p.22. 
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5.2. Carré de MALBERG 
Already in 1922, Carré de MALBERG, in the second tome of his book, 
Contribution à la Théorie Générale de l’Etat, had dedicated a section to 
‘le pouvoir constituant’. He explained the reasons for this, in the first 
few paragraphs. For him, personified in the state, the nation is the only 
subject of the public power; the constitution is the only canal through 
which the power of the nation can be communicated.  
The problem here is the following: who has the power to make the 
constitution; in other words who is entitled to constituent power. He 
wrote:  
En principe, la nation seule, unifiée et personnifiée dans l'Etat est le sujet de 
la puissance publique: mais la constitution est le canal par lequel cette 
puissance se communique, quant a son exercice, aux divers organes étatiques. 
De fait et en droit positif, tout pouvoir s'exerçant dans l'Etat prend sa source 
dans une dévolution faite par la Constitution.  
Mais alors, un nouveau problème s'élève, auquel vient aboutir toute la théorie 
de l'organe d'Etat: A qui appartient-il de faire la Constitution elle-même? Qui 
aura qualité pour déterminer les organes étatiques et pour repartir entre eux 
l'exercice de la puissance nationale? En d’autres termes, en qui réside le 
pouvoir constituant?113 
Carré de MALBERG began with a brief presentation of the different 
theories regarding the origin of constituent power: Duguit’s theory of 
the organs, Rousseau’s social contract and Sieyès’s popular 
sovereignty, followed by his own theory.  
5.2.1. Different Theories regarding the Origin of the Constitution  
Carré de MALBERG refers to the theory of organs, as presented by M. 
Duguit. According to that theory, the organs presuppose the 
constitution but they cannot explain and justify it. For Duguit the state, 
the personification of the national collective, has its own Will; a Will 
that results from the constitutional organization of the collective. Here, 
there is a dilemma: the will of the state cannot logically exist when 
                                               
113  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.484. 
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there is not yet a state; that is, at the moment of accomplishing the first, 
primordial and supreme act of dominating power: at the moment of the 
creation of its own legal system. In the moment of giving itself an 
original constitution, the state has no constitution; more precisely, the 
state does not exist as a legal entity, at the moment of the creation of 
the state, with an accomplished organization of the national 
collective.114  
Consequently, there is no way to explain the origin of that first 
constitution by referring to the organs. It is necessary to refer to 
something outside the state, a Will that is not of the state itself; a Will, 
or a power that refers to the Will of individuals, a Will that generates 
the state, that appears prior to and superior in relation to the state; the 
constituent Will, that is at the origin of the constituted will of the state, 
which is only the consequence and the product of the first will, which, 
in its turn, is the sovereign and the original Will. Therefore, the 
sovereign power resides outside the state; that is in the individuals, and 
in their will.115 The dilemma is suddenly resolved: “Une fois 
transportée sur ce terrain, la question du pouvoir constituant se résout, 
pour ainsi dire, d'elle-même”.116 
Now, if the rules of private law concerning the creation of an 
association that is ruled by its corporative statute are considered, it may 
be discovered that the organization was the product of a primary Will; 
that primary Will is not the Will of the social organization, but the Will 
of the founders of that group, as individuals. Authors make these same 
argumentations in relation to the state.117  
Le statut organique par lequel une pluralité d'hommes, concourant à former 
une même nation, se constituent en un corps étatique unifié, doit logiquement 
être l'œuvre de ces hommes eux-mêmes. En d'autres termes, la souveraineté 
                                               
114  Idem, pp.484-485. 
115  Idem, p.485. 
116  Ibidem. 
117  Ibidem. 
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primaire, le pouvoir constituant, réside essentiellement dans le peuple, dans la 
totalité et dans chacun de ses membres.118 
Carré de MALBERG saw in this the principles that characterize the 
doctrine of social contract. The constitution, according to that doctrine, 
is the act, with which the citizens agree to create a national 
organization, which is a contractual act. The logical result of that 
doctrine is the following: every constitution is a type of new social 
contract. In that contract, there is a need for the participation of all the 
individuals in the formation of that Will, and the reorganization of the 
national association. Rousseau confers a great influence on this.  
Carré de MALBERG criticized that doctrine; the theory of social 
contract –he argued- means first of all that the creation of a constitution 
necessitates a social pact. That pact has to follow the Declaration of 
Rights, since it has to find its value in the principles of natural law that 
are recognized by such a declaration. The dilemma here is the 
following: the social pact –which has to be adopted unanimously- has 
to exist prior to any constitutional act –which will be adopted by the 
majority- and not the opposite.119  
According to Carré de MALBERG, it is to consider Sieyès is the 
originator of what he calls ‘souveraineté constituante du peuple’, that is 
the constituent sovereignty of the people. Sieyès, in fact, considers the 
sovereignty as essentially consisting of constituent power. Via the 
constitution, the people give some of their power to constituted powers; 
nevertheless, for him the people retain constituent power.  
This has two consequences: first, the sovereignty, as for its exercise, is 
divided into different constituent authorities, but it keeps its unity and 
indivisibility through the people, that is, the unique common constituent 
source of the public powers; second, the people, by keeping in their 
hands constituent power, cannot be limited by the constitution; the 
constitution only imposes limits on constituted powers.  
                                               
118  Ibidem. 
119  Idem, p.486. 
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Nevertheless, Sieyès followed the representative principle and defended 
it in the National Assembly; with the introduction of this principle, he 
attenuated his theory of popular sovereignty. In fact, he was on the side 
of popular sovereignty but requested that constituent power should be 
exercised by special representatives, as opposed to ordinary 
representatives. In other words, the distinction between constituent 
power and constituted powers had to function within the representative 
regime.120 
Carré de MALBERG considered this extension of the representation to 
the constituency as illogic, for two reasons: first, it is the constitution 
that sanctions the representative principle; through the constitution, the 
people accept not to govern themselves directly but through 
representatives; consequently, the representation presupposes the 
constitution and it cannot serve as a basis for its establishment. Second, 
if it is true that a new constitution means a new Social Contract, there is 
one reason to exclude representation from that pact: the people, at the 
moment of concluding that pact, are in a non-organic state. The people 
have no representatives and no body is entitled to represent them. The 
revolutionary constitutions understood that, for this reason always 
asked for a popular vote, that is the constituent sanction of the people; 
the 1971 Constitution was an exception since it was adopted by a 
Special Assembly.121  
Carré de MALBERG criticized this theory in that it was based on the 
constituent sovereignty of the people; he argued that this doctrine tried 
to explain the very first constitution and tried to give it a juridical basis; 
that juridical basis is the individual Will of those persons composing 
the nation. Here, there is an error right from the beginning: for Carré de 
MALBERG, it is not possible to give juridical construction to events 
and acts that have determined the foundation of the state and its first 
organization. Otherwise, it is necessary to admit that the law (droit) 
comes prior to the state.  
                                               
120  Idem, pp.487-488. 
121  Idem, p.489. 
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Admitting this means that the procedures that create the state follow a 
preceding legal order. The belief of jurists and philosophers of the 
school of natural law to a previous legal order was proper during the 
sixteenth to eighteen centuries. It was also the belief of the men of the 
Revolution who prepared the Declaration of Rights on the basis of 
natural law and believed that it had to limit the social pact and the 
constitutional act and serves them as a basis.  
Carré de MALBERG concludes, that it is incontestable that there are 
perceptions of morality and justice that are superior to positive laws; 
nevertheless, it is not acceptable to consider them, for the only reason 
of being superior, that they are legal rules; then Carré de MALBERG 
explains why:  
Car, le droit, au sens propre du mot, n'est pas autre chose que l'ensemble des 
règles imposées aux hommes sur un territoire déterminé par une autorité 
supérieure, capable de commander avec une puissance effective de 
domination et de contrainte irrésistible. Or précisément, cette autorité 
dominatrice n'existe que dans l'Etat: cette puissance positive de 
commandement et de coercition, c'est proprement la puissance étatique. Des 
lors, il apparaît que le droit proprement dit ne peut se concevoir que dans 
l'Etat une fois formé; et par suite, il est vain de rechercher le fondement ou la 
genèse juridiques de l'Etat. L'Etat, étant la source du droit, ne peut pas avoir 
lui-même sa source dans le droit.122  
5.2.2. The Doctrine of Carré de MALBERG 
For Carré de MALBERG, the initial formation of the state, and its first 
organization, are to be considered as a pure fact; that fact cannot be 
classed in any existent legal category, since it is not ruled by juridical 
principles. The formation of the state, then, is not ruled by any pre-
existent legal order: the state, in fact, is the condition for legal order; 
consequently, it is not ruled by it. Accordingly, it is not possible to 
confirm that a state exists only when it is born from the consent of all 
the members of the nation or of the majority. The formation of the state, 
in fact, may result simply by force, by imposing upon the members of 
                                               
122  Idem, p.490. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 43 
that nation, through fear or persuasion. Carré de MALBERG resumed 
his theory as follows:  
En d'autres termes, à l'origine de l'Etat, il n'y a place que pour du fait, et non 
pour du droit. Tout, ce que peut faire le juriste, c'est de constater que l'Etat se 
trouve formé à partir du moment où la collectivité nationale, fixée sur un 
certain territoire, possède, en fait, des organes exprimant sa volonté, 
établissant son ordre juridique, et imposant supérieurement sa puissance de 
commandement.123  
Accordingly, for Carré de MALBERG, it is not a question of tracing 
the legal procedures through which those original organs were 
constituted; this is not a problem of public law; more precisely, this is 
not a legal problem. For him, the theories that traced the origins of 
constitutions in order to discover the legal source of the state commit a 
grave error; since -to use his words- “la source de I'Etat, c'est du fait: à 
ce fait se rattache ultérieurement le droit”.124  
Carré de MALBERG then presented his point of view with regards to 
the other previous varying theories:125 First, critics to the theory of the 
organs: No body was able to prove how the first constitution had to be 
the work of regular organs of the collective. In fact, the first creation of 
the state coincides with its first organization; consequently, it is not 
possible to think that the first constitution is the work of pre-existent 
institutions. Besides, the theory of the organs, cannot explain in 
juridical terms something that is a pure fact. This theory, nevertheless, 
is very apposite to explain the exercise of constituent power and the 
constitutional revision in a state that is already established. Second, 
Critics of the theory of Social Contract: when a state exists, it has its 
own Will; the state can take sovereign acts, including constituent 
matters, but it is not a question of a new social pact. Changing the 
constitution does not imply changes in the legal personality of the state, 
neither in the collective that is personified in the state. A new or 
amended constitution does not mean necessarily the creation of a new 
                                               
123  Idem, p.491. 
124  Idem, p.492. 
125  Idem, p.493. 
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state, neither a new nation. A new constitution simply gives the state a 
new form or new statute, without interrupting its continuity, or 
changing its identity. In fact, the origin of the state does not depend on 
constituent power.  
For Carré de MALBERG, it is necessary to extend the theory of organs 
to cover also constituent power. Now, the constitution is the origin of 
the constituted organs, how can it be changed by them? Carré de 
MALBERG considers this contradiction as apparent only. For him, 
there are two different circumstances in which constituent power is 
called to be exercised.  
First, there are many historical examples of changes introduced with 
the force which can be also violent. What is characteristic here is that 
those changes happen outside the legal order, and outside the provisions 
of the same constitution; it does not follow the procedures, the form and 
the limits imposed by preceding constitution. Accordingly, it is not of 
concern for those entitled to constituent power, since in these situations 
there are no juridical principles, or constitutional rules. Here, there is no 
place for law but for force; constituent power is in the hands of the 
more powerful.  
Ainsi, entre la Constitution ancienne, dont il a était fait table rase, et, la 
Constitution nouvelle, qui reste à faire de toutes pièces, il n'existe pas de lien 
juridique; mais il y a, au contraire entre elles une solution de continuité, un 
interrègne constitutionnel, un intervalle de crise, durant lequel la puissance 
constituante de la nation n'aura d'autres organes que les personnages ou corps, 
qui, à la faveur des circonstances, seront parvenus à mettre la main sur elle.126 
Carré de MALBERG believes that this option has to stay outside the 
consideration of law; in this situation, in fact, the devolution and the 
exercise of constituent power are not ruled by the law.  
The second option is to operate changes to the existing constitution that 
may be partial or total, following the procedures provided by the same 
constitution. In fact, a preceding constitution remains in force until the 
time of its abrogation by the new constitution which simply succeeds to 
                                               
126  Idem, p.497. 
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it without interruption. That is why modern constitutions pay particular 
attention to the regulations related to the revision procedures. 
Following those procedures, it would not be necessary to refer the 
question to the people, or to make a revolution. 
Carré de MALBERG concludes with these specifications: constitutional 
law presupposes a constitution in force; constitutional law does not 
mean a law that constitutes the state, but a law that may not exist 
outside a state which already has been constituted; jurists should not 
look for constitutional principles outside a positive constitutions; 
nothing legal exists outside the constitution; it is simply a pure fact; 
every Organ in the state has its origin in the constitution: no Organs 
exist prior to the constitution; there are not properly constituent organs, 
but only constituted organs.127  
For Carré de MALBERG, the juridical notion of Constituent Power 
implies the pre-existence of a certain order and certain constitutional 
organization. When an Assembly was elected in 1789 to emanate a 
constitution, it acted as if it had received the mandate from a pre-
existent constitution; for this reason it claimed that it was only for the 
Assembly to represent the general Will of the nation, based on the idea 
of receiving the constituent mandate. In other words, the work of the 
Assembly was simply to express the constitution that already existed, 
and to ameliorate it. Now, they could do that only because they had 
constituent power. Consequently, there was a kind of revolution:  
Par là, la Constituante s'élevait la conception hardie, qui devait assurer la 
pleine indépendance de Son pouvoir, et, comme on l'a dit, elle transformait la 
représentation du peuple souverain en une représentation souveraine du 
peuple.128  
For Carré de MALBERG, the Assembly understood that it was a 
necessary to give a legal basis to its constituent pretensions; it could do 
that only by referring to previous and existing legal orders.  
                                               
127  Idem, p.499. 
128  Idem, p.504. 
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La conclusion unique à retenir de ces observations demeure donc simplement 
que la Constituante, en invoquant a l'origine les clauses des cahiers relatives a 
l'établissement de la Constitution, avait compris la nécessite de donner une 
base proprement juridique à ses prétentions d'ordre constituant: elle avait 
essayé de se poser en organe statutaire d'une nation, qui apparaissait, selon ce 
concept, comme déjà organiquement constituée; et en cela, elle avait rendu 
hommage à cette idée, dégagée plus haut, que le pouvoir constituant lui-
même ne peut se concevoir comme un pouvoir d'essence juridique qu'autant 
qu'il prend sa source dans un ordre statutaire antérieur et qu'il s'exerce 
conformément a cet ordre préétabli.129  
For Carré de MALBERG, there was no possibility of making reference 
to a law that was pre-existing to the constitution;130 after the 
establishment of the state, entitled to constituent power are those 
Organs which the constitution designs. Now, can the constitution 
attribute that power to any Organ? Here, there is another principle in 
French public law that intervenes and that is the principle of national 
sovereignty. This will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
5.2.3. The Separation of Constituent Power from Constituted 
Powers  
The principle of national sovereignty is opposed to the idea of giving 
any of the organs the exclusivity in the process of constitutional 
revision; this is why, pushed by the strict interpretation of the national 
sovereignty, the 1791 French constitution specified that the 
amendments made by the Legislative Assembly would not be submitted 
to the king. Now, is it possible to give that power exclusively to one of 
the other organs? For Carré de MALBERG, there are two reasons that 
lead one to believe that this cannot be the case: first, it is difficult to 
admit that the title of that Organ and the extension of its power can be 
amended only with its consent; the Nation had no longer the liberty to 
modify the constitution; second, the principle of national sovereignty is 
opposed to the idea that any of the constituted organs can give to 
                                               
129  Ibidem. 
130  The constitution that Carré de MALBERG is talking about here should be 
understood in its material sense. 
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themselves the same power or more. Every constituted authority has to 
obtain its powers from the national Will that is superior to its own 
Will.131  
Now, this question is not relevant in countries where the Will of the 
monarch is the only reference; the principle of national sovereignty 
means that it is the nation that is the sovereign; this principle is 
expressed already in the 1789 Declaration of Rights: “…nul corps, nul 
individu ne peut exercer d'autorité qui n'émane expressément de la 
nation”. Besides, the preamble of the 1791 constitution mentioned that 
“la souveraineté appartient à la nation” and declared in its first article 
that “nul ne peut s’en attributer l’exercice”. For Carré de MALBERG, 
the separation of powers meant that:  
Le pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir législatif doivent être effectivement séparés 
de façon que le Gouvernement et le Parlement assument chacun pour sa part 
et sous sa responsabilité la plénitude de leurs attributions.132  
The interpretation of these texts is that no constituted organ can be at 
the same time, the constituent organ. The logical consequence of these 
arguments is the following: it is necessary for the constituent organ to 
be different from the constituted organs.  
Most of the constituent systems adopted in France for example, had one 
common point: all of them refused, in fact, to attribute that power to the 
ordinary legislative body but to a special assembly that had a 
constituent task. Another principle is the need to separate between the 
power that creates a constitution and the powers created by it; in other 
words, the principle of the separation between between constituent 
power and constituted powers.  
Carré de MALBERG studied this question; he tried to trace the origin 
of the doctrine and its links with Rousseau’s doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, Montesquieu’s separation of powers and individualism, 
and the national sovereignty.  
                                               
131  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.506. 
132  AVRIL P., Op. cit., p.296. 
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5.2.3.1. Constituent Power and Popular Sovereignty  
Some authors thought that there is only indirect liaison between the 
theory of the separation of constituent power and the theory of popular 
sovereignty; for the following reasons: according to the social contract, 
the sovereignty is absorbed by the legislative body; essentially 
sovereignty here means the power of the people to pronounce the 
general Will; consequently, there is no place in Rousseau’s teaching for 
a constituent power that is distinguished from the legislative power. 
Besides, it is not a question of thinking that a supreme organ is superior 
to the ordinary legislator for a simple reason: the constitution limits the 
constituted organs; the legislator is the people and the people are not a 
constituted organ; the constituent cannot be superior to the people nor 
can the constituent be superior to the legislative body.133  
In fact, the theory of the separation of constituent power from 
constituted powers, was intended to limit the legislative power, 
especially in relation to those individual rights, inviolable and 
untouchable; now, the Social Contract excludes such an idea, for the 
following two reasons: first, the social contract implies the complete 
absorption of the individual by the community and therefore, there is no 
place for individual rights; second, in the case where there are some 
individual rights, they can be extended, suspended or limited by the 
sovereign at any time; and for Rousseau, the sovereign is the legislator. 
Carré de MALBERG continued his analysis, and considered a second 
option. In fact, if the origin of the separation of constituent power 
cannot be found in the doctrine of Rousseau, where to go, then? The 
option that some authors present is Montesquieu's theory of separation 
of powers. According to Carré de MALBERG, the precedent theory fits 
in very well with the theory of national sovereignty.134 
                                               
133  “C'est pourquoi ROUSSEAU même déclare qu'il ne peut exister pour le peuple 
aucune loi fondamentale qui l'enchaîne, car la volonté générale ne peut point se lier 
elle-même”. CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.514. 
134  He wrote: “La solution proposée par Montesquieu en vue de limiter la puissance 
respective de chacun des titulaires de la puissance nationale cadre très 
heureusement avec ce principe (de la souveraineté nationale), car, en n'accordant à 
chacun de ces titulaires qu'une partie fragmentée de la puissance souveraine, elle 
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Montesquieu in fact, considered the three powers of the state as if they 
were divided from the beginning, so the unity of the three constituted 
powers may have their same origin in constituent power that is the 
people. This is the basis of the separation of constituent power as taught 
by Sieyès. For him, in fact, “…le mot Constitution est relatif à 
l'ensemble et à la séparation des pouvoirs publics”.  Constituent power, 
for Sieyès, is the unity principle of the multiple constituted powers. 
Popular sovereignty therefore, appears as the logical consequence of 
Montesquieu’s theory; without popular sovereignty, Montesquieu’s 
theory becomes unintelligible and unacceptable. This is why, according 
to Carré de MALBERG, it can be rightly assumed that Sieyès’s theory 
is the synthesis of Rousseau’s theory of popular sovereignty and 
Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers.135  
Furthermore, Montesquieu is highly liberal. His intentions are, in fact, 
to protect and to secure the respect of individual rights that the Social 
Contract oppresses; those rights are the reflection of an objective law 
that is established by and for the community, and the idea of constituent 
power intends to guarantee those rights. For this reason, Sieyès took a 
position that is in complete contrast to Rousseau’s (total alienation of 
every associated, with all his rights) considering that the union of the 
associated is for their gratification, consequently, it is an advantage, not 
a sacrifice. Individuals do not have to sacrifice their liberties to the 
state; on the contrary, the state is there to guarantee them.136 For this 
reason, Sieyès considered some rights as untouchable, and are 
guaranteed by the constitution itself; those rights in fact are not limited 
by constituted powers, but they can not be limited neither by 
constituent power itself.  
It is for constituent power itself to recognize and to declare those rights 
in order that they become operative. The same constitution, also, shall 
specify the ways in which those rights have to be guaranteed in order to 
                                                                                                       
met obstacle à ce qu'aucun d'eux acquière et puisse conserver un pouvoir complet et 
vraiment souverain en ce sens; et ainsi elle laisse intacte la souveraineté exclusive 
de la nation”. AVRIL P., Op. cit., p.301. 
135  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.515. 
136  Idem, p.519. 
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make them effective. Besides, it is the same constitution that has to 
protect those rights from being tampered with in the future.  
5.2.3.2. Constituent power and National Sovereignty   
For Sieyès, the constitution may bind constituted powers but not the 
nation, declared sovereign. In fact, the doctrine of Sieyès is based on 
two ideas: first, Bodin’s doctrine, in relation to the prince who was 
considered as suprà leges and remained legibus solutus; Sieyès took 
this concept, and gave it to the nation; second, the idea of the nation as 
it is in the state of nature, as vulgarized by Rousseau in relation to the 
individuals. Sieyès wrote:  
On doit concevoir les nations sur la terre comme des individus hors du lien 
social, ou, comme l'on dit, dans l'état de nature. Et cela, par la raison qu’à la 
différence du Gouvernement qui ne peut appartenir qu'au droit positif, la 
nation se forme par le seul droit naturel. Elle est tout ce qu'elle peut être, par 
cela seul qu'elle est. En effet, s'il lui avait fallu attendre, pour devenir une 
nation, une manière d'être positive, elle n'aurait jamais été.137 
Accordingly, the nation can not be limited by the constitution and the 
nation can not be limited in its exercise of constituent power by pre-
established form. Sieyès said expressly:  
L’exercice de la volonté des nations est libre et indépendant de toutes formes 
civiles. N'existant que dans l'ordre naturel, leur volonté, pour sortir tout son 
effet, n'a besoin que de porter les caractères naturels d'une volante. De 
quelque manière qu’une nation veuille, il suffit qu'elle veuille; toutes les 
formes sont bonnes, et sa volonté est toujours la loi suprême. Une nation ne 
sort jamais de l'état de nature, et n'a jamais trop de toutes les manières 
possibles d'ex-primer sa volonté. Ne craignons point de le répéter: une nation 
est indépendante de toute forme; et de quelque manière qu'elle veuille, il 
suffit que sa volonté paraisse, pour que tout droit positif cesse devant elle, 
comme devant la source et le maître suprême de tout droit positif.138 
                                               
137  Idem, p.521. 
138  Idem, p.522. 
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Sieyès, nevertheless, admitted a representative regime also in 
constituent matters. In fact, the representatives of a sovereign nation are 
in themselves sovereign and cannot be limited. They can also be 
ordinary representatives of the nation who legislate and they can be 
extraordinary.  
According to Carré de MALBERG, the theory of Sieyès finishes in 
having great affinity with the theories of Rousseau. Here are the 
reasons why: first, both, in fact, believe that the people or the nation 
can not be limited by the constitution; still, for Rousseau, this 
unconditioned liberty of the nation is less absolute than it is for Sieyès. 
In fact, he admits the possibility of limiting that liberty with the form; 
that condition is, in fact, in the form: the revision process has to have 
the same solemnity as its establishment; second, constituent power, 
according to Sieyès, finds its content in the theory of Rousseau. That 
constituent power, in fact, is nothing else but the popular sovereignty 
that is treated in the Contrat social. Still, Sieyès tries to reconcile the 
sovereignty with a representative regime; for this reason, Sieyès 
introduced the theory of delegation. For him, the Assembly that is in 
charge of adopting a constitution is that entitled to the plenitude of 
powers of the nation.  
The problem here is that Sieyès, in the same presentation of his theory 
of the separation of constituent power from constituted powers finishes 
by destroying that separation, since the same legislative body is that 
entitled to constituent power! According to La Fayette, this idea (that 
constituent power has the plenitude of all powers) has its origin in the 
doctrine of Sieyès and not in the American convention which is simply 
delegating the nation to examine and to modify the constitution.139 
Now, theoreticians of popular sovereignty believe that the legislative 
body and not constituent power, which received the mandate to 
                                               
139  La Fayette criticized Sieyès saying that this doctrine: “bien loin de faire faire, sur ce 
point, un pas a la science (comme le prétendait Sieyès dans son discours du 2 
thermidor an III), l'a plutôt fait rétrograder par le mélange des fonctions 
constituante et législative dans l'Assemblée constituante et dans la Convention 
nationale, tandis qu'en Amérique ces fonctions ont toujours été distinctes”. Idem, 
p.535. 
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legislate only; accordingly, during their legislative mandate, they 
cannot revise the constitution. The task to revise the constitution is left 
to a special assembly with the extraordinary delegation of the people. 
This means that, the same power cannot be simultaneously constituent 
power and a constituted power. Nevertheless, constituted powers can 
only start and put in to effect constituent power.  
The consequence of this reasoning is to admit that the constitutional 
law has an intrinsic distinguishing nature from Ordinary Law; the 
constitution is superior, it is the primary law that constitutes the 
legislative power itself. Besides, the constituent act is to be considered 
the first act of sovereignty that is superior and prior to ordinary acts of 
sovereignty, that are accomplished by the constituted authorities. Now, 
this cannot be exercised by ordinary legislative body but by a special 
organ, that is the Constituent Organ.  
This is why a number of constitutions provide for a special and 
extraordinary assembly with a higher number of representatives; other 
constitutions leave this task to the Legislative Assembly but these 
Assemblies have to be renewed and re-elected; others ask only that the 
revision is adopted by the Assembly with a strong majority.  
For Carré de MALBERG, this reasoning concludes by dividing the 
sovereignty in to two: the first is that initial, extraordinary and prior act 
of the constituent organ and the other is that of the constituted organs. 
For him, this division cannot to be accepted since the sovereignty of the 
nation is unique and resides in its power to impose its Will through 
regular organs.140  
For Carré de MALBERG, the organs that express the sovereign Will of 
the nation are those entitled to do the same with the constituent 
question. Now, that organ is the legislative body since the constitution 
is nothing more that one of those laws regulating the nation, although it 
is distinguished by its exceptional importance; it is nevertheless, a 
legislative act.  
                                               
140  Idem, p.539. 
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Now, considering the constitutional laws as a distinct branch of 
legislation, it is based mainly on the necessity to justify those powers, 
by referring to the people, according to the doctrine of Rousseau; in the 
French concept of state, the sovereignty for the people and its members 
is not primitive and anterior to the constitution; it is their, only in the 
measure that it is recognized as such by the same constitution.  
Accordingly, the French constitutional law that is based on national 
sovereignty and not popular sovereignty can explain how the citizens 
themselves are those entitled to constituent power; for this reason, 
Carré de MALBERG found that the theory of separation of constituent 
power cannot prevent the admission of the possibility that constituent 
power can be exercised by ordinary Legislative Assembly. The 
establishment of an extraordinary constituent assembly is full of 
dangers since that assembly, called to examine and to amend all 
constituted powers, may end by thinking that it has all those powers in 
itself, finishing up by being an omnipotent, despotic assembly.141  
This problem does not exist in England, where there is no necessity for 
constituent power. In fact, Parliament is the only entitled to adopt laws 
and to make the necessary changes to the organization of the state. 
Parliament is the only entitled of the sovereignty in England, and there 
is no need for another Organ or Assembly, to adopt these changes. 
Now, by adopting this system in France –that is leaving for the ordinary 
legislative body the capacity to revise the constitution- historically 
meant instability. In this sense, the adoption of the theory of constituent 
power, distinct from constituted powers, was a wise step since it offered 
real and practical advantages for a country that is tormented by the 
constituent mania.  
For Carré de MALBERG, the separation of constituent power is not 
only a convenient and recommended precaution; it is also the logical 
consequence of the principle of national sovereignty that is 
distinguished from the popular sovereignty. He wrote:  
                                               
141  Idem, pp.540-541. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 54 
La séparation du pouvoir constituant ne forme pas seulement, en France, une 
précaution utile ou une mesure recommandable: elle semble bien s'y imposer, 
comme une conséquence directe et nécessaire du principe de la souveraineté 
nationale.142  
For Carré de MALBERG, there are three motivations why to consider 
the theory of the separation of constituent power as the consequence of 
the French concept of national sovereignty: first, national sovereignty is 
not a positive principle that makes from the citizens those entitled of 
the sovereignty. Accordingly, no member of the nation can repose the 
power as emanating from its own Will; second, when constituted 
authorities have constituent power, the extension and attribution of their 
powers cannot be amended without their consent; in other words, the 
Nation does not keep the total freedom to change its constitution for 
itself; third, if the Nation is the sole sovereign, there is no place for 
unlimited power by one of the constituted organs; accordingly, the 
powers of the constituted organs have to be determined and limited by a 
different one from themselves, that is by the constitution, or by the 
work of a more superior authority to constituted organs.143  
The principle of separation of constituent power has an American 
origin in that, contrary to the English system, it has adopted the idea 
that the people, the original sovereign, are the source and the creators of 
the other constituted powers. Besides, the principle of national 
sovereignty does not admit the absolute sovereignty of one of the 
organs; as such, it necessitates the separation of constituent power. This 
principle of national sovereignty finds its limitation in the same 
constitution that is the work of a distinguishable constituent organ or of 
all the constituted organs.  
On the other hand, constitutions that are based on the principle of 
popular sovereignty may easily finish up by admitting that one of the 
organs has all the powers in itself and therefore finish up by being 
omnipotent; while those accepting the basis of national sovereignty, 
considers the sovereignty as the prerogative of the Nation exclusively; 
                                               
142  Idem, p.545. 
143  Ibidem. 
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accordingly, no organ can pretend to absorb that sovereignty. The 
consequences are two: first, the legislative body can not pretend to have 
constituent power; and, second, the constituency cannot pretend to have 
legislative powers.144 For Carré de MALBERG, it is a grave error to 
consider the constituency contains all sovereignty and all powers; he 
wrote:  
L'idée qu'une Constituante concentre en elle toute la souveraineté et réunit 
tous les Pouvoirs… est, au point de vue du principe de la souveraineté 
nationale, l'une des plus grandes erreurs qui aient été commises en France, 
depuis 1789.145 
Nevertheless, Carré de MALBERG made a distinction between 
monarchic and democratic systems (in the original sense of the terms) 
from one side and national sovereignty from the other. In the first, 
constituent power created constituted powers that were originally 
contained in them; according to the principle of national sovereignty, 
the constituency has only constituent power, and not constituted powers 
that were simply established by it; accordingly, the constituency cannot 
pretend to have legislative, executive and judicial powers.146 Here is the 
importance of national sovereignty that is not to be considered as a 
principle without direct implications: in fact, in a country of national 
sovereignty, only the nation, represented by all its organs is sovereign; 
no organ, taken alone, is sovereign; neither the constituent organ. That 
organ can be considered the supreme, but is not sovereign since it is not 
unlimited.147 
                                               
144  Idem, p.549. 
145  Ibidem. 
146  Idem, p.550. 
147  Carré de MALBERG wrote: “Dans un pays de souveraineté nationale, la nation 
seule, agissant par l'ensemble de ses organes, est souveraine: aucun des organes, 
pris en particulier, pas même l'organe constituant, ne peut être souverain. L'organe 
constituant peut bien apparaître comme l'organe suprême, en tant qu'il exprime la 
volonté la plus haute, dans l'Etat: il n'est cependant point souverain, car il n'a pas 
un pouvoir de volonté illimitée. La souveraineté de la nation exclut celle de l'organe. 
Toute négative que soit cette signification du principe de la nation souveraine, ce 
principe n'en est pas moins susceptible de produire des effets considérables: l'un de 
ces effets est d'exclure le système des Constituantes omnipotentes”. Idem, p.551. 
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Carré de MALBERG resumes the distinction between the two concepts 
of the separation of constituent power: the first one is based on popular 
sovereignty and the second on national sovereignty. Both in fact, admit 
the existence of a distinguishing power that is constituent power as 
opposed to constituted powers. Nevertheless, when based on popular 
sovereignty, constituent power is mainly superior to constituted powers; 
besides, if combined with the representative principle, we may have a 
constituents’ regime with unlimited powers. To the contrary, the 
concept of the separation of constituent power, which is based on 
national sovereignty, implies the limitation of the constituency itself; 
since it is directed against both the constituent organ and the constituted 
organs; besides, there is no danger that the organ called to constitute the 
others has an absolute and unlimited power.148  
 
                                               
148  Idem, pp.551-552. 
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§6 THE MATERIAL CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUENT 
POWER 
A general presentation of the material conception of constituent power 
will be made, followed by that of the doctrine of Carl SCHMITT.  
6.1. General Presentation  
The material concept is presented by non-positivists authors such as 
Carl SCHMITT who defended the thesis by saying that there is only 
one constituent power which he calls the ‘constituent power’ tout court, 
since ‘the power of the constitutional revision’ is not a constituent 
power. For SCHMITT, the confusion between constituent power and 
the power of the constitutional revision is the result of another 
confusion that is between the constitution and the constitutional Laws; 
these two concepts, in fact, had two different ‘objects’, they are 
respectively related to the constitution (Verfassung) and to the 
constitutional Laws (Verfassungsgesetz). In this sense, the power of the 
constitutional revision can change the constitutional laws, and not the 
constitution.149 
Schmitt’s essentialist constitutionalism can be described as a distinction 
between two different concepts of ‘Constitution’: the first, Verfassung, 
represents the pre-constitutional political unity or, in other words, the “very 
political essence and ‘identity’ of the Constitution which cannot become 
subject to any amendment”. The second, Verfassungsgasetz, which could be 
translated as ‘constitutional law’, represents “merely the provisions about 
more or less inferior issues which, as a result of compromises between 
pluralistic social groups, had been incorporated into the Constitution in order 
to protect particularistic interests against social and political change through 
the barrier of the two-thirds majority required for constitutional 
amendments”. In brackets, it is interesting to see that for Schmitt it is the 
ordinary law that recognizes pluralism, while the level of higher law (i.e. 
constitutional law) demands unity. Schmitt’s constitutional approach 
maintains a clear differentiation between law and will. No “formalized” 
procedure or institution can capture the essence of the sovereign people, 
                                               
149  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.25. 
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because formalization is incompatible with the willful, unrestrained nature of 
the pouvoir constituant. “The wilfulness of constituent power simply cannot 
be subjected to the mundane everyday lawfulness of the pouvoir constitué, 
given the radically different principles at hand. The attempt to do so, for 
Schmitt, is akin to transforming fire into water – in short, a native fantasy of 
liberal constitutional alchemists”.150 
Now, it is clear that the concept ‘constitution’ here has a specific 
meaning; in fact, SCHMITT defines the constitution as being 
la volonté politique dont le pouvoir ou l'autorité sont en mesure de prendre la 
décision globale concrète sur le genre et la forme de l'existence politique 
propre, autrement dit déterminer l'existence de l'unité politique dans son 
ensemble.151  
In other words, the constitution is the fundamental political decision of 
those entitled to constituent power.152  
Legitimacy ultimately can refer to nothing more than the efficacy of a 
particular set of political power holders or decision makers. Legitimacy, 
which refers to the political essence of the Constitution, is thus essentially a 
question of power.153  
Hence, a constitutional system is valid only when it rests on an 
authoritative ‘decision’ made by a concrete ‘will’. And a constitution is 
legitimate “when the power and authority of constituent power…is 
recognized”.154 More recently, Olivier Beaud more recently adopted the 
theory of SCHMITT and considered these two concepts –which he 
called le pouvoir constituant and le pouvoir de revision- as hierarchical. 
The first is sovereign the second is not. The difference between him and 
                                               
150  LERNER H., The people of the Constitution: Constitution-making, legitimacy and 
identity, p.37. 
151  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.24. 
152  Idem, p.25. 
153  SCHEUERMAN, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law, p.68, cited in: LERNER H., op. 
cit., p.38. 
154  SCHMITT, Verfassungslehre, in: Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law.p.67-
8; cited in: LERNER H., op. cit., p.38. 
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SCHMITT is that he considers the criteria of distinction in the national 
sovereignty of the people; in fact, for Beaud, the only competent body 
to change affairs related to national sovereignty of the people is the one 
of constituent power, and never that competent for constitutional 
revision.155  
Disregarding the form of state to which they are connected, 
VERGOTTINI suggests that contemporary constitutions are derived 
from an initial decision that provides the founding power of a certain 
system.156 For the same author, constituent power is only framing 
power (potere constituente) which is distinct from constituted powers 
(poteri costituiti) which does not include the executive, legislative and 
judiciary powers only but amending power (potere di revisione) since 
the latter are subjected to limits of the same constitution. The 
importance of the division between framing power and amending 
power is that the former indicates the discontinuity with a precedent 
constitution while the later indicates its continuity.157  
6.2. Carl SCHMITT 
Carl SCHMITT made an interesting comparison between the 
‘constituant-constitué’ de Sieyès, and that of Spinoza distinction 
between natura naturans in its relation to natura naturata, and 
concluded that “[T]ous les concepts prégnants de la théorie moderne 
de l’Etat sont des concepts théologiques secularises”.158 The concept of 
constituent power, invented by a theologian (Sieyès), is a famous 
example of what has been called political theology: constituent power 
is the secularized version of the Divine power to create the world ex 
nihilo, to ‘create’ an order without being subject to it.159 
The doctrine of supra-constitutionality that finds its origin in Carl 
SCHMITT, supposes two levels of constitutional Rules: first, the 
                                               
155  GÖZLER K., Op. cit., p.27. 
156  VERGOTTINI G., Op. cit., p.166. 
157  Idem, pp.166-167. 
158  KLEIN C., Théorie et Pratique du Pouvoir Constituant, pp.2-3.  
159  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.144.  
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constitutional laws, which contains technical rules, and are related to 
the organisation of public powers, to their competences, and their 
mutual relationships, and, second, the constitution in itself which 
includes all the fundamental political principles of the state, which can 
not be modified.160  
In that sense, the formal constitution, as all legal texts, can change not 
only when constitutionally amended but also suffers an evolution that 
may be considerable, regarding the conditions in which it is applied in 
other words, in reason to its interpretation.161  
6.2.1. Carl SCHMITT’s Concept of Constitution  
According to SCHMITT, “…a Constitution is valid because it 
emanates from a constituent power... and is posited by its will”.162 
Constituent Power is the absolute substance, the natura naturans, from 
which a constitution emanates. Constitutional order and authority are 
based on that same constituent power.163 A positive constitution is not 
an absolute constitution, but rests on it as the firm foundational core 
that protects its identity, and guards it from wholesale and 
indiscriminate reform.164 
The point of departure of SCHMITT’s argument in his 
Verfassungslehre is the fundamental distinction between an absolute 
conception and a relative conception of the constitution; in other words, 
the distinction between constitution and constitutional law.165 The 
relative conception reduces constitutions to a set of constitutional Laws, 
to “several, various or many legal determinations of a certain type”… 
SCHMITT adopts the expression used by Barthelemy-Duez to refer to 
the French Constitution of 1875: “Il n’y a pas de Constitution; il y a des 
                                               
160  BURDEAU G., HAMON F. TROPER M., Op. cit., p.42. 
161  Ibidem. 
162  CRISTI R., The Metaphysics of Constituent Power: SCHMITT and the Genesis of 
Chile’s 1980 Constitution, p.1749.  
163  Idem, p.1750.  
164  Ibidem. 
165  Idem, p.1756. 
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lois constitutionnelles”. In contrast, the absolute conception discerned 
in chapter one presupposes the distinction between constitution and 
constitutional laws. It emphasizes constitutional unity as opposed to a 
random plurality of laws.166  
The substantive unity of SCHMITT’s absolute constitution manifests 
itself in three ways. First, the absolute substantive constitution refers to 
the sovereign state itself… SCHMITT defines the constitution as the 
“concrete amalgamation of political union and social order that 
belongs to a determined state”; the constitution is the state. This means 
that the state does not have a constitution; it is the constitution. 
SCHMITT’s metaphysical disposition appears in full swing when he 
declares that the state is “a really existing situation [ein seinsmäßig 
vorhandener Zustand], a status of unity and order”, and the 
constitution, in the words of Socrates, is its “soul”.167 Second, the 
absolute constitution privileges its essential over its existential 
meaning; the essential constitution defines the particular mode of the 
state’s existence. The constitution appears now as “a particular mode of 
the political and social order”…“A successful revolution brings about 
a new status and eo ipso a new constitution”.168 Third, the essential 
constitution is not merely an authoritative status, but also a “principle 
of dynamic development” (dynamischen Werdens). The unity of the 
state is forever being generated and is not stable or static.169 
Refusing to abandon the metaphysical “sphere of being and existence,” 
SCHMITT sees the constitution as more than a general rule or basic 
norm “under which one subsumes” particular rules or cases:  
The Constitution is the active principle of a dynamic process of effective 
energies… but definitely not a regulated procedure consisting of normative 
prescriptions and imputations.170 
                                               
166  Idem, p.1751. 
167  Idem, p.1752.  
168  Idem, p.1753. 
169  Ibidem. 
170  Idem, p.1754. 
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When SCHMITT declares that “a constitution is valid because it 
emanates from a constituent power”, he defines constituent power as an 
empirical act of the will.171 That unified will of the people is the 
foundation of the real legal system is somehow similar to Kelsen’s 
notion of the basic norm and serves for both to explain the possible 
relation between the constitution and the political. For both, this was 
inevitable since they tried to examine the moment before the 
constitution in order to be able to justify the constitution itself as a 
unified legal order.172 In fact,  
Schmitt believes that the construction of the Constitution cannot be as 
unrelated to the political identity of the people who write it. Yet, Schmitt 
contends that identity does not influence Constitutions in a slow gradual 
fashion but in a decisive manner. The fundamental concept that underpins his 
approach is not the historical but the political.173 
Now, ‘The political’ is viewed by SCHMITT in terms of the distinction 
between friend and enemy. SCHMITT writes:  
Rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group 
themselves according to the friend and enemy antithesis…that this is an ever 
present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere.174 
Accordingly, the united identity of the people is present before any 
institutional manifestation of it. The shared feeling of a society’s 
oneness is the preceding condition on which the state rests. In his very 
first sentence of The Concept of the Political, SCHMITT confirms that 
“the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” and 
“[a] people [Volk] must already exist as a political unity if it is to 
become the subject of Constitution-making”.175 
                                               
171  Idem, p.1755. 
172  LERNER H., op. cit., p.34. 
173  Idem, pp.32-33. 
174  SCHMITT C., The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), p.28; cited in: LERNER H., Op. cit., p.33. 
175  Cited in: Idem, p.34. 
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Constitutions are born and may even die, but constituent power that 
sustains them cannot be destroyed, changed, or altered in any way. It 
persists as the extra constitutional ground of constitutions. Pouvoir 
constituant is a substantive entity that is not exhausted by its exercise, 
and is capable of “persevering in its existence”. The constitutions that 
arise from this metaphysical matrix are accidents posited and supported 
by this substantive power. Positive constitutions are born, suffer 
alterations, and eventually die, but over and above them the pouvoir 
constituant continues to exist.176  
The distinction between absolute and positive constitutions denotes the 
relativity of the latter. This is implicitly acknowledged by SCHMITT 
when he writes:  
The [positive] Constitution is not something absolute, because it is not self-
generated. Again, it is not valid by virtue of its normative rectitude, or by 
virtue of its systematic closure. It is not granted by itself, but for a concrete 
political union… The [positive] Constitution is valid in virtue of the existing 
political will of whoever grants it.177 
The Constitution, in its positive meaning, is generated by an act of constituent 
power. Constituent power is the bridge that links the absolute Constitution 
with the positive Constitution -a narrow bridge indeed.178 
The decision that creates the political form of this positive constitution 
is made only once. But this “only once” is in reference to this particular 
positive constitution. The decision itself can change. This means, 
SCHMITT admits, that “the form can change”; new forms can be 
introduced without substantially changing the political union itself. In 
no case does the absolute constitution – that is the political union cease 
to exist.179 What really counts in terms of continuity and identity is the 
absolute constitution.180 
                                               
176  CRISTI R., Op. cit., pp.1755-1756.  
177  Ibidem. 
178  Ibidem. 
179  Idem, p.1757.  
180  Idem, p.1758.  
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When such violations and measures are taken in the interest of the political 
existence of the whole, the supremacy of the existential [des Existentiellen] 
over mere normativity shows forth. 
By the “political existence of the whole” and the “supremacy of the 
existential,” SCHMITT means the prior existence of an absolute 
constitution.181 According to SCHMITT, this ideal concept of 
constitution comes to light when the contenders in a “political struggle” 
try to impose the “constitution that corresponds to their political 
demands” as the “true constitution”.182  
The founding of a new state does not require the immediate adoption of 
a positive constitution. One ought to distinguish the founding of a state 
by means of a social contract from the conferring of a constitution. The 
state or social contract (Staats-oder Sozialvertrag) gives rise to a 
political union; a constitutional contract (Verfassungsvertrag) 
presupposes an already-existing political union. In accordance with his 
metaphysical design, SCHMITT asserts that “a political existence 
precedes the giving of constitution (Verfassunggebung)”.183  
According to Schmitt, as well, the political precedes the Constitution because 
the pre-institutional political oneness of the people is the foundation of the 
Constitution. ‘The political’ is prior to any constitutional or legal order in a 
transcendental sense. The pre- or nonconstitutional political energies are 
constantly present and threaten the Constitution from within. Hence, they 
could never be encompassed or regulated by the written Constitution.184 
6.2.2. Carl SCHMITT’s Ethnicity Concept of democracy 
What is essential in this interpretation is the introduction of an ethnic 
understanding of democracy, the substitution of the ethnos for the 
demos. For SCHMITT, the political character of a democratic order 
was not characterized by good rules but by good rulers, whereby good 
represents the pre-normative existential quality of the people. In a 
                                               
181  Idem, p.1759.  
182  Ibidem.  
183  Idem, p.1762.  
184  Cited in: LERNER H., Op. cit., p.34. 
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purely empirical sense, the people are only a multitude of individuals 
within a distinct territory; but in the political sense, the people exist in 
the ethnic and cultural oneness of the multitude, which entails its 
capacity to realize its otherness in relation both to other peoples and the 
liberal-universalist category of mankind. For him, the essence of the 
political, in a democratic order, is the will of the people to preserve 
their distinctive property and oneness, and to impose this will on the 
economic, social, and political cleavages of the modern society.185 
It comes as no surprise that SCHMITT regarded the constitutionally 
non-alienated people, in their ethnic and national sameness, as the 
‘true’ foundation of democracy. Democracy is the rule of the people’s 
will, whose essence is collective authenticity; this quality cannot be 
achieved by mere aggregation of private individuals’ will, the attribute 
of elections in liberal democracies.186  
Within the institutional framework of mass democracy, the utmost 
attainable degree of authenticity and congruity of the people’s will, 
with its very essence, is to be achieved through representation. By 
representation, SCHMITT does not mean the complex process of 
constitutional aggregation of the many divergent and antagonistic 
interests and opinions, channelled and processed through rights, 
procedures, institutions, associations, et cetera, which are characteristic 
of constitutional democracy; rather, he suggests a kind of symbolic 
reappearance of the essential qualities of the people and their 
incarnation in a person who has the capacity to express the “true” self 
of the people.187 
The concept of democratic representation clearly reveals the close 
connection between democracy and the authoritarian rule – an affinity 
which led SCHMITT to the contention that a true dictatorship can only 
be founded on democratic bases. According to this view, democracy 
and dictatorship are not essentially antagonistic; rather, dictatorship is a 
                                               
185  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., pp.153-154. 
186  Idem, p.154. 
187  Ibidem. 
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kind of democracy if the dictator successfully claims to incarnate the 
identity of the people.188 
Besides, some may –rightly- criticize SCHMITT’s existentialist 
interpretation of the democratic decision-making process, which is 
understood as the collective self-affirmation of a people. SCHMITT 
emphasizes in his Verfassungslehre: “What the people want is good 
just because the people want it”.189 By removing any rational content 
from the guiding political will, and by construing it merely in terms of 
the expressive content of a naturalized Volksgeist, SCHMITT’s political 
will-formation “does not need to be generated though a public 
discussion, participation in which is guaranteed by civic rights”.190 
More important for our contemporary problems is the question of 
whether the constitutional state presupposes some minimum degree of 
pre-political sameness and homogeneity of constituent power.191 The 
idea of modern constitutionalism is the separation of fellow-feelings of 
a nation from the structure of government and the rights of individuals 
given from the constitution.192 This subject will be treated in next 
chapters.  
                                               
188  Ibidem. 
189  Cited in: LERNER H., Op. cit., p.39. 
190  HABERMAS, On the Relation between the Nation, Rule of Law, and Democracy, 
p.135, cited in: LERNER H., Op. cit., p.39. 
191  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.163.  
192  Idem, p.164.  
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§7 CONCLUSION TO PART ONE 
Opting to this or that approach of the constituent power had direct 
implications on the way the constituent power is conceived. Here are 
some elements that can distinguish the two schools.193  
 Formal conception Material conception 
What matters is The form of the exercise of framing power  
The object on which that power 
is exercised  
Those entitled to 
original 
constituent power  
This depends on the 
circumstances of force, 
regardless of who is those 
entitled since it is pure fact 
and outside any legal 
consideration.  
Those entitled to constituent 
power is the people in a 
democracy and the monarch in a 
real democracy (SCHMITT). 
The people are the only entitled 
to exercise constituent power 
(Beaud) 
The exercise of 
the original 
constituent power 
It is, by definition, outside 
of every constitutional 
framework. It is a mere 
fact.  
When it touches the constitution 
(SCHMITT) or the national 
sovereignty (Beaud) even 
though it may follow 
constitutional revision 
procedures.  
Limits of the 
derived 
constituent power  
Only by the form and the 






Identical in their function 
distinct in their 
organization and origin; 
Distinct and opposed, there is 
only one constituent power.  
Conception of the 




The same value Hierarchical  
The passionate literature related to constituent power express those two 
different approaches; choosing one of those two options means also the 
determination of all the rest: the relevance of knowing who is entitled 
to constituent power; his legitimacy and limits; the nature of amending 
power; the nature of the constitution; the distinction between 
                                               
193  For more details, see detailed analyses in: GÖZLER K., Op. cit., pp.28-40. 
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constitution and constitutional laws… all questions that we have treated 
in details in the second and third chapters, when we presented the 
formal and material approaches.  
Let us take an example of two authors that had made a choice; 
consequently, their conclusions were totally in opposite direction. In his 
article, Prof. Nicolas MAZIAU, of the University of Nancy II, 
presented the two concepts of constituent power considering that:  
Le pouvoir constituant originaire est ainsi communément défini comme la 
puissance dont dispose une personne ou un organe constitué spécialement 
afin d’introduire une nouvelle Constitution tandis que le pouvoir constituant 
dérivé ou institué serait celui de modifier le texte constitutionnel dans les 
formes prescrites par celui-ci.194  
For MAZIAU, this definition creates a problem: the necessity to find 
out those entitled to sovereignty, and the authority of those that are 
charged to elaborate the constitution.  
The second definition of original constituent power considers these 
questions as irrelevant for the jurists since they are pure facts; 
according to O. Pfersmann:  
Le pouvoir constituant originaire ne peut être, par hypothèse, un phénomène 
juridique. Si l’on établit une Constitution en rupture avec celle qui existe 
jusqu’alors, on n’exerce pas un droit, on institue un nouveau système 
juridique. Le résultat est ce que nous avons appelé la Première Constitution 
historique. (…) L’établissement d’une Constitution ne relève pas du droit, il 
fonde le droit. (…) Puisqu’il n’y a pas de normes juridiques, il s’ensuit que la 
manière dont il convient de mettre en place une Première Constitution relève 
de la théorie politique non du droit.195  
For those who adopt such positions, it is more important to know who 
actually exercise that fundamental competence than to know who is/are 
nominally that/those entitled to it: this depends actually of the provisory 
government that will determine the organ –or organs- that would 
                                               
194  MAZIAU N., Op. cit., p.1. 
195  Cited in: Idem, p.2. 
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activate framing power. It is possible that the government, although 
declares his attachment to democratic procedures, would try to use that 
in order to have some advantages.196  
It is not easy to adhere to either of those two schools since none is 
completely satisfying: First, no doubt that the material conception is 
particularly complicated since many divisions can arise relating to the 
nature of the constitution (in opposition to constitutional laws) and its 
contents: what is its content exactly? Who can decide that? What is the 
best way to determine popular will? Besides, the material approach is 
also dangerous since it is easily the object of manipulation; second, the 
formal approach seems to be sometimes very simplistic. Jurists 
consider those entitled to constituent power as irrelevant since the 
enactment of original constituent power is, by definition, out of any 
legal limits. For those who opt for such a pure positivist approach, they 
may finish up by considering legitimate whatever follows the legal 
procedures. For them there is nothing legal outside the state, and 
anything inside the state that is in accordance with the legal norm, is 
considered as legal.  
Nevertheless, the reconciliation between both schools is possible. In 
fact, the framing and amending power both have a constituent nature 
but are enacted in different contexts: the first is enacted in contradiction 
to the procedures provided by the same constitution, while the second is 
enacted within the limits of the provisions of the constitution: 
regardless of the nature of the constitutional reform and whether the 
people participated in the process of constitutional amendment.  
Material limitations to the amending power can be easily surpassed by a 
double amendment: starting by amending the article that limits the 
amending possibility of certain constitutional provisions and then by 
amending the same provisions previously protected. The only 
limitations are procedural: the ‘constituency’ in charge of amending the 
constitution must respect the delays, and the procedures provided by the 
same constitution and the majority required. Also the procedures can be 
surpassed in double amendments. Accordingly, the only limitations that 
                                               
196  PACTET P., Op. cit., p.70 
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may exist to constituent power may be of a political nature that can be 
translated by self-binding provisions. Accordingly, the original 
constituent power may impose material or formal limitations on the 
framing power, but a double amendment will resolve the problem: for 
those who support this position, the amending power is unlimited.  
We don’t share this position; for us, changing those limits by double 
amendments imposed by the original constituent power shall be 
considered as enactment of the original constituent power. In other 
words, those entitled to exercise amending power commit a legal 
revolution against the constituent fathers, and against their will. They 
act formally in respect of the constitution (amending first the limiting 
article, and then amending what was first protected) but in fact, they do 
not. This can be considered as a ‘constituent revolution’, made by those 
entitled to exercise the framing power since those no longer comply 
with the limits imposed by the constituent fathers.  
Let us take the example of the limitations regarding the ‘Republican 
form’ of a state. Changing this kind of provision does not mean 
necessarily the enactment of original constituent power: all republics 
may convert one day to be monarchies and vice versa. Now, if a 
constitution provides that it is out of the constitutional amendment, then 
the double amendment to surpass this provision shall be considered as 
an enactment of the original constituent power and no longer the 
framing power, exactly as in the case of a revolution and a coup d’état; 
accordingly, those organs which effectuate such changes should 
seriously consider the consequences of their acts. As in a revolution, 
they may take the risk of failing, with the possible negative 
consequences in term of institutional stability and the pacific 
relationships between individuals and groups may be threatened.  
The enactment of the original constituent power is not completely out 
of any legal consideration since there is a need to distinguish between 
formal and material constitution. The material one, in fact, means a 
comprehensive system of laws and organization of power that every 
state, by definition, has. Accordingly, in the case of a new state -or an 
old one that has suffered drastic changes- the new (material) 
constitution reflects necessarily, the new force relationships and the 
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will of the new bearer(s) of supreme powers. The new system also 
reflects their ideology, their priorities, and their interests... which 
justified their ‘revolt’ (pacific or bloody) on the preceding regime. In 
this case, the constituency (ordinary assembly, assembly ad hoc, or 
simply a committee nominated by the executive) is given the charge to 
establish a (formal) constitution. They have nothing to invent but only 
to codify the material constitution, already enacted in the new state. In 
case of a state existing already, and the original constituent power is 
enacted (changing the constitution by disregarding constitutional 
provisions) then it can be considered that this reflects a change in the 
ethos of the interested population or of the state institutions and organs. 
Again, the formal constitution had a tendency to reflect the material 
constitution that has concretely applied supreme norms, not simply 
those included in a text, called the constitution. Accordingly, jurists 
cannot simply ignore the original constituent power as irrelevant. The 
‘legal’ character cannot be the exclusivity of ‘state’ production.  
Two examples at least to prove this assertion: first, the international 
law (we put aside the different reserves expressed by authors in relation 
to the nature of such a ‘law’); second, the acts of entities (with legal 
effects) that are not completely sovereign (thus not compelling 
statehood conditions) but exercise prerogatives towards a group of 
persons and/or territory; this can be the case of non-states subjects of 
international law which can be international organizations and 
liberation movements.  
Original constituent power is distinguished from amending power. On 
this point, formal and material conceptions agree (although they do so, 
following totally different reasoning). What is not always clear is 
whether constituent power is separated from the other powers (mainly 
the legislative, judicial and executive). We may confirm here (as 
outlined by Carré de MALBERG) that constituent power is not the 
exclusivity of any of the powers of the state, but it does not cover all 
the other powers either. Constituent power cannot have another task but 
to enact a constitution. Constituent power is neither the legislative 
power nor the judicial or executive powers, nor all of them collectively. 
They are simply separated. The constituency should not be tempted to 
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play another role other than that for which it has been designed: frame a 
constitution.197  
                                               
197  The question of the entitled to constituent power is much more complicated and is 
tightly related to another two questions treated to some extent in this first section, 
but will be considered in detail in the second and third parts: the question of limits 
and the question of legitimacy. In fact, many authors determine the limits in the light 
of pre-existent elements such as culture, ethnicity, religion… these elements can 
determine the identity of the people: the holder of constituent power. The reflection 
of the constitution on such identity may determine the legitimacy of such a 
document, since all (or at least the majority of) those making part of the people and 
living in the territory where the constitution is enacted, will consider it as their own.  
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THE NATIONALIZATION OF 
CONSTITUENT POWER 
 
Quoting GROTIUS, who contented that a people may give itself up to a 
king, J. J. Rousseau argued:  
…according to Grotius a people is people even before the gift to the king is 
made. The gift itself is a civil act; it presupposes public deliberation. Hence, 
before considering the act by which a people submits to a king, we ought to 
scrutinize the act by which a people become a people, for that act, being 
necessarily antecedent to the other, is the real foundation of society.198 It is 
this absolutism of individual’s self-commitment which leads Rousseau to the 
conclusion that the sovereign who originates from this act cannot violate 
anybody’s rights.199  
Consequently, studying the foundation of the legitimacy of the 
constitution, one should inevitably consider the social contract as the 
basis of its legitimacy. Social contract means that popular sovereignty 
is expressed by the constituent assembly. J.J. Rousseau wrote:  
Each one of us puts into the common stock his person and all his power, 
under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive as a body 
each member of an indivisible part of the whole. 200  
                                               
198  PREUSS U.K., op. cit., p.161. 
199  Idem, p.162. 
200  Nevertheless, one shall distinguish between the foundation of the society and the the 
constituent power. As explained by PREUSS: “Rousseau speaks of the foundation of 
civil society, not of the process of constitution making. We must distinguish both 
steps, although empirically they will normally coincide. It is hardly conceivable that 
in real life the formation of a group out of multitude of individuals, and the 
determination of the structure according to which the group is enabled to act as an 
entity, can be separated from each other. However, the distinction is analytically 
important because the generation of a constitution for a group presupposes the very 
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Some modern constitutions express this, in the same constitutional 
document: the 1949 German Grundgesetz states that the “German 
nation has given itself this Basic Law, and that it applies to the whole of 
the German Nation…”; the 1946 Japanese Constitution: “We Japanese 
people… do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and 
do firmly establish this constitution”; The 1996 South Africa 
Constitution: “We the people of South Africa… through our freely 
elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the Supreme law of 
the Republic”. Hanna Lerner wrote,201  
We live in an era of constitution making. Of close to 200 national 
constitutions in existence today, more than half have been written or rewritten 
in the last quarter of a century. Many of these constitutions begin with some 
version of the four famous words: “We the People of…” Yet it is surprising 
how limited and narrow the theoretical discussion is concerning the meaning 
of that “We”, and the nature of the relationship between the constitution and 
the people who draft it. The “We” issue is particularly problematic in the 
context of deeply divided societies, which are grappling with the very 
definition of their unity.202 
For her, the people are the authors of the constitution and, accordingly, 
the constitution shall reflect also their specific identity.203 Yet, there are 
different social contract approaches: first, the British approach – which 
did not need a written constitution -emphasizes the political self-
government of society through parliament; second, the French approach 
                                                                                                       
existence of the group.Hence, before the group gives itself a constitution, it must 
clarify who is subject to this constitutional determination, and who is entitled to 
participate in this decision. In other words, who is a member of the group”. Idem, 
p.161. 
201  Hanna Lerner is Ph.D. candidate in Columbia University. She presented this paper at 
the mini-APSA, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, April 30, 
2004. The paper is not published yet, but I had obtained her approval for citing her 
in my thesis.  
202  LERNER H., Op. cit., p.2.  
203  “I refer here to the issue of the people who are the authors of the constitution, their 
values, their shared norms and beliefs, their identity. Constitutions, I wish to argue, 
do not only establish the structure of a political regime or set limitations on 
governmental power. They also delineate the highest principles and ultimate values 
shared by the citizens of the state”. Idem, p.6.  
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– which had few scruples in replacing its constitutions- emphasizes the 
nation as it is manifested in the state; third, the American social 
contract approach reflects the American concern with a society 
consisting of a multitude of individuals whose mutual contract is 
contained in the Supreme Constitution.204  
Now, the feeling of belonging together can be created by different 
means; consequently, there are different concepts of nation which 
influence and determine the concept of ‘constituent power’.  
The German nation excluded all those who did not share the German culture. 
In the United States the exclusion of culture from politics was the means that 
created national unity. France created the nation based on political will by 
creating an own national culture and by suppressing divergent cultures.205 
National identity played a necessary role in the emergence phase of the 
nation-state, by making possible a new mode of secular legitimization 
to the state based on a new form of social integration.206 This is also the 
case of contemporary new states. The problem is to understand whether 
a constituent power will necessarily reflect a pre-existent identity,  
The idea of constituent power seems to presuppose a capacity on the part of 
society to act together as a collectivity. However, it is not clear whether the 
collectivity of the people must exist prior to the constitution or if the very act 
of constitution making –of practicing the constituent power – which creates 
the collectivity. Does the constituent power of the people only exist if ‘the 
people’ represents an ethnically homogenous collectivity, or does it 
essentially mean that a pluralist and diverse society has the capacity to govern 
itself? Is the constitution the manifestation of the national identity of a 
particular people or is it an act of political self-organization of a civil 
society?207 
The answer is simple (at least theoretically): both cases are possible. It 
depends in fact, on the country and the particular context in which the 
                                               
204  VENTER F., Constitution Making and the Legitimacy of the Constitution, pp.10-12.  
205  TÖPPERWIEN N., Nation-State and Normative Diversity, p.3. 
206  LERNER H., op. cit., p.19. 
207  Idem, p.11. 
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constitution is enacted. Nevertheless, the second question is, then, to 
know if there is any connection between the constitution and the 
collective who holds the constituent power. Here there are two options: 
first, there is no connection at all between the two. This is the position 
of Hans Kelsen; with his legal positivism, he solves the paradox of 
constitutional legitimacy by separating the legal from the political; 
secondly, there is a direct connection between the constitution and the 
people. Here there are three alternatives: a) the identity of “We the 
people”208 derives from the making of the constitution itself; b) the 
people as well as their constitution emerge simultaneously in a gradual 
and incremental manner; or c) the constitution does not create the 
collectivity but mirrors a pre-political unity while recognizing the pre-
constitutional exercise of a homogeneous nation’s general will.209  
Although the constitution does not always express a predefined 
identity, it is nevertheless important that the constitution be felt as the 
result of the act of all those who compose the ‘we’ of the constitution. 
Otherwise it will lack necessary legitimacy. The constitution shall be 
considered by the majority of the polity (as individuals or as groups- 
ethnics, religious, linguistic…) as being their own and they shall 
identify themselves with the document.210 In other words, the 
importance of the constitution does not lie in its expression of political 
identity, but in its ability to transform it into a civic one.211 Besides, the 
constituent power is tightly related to the question of constitutional 
                                               
208  Quoting Bruce Ackermann’s reflection in his volume: We the People. Foundations, 
Cambridge, Mass. /London, 1991. 
209  Idem, pp.13-14. 
210  LERNER H., op. cit., p.12. 
211  As confirmed by PREUSS, “the constituent power is simultaneously the creator of 
the constitution and the permanent threat to it. Yet, both functions are necessary for 
the vitality of the constitution. What matters is not the pre-constitutional shared –or 
unshared– identity, but the new political identity based on the constitution itself… 
The constitution although created by the constituent power, must always fight 
against the tendency of its own creator to infuse pre-political elements into the 
structures of politics…The constitution gives birth to the people in the sense in 
which this notion has been developed for the concept of democracy that is in the 
sense of the demos”. Cited in: LERNER H., op. cit., p.26. 
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legitimacy. In contemporary times, the constitution that is adopted 
through democratic means is considered legitimate.212  
Now, many authors expressed serious criticisms towards the social 
contract as the foundation of legitimacy of the constitution. For them, 
justifying law by social contract is fiction; law has to be justified by 
something outside itself. The constitution, indeed, has to be effective. It 
must be adopted and put into operation with authority. In a 
constitutional state, authority is characterized by democratic 
legitimization to which also the democratic minority acquiesces.  
The origin supremacy of the constitution is therefore founded in the 
authority of the constitution-writing entity, but this does not explain the 
perpetuation of its predominance. In fact, predominance of the 
constitution is maintained by the operation of the legitimately 
established devices of the constitution itself, which can remain effective 
only as long as citizenry and the states’ organs of authority – which are 
governed by the constitution, continue to lead legitimacy in its 
institutions through the due employment of the mechanisms and 
procedures provided by the constitution. The force outside the 
constitution, which ensures its primacy, is its practical legitimacy, when 
it gives reasonable and realistic expression to the principles and needs 
of the legal community that it serves.  
In a constitutional state, revolution, civil war, and the amendment of the 
constitution shall be considered as a changing of the ethos and/or the 
will of the citizens. Accordingly, a legitimate constitution can be 
considered a solemn codification of basic rules for the operation of the 
                                               
212  Idem, p.11. “To be fully legitimate, political institutions must be perceived by 
citizens as democratic forums of self-rule, where debate is inclusive and 
comprehensible, representatives fully accountable, and decisions publicly justified. 
A well functioning public sphere of this sort would seem to require something more 
than a shared commitment to universal principles, something which motivates 
citizens to feel that particular institutions are somehow theirs, in a meaningful 
sense, so that they are in a position to adopt what Habermas calls the ‘we 
perspective of active self-determination’ ”. LABORDE C., From Constitutional to 
Civic Patriotism, in: British Journal of Political Science, n. 32, 2002, p.601, cited 
in: LERNER H., op. cit., p.12. 
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state. It tends to reflect national customs and usages that the legal 
culture of the state is strongly influenced, if not determined thereby.213  
Now, most Arab countries have a constitution; the way the constitution 
is adopted and the role it plays done for it depends also on the way it is 
conceived by interested members of a population and those in power. 
The particularity of Arab States will be presented here, in the light of 
national movements and ideals and the influence it may have on those 
who have the power to elaborate the constitution in those states.214 
After a general presentation of different concepts of nation, state, and 
nation-state, and the influence a nation has to constituent power, we 
will refer to Arab-Muslim particularity. We need examine if and how 
the reconciliation with the theory of constituent power will be possible.  
In section two, we will present internal challenges facing contemporary 
Arab States: Arab nationalism and Islamism. This section will be 
followed by a brief presentation of the characteristics of early 
Caliphate, and the successive political and doctrinal divisions that 
occurred. After that, a presentation shall be done to different attempts to 
answer main doctrinal problems of that time which manifested 
themselves in the early schools of law, followed by the presentation of 
the doctrine of Al-Fārābi in his ‘ideal city-state’ and the political theory 
of Ibn Khaldûn and his chef d’oeuvre: the introduction to universal 
history (al-muqaddimah). The last section is dedicated for comparative 
presentation of some Arab constitutional provisions in relation to the 
internal challenges presented in the previous sections.  
                                               
213  VENTER F., Op. cit., p.12.  
214  Since “Constitutions are not “one-size-fits all” items. Their particular elements are 
of importance…On the other hand, one should be wary of reducing constitutional 
discourse to merely relativistic terminology. Thus, despite the dominance of the 
liberal constitutional perception, the notion of a constitution is not painted with only 
one particular cultural colour. That is, constitutions are not merely a product of 
Western civilization, or a new form of domination, which does not fit non-western 
societies. Moreover, constitutions should not be conceived merely in contextual 
terms which prevent any generalization. Albeit the variety of places and times in 
which they have grown, the range of documents identified as ‘constitutions’ do 
share some principles, standards, and symbolisms”. LERNER H., op. cit., p.43. 
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In considering the problems of ‘authority’, the treatment of various 
arguments such as the Caliphate, the question of ‘power’, and the 
relationship between the governor and the ‘governed’, will need to be 
made. How can one or more have authority over the others? This is the 
main question posed in this part. Ibn Khaldûn addresses this in his long 
introduction, and modern writers such as Ghassan SALAMÉ,215 took 
al-muqaddimah as a lesson for modern Arab states, where there is a real 
and continuous challenge for the states in order to establish and to 
justify their authority on their peoples. 
                                               
215  Ghassan SALAMÉ, author of: Appels d'Empire. Ingérences et résistances à l'âge de 
la mondialisation, Paris, Fayard, 1996; Démocraties sans démocrates. Politiques 
d'ouverture dans le monde islamique, (dir.), Paris, Fayard, 1994; Proche-Orient. Les 
exigences de la paix, Paris, Complexe, 1994; The Foundations of the Arab State, 
Londres, Croom Helm, 1990; The Politics of Arab Integration, Londres, Croom 
Helm, 1990.  
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§8 Different Concepts of Nation 
The idea of constituent power presupposes the capacity of the society to 
develop its ability to act as a collectivity in order to gain (or regain) an 
active role in the organization of the lives of individuals and their social 
relations with each other.216 According to Sieyès, the constitution is not 
based or dependent upon tradition, historical legacy, or religious 
revelations, but originates in a secular willpower… the concept of the 
constituent power of a nation implies that the empirical subject of this 
power is the people, not a monarch or an aristocratic elites.  
The nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is 
always legal; indeed it is the law itself…Not only is the nation not subject to 
a constitution, but it cannot be and must not be…the manner in which a 
nation exercises its will does not matter… any procedure is adequate, and its 
will is the supreme law.217 
As such, the nation’s will is a pre-constitutional source of the 
constitution, and the constitution is the institutionalization of the 
nation’s will.218 At this point, the question arises regarding the meaning 
of a nation; according to Sieyès, the nation is a “body of associates 
living under common laws and represented by the same legislative 
assembly”.219 In other words, the nation consists of the totality of its 
citizenry.220 This reflects the French idea of the nation. According to the 
German and Eastern Europe Concept, the nation is a pre-political 
community, which is constituted by the commonness of such properties 
as origin, race, language, religion, culture, history and the like. In this 
sense, a nation must be distinguished from a nation-state, which is a 
                                               
216  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.148.  
217  Idem, p.149.  
218  Ibidem. 
219  Ibidem. 
220  Idem, p.150. 
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political organization that incorporates a nation. In this understanding a 
nation can exist independently of a state.221  
There are different interpretations of constitution: the radical-
democratic form (France can be cited as an example) that refers to the 
people to resolve problems; a constitution is a continuous revolution, 
and as such is unstable. The other interpretation is the institutionalized 
form which creates institutions that would allow people to return to 
their normal lives (the new states following 1989 revolutions can be 
cited as examples).222  
According to Prof. MAZIAU, there are two approaches in relation to 
the constituent power, the first one he calls ‘essentialiste’ and the 
second he calls ‘formaliste’. The first approach nationalizes the 
constituent act and finds its origins in the doctrine of Sieyès, developed 
further by SCHMITT. According to such an approach, constituent 
power derives from the nation, the first subject of the law, from which 
the state and the constitution are originated. While the second approach 
finds its origins in the American constitutionalism, which is less 
dogmatic and considers the constitution as a group of mechanisms of 
division of power and institutional organization.223 
8.1. Nation, State, and Nation-State 
Authors used to distinguish between the term of people as demos or as 
ethnos. Demos (staatsvolk) refers to the totality of citizens while ethnos 
(Volk) is a community based on the belief in a common descent or 
culture.224 When a nation substitutes the people as an element of the 
state, we have a nation-state. The term ‘nation’ is accepted as a central 
political concept of recent times; sometimes it is synonymous with a 
                                               
221  Ibidem. 
222  Idem, 145. 
223  MAZIAU N., Op. cit., pp.7-8. 
224  TÖPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., pp.4-5.  
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state, with its inhabitants, or with a human group bound together by 
loyalty and common solidarity.225  
The nation is a community of people united in solidarity who believe in a 
common identity and who decide or want to decide about their own destiny 
through concreted political action. The political action is directed at gaining, 
preserving, or strengthening statehood.226 
Now, if those entitled to constituent power are the people, then, they 
who have the right to limit themselves in a constitution are the 
sovereign people, considered as the totality of the citizens. In case the 
people as demos do not coincide with the people as ethnos, a problem 
exists: what is the relation between them? It is clear that vital decisions 
need to be taken and those entitled to sovereignty needs to make a kind 
of legal fiction, acting as if they represent the people in their totality -
including those who are not or not yet the citizens of the state (the post 
World War II Germany, for example).227  
The paradox of constituent power originates in the very definition of the term 
“the people”. The ancient Greek concept of the demos already had several 
possible interpretations: it could mean either the entire body, the many, the 
majority or the mob. This diversity is still reflected in the modern language: 
while the Italian term popolo, the French peuple, the German volk, and the 
Hebrew עם  (am), all convey the idea of a singular entity, the English word 
people indicates a plural. This diversity has generated a variety of approaches 
                                               
225  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Islam and the State, p.35. For us, ‘nation’ is used mostly in 
sociological terms, while ‘people’ is more appropriate for legal use. Accordingly, we 
do not share the position of some authors who distinguish between nation and 
people by the existence or not of sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is true, as some 
authors put it that a people/nation as demos is a sovereign people while the 
nation/people as ethnos means a unique people based on a unique culture (for 
example, TÖPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., p.5). 
226  TÖPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., p.57.  
227  In the Palestinian case, the citizens of the future state of Palestine would exercise 
their constituent power and would adapt a constitution. This constitution needs to 
discuss some key arguments which regulation interests all the Palestinian people, not 
the Palestinian citizens only.  
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aiming at understanding the interrelations between constitutions and the 
people who make them.228 
In fact the father of the constituent power (l’Abbé Sieyès) defines the 
nation exclusively as demos (the French concept of nation). According 
to the definition given by Sieyès –as we have previously asserted- every 
demos is a nation. This was partially the position held by Dominique 
Schnapper who defines the nation as demos but then denies that nations 
exist as ethnos, although some nations began as ethnic groups. For her, 
in fact, once the state exists, all citizens are members of the nation.229 
Now, defining the concept of nation is essential for the state-building 
(in the case of a non-existent state) or for preservation of the state (if 
the state exists already); in fact the nation provides identity for the 
individual and legitimacy for the state.  
Nation-building, as a reaction to a profound identity and legitimacy 
crises, went hand in hand with the internationalization and application 
of theories of popular sovereignty.230 The definition of the state adopted 
here is a legal one: cumulatively, as constitutive elements, a state has a 
people, a territory, and sovereignty, and they must be interrelated.231 
This is called a minimalist definition because it is open to most existent 
regimes although illegitimate, authoritarian or non-democratic. The 
people are considered as subjects over whom the state exercises its 
sovereignty;232 the sovereignty must encompass a people based on a 
                                               
228  LERNER H., op. cit., pp.10-11. 
229  Idem, p.45. 
230  Idem, p.23.  
231  This is the legal definition made given by Jellinek, in: Idem, p.21.  
232  Contemporary state’s sovereignty is no more absolute. In fact, the state can impose 
self-limitations as for example when the state limits itself by the law and stop to be 
arbitral (rule of law). Besides, contemporary state is conceding elements that were 
always under its domestic jurisdiction in favour of international or regional 
organizations.  
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territory.233 A similar definition of the state is presented by Carré de 
MALBERG, who wrote that:  
Tout, ce que peut faire le juriste, c'est de constater que l'Etat se trouve formé a 
partir du moment où la collectivité nationale, fixée sur un certain territoire, 
possède, en fait, des organes exprimant sa volonté, établissant son ordre 
juridique, et imposant supérieurement sa puissance de commandement.234  
8.2. The Different Concepts of Nation 
The French concept of nation, based on the idea of citizenship, is an 
example of a state nation (the nation is the demos). In contrast, the 
German perception includes the idea of a culture nation (the nation is 
the ethnos). A nation based on common citizenship is necessarily a 
state-nation, whereas the culture-nation can be entirely stateless235 and 
can be politically organized in a plurality of states.236 In fact, in 
contemporary states, it is very rare –even impossible- that one 
homogeneous ethnos is politically organized in a nation; normally the 
ethnos and the demos of a state are incongruous.237 This has serious 
consequences, as it has for the concept of self-determination, for 
example, as shown by PREUSS, 
In Western Europe it (self-determination) meant that the demotic nation took 
over the government of an existing sovereign state, thereby safeguarding its 
self-determination. In the freedom movement that spread from Germany east 
and south, however, the term “self-determination” meant the liberation of a 
pre-established ethnic society from alien influence and foreign domination.238  
                                               
233  The borders of the territory is not necessarily definitively delimitated; this is the case 
of the state of Israel that has never defined its territory or delimitated its borders. For 
a different position, TÖPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., p.14. 
234  CARRE DE MALBERG R., op. cit., p.484. 
235  Such as the Polish Nation between 1795 and 1918. PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.150. 
236  Like Germany before the foundation of the Bismarck Reich in 1871, and between 
1949 and 1990. See Idem, p.150. Many Arab nationalists believe that Arabs form a 
unique nation (in its ethnic sense) which is divided politically in indifferent modern 
Arab states.  
237  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.150. 
238  Ibidem. 
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In fact, different concepts of nation would have serious consequences 
on the concept of ‘constituent power’.  
For example, according to the French concept of nation, the constituent 
power is the power of a collective body, which, by the very act of 
constitution-giving, exercises its right to self-rule. The constituent 
power of a nation presupposes the notion of a demotic entirety of 
individuals –the citizenry- an entirety which originates from this very 
act of creating common laws and a common representative body.239  
It is generally accepted that the French Monarchy had already claimed 
to embody the French nation, but evidently, this claim did not refer to 
entire population living within the boundaries of the kingdom, nor did it 
refer to a pre-political entity such as the linguistic community of all 
Frenchmen.240 In a political sense, there was no French nation before 
the Revolution nor was there one before its establishment through the 
exercise of the constituent power by the third estate.241 Therefore, it was 
not the commonness of the language that constituted the nation, but, 
conversely, it was the nation that required and created the commonness 
of the language.242  
According to the German concept of nation, the meaning of nation-state 
is that a nation, (in its ethnic sense, defined in terms of commonness of 
language and/or religion, culture, origin, etc.), acquires its political 
existence in its own state. The nation is a pre-statal, pre-political, 
existential and almost an eternal entity, whereas the state is a quasi-
accidental and ephemeral phenomenon, which supports the survival of 
the nation in the history, but is not really the embodiment of the essence 
of the nation. However, the political self-determination of a nation 
requires statehood; but it is a statehood based on ethnic homogeneity.  
It is the self-determination of ethnos, directed against alien influence, 
rather than the political self-rule and freedom of demos, which is 
                                               
239  Ibidem. 
240  Idem, p.151. 
241  Ibidem. 
242  Idem, p.152. 
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directed against political pressure and social inequality.243 What is most 
relevant in the debate regarding the affinity between constitutions and 
constituent power, is the conclusion that in the framework of the ethnic 
conception of a nation the constituent power of the nation does not 
coincide with the principle of democratic sovereignty (just as national 
self-determination is not the same as democratic freedom). 
In her recently published doctorate thesis (Nation-State and Normative 
Diversity) Nicole TÖPPERWIEN dedicated the second part to the 
American, French and German concept of nation. For her, these 
different experiences present three diverse ways of considering culture, 
and in the final part an alternative to these is presented in the Swiss 
concept. For her, nation and culture are not linked in the USA; culture 
is not relevant for the state because it was not relevant for the nation 
whereas in France the nation creates and defines the culture; 
accordingly, the culture is relevant to the nation and to the state 
although it was not relevant to nation-building. On the other hand, in 
Germany, the culture defines the nation; consequently, culture is 
relevant to the nation and the state, and was already relevant for to 
nation-building.244 The different concepts of nation determine the idea 
of a state, and its relation to individuals and civil society.245  
8.3. Sha’ab or Umma?   
It is clear that there is not one definition of the concept of nation, 
people and state. Actually, these terms are often used as synonymous, 
while they are not.  
As an example of that confusion, we will mention the charter of the 
United Nations (UN). In fact, we read in its first beginning: “we the 
peoples of the United Nations…” while the organization membership 
is limited to states. Peoples subjectivity, in fact is limited to the 
recognition of people’s right to self-determination, which is not 
                                               
243  Ibidem. 
244  TÖPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., pp.68-69. 
245  The particularities of each system are related to their constitutional history, however, 
due to the limitations of this research, a detailed investigation cannot be made. 
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interpreted pacifically, especially when it does mean the right to 
statehood, since the UN is based on sovereignty of member states.  
The same confusion occurs in the Arabic terminology. The concept 
umma (translated as a nation) is used when it refers to Islamic and/or 
Arab nation, while sha’b (translated as people) refers to single Arab 
peoples and dawla (translated as state) refers to the territorial Arab 
states (dawla qutryya). The term dawla is relatively modern and refers 
to ruler’s (or dynasty of rulers) administration in the recent past, similar 
to the concept of Sultanate in the Ottoman Empire. The concept of ard 
or arady (territory or territories) refers to all the Arab territories as one 
unit or to the territory of single Arab states, while the concept qutur 
refers only to the territory of a single state.  
In addition, the adjective of the word ‘nation’ (translated as ‘national’) 
is qawmiyya when it refers to the Arab nation, while it is wataniyya 
(also translated as ‘national’) when it is related to the territorial Arab 
nationalism, also meaning patriotism. While the concept of muwatana 
refers to the citizenship; this concept has its origin in watan that is 
homeland, although sometimes it is used to refer to Arab land, alwatan 
al-arabi!  
Consequently, it is necessary to take in consideration these different 
concepts, and understand them in their historical context and actual 
application, in order to understand the relation between nation-people 
in the Arab perspective.  
In his book, Az-Zahir fi ma’ani Kalimat an-Nas, Ibn al-Anbari notes 
that the term umma (nation) occurs in eight different senses in Arabic. 
Some of these meanings are: a community or a group of people; a 
religion; time…246 Besides, the terms nation (umma) and mother (umm) 
prove by virtue of their being derived from the same linguistic root, that 
‘nation’ is an extension of one’s family – indeed it is the bond of 
brotherhood par excellence. ‘A nation is a uterine experience’, says al-
Arsuzi, meaning that it is an extension of foetal life.247  
                                               
246  BENSAID S., Al-Watan and Al-Umma in Contemporary Arab Use, p.150. 
247  Idem, p.167. 
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In the al-muheit dictionary the term umma means a group of people 
(nas)248 united by common land, language, tradition, interests, emotions 
and aspirations; Accordingly, the Arabs would be considered as one 
complete umma although they may be distributed in different states, 
each holding its own political independence.  
In the al-Ghany dictionary the term umma means a group of people 
(nas) united by common historical liaisons that may be composed of 
language, religion or the economy and have the same goals in their 
beliefs, the politics or in the economy. It is used to indicate the Arabic 
umma and the Islamic umma. The same term is used in plural umam to 
indicate, for example the United Nations.  
By contrast the semantic field of the term watan (fatherland, or patrie, 
in French), is much narrower than that of the umma. According to Ibn 
Manzur’s (Lisan Al-‘Arab, Vol.XIII: 451) watan is “the house in which 
one lives; one’s residence or native place; the place where these 
animals lies down to rest”.249  
The word istawtana means ‘to settle in a country’.250 Still, there is a 
difference in contemporary use:  
There is a wide difference between the meaning of watan used by Ibn Manzur 
and the meanings which the term conveys in contemporary Arab use, where 
both watan and its derivative form wataniyya (Patriotism), are highly charged 
emotionally. Besides, with reference to national territory itself, the term, in 
contemporary Arab usage implies the existence of linguistic, racial and 
cultural ties between different groups and individuals living in the same 
geographical area.251 
                                               
248  As the French concept ‘gens’ and not ‘peuple’; both these French terms are 
translated into English as ‘people’. 
249  Personally, I believe that the main difference between umma and watan is that the 
first is related to persons: a community or group of people at the centre of relations 
between the governors and the governed at the beginning of Islam, as in the case of 
medieval Europe. The second, on the contrary, refers to the place, where one 
(human or animal) lives, and rests. The term watan in contemporary Arabic reflects 
the evolution of the concept of state in Arab and Islamic culture. 
250  BENSAID S., Op. cit., p.151.  
251  Ibidem. 
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In the al-Ghany dictionary, the word ‘sha’ab’ means a group of people 
(nas) united by common liaisons and speaking one language. Here the 
concept of sha’ab is not distinguished from umma since this definition 
does not distinguish Palestinian people from the Jordanian people for 
example, considered in this definition as one Arab sha’ab. The term 
sha’ab here is equivalent to umma. The only difference is that sha’ab 
can be used to indicate distinct Arab populations (thus, it also can be 
used in the plural) when referring to all Arab people considered as a 
single entity, while the concept of umma can be used only in the 
singular and in reference to the Arab nation as a single unit.252 
8.4. The Powerful Concept of Homeland  
The power of the homeland concept to shape ethnicity, nationalism, 
citizenship, and immigration is well illustrated by the Israeli/Palestinian 
case, in which two opposite homeland narratives are told: Palestinian-
Arab and Jewish-Zionist. The former is premised on the continuous 
long-term residence as an indigenous people of the country, while the 
latter rests on ancient sacred texts and Diaspora longings for a 
‘promised land’. Both Jews and Palestinians claim to be the rightful 
owners of the land on historical grounds, but refer to different historical 
periods to justify their claims.253  
The ‘homeland’ is a powerful mobilizing force behind ethnic and 
national movements and identities. Homeland ethnicity is distinct from 
immigrant ethnicity, and forms the basis for homeland nationalism. 
Ethnic homeland territoriality was transformed during the modern 
period, and was gradually elevated to state level, becoming increasingly 
separatist and absolute. This came about because the homeland territory 
constituted a central foundation of modern ethnic nationalism and 
embodied much of the nation’s cultural and political assets.254  
                                               
252  The Arab terminology does not coincide necessarily with the terms used usually in 
English.  
253  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.376.  
254  Idem, p.381.  
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In Arabic, homeland is translated as watan. This concept will be 
presented with reference to Arab and Muslim culture and usage, and 
then applied to the Palestinians. For them, in fact, it was this concept 
that related their nationalism to a specific land called Palestine, which 
they considered their homeland and the realization of their nationalism. 
Palestinian nationalism involves the specific identity of Palestinians in 
their relation to their homeland. It seeks to exhibit national 
characteristics, to emphasize them, and to deepen people’s awareness of 
them.255 It is a return to the people, as the only source of legitimacy and 
power, as Mustapha Kamel (the Egyptian nationalist leader) put it:  
The people are the backbone of the watan and the source of its prosperity, its 
glory and its happiness.256 The people are the only real power, to whose will 
even the greatest and mightiest men submit.257 
The notion of watan was used to justify the rebellion against Turkish 
occupation, even though the occupier professed the same religion as the 
occupied.258 The same concept was used to justify the rebellion against 
western colonialism under the mandate.  
At-Tahtawi says that ‘one’s watan is the home in which one was born 
and brought up, the home of one’s family and relatives, the land whose 
soil, food and air have contributed to one’s growth’.259 In fact, the 
notion of watan acquired a new dimension and became connected to 
nationalism and patriotism. At-Tahtawi writes:  
The devoted nationalist is the one who scarifies every thing, even his life, to 
protect his watan against any potential harm-doer, just as the father would 
protect his child from evil… therefore, the citizens’ intentions regarding their 
watan should always be virtuous and honorable.260 
                                               
255  BENSAID S., Op. cit., p.162. 
256  Idem, p.164. 
257  Ibidem. 
258  Idem, p.153. 
259  Idem, p.155. 
260  Idem, p.157. 
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Only since at-Tahtawi’s time it was common to read that 
Fellow-countrymen are always united, sharing the same language system, 
having the same ruler, and obeying the same ruler, and obeying the same laws 
under the same political system.261  
Before his time, membership consisted of belonging to the Islamic 
community, or to the land of Islam, regardless of language and political 
differences. As ad-Duri has pointed out, at-Tahtawi must have been 
influenced by the notion of a national state.262 It is clear that the concept 
of nation switched to its civic dimension here. This is the position of 
Adib Ishaq who repeatedly pointed out that the worth of a watan resides 
in its citizens, that is, in the people who are ‘equal in rights and duties 
in front of their watan’. The totality of these citizens constitutes the 
people.263  
In at-Tahtawi’s view, the primary characteristic of a compatriot is that 
‘he/she enjoys the rights of citizenship, the most significant of such 
rights being total freedom in society’. Finally,  
the citizen will not be considered to be free unless he submits himself to the 
laws of the country, and helps in its application. The individual citizen’s 
submission to national law necessarily entails that, in return, the country 
guarantees the citizen’s civil rights as well as certain municipal privileges and 
services.264 
The watan, as political philosophers define it, is “the place you descend 
from, toward which you have well defined obligations, in which you 
have sacred rights, and in which you, your kin and your property are 
secure”.265  According to Adib Ishaq, “The watan is the individual’s 
place of residence. Traditionally, it is the country in which the great 
majority of a nation (umma) has struck roots and grown in number 
                                               
261  Ibidem. 
262  Idem, pp.155-156. 
263  Idem, p.163. 
264  Idem, p.156. 
265  Idem, p.158. 
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through the process of creation”.266 Quoting La Bruyère, Adib Ishaq 
writes:  
What use is to me to have a great watan, if in it, I’m unhappy, despised, 
living in perpetual humiliation, misery, and fear of imprisonment? 
Consequently, a watan is meaningless unless it is a place where one can live 
with dignity and respect... as La Bruyère put it, ‘there is no patrie where there 
is despotism’. Or, as the ancient Romans defined it, ‘one’s fatherland is that 
in which one enjoys political rights and performs political duties’.267 
From the fundamentalist point of view, there is no connection between 
watan and territory. This had been the case since the dawn of Islam. 
According to Sayyed Qutb,  
Since that day, the fatherland of a Muslim ceased to be a portion of land. 
Instead, his watan became the home of Islam, the land in which Islam and 
Islamic law are the sole authority.268 
Sayyed Qutb considers that a “Muslim’s watan is not a piece of land, 
and his nationality is not that of a government”. 269  
  
                                               
266  Ibidem. 
267  Ibidem. 
268  Idem, p.172. 
269  Idem, p.173. 
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§9 Arab nationalism, Islamism and Territorial States 
The relation between Arab nation and single Arab peoples is an 
interesting study case and of significance in this research. The relation 
between the two concepts may not be properly realized by using 
concepts such as ‘nation’ and ‘people’. In fact, these two concepts have 
to be understood in the light of the wider concept of the umma, which 
was originally used to indicate the Islamic community, or the 
community of believers. It is noted, in fact, that a return to shari’a has 
been made, and an increasing reference to Islam as a justification of the 
State’s authority and of the state’s rejection at the same time, made 
respectively by the state apparatus and the fundamentalist groups of 
Arab States. In contemporary Arab States, the relation between these 
three concepts (the Islamic nation, the Arab nation and the single Arab 
people) is becoming increasingly problematic.  
This apparent incompatibility explains the popular diffidence towards 
their regimes from the one side and the diffidence of Arab regimes 
towards movements promoting HR and democracy (especially with 
regards to the liberty of thought and expression), on the other. Still, 
most of Arab regimes justify their same authority by ‘elections’ or by 
popular legitimacy and representation, which are the basic elements of 
democracy.  
In order to define people and nation in general, and in the Arab and 
Muslim context, the terminology will be clarified, followed by an 
introduction to Arab nationalism, in relation to existing Arab States and 
to Islamism. 
After considering the concept of nation in general, the concepts of Arab 
nationalism, territorial nationalism and Islamism will be taken into 
account.270 The term nationalism will be reviewed, and then 
                                               
270  Some authors advocate that nationalism is a European invention carried to the 
Middle East by Napoleon. It became precarious because it clashed with older, 
deeper loyalties, and remained insignificant in determining and directing political 
identity under Islam. Consequently, a country under Islamic history is a place, while 
a nation is a people or umma and the community is determined by religious belief. 
Accordingly, identity remained based on religious belief and loyalty developed, by 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 94 
consideration will be given to Arab nationalism, its genesis and the 
relation between pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism, followed by Arab 
States and territorial nationalism in the final section, then the question 
of Islamism in relation to Arab nationalism and territorial nationalism 
will be evaluated.  
9.1. Arab Nationalism  
The term umma, throughout the Islamic era, has referred to the 
universal Muslim community. Around the end of the nineteenth 
century, however, the term umma began to appear in political literature 
of the time with reference to the universal Arab community, thus 
acquiring a preponderantly secular meaning.271 Not only that; Arab 
nationalists insist that the Arab nation is the only ‘true’ nation, either in 
Sati’ al-Husri’s rather assertive way or in ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ad-Duri’s more 
subtle prose. For ‘Aflaq, umma is the Arab nation; since a nation exists 
when the population believes that they constitute a nation, and not 
according to the increment or reduction of numbers.  
According to ‘Aflaq, ‘a nation is an idea, a matter of will’: a nation is not a 
matter of numbers, but an idea embodied in the totality of its members or in 
part of them. Therefore, there is no relation between this idea and the increase 
and decrease in the number of individuals, because a nation does not perish 
when its population decreases in number. Rather, it dies out if the idea itself 
ceases to exist among the population. The total number of people is not holy 
in itself; rather, its holiness depends on its ability to embody the idea of 
umma in the present and in the future.272  
The proponents of an Islamic umma overshadowing all these 
territorially, linguistically or ethnically defined ‘asabiyyas (group 
feelings), tend to view these loyalties as pre-Mohammedan and thus 
anti-Islamic Jahiliyya concepts, which should have disappeared when 
the Mohammedan Da’wa (Call) emerged.273 In fact, some authors 
                                                                                                       
force of historical circumstances, to a state, a government, or a ruler. VATIKIOTIS 
P.J., Op. cit., p.36. 
271  HARIK I., The Origins of the Arab State System, pp.20-21. 
272  BENSAID S., Op. cit., pp.166-167. 
273  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), The Foundations of the Arab State, p.5.  
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outlined that the concept of community (umma) in Islam is an 
expression of a religious ideology. The community exists in order that 
the believers may actualize the Islamic ideal: God’s revealed pattern for 
the universe.274  
One has also to bear in mind that if nationalism has rapidly ‘invaded’ 
Arab mentality, it has not been met with a clear definition of where the 
nation is.275 This nation is based on the same unified high culture that 
was generated from language and religion throughout the ages, which 
bequeathed a sense of collective identity.276 This united culture is also 
enforced by a similar history through the centuries and does not deny 
the particularities of a single Arab population. GHALIOUN277 wrote:  
[P]arler d’une seule et même nation ou des nations différentes, implique pour 
les instants des discours nationaliste la reconnaissance de l’homogénéité ou 
de la cohésion interne des populations arabes ou régionales propres. Dans ses 
conditions toute tentative visant à mettre en doute cette homogénéité est 
considérée par les nationalistes arabistes ou régionalistes comme une 
manœuvre tendant à saper les fondements de l’entente nationale. Elle ne peut 
avoir pour origine que les manipulations extérieures ou l’émergence des 
solidarités archaïques pré-nationales ou anti-nationales.278  
I shall urge here that the question of Arab nationalism used in modern 
Arab states is related to the question of legitimacy; political regimes in 
fact, require justification beyond raw power through an appeal to such 
things as tradition, charisma, or nationality.279 The ‘agents’ of 
nationalism can either be states -after achieving independence, national 
                                               
274  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Op. cit., p.29. 
275  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), Op. cit., p.4. 
276  HARIK I., Op. cit., p.20.  
277 Burhan GHALIOUN, author of Le Malaise Arabe: l’Etat contre la Nation; Islam et 
Politique: la Modernite Trahie; Crise de la Politique: l’Etat et la Religion and La 
Culture Arabe: Entre Modernisme et Traditionalisme. 
278  GHALIOUN B., Le Malaise Arabe L’Etat contre la Nation, p.38. 
279  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.385. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 96 
movements, or both.280 Nevertheless, in contemporary Arab states there 
is a new phenomenon: the switch to Islamism. In effect, political 
regimes justify their power by the reference to Islam; simultaneously, 
Islamic movements combat those same regimes in the name of Islam.  
9.1.1. The Genesis of Arab Nationalism 
The Ottoman Empire ruled in the name of Islam and demanded the 
loyalty of both their Muslim and non-Muslim subjects on that basis.281 
In fact, there was a fostering of collective identity and loyalty to the 
Ottoman Empire based on citizenship regardless of creed or race. This 
was essentially a form of patriotism.282 Patriotism originally refers to 
the love of Patria, which in turn derives its meaning from Latin pater, 
that is, ‘father’. Patria is thus the fatherland: place of birth and the soil 
in which one’s ancestors were buried; a soil characterized by a 
commonality of memory.283  
According to some authors, Arabs under Ottoman rule did not perceive 
themselves as subject of foreign rulers. They identified with the 
Ottomans and looked upon the Sultan as the Muslim head of a Muslim 
commonwealth of which they were a part.284 The wave of patriotism in 
the Ottoman Empire was followed by the growth of an organic or 
ethnic nationalism, which concerned itself with fostering a common 
identity and the realization of an intrinsic spirit of the collectivity, 
rather than with forms of governance that could ensure the rights of the 
individual citizen.285  
In the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire claimed the loyalty 
of Muslim peoples outside the Empire, and attempted to mobilize them 
for political purposes in order to meet the political and cultural 
                                               
280  Idem, p.488. 
281  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.486. 
282  Idem, p.485.  
283  Idem, p.407.  
284  HARIK I., Op. cit., p.35. 
285  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.487. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 97 
challenges posed by the West, an ideology known as Pan-Islamism.286 
Even the most prominent modernizing and nationalist leaders of 
modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Attatürk rose to power professing his 
service to Islam and commitment to nationalist ideas in equal measure. 
In fact, only two years after Attatürk abolished the Sultanate (1922) he 
abolished the Caliphate as well.287 
The first wave of nationalist thinkers were much more concerned with 
the issue of how to govern empires and states rather than forging a new 
identity, although they did that as well. The ideas and ideologies being 
voiced were liberal and constitutional, emphasizing a patriotic loyalty 
on the basis of residing in a given territory, and the focus of loyalty 
based on genealogical, cultural or racial ties; a distinction made by 
Bernard Lewis who called the former patriotism and the latter 
nationalism.288 
For some authors, the substance of national movements may be better 
explained as a domino-like chain reaction towards neighbouring 
national ideology, state, or national movements, which were usually 
corrupt, or, either excluded a group from the nation or wrested territory 
away from another group. Turkish nationalism began outside the 
Empire and in turn stimulated the growth of Arab nationalism in the 
second decade of the twentieth century, just as Palestinian nationalism 
–according to the same author- emerged in the 1920s, mainly as a 
reaction to Zionism.289 
In fact, being conscious of being Arab and defining oneself on that 
basis rather than as a Muslim subject of the Empire was most probably 
in reaction to the first stirrings of Turkish nationalism and the policies 
                                               
286  Idem, p.485.  
287  Idem, p.486. 
288  Idem, p.487. 
289  Idem, p.486. In my opinion, this idea is not completely true; in fact, if it is 
indeniable that Zionism may have helped the crystallization of Palestinian identity, it 
is also unrefiutable to prove that Palestinian nationalism existed also before it; in 
other words, Palestinian identity would have develpped without the clash with the 
Zionist claims on Palestine, and their nationalism would have developed as much as 
other territorial identities or nationalisms in nearby Arab countries.  
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that the new rulers of the Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Union and 
Progress, adopted after coming to power in 1908.290  
With Turkish nationalism replacing Islam as the motivational force in 
the Anatolian remnant of the Ottoman Empire after 1918, many Arabs 
(both Muslims and Christians) who did not want the imposition of 
French and British control looked increasingly towards nationalism as a 
rallying force to coordinate resistance. It was only midway through 
World War I that the first successful “nationalist” revolt took place 
when Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali declared the Arab revolt in 1916 and 
declared himself king of the Arabs. The revolt was motivated by the 
British promises of establishing an Arab state that was to stretch from 
the eastern part of Syria to the Persian Gulf and Palestine.291  
Authors differ in their opinion regarding the ideological origin of Arab 
nationalism. The first group considers it a creation of Lebanese and 
Syrian Christian minorities; the second group considers it a 
development of Islamic modernism.292 The arguments presented by 
each group are consistent; however, it would be wrong to conceive the 
origins of an Arab national identity as an exclusive preoccupation by 
Christian minorities before 1908, since before that date, many Islamic 
cultural societies emerged, promoting the Arab language and 
uniqueness of Arab culture.293  
Nationalism here, concerns the crystallization of a modern collective 
identity focusing on language, culture and history with a special 
relationship in defining a territory, and had a crucial effect on other 
important social processes in the area such as modernization, the 
crystallization of a territorial state, and the impact and role of religion, 
and was in turn affected by them.294  
                                               
290  Idem, p.492.  
291  Idem, p.493.  
292  Idem, pp.491-492.  
293  Ibidem.  
294  Idem, p.486.  
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According to GHALIOUN, Arab nationalism is an ideology that 
replaced Islamism; for the same author, Arab nationalism was formally 
inaugurated at the Arab Conference held in Paris on 18 June 1913.295 
Besides, he considers the renaissance of Arab nationalism, after a 
thousand years, as a miracle. For him this was due to two factors: 
religion and modern rationalism with which Muslims were familiar in 
the nineteenth century.  
Ce miracle est également dû au travail lent et continu de deux facteurs 
fondamentaux, en apparence contradictoires, à savoir la religion, dans la 
mesure où elle a constitué le dernier refuge de la langue et de la culture 
Arabes, sans laquelle celles-ci auraient éventuellement disparu, et le ferment 
du rationalisme moderne qui ébranle profondément la pensée musulmane au 
XIX° siècle.296  
The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was important to the growth of 
Arab nationalism;297 still, the diffusion of Arab nationalism was 
possible in the 1930s and 1940s with the dissemination of the works of 
nationalist secular scholars such as Sati’ al-Husri (from Iraq), and the 
writings of Michel ‘Aflaq (from Damascus), ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz 
(from Baghdad) and Costantine Zuraik from Beirut. Arab nationalism 
began to advocate the creation of a unitary Arab state stretching from 
the Moroccan coast in the west to the ‘Arab Gulf’ in the east.298  
Jamal ‘Abd el-Nasser took the lead in opposing Western attempts to 
integrate Arab States into the Cold War schemes to contain the Soviet 
Union by announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Arab 
nationalism swept throughout the Arab world, following the attack by 
British, French and Israeli troops in 1956. In fact, the creation of the 
United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958 between Egypt and 
Syria was possible because of popular pressure, motivated by Arab 
nationalism since the union was supposed to be the nucleus of a future 
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Arab nation-state. The dream was shattered when a coup d’état by 
Syrian officers in 1961 spelt the end of the UAR.299 In addition, Israel’s 
victory over Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six-Day War in June 1967 
dealt a major blow to Arab nationalism.300  
9.1.2. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism  
In contemporary Arab thought, three major views underlie the 
systematic use of political notions: nationalism, pan-Arabism, and pan-
Islamism. However, the distinction between the three is not always 
clear-cut.301 The first regards single Arab people; the second, Arab 
umma; the third, Islamic umma. It is clear that territorial nationalism of 
a single Arab people had to face these two powerful currents:  
Contemporary Arab nationalist, though, has had to resist two powerful 
currents, both striving to contain and subsume it. On the one hand, there was 
the pan-Islamist movement which called for a kind of Islamic renaissance, 
together with unification of political power around the exhausted Ottoman 
Caliphate or around a central Islamic consultive system. In both cases, the 
movement’s slogan was the Islamic umma. On the other hand, there was the 
pan-Arab movement which, whether seeking autonomy from Ottoman 
domination or calling the Arabs to resist Western colonization, always 
brandished the slogan: watan. It follows, therefore, that Arab nationalist 
discourse brought out and reinforced the notion of nationalist discourse 
brought out and reinforced the notion of watan.302  
Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism are the most important pan-nationalist 
movements in the Middle East. Adherence to pan-Islamism or to pan-
Arabism has resulted in different conceptions of the notions of umma 
and watan.303 Pan-nationalism refers to movements whose primary goal 
has been to organize individuals and groups inhabiting two or more 
states into one nationality. In fact, nationalist ideologies, whether 
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promoted by states or by national movements, have not always 
recognized state borders.304 In other words, Pan-nationalism is an 
ideology calling for the unification of a people living across existing 
state borders into one organic political entity, usually a sovereign 
state.305 
The Turkish Sultans have promoted Pan-Islamism as a vehicle for 
holding together their disparate subjects throughout the Middle East 
and insulating the Empire against revolution. Later on a notion, of Pan-
Arabism emerged in the Arab world, which underscored the idea that 
there is such a thing as an Arab nation, speaking a common language, 
sharing a common culture and history, and encompassing the peoples of 
the Arab states.306 According to GHALIOUN, Arab nationalism does 
not mean the disappearance of Ottoman Islamism; rather, it rendered 
possible, some decades later, the appearance some decades later of 
Islamism with rival political claims:  
Sous sa forme initiale et confuse, l’idéologie arabe a surtout à rendre plus 
aisée, politiquement et psychiquement, la sécession, l’effondrement de 
l’idéologie ottomane vieille d’environ cinq siècles et le dépassement de 
l’échec politique du réformisme islamique incarné par le projet de la Ligue 
musulmane. Elle se veut le support d’une conscience nouvelle, susceptible 
d’offrir une vision cohérente à l’action collective, des objectifs réalisables et, 
par conséquent, un sentiment d’appartenance à un seul et unique peuple. Cela 
n’a pas empêché l’islamisme de continuer d’exister, mais plus comme la 
source d’une conscience religieuse, morale et culturelle. C’est d’ailleurs cette 
transformation effective de la base d’identification politique, marginalisant la 
religion sur ce plan, qui rend possible par réaction, la naissance. Quelques 
années plus tard, de l’islamisme comme support d’une revendication politique 
concurrente.307  
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9.1.2.1. Pan Islamism  
Pan-Islamism is a trans-ethnic and trans-national political movement 
that started in the nineteenth century. Its aim was to raise the political 
awarness of Muslims to create a unified front and protect the interests 
of the Muslim community against colonialism. The concept of Islamic 
umma has become the main religious source of this political movement. 
It is evident that the concept of an Islamic nation existed before the 
nineteenth century since Islam was an element of unification between 
nations and ethnicities that made up part of the Muslim empires. In fact, 
Pan-Islamism does not negate the ideas of nationalism or ethnicity but 
rather seeks to consolidate them.308  
Pan-Islamism was articulated by some Ottoman intellectuals such as 
Jamal al-Din al-Afaghani (d.1897), Namik Kemal (1840-1888), Ali 
Suavi (1838-1878). It was inherently a defensive ideology against the 
penetration of European colonialism but was formulated later as 
counter-colonial ideology against colonial expansion.309 It transferred 
the concept of Islamic umma, which reflected the Muslim sense of 
communal-religious identity into a political one. In other words, it 
politicized the concept of umma and Caliphate. As a result of Pan-
Islamism, the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire believed that the state 
was their own and that the rulers were concerned for their well-being.310 
In practice, Pan-Islamism became a powerful vehicle for secularization 
and internalization of the modern concepts of homeland (watan) and 
nationalism.311  
With the abolition of the Caliphate, the Pan-Islamic movements lost 
their centre of gravity and the age of Pan-Islamic congresses started: 
Mecca, 1924; Cairo, 1926; Jerusalem, 1931; and Geneva, 1935. In 
reaction to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Muslim states formed the 
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Organization of Islamic Conference in 1969 to protect the interests of 
Muslim states to coordinate and promote cooperation between them.312  
9.1.2.2. Pan-Arabism 
Pan-Arabism thought is dominated by one sole and constant dream, the 
dream of a single Arab state or Arab unity. There is always one 
constant element, the Arab umma.313 Still, there is no consensus 
regarding what pan-Arabism exactly is. Is it an expression of anti-
colonial resistance against France and Britain? Is it opposition to the 
new, semi-colonial governments in the mandates that followed the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire? Is it some kind of renewed pan-
Islamism? Or is it something else?314  
Pan-Arabism was promoted mainly by movements such as Al-Fatat al-
‘Ahd or Hizb al-Istiqlal al-Arabi, in opposition to existing empires and 
state regimes before their ideologies were adopted by ruling regimes of 
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In fact, movements which promoted Arab 
nationalism -such as the Arab Nationalists, al-Qawmiyyun al-Arab- 
continued to exist in most Arab states, or at least influenced their 
regimes long after achieving independence.315  
In Egypt, a powerful national movement, the Wafd led by Sa’ed 
Zaghlul, emerged after World War I, embracing a liberal outlook. 
Egyptians rejected patriotic identity either for a cultural Arab 
nationalism or for a more pronounced Islamic identity, or one that 
combined both. The same was true in the post-World War II states that 
emerged out of the mandate system. Syria and Iraq continued to 
promote a radical pan-Arabism long after a more geopolitically secure 
Egypt abandoned it after the death of President Jamal ‘Abd el-Nasser, 
in 1970; but even during Nasser’s rule, the regime fostered a more 
moderate version of pan-Arabism than did the leaders of Syria and 
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Iraq.316 In fact, the Ba’thi party which ruled these two countries, 
promoted the creation of one single Arab state that would encompass an 
Arab nation, while Jamal ‘Abd el-Nasser’s vision was that Pan-
Arabism should involve solidarity among Arab governments.317  
Pan-Arabism renders the term watan vague and indefinable and gives 
more importance to the concept of nation. The territorial nationalists 
give more importance to the watan as it refers to a specific area that 
constitutes the homeland of citizens.  
The pan-Arab model, however, both reduces the scope of this notion (watan) 
and diminishes its significance. In general terms, pan-Arabism gives much 
more importance to the notion of nation. In the nationalist model, the term 
watan is used to refer to a specific geographical area that constitutes the 
homeland of citizens bound to each other by legal and emotional ties, and 
who belongs to a sovereign state, or to a state which is struggling to recover 
its sovereignty. In the pan-Arab model, however, the notion watan is used in 
the sense of union, or league. Legally speaking, the notion watan refers to a 
league comprising a group of states, with their respective residence being 
identified in relation to their respective fatherlands. Consequently, the 
meaning of watan loses its precision and becomes somewhat obscure and 
abstract. It refers to one or several emotional ties.318  
Az-Zahrawi describes the watan as follows: “Our watan is our union 
because we either happen to be neighbours, or speak the same 
language, or have the same aspirations and interests”.319 This means 
that the term watan adopted by pan-Arab nationalists although used in 
singular in form is plural in meaning and reference since it does not 
refer to a given geographical province, but rather to a group of 
provinces that share the same boundaries. According to Marlène NASR, 
this same concept of watan is reflected in Jamal ‘Abd el-Nasser’s 
writings, who considers the watan as ‘a geographical space, stretching 
                                               
316  Idem, p.487. 
317  Idem, p.397. 
318  BENSAID S., Op. cit., pp.164-165. 
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from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf’. Furthermore, as pointed out by 
NASR, although Nasser uses the notion of Arab territory, the former 
notion does not refer to any territory in particular.320  
It is also true that this concept of watan in Nasser’s writings is different 
in his earlier works (Falsafat ath-Thawra) from his later ones (al-
Mithak, the Manifesto), in the sense that there is a clear movement from 
a nationalist position in the former to a pan-Arab position in the latter. 
In Nasser’s Falsafat ath-Thawra, the term watan is used frequently to 
refer to Egypt; however, when he talks about great fatherland, the term 
watan not only loses its expressive and referential meanings, but is 
replaced by a new idiom, that is, the Arab nation.321 
9.1.3. The Failure of Arab Unification 
It is evident that Arab unification failed but Arab nationalism is still 
prevalent in the Arab world. Many Arab authors and intellectuals, such 
as Fawzi Mansour, believed that:  
[L]’échec de l’unification arabe ne signifie pas pour autant que la nation 
arabe est disparue... Mansour considère que les peuples arabes constituent 
aujourd’hui une seule nation dont l’homogénéité se manifeste à travers la 
langue arabe commune, la religion Islamique majeure, l’unité du climat, la 
référence aux mêmes structures culturelles, et avant la colonisation, la grande 
et intense mobilité au plan politique et humain.322 
In this part of the analyses the various attempts to unify the Arabs into 
one state will be reviewed, even though they all failed. A negative role 
was played by Europe as we will show here, explains the clash between 
the Arab world and the contemporary Western world. A Palestinian 
intellectual, Naim Khader, will be cited; he treated the argument 
“Europe and the Arab world” in his various writings.323 It is clear that 
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GHALIOUN B., Op. cit.,p.43. 
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the end of the Ottoman Empire signaled a turning point in the history of 
Arab nationalism. However, I shall illustrate the bid to unify Arabs 
under one authority, and the idea of forming a nation distinct from 
others, which preceded the end of the Ottoman Empire. 
For Naim Khader, the first quest to unify Arabs under the same 
authority was done by Mohammed Ali of Egypt when he began his war 
against the Ottoman Empire in November 1831 in order to “liberate the 
Arab populations and to unify them in an Arab Empire”. Europe 
(Britain and France) encouraged him since their interests lay in the 
weakening of the Ottoman Empire, but restrained him with the Kutahia 
Agreement on 4-5 may 1833, and initiated the protectorate system over 
the ‘sick man’ (a euphemism given to the Ottoman Empire, by this 
time).324 The first failure to unify Arabs in the Middle East was due to 
direct European interference. This experience served to clarify how 
Arab unity would be dangerous to European interests in the Middle 
East, since Europe believed at that time in its mission to civilize and its 
right to colonize.325  
The second bid to unify the Arabs was during the First World War. The 
allies began the war against the Ottoman Empire on 30 November 
1914. Sheikh Hussein of Mecca declared a revolution against the 
Ottomans on 5 June 1916, following a promise that independence 
would be granted at the end of the war (according to correspondence 
between Hussein and McMahon). However, the Europeans had 
different plans for the Arab territories; they had decided secretly in the 
Sykes-Pico Treaty of 1916 to share the Ottoman Empire. In the famous 
Balfour Declaration, Britain also promised the establishment of a 
homeland in Palestine for the Jews.326  
GHALIOUN describes the situation after the end of the Ottoman 
Empire as following:  
                                                                                                       
taken from a presentation given during the Arab-European conference in Paris on 
20-22 September1977. 
324  ABU-SAHLIEH R., Naim Khader Rasoul Falasteen, p.62.  
325  Ibidem.  
326  Idem, pp.65-66. 
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Ainsi à la place de la réforme souhaitée et de la souveraineté espérée, les 
Arabes se sont trouvés, à la veille de la disparition de l’un des plus grands 
empires de l’histoire, au début du XX° siècle, dans la confusion générale. 
L’Afrique du Nord est soumise à une politique coloniale des plus agressifs; 
l’Arabie abandonnée des troupes turques, est livrée à une guerre civile sans 
merci, et en partie occupée par les étrangers; quant au croissant fertile, il est 
partagé entre des Etats artificiels et distribué en zones d’influence aux 
colonialismes antagonistes anglais et français, tandis que le la Vallée du Nil à 
un vaste champ de manœuvre pour l’empire britannique.327  
The third attempt to unify Arabs under one state was made by Jamal 
Abd el-Nasser of Egypt; this failed due to the defeat of Arab armies by 
Israel in 1967 and the internal conflicts between Arab regimes. Arab 
unification did not seem to be envisioned in the contemporary Arab 
world.  
9.2. Territorial Arab States 
9.2.1. The Origin of Arab States 
According to some authors, the conception of state is alien to Arabs 
since originally they were a tribal society, not citizens –they were only 
kinsmen united by blood ties.328 This was in substance the vision of Ibn 
Khaldûn about Arabs. Still, the Umayyads (who are Arabs) created a 
stable centralized state (AD 660-750) with an administration more 
elaborate than anything that Arabs had previously known. The 
Umayyads Caliphate in Damascus gave way to the Abbasid in Baghdad 
in 750. This instigated the spread of the Arab language as the new 
lingua franca.329  
The collapse of the Arab civilization is due first, to the collapse of the 
Caliphate and the disintegration of political unity of the Islamic 
dominion; and secondly, the transformation of the military system by 
the introduction of that institution so unique to Islam: slave armies and 
praetorian garrisons, which rendered the Caliphate an otherwise 
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powerless spiritual office. The Sultanate, a secular institution, was 
inaugurated, based strictly on power,330 and was accepted in lieu of the 
Caliphate for the sake of social peace (Ibn Jamaa, Mawardi, al-
Ghazali).331 
Some considers Arab states as the result of colonialism and others 
confirm that before the impact of Western powers, political identity was 
religious or dynastic, or a mixture of both.332 For those authors, the 
west, during the mandate and after its end, imposed its notion of state 
over the populations. The most successful nationalist movements were 
based on the colonial or traditional territory even if they did appeal to 
ethnic identities, which made little sense within those boundaries.333  
Nationalism of the populations met the western concepts of territorial 
statehood. Authors differ in considering this imposition of Western 
concepts of state, economy and society upon non-Western peoples as a 
form of domination –exploitation or westernization- or 
modernization.334 BREUILLY wrote: 
What does seem to be the case is that the idea of nationalism takes hold in 
such societies not as “natural” form of resistance or opposition, nor as an 
imitation of western political ideas. Rather it is a fairly obvious response to 
the importation of the western political model of a clearly defined public 
territorial state ruling over a private society.335  
Others repudiate this position:  
An important question should then be explicitly raised: if the contradictions 
of the Arab territorial state are closely related to its foreign origin, does this 
                                               
330  Idem, p.20. 
331  Idem, p.34. 
332  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.486. 
333  Idem, p.789. 
334  Idem, p.782.  
335  Ibidem. 
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foreign origin provide sufficient and necessary reasons also to explain its 
continuing consolidation and supremacy?336  
The debate over the origin of the Arab state has never ceased. 
SALAMÉ wrote:  
This particular debate, concerning the original sin of state creation, was never 
closed in the Arab World. To what extent these Arab states were created by a 
foreign, alien, and hostile will?337 
According to GHALIOUN, the state became at the core of the debate 
over nationalism:  
L’épuisement du débat sur l’identité a ouvert en grand… celui de l’Etat, sa 
nature, ses origines, ses stratégies et son avenir. Les analystes dans ce 
domaine… n’ont jamais été systématiques dans le Monde Arabe. Et même si 
le débat sur la nation continue à exister, son objet véritable n’est autre que 
l’Etat, dans sa morphologie ou dans les structures de ces pouvoirs.338  
According to Iliya Harik, Arab states are not the creation of 
colonialism. In fact, tracing the origin of various Arab states, he 
identifies their structure, power base, legitimacy, and traditions by 
proposing five different types of states. (1) the imam-chief system as in 
the case of North Yemen, Oman and Morocco. (2) the alliance system 
of chiefs and imams as in Saudi Arabia. (3) the traditional secular 
system in which authority is invested in a dynasty, free from religious 
attributes as in Lebanon and the smaller Gulf States. (4) the 
bureaucratic-oligarchy type in which authority is basically in the urban 
caste of garrison commanders, assisted by an extensive administrative 
apparatus as in Egypt and the North Africa States. (5) the colonially-
created state system, comprising the Fertile Crescent States (with the 
exception of Lebanon), carved from the defunct Ottoman Empire by the 
European colonial powers.339  
                                               
336  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.73. 
337  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), The Foundations of the Arab State, p.3.  
338  GHALIOUN B., Op. cit., p.53. 
339  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), Op. cit., pp.5-6. 
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Nevertheless, the same author recognizes the fact that colonialism did 
affect the borders of contemporary Arab States:  
Colonialism affected the boundaries of Arab states, but it did not, with the 
exception of the Fertile Crescent case, create them. Colonialism gave more 
definitive form to the indigenous states and introduced elements of modern 
administration to them.340  
Other authors differ in their opinions, considering Arab territorial State 
as a Western invention:  
The present demarcation of the Arab territorial state is indeed a phenomenon 
made in Europe. Three historical phases are traced: a) the rise and the 
characteristics of the Westfalia system of 1648 which ended Europe’s wars of 
religion and initiated an international system of sovereign states; b) 
dismemberment of the Ottoman empire and its integration into the European 
system; and c) the rise of the mandate system in its place and the resulting 
Arab territorial states.341 
As far as the boundaries are concerned, it can be agreed that external 
factors predominated in the territorial definition of some Arab states.342 
Some authors went so far as to consider the states of the Fertile 
Crescent, shaped after the end of the Ottoman Empire, as artificial: 
“[Q]uant au Croissant Fertile, il est partagé entre des Etats artificiels 
distribués en zones d’influences aux colonialismes antagonistes anglais 
et français”.343  
Territorial Arab states have yet to face internal strains as well as 
territorial conflicts with their similarly created, similarly evolving 
neighbours.344 The result of this evolution is Arab states that are 
becoming increasingly entrenched and naturalized. The rise of the state 
                                               
340  Idem, p.6. 
341  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.48. 
342  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), Op. cit., p.6. 
343  GHALIOUN B., Op. cit., p.24.  
344  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), Op. cit., p.6. 
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of Israel and the oil phenomenon are equally serving this purpose.345 A 
further issue is to assess the extent to which these internationally 
recognized countries have taken root in the hearts and minds of their 
inhabitants.346 
9.2.2. Territorial Nationalism  
States subscribed to Arab nationalism but only to serve their own 
interests.347 Why does this gap exist between discourse and reality?  
The gap between ‘said’ and ‘done’ is a reflection of a contradiction between 
indigenous grass-roots political culture (which is ‘pan’- or particularistic 
ethnic) and the imported élite culture, which emphasizes the nation-state as 
the frame of reference.348 
Heading into the 21st century, nationalism in the Middle East has 
neither the stridency nor the ability to mobilize that it had between the 
1930s and the 1960s; there are simply many intra- and inter-state 
conflicts that fuel organic nationalism.349 Scholars and intellectuals 
began to ask whether Arab nationalism was dead. If Arab nationalism is 
construed as the idea of the one Arab state, then it probably is; but if 
Arab nationalism is construed more modestly as one Arab nation 
comprised of many states, it remains a powerful ideology. Arab 
nationalism might have been politically defeated, but it is very much 
alive as an ideal.350 
Pan-Arabism was not capable in defying international and local forces, 
which protected the Westphalia division of territory into internationally 
sanctioned territorial states. Most Arab states do not tolerate the 
violation of sovereignty of Arab states for the sake of Arab nationalism; 
the Kuwaiti invasion and the following coalition demonstrated that. The 
                                               
345  Idem, pp.6-7. 
346  Idem, p.3. 
347  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.790. 
348  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.49. 
349  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.504. 
350  Idem, p.495. 
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same concern for maintaining the inviolability of existing states also 
protected Iraq from disintegration after its first defeat.351  
The Arab territorial state is becoming increasingly implanted and naturalised. 
It is not an indigenous phenomenon and yet it no longer seems a foreign 
import. It is thus a hybrid product. Though its form represented the primacy 
and globalisation of the modern European political culture at the basis of the 
Westphalia inter-state order, its content is increasingly nationalised. Despite 
this contradiction between form and content, acceptance of it as ‘normal’ is 
growing. People have become accustomed to its presence; it is now the order 
of the day, the standard frame of reference.352 
Many newly established countries in the region (Kuwait, Qatar) retain 
the word ‘State’ in their official name, as if their statehood was too 
vulnerable not to be systematically reasserted. It also explains the 
Palestinians’ emotional investment in a state of their own (a flag, a 
passport, a national anthem) without a detailed view of this potential 
state in relation to the Palestinians as a people.353  
In fact, some consider the consolidation and supremacy of the territorial 
Arab state could also be a problem by default, a victory facilitated by 
the absence of an alternative; the failure until now, to elaborate an 
operational formula of the ‘pan’ state, Islamic or Arab nationalist.354 
According to GHALIOUN, the Arab state is not the embodiment of the 
oriental or Islamist state, but is the reaction or fear of archaism in the 
Arab world. Arabs in fact felt the necessity to adapt themselves to the 
new world order.355  
Arab nationalism, which for much of its history was used to justify the 
need for a larger political entity than the Arab states, was bound to be in 
conflict with its political environment. As it rose in superiority over its 
ideological enemies, the territorial state, it consolidated itself, often 
                                               
351  Idem, p.488. 
352  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.72 
353  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), Op. cit., p.2.  
354  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.74.  
355  GHALIOUN B., Op. cit.,pp.53-66. 
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under leaders employing Arab nationalist rhetoric. Most Arab 
nationalists in Egypt still spoke of an Arab alliance or an Arab bloc: an 
Arab union of states rather than a single state. It was this vision that 
was indeed institutionalized in Cairo with the establishment of the 
British-inspired Arab League in 1945. Article 8 of the League’s Charter 
was, in the long term, probably the most important factor upholding the 
principle of non-intervention. The organ of Arab unity institutionalized 
the nation’s Balkanization.356  
Questions remain as to whether a less radical Arab nationalism can be 
the ideological vehicle for a more revolutionary framework of 
integration based on a territorial state, along the lines of the European 
Union.357 In fact, the state is losing part of its sovereignty in favour of 
regional, supra-national and international entities and organizations. 
The unity of Arab states in these terms can be envisioned and 
encouraged.358 
9.3. Islam as an Alternative  
To begin with, presentation of the relation that exists between Islamism 
and Arab nationalism will be made, followed by an attempt to explain 
the phenomenon of the return of Islamism in contemporary Arab 
countries, concluding with a final section dedicated to the relationship 
between state and religion in the Arab world, according to 
contemporary writings. 
9.3.1. Islamism and Nationalism 
Some researchers have conceived Pan-Arabism as an outgrowth of 
Western thought; many others think now that it was engendered by 
attempts to reform Islam. Nevertheless, Arab nationalism, while not 
vociferously secular, was certainly part of secular enlightenment and a 
modernization project.359 Pan-Arabists were almost all avowed 
secularists thinkers; Islam, they concurred, was the Arab’s greatest 
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357  Idem, p.491.  
358  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.55. 
359  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.489. 
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achievement, but their primary goal was the creation of a political 
entity that would produce a sense of fulfilment in Arabs as people, 
rather than the creation of a state that would enable Muslims to realize 
their religious obligations as a community and as individuals. Islam was 
a mean to a nationalist end.360 In fact, the Ba’thi radical concept of Pan-
Arabism (envisioning the creation of one Arab state) and the Nasser’s 
less radical concept of Pan-Arabism (solidarity between Arab states) 
while not denying an Islamic dimension, emphasize the secular 
character of Pan-Arabism.361 In fact, religion was always crucial to 
status in the Middles East.362 
The relationship between Arab and Islamic umma, or Arabism and 
Islamism was subject to different interpretations. For instance, in 1938 
Amin ar-Rihani emphasized that the Arabs antedated both Christianity 
and Islam and that Arabism comes first and foremost. A year later, 
Sami Shawkat –Director of Iraqi Education- confirmed the pre-Islamic 
civilisation of the Arabs. ‘Ali Nasser was even more explicit: 
“Religious atheism is relatively unimportant, whereas denial of 
Arabism is a crime”.363 
The relationship between religious movements and radical religious 
thought and nationalism has frequently been characterized by political 
and doctrinal tension. The Muslim brotherhood clashed with Nasser in 
the 1950s and 1960s and with the Syrian regime in the 1970s. However, 
many Arab nationalists tried squaring nationalism with Islam while the 
Islamists often highlighted the tensions that are inevitable between a 
man-made ideology that demands ultimate sacrifices in the name of the 
nation and a political-religious order which demands much the same in 
the name of revelation.364 
                                               
360  Idem, p.493.  
361  Idem, p.397. 
362  Muslims were dominant from the arrival of Islam until the end of the Ottoman 
Empire, but Christians and Jews were granted considerable freedom, as long as they 
paid a poll tax, Jizya. Idem, p.22.  
363  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.53. 
364  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.489. 
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Although Arab nationalism continues to exert an emotional appeal in 
the region, its power has been sapped by some of the very factors, 
which aided its earlier genesis. Today, Islamism seems to enjoy the 
vigour that once marked Arab nationalism.365 In fact, the efforts to 
create one Arab state failed (the UAR failure was a tragic 
demonstration of the weakening and ineffectiveness of solidarity 
between Arab states). Besides, the continuous loss of wars against 
Israel had diminished faith in Pan-Arabism, and it was relegated to the 
sidelines of Middle Eastern politics, as political Islam became more 
appealing and powerful.366 The growing strength of fundamentalist 
Islam at present is a continuous reminder of the precarious status of the 
state system and secularist trends.367  
In fact, many call this ‘Islamic nationalism’ but others consider it more 
anti nationalism since Islam is proselytizing world religion. Its holy 
writings are in Arabic, considered as a sacred language. Islam does not 
recognize a distinction between state and church of the kind developed 
in Christendom. If nationalism regards the nation-state as the supreme 
institution and focus of loyalty, it would appear that Islam negates such 
a view.368 Islamism threatens the secular regimes of Arab and non-Arab 
states and has a vision of a different political order that can provide 
both motivation and direction.369 Other authors have dissimilar 
opinions, and consider Arab nationalism as an ideology, more so than 
Islam, which denies legitimacy to the state system.370  
Two ways to read the Islamic nationalism: as a reformist movement 
aiming to transform the existing state, above all by removing its secular 
features or simply as an anti-western reaction, or maybe both.371 For 
                                               
365  Idem, p.22.  
366  Idem, p.397. 
367  HARIK I., Op. cit., p.20. 
368  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.790. 
369  Ibidem. 
370  HARIK I., Op. cit., p.20. 
371  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.790. 
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some authors, this antagonism towards the West expressed sometimes 
by rebellion or attraction is explained by some authors as the result of 
the Muslims taking account of their backwardness since they lack the 
humanist and scientific tradition.372  
Islam distinguishes between the land of Muslims and that of non-
Muslims, the first being called Dar-es-Salam (abode of peace), whereas 
non-Muslim political entities represented Dar-al-Harb (abode of 
war).373 According to the Ibn Manzur’s Lexicon (Lisan al-Arab), the 
land of Islam is the Muslim Community:  
As pointed out in Ibn Manzur’s lexicon, the only strong bond, which the 
Muslim Arab is ever conscious of is his sense of belonging to the land of 
Islam. Ibn Manzur’s view, the land of Islam is represented by ‘the Muslim 
Community’ which necessarily constitutes one umma (or nation) which 
includes every country in which Islam is freely accepted as a religion and 
where Islamic laws reigns over Muslim as well as over non-Muslim citizens 
who enjoy protection by paying Jizya (capital tax). In short, the land ‘where 
the Sunnis are not oppressed by heretics’, as the Muslim theologian ‘Abd al-
Qahit al-Baghdadi, has put it.374 
In an interesting article, Olivier Roy375 concluded that:  
C’est par l’inscription de leur action politique dans le cadre territorial de 
l’Etat-nation que les mouvements islamistes sont devenus nationalistes, ou du 
moins nationalisés, à l’encontre de leur idéologie d’origine, qui se voulait 
internationaliste. En ce sens les grands mouvements islamistes ont été des 
facteurs de renforcement de l’Etat-nation… A l’inverse, le radicalisme violent 
est le propre des mouvements dé-territorialisés…376  
                                               
372  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Op. cit., p.22. 
373  KORANY B., Op. cit., p.57.  
374  BENSAID S., Op. cit., pp.151-152. 
375  Olivier Roy is senior researcher at the National Center for Scientific Research in 
Paris. He is the author of numerous books, including The Failure of Political Islam 
and The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations.  
376  ROY, R., Islamisme et nationalisme, p.53.  
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9.3.2. Return to Islam in Modern Arab States 
One of the most salient features of contemporary Middle Eastern 
politics is the ‘resurgence’ of ‘political’ Islam, not necessarily as a 
replacement for secular nationalism, but as an integral component of 
personal and collective identity that has been ignored, suppressed and 
crudely manipulated by the state.377 This introduces us to the 
presentation of the fundamentalist movements and their position 
towards nationalism (territorial and pan-Arabism).378  
Islamist thinkers accept the basic principles of a constitutional system 
on the grounds that such principles not only agree with, but also are 
derived from Islam.379 Rashid Rida takes a different position. For him, 
the system of government (that is, what a government should be like) in 
the Arab world was thanks to European influence:  
Let no Muslim claim that this type of government has its origin in Islam, and 
that we have learnt it from the Koran and the Caliph’s tradition. In fact, the 
type of government we aspire to is the result of our interaction with 
Europeans. Indeed, had we not learnt such a lesson from political life of these 
Europeans, it would never have occurred to us that the political justice is part 
of teachings of Islam.380 
According to BENSAID, the Islamist attitude towards the European 
political model is more open and positive than the Pan-Arab attitude:  
It is amazing to note that the Islamist attitude towards the European political 
model is more open and positive than the pan-Arab attitude. The latter rejects 
the Occident and refuses to import foreign political notions that do not reflect 
the genuine authenticity which the Arab nation seeks to recover. Contrary to 
                                               
377  EICHELMAN, Changing Perceptions of State Authority: Marocco, Egypt and 
Oman, p.200. 
378  It should be pointed out here that the history of fundamentalist thought began with 
the appearance of al-Afghani’s doctrine. BENSAID S., Op. cit., p.173. 
379  Idem, p.170. 
380  Idem, p.169. 
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this introverted attitude, the Islamist attitude is marked by openness and even 
willingness to borrow from the Occident.381 
But Islamists does not recognize state’s borders, as Hasan al-Banna, 
the spiritual father of the Muslim Brothers, puts it:  
Islam does not recognize geographical frontiers and does not take into 
account racial differences. On the contrary, it considers all the Muslims as 
one umma and regards all Muslim countries as one watan, regardless of the 
distance and boundaries which separate them.382  
At the same time, al-Banna shows an interest to the principles that 
direct a constitutional government since they correspond with Islam: 
When one considers the principles that guide the constitutional system of 
government, one finds that such principles aim to preserve in all its forms the 
freedom of the individual citizen, to make rulers accountable for their actions 
to the people, and, finally, to delimit the prerogatives of every single 
authoritative body. It will be clear to every one that such basic principles 
correspond perfectly to the teaching of Islam concerning the system of 
government. For this reason, Muslim brothers consider that, of all the existing 
systems of government, the constitutional system is the form that best suits 
Islam and Muslims.383 
According to ‘Ali Oumlil in his ‘Fundamentalist Movement and 
National State’384,  
                                               
381  Idem, pp.169-170. 
382  Idem, p.171. 
383  Idem, p.170. 
384  There is a tendency to confuse fundamentalism or radicalism with Islamism. One 
can exist without the other. In fact, fundamentalism is not limited to Islam, and 
Islamism does not mean necessarily fundamentalism. Fundamentalism as an 
ideology or movement may exist in any religion (and it is not limited to religion) 
and consists in the return to the origins, and become radicalism when it is 
accompanied by refusing the ‘others’ by considering themselves as the owners of the 
truth. The Islamist movement can be considered also a reform process or its 
opposite: a reaction to such tendency to reform; returning to origins may be also 
positive since the acceptance of others is based on the discovery of oneself and one’s 
particularity, without necessarily ending up in a clash with the others. 
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Al-Banna adopts the notions of watan, umma, and constitution, but tries to 
translate them islamically. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in al-Banna’s 
view which considers that one individual can at the same time be a citizen of 
a watan like Egypt, for instance, and a member of Islamic umma.385 
Reference to Islam to justify the Arab state identity differs from one 
state to another, in fact, in recent decades the Egyptian State has made 
only general claims to its Islamic identity, in part, because of the 
presence of a significant Christian minority there. In contrast, the 
popular legitimacy of the Moroccan monarch is firmly rooted in Islamic 
tradition as it is understood locally; the Omani monarch must invoke 
religious tradition with more caution because of the country’s multiple 
sectarian identity.386 
In contemporary Arab states, appeals to Islam can be used to justify 
anti-constitutional measures, which can assist authoritarian rulers 
against difficulties to control parliaments. Conversely, political 
opposition appealing to Islam invokes democratic methods (for 
example, the elections in Algeria) against secular regimes, which lack 
popular support.387  
In fact, all fundamentalist literature insists that the West owes its 
progress to the supremacy of liberty and law and to a system of 
government, which treats all members of society on an equal basis. 
Fundamentalist thinkers are unanimous in attributing the backwardness 
of the Arabs to dictatorships, which spread ignorance and suppress 
individual freedoms.388  
This link between civilization and justice is present in Ibn Khaldûn’s 
writings, is also observed in the works of other authors who preceded 
him: 
The fact of linking civilization with justice and security is something that is 
not specific to Ibn Khaldun, for other ancient Arab historians anticipated him 
                                               
385  BENSAID S., Op. cit., p.171. 
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388  BENSAID S., Op. cit., p.168. 
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by establishing a close link between the rule of great kings and the reign of 
justice, and democracy.389 
Still, this idea of social justice is not confined to the allocation of 
material resources alone.  
There is a growing expectation that a just government is an Islamic one, an 
expectation perceived to be at the odds with the practical scope of the actual 
state despite state effort to co-opt both religious values and leadership.390 
9.3.3. Islam and State in Contemporary Arab writings 
In 1922, the National Turkish Assembly issued an edict requiring the 
separation of the Sultanate from the Caliphate. This edict was 
accompanied by a manifesto entitled ‘The Caliphate and the Peoples 
Power’, in which he justifies and explains this separation.  
The manifesto distinguished between a genuine and non-genuine Caliphate 
on the ground that the former satisfies all the conditions that are necessary for 
the official instatement of the Caliph, and specifically that the Caliph is voted 
into office by the nation; whereas the latter lacks these conditions, as the 
Caliph is brought to office by conquest and use of power. The rule of the 
latter is a reign but not a Caliphate… ‘a government could be established and 
a person inaugurated without the former being called a Caliphate, nor its head 
a Caliph, and without any harm coming to the Islamic nation from that’ (‘Abd 
al-Ghani Sani Bey).391 
The manifesto concluded that a genuine Caliphate cannot be restricted, 
because it is one of prophecy, but a nominal Caliphate may be.  
Since the Caliphate has become synonymous with authority and reign, i.e. it 
has become a purely political matter conducted in an arbitrary manner, it is 
imperative, in these ‘later times’, to restrict it so that the power will be placed 
in the hands of the nation, its true owner. This formulation, in fact, was a 
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390  EICHELMAN, Op. cit., p.202. 
391  JADAANE F., Notions of the State in Contemporary Arab-Islamic Writings, pp.112-
113.  
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preparation for the radical edict that was issued in March 1924 officially 
abolishing the Caliphate and instituting a ‘civilian’ rule and a secular state.392 
In Islam, the concept of sovereignty corresponds to Islamic political 
thought with hakimiyya and with Siyada. The term Siyada is used in 
contemporary Arab constitutions as the prerogative of the people. The 
concept ‘hakimiyya’ was invented by Abu ‘Ala al-Maududi the founder 
of al-Jama’a al-Eslamiyya in Pakistan and considers Siyada as God’s 
prerogative only, while people have authorities. In fact, hakimmiyya 
means that God is the source of legislation as revealed to His Prophet, 
while the people are the source of the authorities which they delegate to 
a ruler, who may exercise his authorities and issue legislations; the 
people have to obey him unless he contradicts the God’s law; thus, the 
ruler can be justified as necessary for the perpetuation of the umma 
(Sura xxii: 22).393 This means that God –at least theoretically- remains 
the only provider of civil organization; God is the sole sovereign and 
legislator.394 
Contemporary theoreticians of political Islam believe that sovereignty 
(hakimiyya) only belongs to God, and that the Caliph is ‘his shadow on 
earth’; still, they are less indifferent to that form of political power than 
the classical Muslim theologians who recommended the acceptance of 
the prevailing political power, whatever its form, provided it was in the 
hands of a Muslim, in order to avoid any discord (fitna).395 This is why 
some authors consider that the only political theory of Islam since the 
eleventh century, has been that of passive obedience to any de facto 
authority, government by consent remains an unknown concept; 
autocracy has been the real and, in the main, the only experience.396  
                                               
392  Ibidem.  
393  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Op. cit., p.34. 
394  Idem, p.31. 
395  BOTIVEAU B., Contemporary reinterpretations of Islamic Law: The Case of 
Egypt, p.261.  
396  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Op. cit., p.22. 
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In different ways today, law systems in the Arab states have become 
positive sets of principles, with a status comparable to those of Western 
countries, and Islamic law has become a ‘branch of positive law’ (e.g. 
personal statute); this is why Islamic radicalism denounces the almost 
forgotten Islamic shari’a.397 Contemporary Arab States include in their 
constitution the article that Islam is the state religion and shari’a is ‘a’ 
or ‘the’ principle source of legislation: a symbolic concession to the 
ideology of political Islam according to some and a step towards the re-
evaluation of its judicial system, according to others. 
In this part, we will consider the different positions taken in the last 
century by Muslim-Arab intellectuals, regarding the relation between 
religion and state; the main question being: is Islam a religion, a state or 
both? It is clear that there is a difference between Islam serving as a 
guide and inspirational ideal of authority or political order, and Islamic 
law: shari’a being the constitution of the state.398  
It is apparent that the term ‘Islamic State’ mentioned here, does not 
refer to a determined feature. In fact, nobody knows exactly what an 
Islamic State is; only Muslim States are known. The Islamic State 
therefore, remains an ideal.399  
- Islam is only a religion  
‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, wrote in his book al-Islam wa ‘Usul al-Hukm (Islam 
and the Principles of Government, 1925)  
Islam has nothing to do with the kind of Caliphate known to Muslims, with 
the desire, awe, glory and power with which they surround it, with any legal 
system or any other function of government, or state positions. All of these 
are purely political schemes which have nothing to do with religion. Religion 
neither acknowledges nor denies them. It was left for us to tackle by resorting 
to rationale principles, the experiences of nations and the rules of politics. 
The falsehood that has been spreading among people. Concerning the 
Caliphate being a part of religion and of ‘monotheistic beliefs’, is the 
                                               
397  BOTIVEAU B., Op. cit., p.262. 
398  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Op. cit., p.30. 
399  Ibidem. 
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fabrication of kings and sultans who used it to defend their interests and 
thrones. There have been dire consequences of this for the Muslims. Thus, 
there is nothing in religion to prevent Muslims from competing with other 
nations in all social and political spheres, and from destroying the old system 
to which they submitted and through which they became degraded, 
establishing the rules of their reign and the system of their government on the 
basis of modern reasoning and the most solid aspects of what the experience 
of nations have shown to be the best rules of government.400  
Khaled Muhammed Khaled wrote a book Min Huna Nabda’ (From 
Here We Start). In his opinion, religious government is nothing but an 
instrument of dictatorship creating only disasters and suffering for 
humanity. The renaissance of society, as well as the survival of religion 
itself, is not possible without limiting the power of priesthood and 
separating civilian from religious power. In this way, religion can 
achieve the ends for which it was revealed: love, the glorification of 
God, and the unification of the people.401 
Ibn Badis supported Khaled’s opinion and considered the nation as the 
source of all power. For him, no nation should be ruled except in 
accordance with the law that it chooses for itself, and to the execution 
of which it commits its rulers. This is necessary for the progress of the 
Islamic nation; this is the will of God:  
The day the Turks abolished the Caliphate… they did not abolish the Islamic 
Caliphate in its Islamic meaning, but abolished a system of government 
peculiar to them and removed a fictitious symbol that needlessly captivated 
the Muslims and turned against them fanatical Western states frightened by 
the spectre of Islam… the Caliphate is a dream that won’t come true… there 
are two aspects to the Muslims: a political aspect connected with state affairs, 
and a social-educational aspect… to the extent of almost coming behind all 
other nations…They, as a result, lost their worldly goods, having gone against 
God’s will, and were condemned to the low and degraded state they are in. 
The best medicine for the backward Muslim’s fascination with the advanced 
                                               
400  JADAANE F., Op. cit., p.114.  
401  Idem, p.115.  
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non-Muslim is to realise that his being a Muslim is not the cause of his 
backwardness.402  
- Islam is religion and State 
The strongest voice opposed to ‘Abd al-Raziq’s theses, namely that of 
Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit al Muti’i, ultimately set aside the idea that 
the power of the Caliph is directly derived from God, arguing that the 
nation is the source of the Caliph’s power and that Islamic rule is 
democratic, free and consultative, with the Koran and tradition acting 
as its constitution.  
Influenced by this vision, the Islamic states began to introduce in their 
constitution that Islam is religion of state or that Islamic law is one 
basic source of legislation in the state. In response to ‘Abd al Raziq’s 
provocative claims, Hasan al-Banna headed a new movement, inspired 
by the traditionalism of Rashid Rida and contemporary events: the 
Muslim Brotherhood formed in Isma’iliya in Egypt in 1928. Al-Banna 
and ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awdah’s writings represent the primary source for 
the understanding of Islam as a political system. Later on, Sayyid Qutb 
and Yusuf al-Qaradwi reflected the practical radicalism related to the 
application of principles more so than to innovation in theoretical 
concepts.403  
Hasan al-Banna spoke of a dual task for Muslim Brothers: gaining 
independence and joining other nations by challenging them in the field 
of social perfections. He did not urge the re-establishment of the 
Caliphate but a genuine Islamic government, since Islam does not 
accept chaos and disorder and does not permit the Islamic group to 
remain without a leader (imam).404  
The way of Islam and its rules and principles, is the only way we must take 
and to which we must guide the whole nation, now and in the future… [Islam 
is] a comprehensive system embracing all aspects of life: it is a state and a 
country, a government and a nation: it is morality, power, mercy and justice; 
                                               
402  Idem, pp.116-118.  
403  Idem, pp.119-120.  
404  Idem, pp.120-121.  
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it is culture, law, knowledge and legislation; it is material good, wealth, 
profit, and richness; it is a struggle, a message, for an army and an idea; in as 
much as it is a true doctrine and religion… [Anybody] who thinks that 
religion, or more accurately, Islam, does not deal with politics or that politics 
is not of its concerns does injustice to himself and to his knowledge of 
Islam.405 
For Al-Banna, it is not sufficient to declare in the constitution that Islam 
is the religion of state (as it was the case in Egypt at that time), it is 
necessary to establish an Islamic government based on the following: 
responsibility of the ruler, social and spiritual union of the nation within 
a fraternal framework, and respect for the nation’s will and 
commitment to its opinion. This system does not include parties 
necessarily, but only a limited representative electoral system that 
permit the elected to become the holders of real power without external 
influence, and subject to moral criteria and restrictions. For him, there 
is nothing in the parliamentary system that contradicts the rules of the 
Islamic system of government; and the head of state holds the powers 
and can delegate them to others (a modern counterpart in modern 
constitutions, such as that of the USA!)406  
‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awdah is considered the greatest political theoretician 
of the Brotherhood and dedicates an entire book to the political 
question. For him, the main question is: ‘who rules?’  
God rules and his commands’ and human beings whom God has delegated, 
have no choice but to obey His command, refrain from what He prohibits, 
and resolve differences by reference to what He revealed, for their being 
delegated is subject to their abiding by the law of God. The Koran, which was 
revealed to become the ultimate law of mankind, and whoever refrains from 
judging by what God revealed is an ‘infidel’, is ‘unjust’ or is disobedient to 
God… Islam is not merely a doctrine but also a system, and it is not merely a 
doctrine but also a state… It is required that an Islamic state be established 
that founds Islam within its limits. [The ideal state in Islam is the state] where 
                                               
405  Idem, p.121.  
406  Idem, pp.121-122.  
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religion cannot exist without the state, nor can the state be sound without 
religion.407  
For ‘Abd al-Qadir a government arises for social reasons, but it needs 
to be Islamic, which is possible when it refers to Islam, and when then 
Koran is the constitution of the ruler and the ruled. The function of the 
government is to do what God commands; otherwise the ruled would 
renounce their obedience to the government.  
For him, an Islamic government can be distinguished by three 
characteristics: first, koranic government (the Koran is the ultimate 
law); second, a government of Shura limited by Islamic law; third, a 
Caliphate or imam government that is synonymous with the higher 
presidency of the state. The imam is the representative of the umma and 
its interests, but he has to observe God’s law.  
The umma can check the imam and prevent him from overstepping the 
limits of his position. The difference between Islam and democracy, 
according to al-Qadir, is that the first does not leave to human beings to 
set the criteria determining the limits of justice, equality and the rest of 
human virtues.408 This system is different from monarchy since the 
nation chooses its ruler but differs from a republic since it permits a 
ruler for life.  
‘Abd al-Qadir position on the Caliphate does not deviate from what 
was determined by legal experts, such as Ibn Khaldûn. For him the 
function of the Caliphate was ‘to uphold Islam’. The imamate is based 
on the choice of key powerful figures and the acceptance of the chosen; 
as such, the Caliph is an individual representing the nation. His power is 
derived from the fact that he represents the Islamic nation.409  
Shura is essential to Islamic rule, but is not absolute, since it is limited 
by the provisions and spirit of Islamic legislation.410 As such, the 
members who provide shura are familiar with Islamic law; still they are 
                                               
407  Idem, pp.122-123.  
408  Idem, pp.123-124. 
409  Idem, p.126. 
410  Idem, p.127. 
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chosen by the nation, and have in it the source of their power. 
According to the same author, there are five powers in the Islamic 
State: 1) executive; 2) legislative; 3) judiciary; 4) financial; and 5) the 
power of observation and evaluation which is held by the people as a 
whole towards the rulers. Councillors, learned men and jurists represent 
the nation in this task.411  
- Radical Islamism 
Several writers like ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khatib, Taha ‘Abd Baqi Suru, 
Muhammad Yusuf Musa, Muhammad al-Mubarak and Yusuf al-
Qadrawi, followed the line originally stated by Hasan al-Banna. These 
writers openly stated that Islam is a religion and a state that it is 
obligatory for a Caliph or imam to execute Islamic law, that the nation 
is the source of the state power and sovereignty that the function of an 
Islamic state is to act as a guardian of the faith. For them, the Islamic 
system is unique: it is neither theocratic nor monarchic, it is merely 
Islamic.412  
Islam, however, does not impose a form of government that is well-
defined and detailed. Rather, it represents, according to al-Mubarak, 
general principles and rules which constitute ideal goals that mankind 
aspires to achieve, leaving the details and practical applications that lie 
supported by these principles and rules for peoples’ interpretation 
according to their various states, environments and circumstances.413 
For the same author, there are three component parts of the state: 1) the 
authority or government apparatus; 2) the people governed by this 
authority; 3) and the territory within which the rule of this authority 
prevails.414 He adopts the distinction between the legislative, the 
judiciary and the executive power as functions of the state to  
ensuring internal security and external defense, establishing legal justice, 
achieving financial and economic sufficiency for the individual and society; 
                                                
411  Idem, pp.127-128. 
412  Idem, p.128. 
413  Idem, pp.129-130. 
414  Idem, p.130. 
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spreading the doctrine of Islam through jihad and safeguarding it against any 
deviant behaviour.415 
For the same author, the term Islamic umma refers to human society 
based on common beliefs. This humanistic concept of the nation was 
adopted in opposition to the backward, static nationalistic one. For him, 
the nation, as a basis for the state has rights protected by it, as rulers 
speak for or represent the nation.416 
Al-Mubarak also adopts the old distinction between Dar al-Islam and 
Dar al-Kufr, namely the home of Islam and the home of disbelief, and 
considers the two mutually exclusive. People belonging to the second, 
are either in a ‘state of peace’ or in ‘state of war’, depending on they 
have or they have not concluded a treaty with Muslims. Dar al-Kufr 
may become Dar al-Islam when its people convert to Islam or its 
territory is conquered by Muslims.417 He concludes that the state in 
Islam is: 1) an ideology; 2) system of laws emanating from Islam; 3) a 
unique system; 4) a morality; 5) a culture; 6) humanistic; 7) universal; 
and finally, 8) that the Islamic State is based on solid foundations and 
forms, according to the evolution of social and cultural conditions.418 
- Islam as a System of Government 
The Palestinian intellectual Taqi ad-Din an-Nabhani (1908-1977) 
founded a political party in 1952 in the true sense of the word aiming at 
establishing an Islamic state, restoring the Caliphate and declaring 
unrelenting war against all established political systems in the Arab 
world. The party was called Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic 
Liberation Party). He issued two books: Ad-Dawla al-Islamiyyah (The 
Islamic State) and Nizam al-Islam (The Islamic System), in which he 
presents a complete scheme for the state and its system.419  
                                               
415  Ibidem. 
416  Idem, pp.130-131. 
417  Idem, p.131. 
418  Idem, p.132. 
419  Ibidem. 
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Islamic rule, in an-Nabhani’s opinion, rests on the following bases: 1) 
the predominance of Islamic law; 2) the government should be by the 
people; 3) people’s obligation to instate one Caliph for all Muslims, as 
their representative in government; 4) people have the right to ijtihad 
and to propose legal rulings required to deal with the problems of 
everyday life.  
According to him, the pillars of the state are seven: shura, the head of 
state, the executive body (assistants), the administrative apparatus, the 
rulers (wulat), the judiciary and the army.420 In his view, legislation is 
only the competence of the Caliph and of the people; and therefore, the 
Caliph has to consult the people (shura is an obligation). The council of 
shura –and this is new- is not appointed, but elected from people of 
different regions.  
An-Nabhani crystallised his position by proposing a constitution. The 
nation for him constitutes the practical means on earth of putting Islam 
into effect, by scrutinizing and judging the ruler.421 The ideas of an-
Nabhani affected Sayyid Qutb (1907-1966) who was a member of the 
Egyptian Brotherhood, and began to concern himself with the question 
of social justice in Islam. He distinguishes between pre-Islamic 
(jahiliyya) and Islamic societies. The first can never pursue solutions to 
their social problems because they are not ruled by Islam. Qutb refused 
moderate solutions under the concept of Islamic law as a main source 
of legislation. This radical position is also expressed by Yusuf al-
Qardawi who presents the ‘Islamic solution’: the establishment of an 
Islamic state based on pure Islamic rule, which has in Islamic 
legislation its ‘one and only guide’ and ‘reference’ for all its rulings.422  
- The legislative aspect of Islamic shari’a  
This position can be considered as the middle point between the two 
extreme positions of ‘Abd al-Raziq, who reduced religion to the realm 
of spirit, pushing politics away from its domain and that of al-Banna 
                                               
420  Idem, p.135. 
421  Idem, p.138. 
422  Idem, p.139. 
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position who considered the restoration of an Islamic state and the 
Caliphate as extremely necessary. The former consider Islam as only 
religion, the latter considers it a religion and state.  
In 1905 ‘Ali Abu al-Futuh argued that the established principles of 
shari’a, marked by civilization and development, are appropriate for 
modern times.423 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish and ‘Abd al-Razzaq as-Sanhuri 
held the same opinion, the latter calling for the modification of 
Egyptian legislation, following the end of British occupation, adapting 
it to Islamic law. For him, legislation refers to Muslim fiqh in such a 
way that it accords civilization and the spirit of the age.424  
In 1939, the lawyer Ahmad Husayn, also called for the revision of 
constitutional laws in the light of Islamic shari’a, maintaining that 
Islam is the source of legislation. In 1940 the Iraqi ‘Abd al-Rahman al-
Bazzaz condemned those who disown shari’a from the constitution of 
their country and confirmed the doctrine that Islamic legislation is 
opened to evolution and does deny canonical change.425  
‘Alla al-Fasi, the historic leader of the Istiqlal Party in Morocco, agrees 
in general terms with the thesis of al-Bazzaz. He condemned ‘Abd al-
Raziq, since religion cannot be put outside the domain of socio-political 
life, for such a separation would imply the estrangement of the ‘highest 
ideal which Islamic shari’a lays down for the people’ and that is the 
‘realization of the divine will to build life on this earth and achieve 
justice among people’.426  
Still, a new conception of the priority of national solidarity over Islamic 
solidarity was formulated by ‘Allal al-Fasi:  
It is necessary to adopt a constitutional form of government, based on the rule 
of the people through competent elected representatives. However, this goal 
will not be achieved unless Muslim countries are liberated from foreign 
domination, both physical and moral. Therefore, action for independence is a 
                                               
423  Idem, p.139. 
424  Idem, p.140. 
425  Ibidem. 
426  Idem, p.141. 
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necessary condition for the recovery of freedom which is essential for 
assuming responsibility.427 
For him, it is God who enjoys the ultimate sovereignty and order in the 
ruling system; then it is equally true that political and practical 
sovereignty is left to the people who are entitled to elect and dismiss 
legislators and members of the government. In other words: ordinance 
for God, power for the nation.428  
‘Abd al-Hamid Mutwalli discussed these when considering the 
controversy of Islamic shari’a as the main source of legislation or just a 
source, among others, of legislation, in the Egyptian Constitution.429 
For him Islam contains the general basis for a state ruling system in the 
state (he does not agree that Islam is only a religion, nor is it a complete 
ruling system). For him, Islam is a religion and a state, without a 
specific system of government.430  
- The Humanistic Islam 
This vision is represented by Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah in his 
book, The Koran and the State (1973) and by Muhammad ‘Amarah in 
his Islam and religious power. Both agree that Islam does not embrace 
a specific political government and both believe that government is left 
for men, and called for a distinction –not separation- between religion 
and state. They both proposed that the state is national in nature 
committed to the rulings of shari’a, but that, in the human field, 
legislation is effected through the will and power of the community.431 
For them, religious questions are a divine matter in which human 
beings have no say. Worldly questions, on the other hand, such as the 
policies of the nation, are delegated by God to Muslims… this means 
                                               
427  BENSAID S., Op. cit., p.161. 
428  ADAANE F., Op. cit., p.141. 
429  Ibidem. 
430  Idem, p.142. 
431  Idem, p.143. 
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that “He has given us full freedom and independence in our worldly 
affairs and social interests”.432  
The legislative council would be elected by the nation and would act 
freely; its authority would be limited to worldly affairs. These affairs 
include the choice of the head of state that is elected and not 
appointed.433 
The function of a Koranic state -for him a welfare state- is to direct the 
life of every member of the community towards the achievement of 
public good, irrespective of sex, race, language or religion.434 
‘Amarah’s main concern was to separate political power from that of 
religion, thereby stripping the ruler of the sanctity and infallibility 
implied in endorsing religious power.435 The real Islamic attitude, in 
‘Amarah’s opinion, is that a separation of religion from the state is to 
be rejected as much as a union between religious and political power.436  
However, as outlined by some authors, declaring Islam as the religion 
of state, although tolerated, has repercussions on non-Muslim citizens: 
Most of the constitutions of these states today proclaim Islam as the official 
state religion. One can point to the practice of the toleration of religious 
minorities as a tradition in the Islamic polity. It is not the same however as 
defining full citizenship without reference to religion or its tolerant attitude. 
One of the difficulties is that Islam does not recognize an existence for man 
independent of religion, because it does not entertain a Law of Nature that 
can be discovered by human reason, nor does it distinguish between nature 
(physis) and law (nomos)…  
                                               
432  Ibidem. 
433  Ibidem. 
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436  Idem, p.147.  
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It is difficult, therefore, when the official religion of the state is Islam, for 
non-Muslims to enjoy secularly based rights beyond those allowed by the 
traditional practice of toleration of the ‘People of the Book’…437 
 
 
                                               
437  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Op. cit., p.27. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 134
§10 CULTURAL & RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
STATE  
For BUTTERWORTH, the problems of ‘state’ and ‘authority’ have not 
been discussed per se, in the Arab world until recently.438 Many Arabs 
are still asking questions regarding to the reasons behind their 
discrepancy in power. They sense their senility and watch the modern 
models of power growing.439 SALAMÉ dedicates an article to the 
concept of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states, with a qualified return to the al-
muqaddimah,440 in which he addressed the problems of contemporary 
Arab states thus  
Perceptions of the state’s strength and/or weakness are substantially marked, 
in the Arab world, by a tradition of authoritarian rule where the military 
ghalaba (domination) has preceded and practically made possible a generally 
unrestrained plunder of the society’s available resources441.  
Then he added:  
Ibn Khaldûn asserts that the rise of the state is based on the necessity of 
deterrence (wazi‘) and is therefore equivalent to the appearance of a leader 
who enjoys superiority (ghalaba) over others. The persistence of that leader 
in power is based on the strength of blood ties (‘asabiyya) among the people, 
whose defence and protection are successful only if there are closely knit 
groups with common interests. This strengthens their stamina and makes 
them feared since everybody’s affection for his family and group is more 
important than anything else442.  
Ibn Khaldûn distinguishes between two ingredients of the state’s 
strength. There are, on the one hand, the actual capabilities of the state 
                                               
438  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), Op. cit., p.11.  
439  SALAMÉ Gh., Strong’ and ‘Weak’ States, a Qualified Return to the Muqaddimah, 
p.238.  
440  In the book ‘The Foundation of the Arab States, 1987’ that he himself was the 
editor. SALAMÉ Gh., Op. cit., pp.205-240.  
441  Idem, p.207. 
442  Idem, p.207.  
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and, on the other hand, the recognition by others of those capabilities.443 
The ‘natural’ state must possess the means to control each part on its 
own, and in turn must recognize the state’s power over it. This is 
because leadership (ri’asa) exists only through superiority (ghulp) and 
superiority only through group feeling (‘asabiyya). Following that, and 
in accordance with the new authority, the whole society must be 
coalescence (iltiham):  
Natural authority is derived from group feeling through the continuous 
superiority over competing parties. However, the condition for the 
continuation of this authority is for the subservient parties to coalesce with 
the group who controls leadership.444  
The ‘asabiyya and iltiham form the foundation of authority. Ibn 
Khaldûn, treating the question of the Caliphate, wrote  
If we try to understand the raison d’être of this condition (that the Caliph 
shall be qurayshi), we shall find that it is based on the ‘asabiyya which allows 
protection and ambition. This is its foundation and not –as many authors have 
claimed- the Qureishis’ closeness to the Prophet through direct lineage’. In 
other words, the Qurayshis do not possess the political legitimacy forever, but 
as long as they constitute a strong ‘asabiyya. Ibn Khaldûn could not accept 
the idea of a ‘divine right’ to rule.445 
This authority based on asabiyya and iltiham is stronger than that based 
on attachment to a specific location, which is alien to Arab culture and 
may threaten the blood ties and consequently the very existence of the 
state. Ibn Khaldûn prefers national and/or religious ties but not to 
patriotism related to a territory.446  
                                               
443  Idem, p.208.  
444  Idem, p.207-208.  
445  Cited in: Idem, p.209.  
446  Idem, p.210. According to SALAMÉ, belonging to a group is a source of power. 
This is exactly what Israel, for example, feared from the Arab minority within its 
borders: they are a menace to the Jewish State. For this reason, Israel pursued a 
policy of direct control over the Arabs living within the pre-1967 borders through a 
mixture of segmentation, co-option, and economic dependence. As an Israeli anthro-
pologist convincingly pointed out: “Arabs in Israel do not constitute a united, 
integrated community. They are divided on many lines which tend to overlap, rather 
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As an introduction to this argument, SALAMÉ will be cited again; his 
revelation in a very practical way, of the challenge that represents the 
feeling of belonging to the same group and to a defined territory in 
modern Arab states: 
The rise of the modern state represents a real challenge to the individual, a 
challenge to his feeling of belonging to a group and to the security of having 
a defined place within it. The transfer of loyalty from the traditional group to 
the modern state cannot be easily completed, and anyway takes place in a 
clearly alienating manner. It is doubly alienating when not only the form the 
state is unfamiliar but when those commanding it are strangers as well. This 
could be due to the leader’s allegiance to an external power (during periods of 
colonialism), or to his membership in another traditional group (much as 
Shi’its would look at a Sunni-dominated state or a Berber at a state dominated 
by the Arabs), or his belonging to a social group that is unfamiliar to the rest 
of the citizenry (such as technocrats or professionals).447  
Then SALAMÉ continued:  
Thus, suddenly the citizen is given an identity card or a passport specifying 
for him a new exclusive identity. He is either Lebanese or Syrian, Tunisian or 
Libyan, Qatari or Bahraini.448 
Identity is a cultural product that is not exclusively shaped by those 
who are going to bear it; foreign powers, in fact, have been able to 
intervene substantially in this process.449 Then SALAMÉ cites Erich 
Fromm:  
                                                                                                       
than cut across each other. There is the broad division into Bedouin, village 
dwellers, and townsmen, with hardly any links between these divisions. 
Furthermore, each of these divisions is divided internally, etc”. Idem, pp.224-225. “I 
should like to know how long residence in a town can help (anyone to build loyalties 
to his person), if he does not belong to a group that makes him feared and causes 
others to obey him”. Idem, p.210. 
447  Idem, p.223. Some Insiders Palestinians did have similar feelings towards the new 
Palestinian elites (called the Outsiders) who have the key command powers within 
the PA.  
448  Idem, p.223. 
449  Idem, p.224. 
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The loss of the self and its substitution by a pseudo-self leaves the individual 
in an intense state of insecurity. He is obsessed by doubt since, being 
essentially a reflex of other people’s expectations of him; he has in a measure 
lost his identity. In order to overcome the panic resulting from such loss of 
identity, he is compelled to conform to seek his identity by continuous 
approval and recognition by others.450  
According to Lucian Pye:   
The stable modern state cannot be realized without a clear feeling of identity: 
that is, without solving the problem of co-existence of traditional culture 
forms with modern practices and factional allegiances with cosmopolitan 
lifestyles. It is as if the individual is torn between two worlds without having 
roots in either of them.451 
Yet the Lebanese civil war was also to reveal the failure of Lebanese 
iltiham, which was meant to rise within the modern state in defence of 
its borders and institutions452. Indeed, the Arab State seems to be caught 
between the combined fires of sub-state in the face of greater 
nationalities transcending their limits.453 Some authors believe that this 
modern Arab State had failed to achieve the major objectives it has set 
for itself. This failure will be a motivation of Arabs to move towards 
pan- ideals:  
All appearances point to the spread of the phenomenon of the state in the 
Arab world. But, in spite of these appearances, the failure of the Arab State –
despite its slogans, flag, national anthem, university, plan and national 
museum- in achieving true independence and in eliminating all kinds of 
dependence, or in liberating the occupied Arab territories in Palestine, not to 
mention the failure to accomplish national security on the part of all states, 
will sooner or later strengthen the Arab citizen’s conviction that the state has 
failed to achieve the major objectives it has set for itself. Consequently, this 
same Arab citizen will be inclined to work at a national [pan-Arab] level and 
                                               
450  Idem, p.223. 
451  Idem, p.222.  
452  Idem, p.225. 
453  Idem, p.226. 
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transcend the local state phenomenon. (Hasib, k. Kalimat al Mustaqbal 
Alarabi).454  
In fact, Arab nationalism, as it is understood in its early stages, is the 
main enemy of the existing Arab states since they are ‘too small clothes 
for the Arabs to wear’. Their goal is to eliminate them and to substitute 
them with a unique Arab state that encompasses the Arab umma. Less 
challenging are the proponents of Islamic umma, who generally seem to 
accept the independent existence of current Islamic States, as long as 
they adopt the Islamic shari’a and its laws, and seek active ‘solidarity’ 
with other Islamic countries.455  
Modern Arab States face another challenge presented by some 
minorities, who find these states too large or completely unsuitable. 
The Kurds, for example, may well believe that borders were drawn with 
the specific intention of dispersing them into a number of states.456  
According to SALAMÉ:  
Whether Kurds, Maronites, Berbers or south Sudanese, these groups often 
reject the states in which they find themselves. Even when they adopt a more 
rational and realistic attitude and recognize that existing states cannot be 
easily destroyed, they prefer them to be a weak and fragile, allowing ethnic 
groups the largest possible autonomy.457  
For SALAMÉ, these problems and challenges of Arab states have one 
solution: unity. This unity remains irrelevant without the creation of 
iltiham based on an identity; furthermore, in fact, it has no real impact 
on society:  
A short cut remedy to all these problems is ‘unity’… Too often ‘unity’ 
appears as a panacea, whatever the political cleavage. This reveals this 
‘remedy’s’ highly ideological nature and hence its extreme vulnerability. In 
                                               
454  Idem, p.226. 
455  Idem, pp.226-227.  
456  Idem, p.226.  
457  Idem, p.227. 
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so far as the identity remains debatable, and in so far as those in control of the 
state have not established a strong social iltiham, unity remains an empty 
shell. This widespread obsession with unity is so ‘tribal’ (Arendt) that it 
becomes a sort of ‘political religion’ (Apter), with no real impact on the 
society. It probably also hinders a more rational search for state strength, 
outside the old Khaldunian realm.458  
The economic activity has an interesting role in strengthening the state. 
According to Ibn Khaldûn every state has five stages, the third one of 
which being economic, and the last, in which the ruler has full 
authority:  
It is the stage of leisure and tranquillity in which the fruits of royal authority 
are enjoyed: the things that human nature desires, such as acquisition of 
property, creation of lasting monuments and fame. All the ability (of the 
ruler) is expended on collecting taxes; regulating income and expenses, 
keeping books and planning expenditure; erecting large buildings, and 
constructions, spacious cities and lofty monuments; presenting gifts to 
ambassadors of nobility from (foreign) nations and tribal dignitaries; 
dispending bounty to his people. In addition, he supports the demands of his 
followers and retinue with money and positions. He impacts his soldiers, pays 
them well and distributes their allowances fairly every month. Eventually, the 
result of this (liberality) shows itself in their dress, their fine equipment, and 
their armor on parade days.459  
Ibn Khaldûn points out two basic factors:  
First, that the economy (actually economic capability) is related to actual 
political and military strength; thus, when superiority is achieved and the 
authority of the ruler is established, wealth comes as a natural bonus to 
whoever is in control. Second, that economic activity is not so much related 
to production as it is to spending. That is why this stage does not lead to more 
strength, but actually leads to the stage of senility. Iqtisad, in contrast to the 
                                               
458  Ibidem. 
459  Idem, p.228.  
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usual meaning of the word (that is, to cut down on expenses), is based on 
spending.460  
Some modern authors make similar conclusions over the industrial 
efforts of modern states industrial efforts.461 Another example is the 
Gulf countries where political leadership is clearly based on ‘asabyya. 
This leadership has ruled from the outset that the oil is state property. 
But what is the state? The state was then more a cover for a ri’asa 
(leadership) than an ‘autonomous’ apparatus. Now, ri’asa is basically 
achieved by military means.462 Money which essentially means 
immense oil revenues was controlled by the governing families, that is, 
by small groups of brothers and cousins who headed the ruling families 
and, in turn, ruled the rest of the people. For the state, the issue is not 
about the means of production or its actual development, nor about the 
identity of controlling it, but rather, it is about the way the oil revenues 
are distributed, about the identity of those controlling this process, 
about the amount of money that is being distributed and the identity of 
the beneficiaries.463  
According to some authors, this reality in the Arab world had 
influenced their political culture. People do not view the economic and 
financial resources as being necessary elements of power since wealth 
is the reward received by the powerful and not the source of this power. 
This makes easier for foreign economic domination.464  
                                               
460  Ibidem.  
461  Michel Seurat, considering the Syrian case, wrote: “It is not necessary to be an 
expert in economic anthropology to discover that a factory in the public sector there 
does not function like a similar one in France, as the real reason behind its presence 
is not the achievement of profits, as much as it is to provide a means of spending. 
This spending represents a part of a strategy of the political authority and provides 
it with a new source of strength”. Idem, p.229.  
462  Idem, p.232.  
463  Idem, pp.229-230. 
464  Idem, p.232.  
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10.1. Religious Justification of the State  
Nowadays, is it really necessary to refer to early Islam in order to 
understand contemporary territorial Arab states? Is it really indispen-
sable to make reference to the Arab particularity in a context of general 
acceptance of modern state structure? Is it really necessary to know 
who is the bearer of sovereignty (or if there is another entity, rather 
than God) in the first Islamic Umma? How will it be possible to find 
reconciliation between these positions and the constitutions of most of 
Arab states who declare the people as the only sovereign and that all 
power derives from popular will?  
Many believe that it is a waste of time and energy to return to such 
period but others –rightly- do not agree since they notice a kind of 
nostalgia in some groups (sometimes, but not only, called Islamist, or 
fundamentalist) to such period of Islam. Such groups may dedicate 
concerted political efforts to restore an Islamic state by ‘democratic’ 
means (through popular legitimacy and elections) or clandestinely by 
opposing those governments that do not follow the ‘true teachings’ of 
Islam.465  
The Muslim community had already organized itself into a state-like 
system already before the death of the Prophet, and the question of the 
head of Islamic umma was not relevant before his passing since he 
ensured that role. On the other hand, after his death, the Islamic umma, 
similar to other social group, needed a leader, a chief to handle the 
affaires d’état, but also they needed an imam to guide the Muslims in 
their prayers and to defends Islam. Those roles were entrusted to the 
same person in the beginning: the Caliph. This necessitated particular 
qualities in a chief, which the philosophers tried to enumerate. There 
are nevertheless common points that will be analyzed in the following 
paragraphs.  
                                               
465  It is not the intention here to present or to analyze the political system and power in 
early Islam since it is an extensive subject and not of direct interest here. Reference 
is made to early Islam as predicated by some fundamentalist groups who regard the 
past with nostalgia and work towards the realization of an Islamic state similar that 
of early Islam. 
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Should the chief violate or infringe his duties, a problem of legitimacy 
would arise which, in Islamic and Arab history, sometimes meant his 
loss of power (and his life!) Nevertheless, he could continue as the 
leader by imposing his authority by force. This would explain the 
phenomenon that any observer may readily notice in the history of 
Arab-Islamic empires: many Caliphs were assassinated and replaced by 
another by force. Transference of power was accompanied by bloody 
events, especially when it was made from one tribe or family to 
another; of course, this meant that the new holder of power could be 
usurped in the future, for the same reason. This may suggest that the 
real motive behind such events was not being necessarily the zeal for 
Islam or faith but rather for power. In other words, it was mostly a 
struggle for power between individuals, families or clans rather than a 
question of faith, morality or culture.466  
10.1.1. The First Islamic State 
There are different narratives regarding the first Muslim community 
and the way power was transferred to the Khalifat Rasul Allah.467 The 
appellation was not neutral, as Hicham DJAÏT, a Tunisian historian, 
puts it:  
L’appellation de successeur de l’Envoyé de Dieu est à elle seule tout un 
programme de continuité du pouvoir prophétique, non pas dans sa part supra-
humaine liée à la Révélation mais dans sa part transmissible, lié au pouvoir 
temporel pour l’essentiel. Le Calife est le chef de la communauté islamique, il 
a hérité du prophète le commandement.468  
Nevertheless, the Caliph’s power was in practice political, personal and 
quasi-absolute, as DJAÏT puts it,  
                                               
466  Saying that, no judgments are made on the morality or legitimacy of such events 
since perhaps some may have acted with pure zeal for faith. 
467  Normally translated as ‘vicar of the Prophet of God’ (in French: le Vicaire de 
l’Envoyé de Dieu). 
468  DJAÏT H., La Grande Discorde (religion et politiques dans l’Islam des Origines), 
pp.52-53.  
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Son pouvoir n’est religieux qu’en tant que le religieux est le fondement de 
l’être de la communauté, que tout ce qui est politique est teinté à la base de 
religieux, que tout ce qui justifie l’action des hommes s’enracine dans le 
religieux. De la même manière, l’autorité dans son essence revient à Dieu qui 
l’a déléguée à son prophète dont le calife n’est que le successeur: l’autorité a 
un fondement sacré, et le calife n’est que le dépositaire par la médiation du 
prophète. Dans la pratique, son pouvoir est politique et rien que politique. Il 
est personnel et quasi absolu, étant limité seulement par la parole de Dieu et 
l’exemplarité de l’action de son prophète (la Sunna), mais aussi par les 
conseils de l’élite des musulmans, soit les muhajirun soit les ansar.  
The Prophet left behind him an achieved religion and a state that covers 
the Arabia.469 The real problem which remained, after the passing of the 
Prophet, was to maintain the relation between religion and state, as, 
during his life time, he ensured that role since his authority was based 
on the Word of God and in his concrete command of the Muslim 
community.470 Things were different for his successor who was 
compelled to impose his authority upon the clans who were possibly 
contemplating dissociation from the state, as they considered the liaison 
with the Prophet as personal and, consequently, dissolvable after his 
death. For this reason, one of the main challenges of the Caliph was to 
crack down on apostasy that was not necessarily related to the refusal 
of the Islamic message but rather of paying the sadaka or zakat,471 
which, although of a religious nature, was the most visible aspect of 
their subjection.472 For Abu Bakr (632-634), things should remain as 
                                               
469  For some authors, such as Abdou Filai-Ansary (who support the reflections of Ali 
Abdel-Raziq), considering that the idea that the Prophet had created in the medina 
the first nucleus of the Islamic state is based on a confusion between two forms of 
organisation that need to be distinguished since their respective natures are totally 
different: the state and the religious community. For both, in fact, it is normally used 
to refer at with the term umma that is translated sometimes community and others 
nation. FILALI-ANSARI A., Islam, laïcité, démocratie, p.8. 
470  DJAÏT H., op. cit., p.47.  
471  Zakat: Arabic term meaning purification; Islamic religious tax, one of the five basic 
requirements (arkan or pillars) of Islam.  
472  DJAÏT H., op. cit., p.53. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 144
they were left by the Prophet, and accordingly, for him, state and 
religion are one and the same thing.473 
The rapid election of Abu Bakr can be explained by various factors, 
such as the role played by the new religion which unified different 
clans that were previously in continuous war; basically it depended also 
on the way Abu Bakr was able to impose himself but also on the 
support of ‘Umar whose impelling personality made him one of the 
most influential consultants of the Prophet, who created him into a top-
rank muhajirun (emigrant).474 Pushed by the example of ‘Umar, the 
ansar and muhajirun gave allegance (bay‘a) to Abu Bakr and the 
Caliphate was founded.475  
Still, the condition in which Abu Bakr was elected was the origin of 
several bouts of trouble, which the first community surpassed, not 
without difficulties.476 The circumstances were favourable for Abu 
Bakr, not so for his successors. In fact, the other three ‘Right-going’ 
(al-khulafa’ al-rashedun) were all killed, causing civil war which lasted 
for many years. The third Caliph, Uthman Ibn Affan (644-656), 
replaced ‘Umar, who, in turn, was replaced by ‘Ali Ibn Abi Taleb (656-
661).477  
                                               
473  Idem, p.54. 
474  Idem, p.51. Muhajirun means the emigrants while ansar means the auxiliaries.  
475  Idem, p.48. 
476 Idem, p.52. 
477  The Umayyads governed for 90 years (661-750) and the Caliph’s office became 
hereditary. They were then defeated by their cousins, the Abbassids (the descendents 
of the Prophet’s uncle Abbas), who killed most of the bayt (family) of the 
Umayyads, but Abd-elrahman I escaped to Spain and was the first Umayyad Caliph 
of Cordoba. There were seventy-three Abbasid Caliphs, based in Baghdad, and the 
dynasty remained in power for almost five hundreds years (750-1258). Nevertheless, 
it was under their authority that the Islamic State began to lose its unity, especially 
after the beginning of military chaos in what the historians call the second Abbasid 
era (847-1258). It should be noted that some of the Abbasid first-era Caliphs, and 
most of the second era, were replaced by force or killed. With the end of the 
Abbasid dynasty, the Mamelukes seized power (1250-1217). The difference between 
them and their predecessors was that they were not Arabs, but rather good soldiers, 
originally slaves, taken from central Asia. After their replacement by the Ottomans 
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With the death of ‘Ali, his son, al-Hassan, accepted the passing of 
power to Mu’aweyya Ibn Abi Sufian; thus ending a long civil war, 
started when Uthman was killed and replaced by ‘Ali. In fact, the first 
divisions in the Islamic umma began then. Those who consider the first 
four Caliphs as legitimate, are called the Sunnis; they were (and are) the 
majority of Muslims, who had accepted the fait accompli and accepted 
the defeat of ‘Ali by Mu’aweyya. Sunnism, in fact, opposes shi’ism and 
kharajism in regard to the political-theological question of Caliphate. 
The Shi’ites478 are those who took the side of ‘Ali while the khawarij 
are those who left (kharaja) the ranks of the followers of ‘Ali after he 
had accepted the arbitration between him and Mu’aweyya, during the 
battle of Siffîn.479  
10.1.2. Why Early Islam seems attractive?  
The ‘nostalgia’ to the origins, motivated the fathers of Islamist groups 
to write and to study early Islam. They presented the principles that can 
be considered as the basis of political theory of early Islam. This was 
the case of Abul Ala MAUDUDI. For him, the assumption of political 
power in Islam was founded on certain clear-cut principles such as:480  
First, sovereignty belongs to God. An Islamic state has no right to 
exercise authority except in subordination and in accordance to the Law 
revealed by God and his Prophet. This presents a problem: most Arab 
                                                                                                       
(1281-1921), they continued to govern Egypt until they were defeated by 
Muhammad Ali in 1811.  
478  For the Shi’ites, the imamat (similar to a Caliph) represents divine law, and his 
power is simultaneously temporal and spiritual. Accordingly, as confirmed by 
Ahmad Beydoun, “Le Chiisme partage le malaise qu’éprouvent les doctrines 
religieuses du Pouvoir face au principe démocratique de souveraineté populaire”. 
BEYDOUN A., Chiisme et démocratie, p.43. 
479  Idem, pp.21-22. 
480  SHARIF M.M., A History of Modern Philosophy, p.656. The other principles are: 
those least suited to positions of responsibility, in general, and for the Caliph's 
position in particular, are those who covet and seek them; the foremost duty of the 
Caliph and his government is to institute the Islamic order of life, to encourage all 
that is good, and to suppress all that is evils; it is the right, and also the duty, of 
every member of the Muslim community to check the occurrence of things that are 
wrong and abhorrent to the Islamic State. 
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and Muslim countries had adopted a constitution and declared the 
people as sovereign; however, it was then that the MAUDUDI invented 
a new concept that contains the sovereignty: al-hakemmeyya which 
refers to God, while seyyada (translated also as sovereignty) refers to 
the power of the people.  
Second, all Muslims have equal rights. No distinction should be made 
between Muslims (as individuals or as groups) in the name of race, 
colour or speech. Another problem presents itself: the ‘equality of all 
Muslims’ does not know territorial limits or borders. In fact, Islamist 
groups envisage the instauration of an Islamic state for all Muslims. 
The membership to Islamic umma is based on jus religionis and not jus 
sanguinis nor jus solis.481 So, what of the presence of non-Muslim 
communities?  
Third, shari’a is the Supreme Law. Every one –the Head of State 
included- is to be governed by it. Problem: any law that contradicts the 
shari’a, including the constitution, is, thus, illegitimate, and Muslims 
shall not obey it. There is a problem in finding of the game’s rule of the 
living together.  
Fourth, the government, its authority and possessions are a trust of 
God. No one has the right to exploit them in any way not sanctioned by 
or abhorrent to the shari’a. Problem: authority is a trust of God; in the 
case that the governor misuses it by contradicting the shari’a, he looses 
his raison d’être and may be removed from his position, resulting in 
instability of the state. 
Fifth, the Head of State should be appointed by mutual consultation 
concurrence of the Muslims. He should run the administration and 
undertake legislative work within the limits prescribed by the shari’a 
and in consultation with them. Problem: the consultation does not mean 
necessarily free elections or the participation of all citizens in the 
decision making process directly or indirectly since consultation may 
be limited to the ‘wise people’ that know and are able to distinguish the 
truth, as revealed by the Koran and the Hadith.  
                                               
481  VATIKIOTIS P.J., Op. cit., p.31. 
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Sixth, the Caliph or the Amir is to be obeyed ungrudgingly in whatever 
is right and just (ma'rŭf), but no one has the right to command 
obedience in the service of sin (ma'siah). Problem: the governor may 
pretend obedience only in the case of right and just commands (al-amr 
bel ma'rŭf); the problem here is that justice or rightness remains general 
concept that have not necessarily a precise content.  
Such a system seems attractive to MAUDUDI, especially in the case of 
the first four Caliphs who did not impose themselves by force but rather 
were elected by the people, of their own free-will.482 These early 
Caliphates –also called the ‘Right-going’ Caliphates- had some 
characteristic features that MAUDUDI summarizes as follows: the 
Caliphate was an elective office; the first four Caliphs performed their 
administrative and/or legislative functions through consultation; the 
treasury (Bait al-Mal) was entrusted to them by God and the public; the 
ruler had to obey God and the Prophet and no-one could pretend 
obedience, in defiance of God; the first Caliphs did not see themselves 
as above the law, and the society of those days was free from all kinds 
of tribal, racial or parochial prejudices.483  
It is clear that behind such presentation there is a hidden message: the 
current governments in the Muslim and Arab world are not following 
the example of the early Caliphs. Such authors seem to have one foot in 
the present and the other in the past. Not only is it a contradiction but 
diametrically the opposite.484 
                                               
482  SHARIF M.M., Op. cit., p.659. 
483  Idem, p.659. 
484  There seems to be a hidden message behind all the writings of Maududi. As he 
seems saying: the current governments are serving evil and Muslims should not 
obey them. The real Islamic State is the pure one of the first four Caliphs or better 
still, it is exactly the way we –or I- predict or present it. The real problem with these 
groups –and all religious fundamental groups in general- is that they pretend to the 
exclusiveness to the truth. In fact, the real problem is to know who will be in charge 
of deciding what is right or just. Some may say that it is the shari’a, but then another 
question arises: What is shari’a? Is there one shari’a? In fact, the Koran, considered 
by Muslims as God’s Word dictated to his prophet, cannot be put into question. 
Nevertheless, there are many situations that need an answer that may not be directly 
mentioned in the Koran nor in the Hadith. What should be done, then? There are 
different interpretations for the same text. This explains the existence of different 
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10.2. The Return to Cultural Particularities 
In contemporary use, the reference to Islam is done as to a simple 
reference, as it has the same meaning to everyone. This may lead to 
misuse and therefore, confusions between the credo and history. In fact, 
a distinction is made between Christendom and Christianity, yet 
reference is made to a Muslim religious credo, various rituals and 
practices, and events and attitudes separated by centuries of history as if 
they were one thing, Islam. In fact, there are three levels intrinsically 
associated with the definition of Islam today: first, the values presented 
by the Koran; second, the historical practice principally based on 
religious thinking and its components: tafsir: the commentary of the 
texts; kalam or usul al-Fiqh: the theology; fiqh: the law; third, the 
belief or faith of an individual, where it is influenced by personal 
character and outside context, taking into account that the conditions 
during early Islam were different from those of the Middle Ages and 
the present.  
Other possible amalgams are thus made between moral principles and 
political systems, the religious community and the state, religious 
commandments and the law. As an example, shura (principle of 
consultation) and ta’a (obedience) are considered by the Koran as 
virtues that have to determine orientate the actions of Muslims who live 
within a community. Nevertheless, the way those values have to be 
enacted is not mentioned in the Koran. Now, as (rightly) confirmed by 
Abdou Filali-Ansary,  
                                                                                                       
schools of the Law of Islam, besides the different secessions within the Islamic 
community (Sunni and Shi’is for example) and the multiple Islamic sects that 
developed throughout, history complicate this task. Accordingly, it would be 
preferable to speak about multiple Islamic concept, and a multiple shari’a, rather 
than one, unique, collection of precise and clear principles. Some may then suggest 
leaving the task of interpreting the shari’a to a group of specialized persons: the 
Muslim “theologians”. Now, the same fact that this task is given to competent and 
informed personalities means that shari’a does not have a stable and precise content 
but rather, is adapted to new and unattended circumstances, related to a specific 
context (time and place), and as such need interpretation and explanation; but, these 
people are human beings, and as such, not infallible. Their view may then reflect 
their own will and not necessarily that of God. What is the solution? Not forgetting 
that in the meantime, the state needs to be governed and decisions need to be taken. 
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La confusion entre ces deux niveaux, celui des principes et celui –disons- des 
règles d’application de ces principes, a conduit de nombreux auteurs à croire 
que l’Islam offre, ou contient, à l’état implicite, une véritable « constitution » 
définissant le mode de fonctionnement de l’Etat Islamique.485  
The theologians tried to make analogies to the enunciations made in the 
Koran and Hadith, and prevailed sometimes ta’a over shoura. This 
meant the prevalence of obedience as the basis of the Islamic state: 
obedience is imperative even when the governor is unjust; on the 
condition he ensures public order, does not forbid the basic rituals and 
does not openly attack the symbols of Islam.486 The work of 
theologians, then, was to answer questions that arose in the Muslim 
community and that needed an answer.  
10.2.1. Abu Hanifah  
Together with many others, MAUDUDI presented Abu Hanifah who 
was the first person to lay down a perspicuous Sunni point of view 
regarding matters of divergence with the doctrines of others sect, in his 
famous work, al-Fiqh al-Akbar.487 Abu Hanifah was born in Kufah, 
capital of Iraq, in 699 A.D, tried to answer the main questions and 
doubts of his time, one of which may shed light on the ultimate query 
raised in the preceding paragraph:  
Whether, in a Muslim State governed by the sinful and the wrong-doer, 
it was possible to perform correctly such religious duties as the Friday 
prayers in particular and other prayers in general, or political functions, 
like dispensing justice or participating in war? For Abu Hanifah, 
prayers can be offered behind any of the faithful, good or bad. He 
distinguished between Caliphs de iure and Caliphs de facto. For him, if 
at a time the Muslims were deprived of a Caliph de jure, the functions 
                                               
485  FILALI-ANSARI A., Op. cit., p.7.  
486  In recent times there is a tendency to reverse priorities in favour of consultation that 
is understood as ‘popular consultation’. Idem, p.8. 
487  He is the founder of the Islamic law school which took his name. For the first fifty-
two years of his life, he lived under the Umayyad regime, and the latter eighteen 
under Abbassid. SHARIF M.M., Op. cit., p.673.  
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of their society could continue to be exercised lawfully under a Caliph 
de facto, even though his right to the Caliphate may be disputed. 
Nevertheless, in MAUDUDI’s opinion on this issue, Abu Hanifah’s 
position is similar to the basic view of Islam: the true sovereign is God; 
the Prophet is to be obeyed as God's accredited vicegerent, and shari’a, 
that is, the Law of God and His Prophet, is the supreme Law to which 
all must submit without demur or reservation. He regarded the Qur’ān 
and the Sunnah as the final authority. Legal sovereignty, according to 
him, rested with God and the Prophet; and reason and judgment (giyās 
and rā'y) were to be employed in the service of legislation only in 
matters where no instructions had been given. 
According to Abu Hanifah, to seize power by force and later regularize 
it by exacting allegiance under duress was no lawful mean of selection. 
A Caliph should be chosen after consultation and in conference with 
‘the wise people’ (ahl al-rāy) of the community who were entitled to 
give their opinion.488 According to Abu Hanifah, maintained that 
oppression and the illegitimate use of public money by a ruler rendered 
the entitlement to the Caliphate null and void. Not only that; he even 
did not allow the tokens of good-will and gifts received from foreign 
States, to become the personal property of the Caliph.489  
Another important question that baffled the people of those days was 
whether or not it was lawful for the Muslims to rise in revolt against a 
ruler who perpetrated tyranny or transgressed the limits of shari’a. Abu 
Hanifah's ruling in this matter was that the Caliphate of an despotic 
incumbent was basically wrong and insupportable, and deserved to be 
overthrown; that people not only had the right, but it was their duty to 
rise in rebellion, and that such a rebellion was not only allowed but 
obligatory, provided, however, that it promised to succeed in replacing 
the tyrant or transgressor with a just and virtuous ruler, and not fizzle 
out in mere loss of lives and lose of power.490  
                                               
488  Idem, p.683. 
489  Idem, p.685. 
490  Idem, p.688. 
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10.2.2. Al-Fārābi  
Abu Nasr al-Fārābi was born in about 870 and he died in 950 A.D.; 
eminent founder of a philosophical system as he was, he devoted 
himself entirely to contemplation and speculation and kept himself 
aloof from political and social disorder.491  
In his famous book ‘Opinions of People of the Perfect State’, al-Farabi 
dedicated chapter twenty six to the human needs of society and 
cooperation, and the two successive chapters to the need for a chief/s 
and his/their qualities.492 Human societies, for him, are either perfect or 
imperfect; the perfect society may be great, middling, or small. A great 
human society (ma’moura) is the one consisting of several umam 
(plural of umma) united and mutually supportive. A middling one is the 
society of one nation (umma) in some part of the world, and the small is 
the society of the people of a city (madina). It is interesting to note that 
only madina is defined territorially, since the umma refers to a 
community of people,493 while ma’moura refers to the world as a 
whole. 
The madina is compared to a human body, in which different organs 
have different roles. There is a dissimilarity that is outlined: in a human 
being, the collaboration between organs is natural, in a madina, this 
cannot be other than voluntary.494 Although considered as the smallest 
(perfect) society, the madina constitutes the basic one. In fact, the ideal 
City-state is the city in which the members of the society cooperate to 
attain happiness. The same applies to umma, but the collaboration is not 
                                               
491  Idem, p.450. He left a considerable amount of literature, such as: 1) Kitāb Ara' Ahl 
al-Madinat al-Fddilah (Book on the Views of the People of the Excellent State); 2) 
Kitāb al-Siyāsat al-Madaniyyah (The Book on the Civic Administration); 3) Kitāb 
Tahsil al-Sa'ddah (The Book on the Achievement of Happiness); 4) Kitāb al-Tanbih 
'ala Sabil al-Sa'ddah (The Book on Caution on the Path of Happiness); and 5) the 
Bodleian manuscript of his Fusūl al-Madini (Chapters on the Civilian). Idem, p.704. 
492 AL-FARABI, Opinions of people of the Perfect state, pp.112-126. 
493 Idem, p.113. 
494 Ibidem. 
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between imperfect societies495, nor is it between individuals but rather, 
it is between the mudun themselves. The ideal ma’moura then is the 
one in which different umma (distinguished by its natural character, 
temperament, habits, and language) cooperate to attain happiness. 
Accordingly, the madina is not a closed society; it cooperates with 
other mudun (the same principle of voluntary will can be applied by 
analogy here). The same is valid for umma.  
Now, for a similar existence of the al-madina al-fadela there is a need 
for a chief who cannot, by definition, be so if he is subjugated to 
someone else. The chief cannot be just anyone, nor is anyone excluded 
a priori. The only condition is to have the qualities of a chief (the ideal 
chief, the imam, according to al-Farabi, has twelve characteristics).496 
It is however, impossible to have all these qualities in one man; 
therefore it is necessary to consider the second option: a chief who has 
at least six of these.497 Al-Farabi calls this ruler the traditional king. 
Accordingly, it is not necessary that this role is ensured by one physical 
person; these qualities, in fact, may be distributed in different persons 
who constitute then, perfect chiefs.498 If these characteristics are present 
in more than one person, together they form ideal chiefs for a state. If 
                                               
495 The imperfect society is that of the people of a village, a locality, a lane, or a house, 
the last being the smallest. 
496 Sound health; Intelligence and sagacity; Good memory; Prudence and talent; 
Eloquence; Devotion to education and learning; No greed for food, drink, and sex; 
Friendliness towards truth; Bigness of heart; Indifference to dirham and dinar and 
other forms of wealth; Devotion by nature to justice; Strong resolution. SHARIF 
M.M., Op. cit., p. 712. 
497 (1) He should be wise and philosophical; and (2) learned and abreast with the laws, 
customs, rites, and rituals adopted by his predecessor to discharge the function of the 
ideal State with all perfection. (3) He should be an expert in deriving principles in 
case he does not find airy law, and (4) farsighted, possessing an insight to frame 
rules and regulations in accordance with the conditions and circumstances he finds 
himself in, and capable of keeping up the reforms he introduces. (5) He should also 
be well experienced and eloquent in giving directions to urge the people to follow 
him in accordance with the Sari'ah. (6) In addition he should be skilful in physical 
display of exercises needed in warfare, and in the use of arms, ammunition, and 
other equipments. Idem, p.713. 
498 AL-FARABI, Op. Cit., p.126. 
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these characteristics are not present in anyone, then there would be no 
sovereign and the state would be exposed to destruction.499  
For al-Farabi, the sovereigns of an ideal state, who succeed one 
another and the group of people who administer that state, are 
considered as one and sovereign. The people of an ideal state have 
something in common, although they may enjoy happiness in different 
ways. The excellent state as explained above is the state administered 
by the best and most talented, who aim at prosperity and happiness. If 
its constitution fails to provide the people with prosperity, and the 
rulers do not possess the qualities of ideal rulers, then the state ceases to 
be excellent and is called the state of evil-doing (al-madinat al-
fāsiqah), the ignorant state (al-madinat al-jāhilah) or the state of astray-
going (al-madinat al-dāllah).500  
To conclude, here are three remarks: First, there is only a description a 
posteriori, of the qualities of a perfect chief, not the way he is chosen or 
designated. Accordingly, the consequence of not having a perfect chief 
for the perfect madina will be the destruction of the madina itself. 
Perhaps it is a kind of justification for regime changes and the 
destruction of monarchies/rulers, and not the way they are to be 
preserved. Second, the qualities presented are all human qualities and 
not related to religion, gender or a particular dynasty. Nevertheless, it is 
not easy to have a perfect chief (these qualities are rarely found in one 
person, unless he is a prophet or philosopher).501 In this case, a king is 
enough to guide the affairs of the perfect madina. His qualities are of a 
different order: he just needs the wisdom to follow in the steps of his 
predecessor. Third, governance is not related to the umma but to a 
madina that is territorially defined.502 Accordingly, wherever a perfect 
                                               
499 Ibidem. 
500 SHARIF M.M., Op. cit., p.964. 
501 AL-FARABI, Op. Cit., p.14. 
502 According to some authors, the post-medieval idea of a state –a territorially defined 
entity apart from a ruler or a dynasty organized in accordance with man-made rules 
was alien to Muslim political theory. Ottoman theories of state and government were 
derived from the Muslim concept that God is the source of all authority and law and 
that government exists to enable the community of true believers (Muslims) to fulfil 
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chief exists, he will be the head of the madina, and the umma and also 
the ma’moura. Nevertheless, this is often difficult to realize, so the 
other qualities may be held by different persons who shall reign 
collectively as the perfect chief.  
10.2.3. Ibn Khaldûn 
According to some authors, the death of Ibn Khaldûn (1406) signalled 
the end of Arabic Political philosophy, and was followed by five 
hundreds years of political thought, whose sole exponents were jurists 
and theologians.503  
It was through the examination of culture that Ibn Khaldûn investigated 
the phenomenon of government which is considered to be the 
constituent part and form (e.g. the organizing principle) of culture.504 
This particular and independent science of Ibn Khaldûn, that is, the 
science of culture, is not an art concerned with how man ought to live, 
or how society should be rightly governed, or how the multitude should 
be convinced, but a scientific inquiry into how humans beings have 
actually lived in the past; the natural causes determining the modes of 
human association which necessitate those activities and ways of life, 
pursued in diverse human societies; historical reports afford the 
opportunity to correctly judge their soundness (or not).505 
Ibn Khaldûn presented various political theories of his predecessors, 
but he did not do that merely as a historian; he severely criticized them, 
basing his criticisms on theoretical and practical considerations. In fact, 
he demonstrates the necessity for social organization and a ruler, but in 
order to do that, some philosophers refer to divine law. For Ibn 
Khaldûn, this is evidently false, since a ruler can rule by virtue of royal 
                                                                                                       
its obligations to God. The community, not the state, constitutes the basic Muslim 
policy transcending all boundaries. KORANY B., Alien and Besieged Yet Here to 
Stay: the Contradic-tions of the Arab Territorial State, p.75.  
503  BUTTERWORTH Ch. E., State and Authority in Arabic Political Thought, p.109.  
504 SHARIF M.M., Op. cit., p.962. 
505 Idem, p.966. 
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authority alone, and even a poorly educated persons know that there 
have been innumerable rulers without divine authority.506 
Of the Muslim philosophers, it was precisely Ibn Rushd who (like Ibn 
Khaldûn) was a recognized religious judge (qādi), and a philosopher 
who criticized al-Farabi and Ibn Sina for imitating the dialectical 
theologians; he who wrote the most celebrated treaties on religion and 
philosophy, the main theme of which is in defense of the legitimacy of 
religion and philosophy in their proper spheres - a devastating attack 
upon the combination of religion and philosophy in the form of 
theology.507  
According to Ibn Khaldûn, humans cannot live without social 
organization and solidarity, since these are indispensable in procuring 
basic nourishment and objects of primal necessity. This absolute human 
need for social organization is fundamental to civilization (umran).508 
For him, the efficient cause of the movement to be a specific property 
of the human soul, that is, social solidarity (‘asabiyya, translated often 
as ‘group feeling’). For him, it is a specific property of the human soul, 
a combination of the natural feeling for one's relatives and friends, and 
the need for defense and means of survival. It cements a group together, 
dictates the need for a ruler, leads to conflicts with other groups, and 
generates the power of conquest leading to victory over others; its 
initial power determines the extent of this conquest; the fulfillment of 
appetites and desires, and finally, weakens it and leads to the 
disintegration of political power.509  
Political life, as practiced by all human communities, has to take into 
account the nature of all humans, and should be directed to the common 
good of the multitude. This requires a ruler and a law based on the 
rational understanding of their common needs and interests in this 
world, or a divine Law based on their common good in this world and 
                                               
506 Idem, p.968. 
507 Idem., p.937. 
508 IBN KHALDÛN, The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History, pp.45-48. 
509 Idem., pp.160f. 
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the next. Accordingly, for every social organization, political 
government is necessary; human beings require a person who will make 
them do what is good for them, and who will forbid them by force (if 
necessary) to do what may harm them. However, obeisance to a 
superior depends on his being good and fair; he is so, when he does not 
oppress the population with unjust laws, and treats everyone equally. 
In the case of a holder of authority despising his own people, he will be 
rejected by them, and, after ascertaining the qualities of a successor in 
the spirit of the clan, he will be removed, and his authority given to 
another. In fact, the allegiance oath, albaya’, consists of paying homage 
to obeisance. The person who takes the oath, binds himself in contract 
to his emir, and in doing so, confers upon him the government of his 
affairs and those of Muslims; he is bound to recognize his emir’s 
authority and to execute his instructions, whether he is in accordance 
with him, or not. Similar to a buyer being bound by a contract with a 
seller, those who take the oath of allegiance to, and enter into a contract 
with an emir, put their lives in his hands.510  
The first form of government was the Caliphate. The origin of the word 
means ‘to replace’ because the Caliph is the one who represents the 
Prophet, in Islam. The Caliph is like the vicar of the Lawgiver 
(Mohammed).511 Ibn Khaldûn distinguishes between the objectives of 
natural royal power and those of the Caliphate: the exercise of the first 
consists in making it possible for the masses to operate in harmony with 
their projects and destinies; that is, allowing them to safeguard their 
material interests and avoid what may harm them, in accordance with 
reason. As for the second, it is the guidance of people according to 
divine law, in order to ensure their happiness in this world and the 
next.512  
When the prophet died, his companions took their oath of allegiance to 
Abu Bakr and charged him with directing their affairs; people were 
never left open to anarchy. Governmental functions depended on the 
                                               
510 Idem., pp.166-167.  
511 Idem., p.170. 
512 Idem., pp.154f.  
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Caliphate, which is simultaneously, a spiritual and temporal institution. 
This is why the Caliph is also called imam, since he is the one who 
guides Muslims in their prayers. The imamate was a necessary 
institution: the proof lies in the fact that the agreement was unanimous. 
The dignity of the imam is part of religious law since it is in the service 
of a public good; nevertheless, it is a grave error to consider the 
imamate as one of the Pillars of Faith; it has only the function of public 
interest; those entitled are empowered by delegation.513  
Nevertheless, the characteristics of Caliphate had disappeared - all that 
remained was the name - and the regime became purely and simply an 
autocracy. The Power became absolutist and served the vanities of this 
world, including the use of force, and the satisfaction of arbitrary 
desires and passions.514 Some began calling this institution sultanate, in 
reference to the powers and prerogatives of those who pretended the 
same powers, or in relation to the allegiance that was made to the 
Caliph, when it was imposed by force.515  
10.3. Constitutional Provisions Regarding Religion and Nation 
In the Arab world, constitutions may describe a variety of political 
structures: federal, as in the United Arab Emirates and the Sudan; 
unitary, as in Tunisia; a constitutional monarchy, as in Jordan; a 
republic, as in Egypt; or a traditional hereditary monarchy, as in Saudi 
Arabia. While most Arab constitutions are documents with roughly 
similar provisions, some constitutions are noteworthy products of 
historical and political circumstances. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the 
Koran itself is considered the constitution, accompanied by a series of 
royal decrees compiled to function as a manual for the application of its 
principles. In Libya, the Constitutional Proclamation, the Green Book 
written by Muammar Qaddafi and the People’s Declaration together 
constitute the BL of the land.516 Procedures for constitutional 
                                               
513 Idem., pp.156f.  
514 Idem., pp.181f.  
515 Idem., p.155. 
516  See Constitutions in Arab World, in the website of the Program of Governance in 
the Arab Region (POGAR).  
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amendments vary; sometimes requiring direct referenda or legislative 
action, while in some countries, the head of the state may issue 
amendments by decree.  
The comparison of constitutions in different regions of the world, 
uncovers a remarkable variety of fundamental texts, since they are the 
‘product of their unique history and geography’, as stated by Eric 
CANAL-FORGUES in the introduction to the collection of Arab 
constitutions, edited by him.517 This is also the case of other collections 
in which Arab constitutions have been studied as if they were identical 
(which they are not), in which we may find common features and some 
similarities, since they might have reproduced information from the 
same sources; nevertheless, every Arab state has its own constitution, 
and its own constitutional history. 
If we set aside the so-called ‘Constitution of Medina’, the first ‘Arab’ 
constitution -the Constitution of Tunisia adopted in 1861- was written 
in French! Since then, the constitutional movement began, and never 
stopped, in the Arab world. The Arab world was familiar with evolution 
in relation to the constitutionalism; the democratization process 
experienced a relatively pacific transformation. There is also a brand of 
creativity in the Arab world, wherein new techniques and institutions 
that are unknown elsewhere are invented.518 
Most Arab states adapted written and rigid constitutions, of which some 
have common characteristics. Many Arab states adapted constitutions 
after independence: Algiers gained independence on 5 July 1962, and 
adopted its Constitution on 10 September 1963 (suspended in 1965; the 
second Constitution was adopted in 1976 and amended in 1979, 1988, 
1989, 1996); Bahrain gained independence on 15 August 1971, and 
adopted its Constitution on 6 December 1973 (suspended in 1975 and 
adopted the National Charter in 2001 after a popular referendum); the 
                                               
517  CANAL–FORGUES E., Recueil des Constitutions des Pays Arabes, p.X. 
518  Idem, p.VII. Nevertheless, in no way can we will elude ourselves in thinking that the 
law of the constitution corresponds to the constitutional law. There is a need, in fact, 
to study the constitutional text in the light of the law in force, in every Arab state. 
Nevertheless, studying the constitutions of the Arab countries may give us an idea, 
albeit incomplete, of the constitutional situation of those countries. 
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United Arab Emirates gained independence on 2 December 1971 and 
adopted a provisional constitution on the same date (that became 
permanent in 1996); Kuwait gained independence on 19 July 1961 and 
adopted its constitution a year later; Mauritania adopted its constitution 
immediately after independence in 1961. Some other constitutions were 
adopted before independence, such as the Lebanese one in 1926, while 
Lebanon gained independence on 22 November 1943. Other were 
adopted because of new circumstances; such as that of Jordan in 1952, 
after the unification of the two banks of the river, and Iraq in 1968, 
after the Ba’thi revolution. 
There are states with a special constitutional history such as Egypt, 
which enjoyed certain autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, and 
began very early on, the codification process. Egypt was also familiar 
with different constitutions. Some systems are related to special 
circumstances such as Saudi Arabia, which has no constitution but the 
shari’a; and Libya which has a Constitutional Proclamation – The 
Green Book and a popular Proclamation. There are Unitarian States 
such as Tunisia, and Federal States such as Sudan. Besides, there are 
different political systems such as constitutional royal hereditary 
(Jordan) and republican (Egypt).  
10.3.1. Arab Nation and Single Arab People  
It is obvious that Arab nationalists have the same German ethnic 
concept of nation. The nation exists as a human group with its own 
characteristics such as language, history and traditions (Islam also is 
important in conserving the Arabic language from total decadence after 
four centuries under the non-Arab Ottomans). The Arabic nation made 
its first attempts to a revival in the nineteenth century, and began 
political activities in order to establish a united state for all Arabs.519  
                                               
519  In order to avoid discussions about which state should be considered Arab, all 
members of the Arab League are usually considered so. There are twenty-one states, 
all members of the Arab League, plus the PLO (the state of Palestine became a full 
member on 9 September 1976). Although the State of Palestine is part of the Arab 
League, it is not yet independent and sovereign, nor yet does it consist of the three 
basic elements of a state: territory, people and sovereignty. When the PLO was 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 160
The first attempt of unification was when Mohammad Ali of Egypt, 
encouraged by France, revolted against the Ottomans in 1831 in order 
to “liberate Arab peoples and gather them in one Arab Empire”. The 
second attempt was when Ash-Shareef Hussein declared a revolution 
against the Ottomans, encouraged by the British government, who 
promised the establishment of a united Arab state under the authority of 
Hussein.  
These two attempts failed, and the concept of Arab nationalism as a 
motivation for creating one Arab state, had lost its roots and started to 
live together with the Arab territorial states. Arab nationalism became 
the incentive or enticement for further collaboration and coordination 
between existent Arab states. In the beginning, the ethnic concept of 
nation, helped to justify the revolts against other Muslims. Arabs 
became ethnically recognized and formed a nation that was 
distinguished from other Muslim nations; as such, and according to the 
new concepts of modern nations of that time, they sought to have their 
political independence in one state. 
Although Arab nationalism legitimized rebellions against other 
Muslims, it could not provide elements distinguishing single Arab 
people, nor could it justify territorial Arab states. What makes an 
Algerian different from a Moroccan, a Jordanian from a Palestinian, an 
Egyptian from a Sudanese, a Lebanese from a Syrian? Can borders be 
sufficient to legitimize actual Arab states or are they only a foreign 
imposition? In fact, it was crucial to leave the concept of nation as 
ethnicity, in order to adopt the concept of nation as demos; this concept 
covers all the citizens of one state who live within its borders and under 
its laws, and distinguishes them from others.  
The preambles of the Arab constitutions may provide a brief vision of 
the single Arab state, regarding the relation between the people and the 
Arab nation. Some submit that the state is part of the Arab world, and 
others that the people of a single Arab state are part of the Arab nation. 
Here we will take three study cases: the Jordanian constitution of 1952 
                                                                                                       
admitted into the Arab League, it was considered the sole representative of Arab 
Palestinians and their interests.  
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and National Charter of 1990, the 1971 Egyptian constitution and the 
1996 Algerian constitution. 
The 1952 Jordanian Constitution was applicable to the WB since 
it was part of the Kingdom of Jordan, until its occupation by Israel in 
1967 and the formal separation between the two banks in 1987. In its 
first article, The Jordanian Constitution states that Jordan is a sovereign 
Arab state. The same article states that the people (sha’b) of Jordan are 
part of the Arab nation (umma). The sovereignty of the state and its 
independence from other countries is emphasized in that constitution, 
and this can be understood in its historical context of rivalry between 
Arab leaders, especially in relation to the Palestinian territories that 
were unified with (or annexed to) the Transjordan. The Jordanian 
constitution has a particularity: it refers to the Jordanian people as 
umma. This is the case of  
Art. 24: (i) The Nation is the source of all powers. (ii) The Nation shall exercise 
its powers in the manner prescribed by the present Constitution.  
Art. 29: The King shall upon his succession to the Throne take an oath before the 
National Assembly, which shall be convened under the chairmanship of the 
Speaker of the Senate, to respect and observe the Constitution and be loyal to the 
Nation.  
Art. 93: The Prime Minister and Ministers shall, before assuming their duties, take 
the following oath before the King: “I swear by Almighty God to be loyal to the 
King, uphold the Constitution, serve the Nation and conscientiously perform the 
duties entrusted to me.” 
Besides, the Jordanian constitution refers to the Jordanian Parliament as 
‘Majles al-umma’. This term is usually translated as the National 
Assembly. Now, the National Assembly is the translation of ‘al-majles 
al-watanee’ where watanee refers to homeland (watan) and not to 
nation as umma. This confusion in terms disappears in the Jordanian 
National Charter of 1990 where the term umma (nation) refers to the 
Arab nation and sha’b (people) refers to the Jordanians: “The 
Jordanian people are part of the Arab nation”.  
The Algerian constitution is an interesting case study. We read in the 
preamble that the Algerian people are a free people and relate their 
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identity to Islam and Arabism: Amazighity.520 In fact the Algerian 
preamble provides that Algeria is an Arab land of Islam and is an 
integral part of the Great Maghreb. Still, it refers to its people as the 
only source of authority. The Algerian people are distinguished from 
other Arab peoples and are entitled to sovereignty. Article 6: “The 
people are the source of any power. The national sovereignty belongs 
exclusively to the People”.  
While we read in the Egyptian constitution of 1971 that the Egyptian 
people are part of the Arab nation. The amendment of 1980 introduced 
the interesting concept of comprehensive unity in the Constitution’s 
first article: “The Egyptian people are part of the Arab Nation and work 
for the realization of its comprehensive unity”. What does this 
comprehensive unity mean? It may be a constitutional adaptation to and 
harmony with the actual territorial divisions of Arab states; few would 
envision a united Arab state in the near future, but most Arabs 
encourage Arab unity that is based on the actual division of Arab states. 
This unity would envision special relations between these states that 
have a common culture, language and history. In fact, sovereignty of a 
single Arab people is enhanced in all the Arab constitutional documents 
and no state would compromise it; in the Egyptian Constitution, Article 
3: “Sovereignty is for the people alone they are the source of authority. 
The people shall exercise and protect this sovereignty, and safeguard 
national unity in the manner specified in the Constitution”. 
10.3.2 State-Religion relationship in Arab Constitutions 
Is it possible to read the theory of constituent power in Arabic terms? In 
fact, this theory was ‘invented’ in the USA and France, following 
philosophical and political revolutions. The nation became the source 
of all authority since people are sovereign, and not the monarch or God. 
The principle of popular sovereignty is included in most Arab 
Constitutions which adopted written and rigid Constitutions; this is 
                                               
520  The Amazighity distinguished the cultures of the three countries of the Magreeb. 
The name is given to the original inhabitants of Maghreb. An interesting study was 
made by Rania Zabaneh for a Master degree at the University of Birzeit: “Algeria 
under Scope” (Arabic-2004) under the supervision of Dr. Abdalla Eid.  
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obvious since popular sovereignty and the modern concept of self-
determination is the basis of modern nationalism. This fact is not 
enough to embrace the conviction that this popular sovereignty is the 
legitimization of the state and its institutions in the Arab world. In fact, 
in the Arab world, a contradiction exists: there is an increasing 
attachment to territorial states although not without general scepticism 
from actual regimes (considered the reason for under-development in 
Arab States), while the legitimization of the authority is based on Arab 
or Islamic nationalist discourse.  
The following table shows Arab constitutions refer to Islam. It gives a 
comparative idea of the constitutional documents in the Arab world.521 
State Islam Shari’a 
Algeria Religion of State (Art.2) 
Candidate to the 
presidency: Muslim 
(Art.107) 
National Charter 76, and 1986 (Art.6); 
Freedom of conscience (Art.53) 
Bahrain Islam shall be the religion 
of the State (Art.2) 
Islamic Sharia (Islamic Law) 'a main 
source' of legislation (Art.2) 
Freedom of conscience is absolute (Art.22) 
Egypt Religion of State (Art.2) 
The person to be elected 
President of the Republic 
must be an Egyptian born 
to Egyptian parents and 
enjoy civil and political 
rights. (Art.75) 
Islamic jurisprudence is the principal 
source of legislation (Art.2 and 11) 
The State shall guarantee the freedom of 
belief and the freedom of practice of 
religious rites (Art.46) 
Emirates Official religion of the 
Union (Art.7) 
 
Shari’a= a principle source (Art.7); 
Freedom of religion, in accordance with the 
customs, and in the limits of the public 
order (Art.32) 
                                               
521 Source: Islam (L’) Religion de l’Etat, pp.129-130. 
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Jordan Islam is the religion of the 
State (Art.2) 
Legitimate child for a 
Muslim mother and father. 
(Art.28) 
The State shall safeguard the free exercise 
of all forms of worship and religious rites 
in accordance with the customs observed in 
the Kingdom, unless such is inconsistent 
with public order or morality (Art.14) 
Koweit The religion of the State is 
Islam (Art.2) 
Legitimate son of Muslim 
parents (Art.4,5) 
The Islamic Shari’a shall be a main 
source of legislation. (Art.2) 
“…Without distinction as to race, origin, 
language or religion…” (Art.29) 
Freedom of belief is absolute. (Art.35) 
Morocco Religion of state (Art.6) 
The king: Amir al-
mu’minun (Art.19) 





Hanbalite school, Ibn Taymyya 
Syria The religion of the 
President of the Republic 
has to be Islam. (Art.3) 
Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of 
legislation. (Art.3) (1) The freedom of faith 
is guaranteed. The state respects all 
religions. (2) The state guarantees the 
freedom to hold any religious rites, 
provided they do not disturb the public 
order. (Art. 35) 
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§11 Conclusion to Part Two 
The relation between authority, power and/or force is subtle, as seen in 
Arab literature and terminology. In fact, the word ‘force’ is translated 
as kuwwa and ‘authority’ as sulta while ‘power’ can be translated as 
sulta and kuwwa. However, the term authority may have connotations 
related to legitimacy while the use of the word power (as sulta) may 
have connotations of legality. Accordingly, not all those who are in 
power enjoy sulta; rather, the imposition of sulta (power) may be done 
by kuwwa that is by force, in the name of sulta (power/authority), 
which is legally enjoyed. Therefore, sulta is mostly related to legality 
rather than to legitimacy, and may endure as long as it can be imposed 
by kuwwa.  
The main subject in this thesis is the constituent power. Accordingly, 
reference to the first Islamic umma and the first Islamic State, and later 
to contemporary Arab States, may be of help to understand how can the 
state apparatus pretend the obedience or the consensus of its subjects 
without being attacked or rejected by citizens for lacking legitimacy 
(although they may apparently being ‘democratically’ elected). How 
can those entitled to constituent power and those who use it express that 
popular will that is not only the volonté générale that ignore individuals 
will, neither is the sum of individuals’ will that act in egoistic and 
individualistic way without any consideration to the rules of living 
together, necessary for the maintenance and the unity of any social 
group, including the political ones, but rather a combination of both of 
them.  
Arab countries have at least one thing in common: they are all rooted in 
the Arab and Islamic culture that is distinguished from other cultures, 
but not necessary in opposition to or in conflict with any other. In 
western countries, particular historical events had occurred, that 
changed and influenced political systems, even to the present day. The 
same is true for Arab countries: the end of the Ottoman Empire and the 
particular experience of colonialism and/or mandate are turning points 
in the Arab modern history.  
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Arab and European political thinkers took their bearings from Plato and 
Aristotle, but the European tradition soon began to discuss the 
fundamental differences between the demands of the secular rule and 
those of divine rule. This European distinction led to a modern realistic 
approach towards politics by authors like Machiavelli, Bacon and 
Hobbes, and to the emergence of the Locke-Rousseau principle of 
popular sovereignty. According to some authors, a similar rupture with 
the medieval philosophy did not occur in the Arab tradition.522 
This absence also led, in BUTTERWORTH’s view, to a ‘quietistic 
acceptance’ by the citizens in the Arab countries of their non-
democratic governments.523 The same author continues, “The absence 
of an unquestioned, perhaps unquestionable belief in the fundamental 
need for popular sovereignty is what primarily explains why political 
life in the Arab World differs so markedly from political life in the 
West”.524 
Effectively, western countries had had two revolutions: the American 
and the French; those were preceded by a number of theories that 
justified the power of the state by popular will rather than that of God 
or the king. This was possible in a context of (initially partial, then 
complete) separation between Church and State. Nevertheless, the 
consequences of these Revolutions are not limited to western countries: 
the establishment of modern states and the dispersion of nationalism 
and theories of popular sovereignty all over the world are convincing 
proof.  
In fact, power has no more its origin in God than in his representative 
on earth (the Pope). Consequently, it was necessary to find out who 
were the newly entitled to sovereignty. Bodin (1530-1596) answered 
that the bearer of this indivisible and unlimited sovereignty was the 
                                               
522  BUTTERWORTH Ch. E., Op. cit., p.91-92.  
523  Ibidem. This position is somewhat exaggerated although not totally void of logic. I 
do not share BUTTERWORTH’s point of view in relation to Arab countries 
although his analyses of modern developments in western countries are excellent. 
524  SALAMÉ Gh. (ed.), Op. cit., p.11.  
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monarch.525 Hobbes (1588-1679) said that it was the highest 
representative of the state who had the undivided and unlimited 
sovereignty since the people formed a social contract and every person 
cedes his freedoms and powers to one person and community.526 While 
John Locke (1632-1704) proposed that it was the representative(s) of 
the state who had the undivided power, but it was not ‘unlimited’ since 
it was bound by natural law.527 Rousseau (1712-1778) related the 
sovereignty to the people which expressed ‘volonté générale’; as such a 
rational and just state was governed by direct democracy.528 
Simplified, the shift in sovereignty can be expressed in the following 
way: while Bodin still relied on the notion of the rule over the people, 
Hobbes and Locke introduce the rule for the people and Rousseau 
argued in favor of the rule for the people by the people.529 As Gérard 
Mairet puts it: ‘the concept of nation was a revolutionary notion’, 
perhaps because it meant the abolition of absolute monarchic power 
and its replacement by the power of the people.530  
Accordingly, the concept of popular sovereignty was possible in 
Europe only in a context of a separation from the Church and the 
subsequent approaches to the new bearer of sovereignty and not -as 
some may think- to the French or the American Revolutions. In fact, 
those two Revolutions gave birth to the new modern states, based on 
the separation and balance between the three powers (legislative, 
executive and judicial) but the concept of popular sovereignty is much 
older; these two Revolutions changed only the way that sovereignty 
may be exercised and controlled.  
                                               
525  TÖPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., pp.24-25. 
526  Idem, pp.25-26.  
527  Idem, pp.26-27.  
528  Idem, pp.27-28. 
529  Idem, p.28. Interesting to notice that some Arab countries adopt the Rousseau’s 
vision in their constitution such as the 1996 amended Algerian constitution which 
states in article 11 that “[t]he State takes its legitimacy and its raison d’être from the 
People’s will. Its motto is ‘By the People and for the People’. It is exclusively for the 
service of the people”.  
530  BENSAID S., op. cit., p.149.  
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In the Arab context, a similar experience occurred but much earlier: 
Muslim (and Arab) philosophers tried to justify royal power. They did 
that without necessarily referring to religion, though it remained 
important as an element in helping diverse populations (or clans) 
remain cohesive under one political organization. As Ibn Khaldûn 
conceived it, Islam served as a unifying element of the various 
communities in the Islamic Empire.  
Besides, by the end of the First World War, a similar turning point 
occurred in the Arab world history, when Sheikh Hussein of Mecca 
declared a revolt against the Ottomans, justifying his allegiance with 
Christian Europeans against the Muslim Ottoman Caliph, by the need to 
establish a modern state for Arabs. This revolution may be compared to 
those of France and America, but not for the substantial consequences 
in term of the realization of the goals of the revolution, but rather to the 
principles and ideas behind it. What prevailed for Sheikh Hussein was 
the realization of a political unity of Arabs (or most of them) in one 
state rather than of allegiance with other Muslims. To do that, he 
pledged allegiance to non-Muslims against the Muslim Ottomans, in 
the name of an Arab nation. This was the revolutionary objective of 
that unsuccessful and incomplete revolution.  
The end of the Ottoman Empire signaled the end of the Caliphate and 
the beginning of new theories of the legitimacy of state in the Arab 
world. Arabs, in fact, needed to justify their revolution and their right to 
statehood by referring to the concept of ‘Arab nation’ and/or to the 
concept of ‘popular sovereignty’, based on the people’s right to self-
determination. These two concepts helped Arabs and single Arab States 
to justify their authority within and to the outside world. The first 
concept provided the internal legitimacy and the other, international 
legitimacy. In other words, Arabs justified their revolution against other 
Muslims by the concept of an ‘Arab nation’ as opposed to other 
nations, albeit Muslims, while Arab territorial states justified their 
territorial autonomy and independence by the concept of popular 
sovereignty.531  
                                               
531  Among many others, Palestinian nationalism is the strongest national movement in 
the Middle East, and the only one which has not yet been realized as a state in its 
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Contemporary societies are much more complex than ancient societies 
since they had adapted the methods and techniques of positive law in 
order to function. This was possible after the end of traditional 
doctrines that were attached to religion and its replacement by elaborate 
concepts and based on modern science and modern thinking. Religious 
law was then confined to a limited sphere, such as personal status. This 
was the case in most Arab countries. The problem is that there is 
sometimes confusion between religious commandment and religious 
law, two concepts that always have to be always distinguished in order 
to avoid an amalgam.532  
                                                                                                       
own. It developed closely with Arab nationalism: in the beginning, in its extreme 
sense (finalized with the construction of an Arab State for all – or at least, the 
majority of Arabs), or, later, in a moderate and pragmatic sense, whose intention 
was coexistence with the current Arab territorial States. However, these modern 
Arab States undergo the most serious and dangerous crisis for their stability and 
very existence. However, it is precisely in this continual search for a proper Arab 
identity, and a Palestinian one in particular, that the Palestinian people intend to take 
their first steps towards statehood. 
532  FILALI-ANSARI A., op. cit., pp.7-8. 
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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
CONSTITUENT POWER 
 
Any attempts to elaborate or adopt a Constitution for the Palestinian 
State cannot ignore three facts: First, the existence of a comprehensive 
system of law in the Palestinian occupied territories, which is an 
accumulation, or a mixture, of several legal systems that succeeded 
each other. In fact, Palestine (as a historical or territorial unit) had been 
governed by different legal systems: the Ottoman, the British, the 
Jordanian -in the WB- and the Egyptian -in Gaza Strip (GS); the Israeli, 
in WB and GS (WBGS), and the Palestinian (after the establishment of 
the PA); each left a legal heritage in the Palestinian territories. Second, 
the existence of the Palestinian National Charter (PNCh), two 
Declarations of Independence and other documents made in exile by 
representative organizations of the Palestinian people, especially by the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), present for more than four 
decades. Third, the existence of international law that guarantees people 
the right to self-determination. As for the Palestinian people, this right 
was recognized several times and was intended to guide the 
Palestinians towards statehood. 
Accordingly, any attempt to enact or elaborate a constitution shall take 
in consideration the precedent elements, and as such, secure the 
reconciliation of the different processes in the Palestinian territories; the 
constituent organ shall take in consideration previous documents and 
declarations that were issued by those who used to represent the 
Palestinian people and who expressed the evolution of the people self-
awarness (related to the nation-building process). In addition, it shall 
take in to consideration the agreements with Israel (related to the peace 
process); and, it shall not ignore the principles and values recognized as 
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universal by the international community (related to the democracy 
process).  
Observers may notice here three moments: the moment of the past, of 
the present and of the future; these moments correspond respectively to 
the moment of the awarness of one-self, in relation to the other and to 
the international community; that is, nation building, peace and 
democracy processes. The relation between these three processes is not 
always conciliatory but for Palestinians, handling these issues 
competently, means a secured peace, based on national rights that are 
realised through bilateral negotiations within international legitimacy. 
The process of nation-building in the Palestinian context faces serious 
challenges, especially in relation to two other processes: those of peace 
and democracy. Palestinians are trying to handle these three challenges 
without specific orientation: this may have negative consequences on 
all those processes.533  
Now, the Constitution is not merely the result of a certain political 
development.534 It could be seen as a technique, a strategy, for 
achieving a certain goal, which is to provide an institutional as well as 
normative framework for the exercise of a shared stable democratic life, 
but also to formalise a peace agreement in the post-conflict areas. 
*** 
In previous chapters we have asserted that a state does not exist unless 
three elements are there, and interrelated (People, territory and 
sovereignty) and if there is no direct relationship or interconnections 
between those three elements. We have also asserted that a constituent 
power, conceived as the power to frame or to amend a particular text, 
called the constitution, exist only in relation to a state. Said differently, 
the constituent power owe his life to the state but, as the state, does not 
exist ex nihilo, but are the state (and the constitution) of a particular 
people and territory. The constituent power, is thus, conceived as the 
                                               
533 SHIKAKI K., The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to 
Democracy in Palestine, pp.5 f.  
534  LERNER H., op. cit., p.43. 
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First Act of sovereignty (in terms of importance and not necessarily in 
chronological terms) and its internal expression and exteriorisation.  
In this part, we will make the way backward: the constituent power, 
once enacted, has to delimit, within many other things, the content and 
the meaning of those three indispensable elements: people, territory 
and sovereignty. The constituent power shall decide who makes part of 
the people of the state, but also shall be the expression of the people 
(individuals and groups), in order that all those who make part of the 
nation can see themselves represented and expressed by the 
constitution, that they will consider as their own: the legitimacy of the 
constitution consists of the consensus of those who are governed by it 
to consider it as binding on them.535 The constituent power shall 
determine the best way to minimise any possible clashes between 
individual and group interests within the state. It shall find the best way 
to accommodate national members with those who are called to make 
part of the citizenry. This is why we will start with constituent power 
and the people (§12).  
Later, the territorial element of the constituent power will be 
considered. It is within a specific territory, that the constitution is 
considered the supreme law. In fact, it is the supreme domestic law. 
Outside this territorial delimitation, the constitution has no value. In the 
internal level, the judge will apply the constitution and may refuse the 
application of national laws or regulations, or either international law, 
unless in accordance with the constitution. The supremacy of the 
constitution will be fictive in the presence of an occupation of the land, 
where the occupier imposes unilaterally their decisions on local 
populations and the institutions representing them. This is why, we 
need to consider the relationship between the constituent power and the 
territory (§13). How can the constituent power treat the law applicable 
on the land, and the institutions that used to represent the Palestinian 
population? One of the main questions that will be answered here is 
who is representing the Palestinians? The answer to this question will 
determine, within other things, the entity (or entities) who will 
                                               
535  VERGOTTINI G. De, Op. cit., p.100.  
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effectively be involved in the process of constitution-making, and thus, 
in the enactment of the constituent power.  
Once clarified those two elements, we have to present the possible 
relationship between the claimed sovereignty of states, and the 
necessity to adopt a constitution that shall not violate rights and 
freedoms of individuals and groups. The tendency/risk of international 
implication is to show the constitution as a limitation to the national 
freedom rather than its main expression. The equilibrium between 
national and international priorities will determine the effectiveness of 
the constitution (§14).  
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§12 Constituent Power and the People 
Of all the territorial or particularistic ideologies of nationalism to have 
emerged in the Arabic-speaking areas of the Middle East, Palestinian 
nationalism can be considered as by far the most developed and 
articulated. Yet, despite affirming its distinctive Palestinian identity in 
the Palestinian national Covenant, the movement has never severed its 
ties with Arab nationalism.536  
Palestine had never been a distinct political entity until the British 
Mandate was enacted by the League of Nations Council in 1922.537 
Nevertheless, most contemporary countries in the Middle East are the 
consequence of developments at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries. The establishment of a British-
ruled Palestine was explicitly in relation to the promise of securing a 
homeland for Jews in Palestine. As such, Zionist nationalism, since its 
creation was in direct contradiction to Palestinian nationalism, given 
that both considered Palestine as their homeland.  
Palestinian nationalism reached a critical point with the establishment 
of an independent state of Israel in 1948, which forced many 
Palestinians (almost half) into continuous exile, and the creation of 
widespread refugee camps in which families have lived for more than a 
generation.538 A Palestinian awarness of their identity emerged in the 
refugee camps and was later promoted by Palestinians studying in Arab 
universities.  
This stage of Palestinian nationalism was followed by the creation of 
the PLO that was engaged in guerrilla raids into Israel. Since the re-
emergence of Palestinian nationalism in the late fifties and early sixties, 
                                               
536  Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.496. 
537  Idem, p.394.  
538  Idem, p.394. This position was systematically refused by the Israelis, who 
considered it a voluntary departure. In the meantime, the so-called ‘new-historians’ 
in Israel began revising their history and have admitted that the theories defended by 
Israel regarding the departure of the Palestinians, have not always been consentient. 
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and in particular, following the dominance of the largest faction, Fatah 
over the PLO in 1968-69 (four years after the establishment of the 
Organization), Palestinians felt that they had to play a leading role in 
the liberation of Palestine.539  
The acceptance of the PLO of the two states’ solution, officially 
adopted by the Declaration of Independence in Algiers can be 
considered as a tuning point in the Palestinian national history. In 1993, 
the PLO and Israel signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP) that put 
an end to the Palestinian Intifada. Subsequent Accords gave birth to the 
PA, which began functioning in the autonomous territories; Palestinians 
added the term national in between (the Palestinian National 
Authority), to emphasize their role as the continuation of the 
Palestinians national movement. The status of the Oslo Accord is 
unclear after the second Intifada.540 
12.1. Palestinian Common Identity 
A nation is constituted by the belief of belonging together. This belief 
of belonging together shall be accompanied by a strong solidarity 
between members of the nation.541 If a nation exists, it is possible to 
trace its origins since every nation is the product of a nation-building 
process. The concept of nation-building suggests two elements: first, a 
common identity and, second, a concerted political action.542 The 
contents of these two elements depend inevitably on the definition of 
nation. The solidarity and the belief of belonging together can be 
studied in two contexts: the Palestinian self-awarness of constituting a 
nation, and the international recognition of them as such.  
12.1.1. Palestinian Self-Awarness of being a Nation  
As previously mentioned, the subjective approach of common identity 
is constituted by a shared belief and solidarity, clear in the Palestinian 
                                               
539  Idem, p.496. 
540 Many events happened since then. They will be presented in details in successive 
chapters.  
541  TOPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., p.53.  
542  Idem, pp.41-57.  
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case. The problem of self-awarness of the Palestinian people is 
important, and may influence the same concept of citizen in the future 
Palestinian state. The documents under consideration here are the 
Palestinian Charter of 1964 and 1968, the Declaration of Independence 
of 1988, the DOP of 1993, BL and the Draft Palestinian Constitution 
(DPC).543  
- The Palestinian Charter  
The Palestinian conference which created the PLO, adopted the PNCh 
in 1964. The participants in that conference, as representatives of the 
Palestinian people, put forward a charter which every Palestinian 
considers his/her own. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) 
amended this charter twice: first in its 4th session in 1968, following the 
1967 War; second, in 1996, during a special session, following the Oslo 
Agreements.  
The PNCh does not explain or justify the fact that the Palestinians are a 
people, but presents it as a fait accompli, but this fact does not seem to 
be so evident to others. Nevertheless, with time, Palestinians 
consolidated their conviction of their specific identity, being 
internationally recognized, despite all their lost wars with Israel; despite 
internal conflicts and those with other Arab countries, and despite 
differences among the Palestinians themselves.  
In the 1964 PNCh544, the word ‘people’ is used nineteen times when 
referring to Palestinians. It also mentioned: ‘The Palestinian Arab 
People’ seven times; ‘the people of Palestine’ five times; and ‘the 
Palestinian people’ seven times. Before listing the twenty-nine Articles, 
the participants in that conference stated: “We, the Palestinian Arab 
People, dictate and declare this Palestinian National Charter and 
                                               
543  Palestinian self-awarness is not expressed only by the documents analyzed here; by 
studying these documents, an example emerges which reflects the Palestinian 
awarness of its own identity. More documents of a different nature will be 
scrutinized later. 
544  The 1964 PNCh is used to distinguish it from the 1968 PNCh. In the case where 
PNCh only is mentioned, it refers to the 1968 text.  
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swear to realize it”. This is a curious sentence which brings to mind the 
prologue of other constitutional documents.  
The amendment of the PNCh in 1968 came about after the Arabs had 
lost the war with Israel, and reflected the guerrillas’ emphasis on armed 
struggle based on popular support. What concerns us here: the concept 
of ‘Arab Palestinian people’ does not change. In fact, it was 
increasingly emphasized: the PNCh mentioned the term ‘Palestinian 
people’ or the ‘the Arab Palestinian people’ twenty-nine times! The 
reference to the Arab Nation is also more frequent since it stresses the 
national (qawmi) mobilization (in relation to Arabs) in order to realize 
national (watani) unity and liberation (in relation to Palestinians). 
The concept of Palestinian people (sha’b) is mentioned in the singular 
form regarding the Arab peoples (used in the plural) or in relation to 
other peoples in the world with whom they share the right to self-
determination. The Palestinian people are part of the Arab Nation (used 
in the singular, al-umma al-arabyya): “The Palestinian people… are an 
inseparable part of the Arab Nation. It shares the suffering and 
aspirations of the Arab Nation and its struggle for freedom, 
sovereignty, progress and unity”. This Palestinian position in relation to 
the Arab nation reflects the Pan-Arabism of the Egyptian Jamal Abd El-
Nasser, the real supporter (fabricator?) of the PLO at its inception.  
The oneness of the Palestinian people is outlined in order to defend 
their right to their homeland in the mandatory Palestine and also against 
Zionist claims. In fact, in terms of the PNCh, the Jews are not one 
people with an independent personality just because they are citizens of 
their states. The same article of the PNCh provides that “Judaism, 
because it is a divine religion is not a nationality with independent 
existence” (Art. 35 20) 
As such, Jews who normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of 
the Zionist invasion were considered Palestinians. This vision has 
totally changed now, following the Palestinians’ recognition of the right 
to existence of The State of Israel. This recognition explains the 
amendment to the PNCh in 1996 by the PNC in a special session (21st), 
which, for the first time, was conducted on Palestinian territories, and 
in the presence of President Clinton.  
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Still, Palestinians have never recognized the right of the Jewish people 
on a homeland in Palestine, but rather the right of Israel to exist. Israel, 
in this sense, is considered as a de facto entity that enjoys international 
recognition as an independent and sovereign state, whose territory is 
part of historical Palestine. This is the reason why Palestinians declare 
independence in 1988, also basing their rights on UN Resolution 181, 
as they considered it a historical injustice towards the Palestinian 
people; it seems that the Palestinians accepted the existence of Israel, 
based on the principle of the two-State solution, as a pragmatic step. On 
some occasions, Palestinians recognize the liaison that exists between 
Judaism, or the Jewish people, and Palestine. This recognition was 
never translated in to an acceptance of the Zionists’ rights to Palestinian 
land.545  
The text mentions Arab Palestinians in relation to a lost ‘homeland’ 
which Palestinians intend to ‘restore’. The term watan used here 
(translated as homeland) refers to that territory, as a part of the land 
belonging to Arabs, where a specific and distinguished Arab people 
live. In other words, the term homeland in modern Arab culture refers 
to a specific territory belonging to a specific Arab people. Others use 
the same term, watan, when they speak of an Arab homeland (alwatan 
al-arabi). Certainly, the term here has different connotations, and the 
indiscriminate use of it refers to that pan-Arabism ideology that still has 
its proponents in the Arab world.  
- The Declaration of Independence of 1988  
The Declaration of Independence in Algiers in 1988, the first formal 
indirect recognition of Israel’s right to exist, was based on the 
Palestinian right to self-determination and to Statehood in terms of the 
same UN General Assembly (GA) 181 Resolution. This recognition 
                                               
545  Nevertheless, many elements push us to believe that there would be no permanent 
settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if Palestinians do not recognize the 
particular Jewish attachment and liaison Palestine, considered also as their homeland 
that had justified a lot of sacrifices. Otherwise, any permanent settlement of the 
conflict may be considered as a step towards something else (the liberation of all 
Palestine, for example). Any settlement will be a pragmatic decision but no one will 
be sure about the future. 
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could be possible because of the internal shift in the PLO, following the 
1974 Arab-Israeli war. The 12th PNC in fact, advocates the 
establishment of a national authority over every area of the Palestinian 
territories. This visualization was in conjunction with the Arabs’ 
recognition of PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people, 
and its international recognition expressed by the General Assembly of 
the UN (UNGA). As the Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat was 
invited, to address a speech to the Assembly in November 1974.  
In its 19th session, the PNC declared the independence of the State of 
Palestine which was followed by the recognition of the State by a 
hundred of states, and the change from ‘PLO’ to ‘Palestine’ in the UN 
institutions. This event did not change the ‘observer’ position of 
Palestinian representatives to the UN since full membership is 
exclusively the right of a State. A state, according to the international 
public law definition, is a community of people established in a 
territory with a sovereignty that is autonomy towards the outside and 
independence towards the inside. That was not the case with the All-
Palestine government because it lacked sovereign jurisdiction over the 
population and the territory; nor was it the case with the PLO and the 
PA; the former lacked a territory and the latter, sovereignty.  
A Palestinian State exists, only hypothetically; for its realization it 
requires a sovereign authority over the Palestinian people and their 
territory (or at least a part of it). On the other hand, it is true that a 
modern state’s sovereignty is seriously challenged. Sovereignty is no 
more an absolute element of the modern state now, than it was in the 
beginning. In reality, the state concedes part of its sovereignty in favour 
of regional integration. Besides, international humanitarian intervention 
limits a state’s sovereignty regarding its domestic affairs such as the 
treatment of minorities, especially when serious violations of 
international law are committed by the state. Therefore, a state may 
exist with limited sovereignty.  
Now, the Palestinian people – as reflected in the Declaration - have the 
right to statehood, and that PNC declared the state in the name of God 
and the Palestinian Arab people. The difference with previous 
documents (such as the Charter) is that the historical or mandatory 
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Palestine is not mentioned. On the contrary, there is a vague concept of 
‘Palestinian territory’. Palestinians in fact, adapted their request and 
expressed their will to accept part of the Palestinian territories in which 
to build the State. The Declaration, as previously mentioned, is in 
harmony with previous PNC sessions.  
A very interesting image is presented in the Declaration of 
Independence: the Palestinian peoples are shown as a human being: 
born in Palestine, where it was nurtured, developed and excelled. The 
image offered here is to enhance the Palestinian peoples’ oneness and 
unity, as a human. The disintegration of the Palestinian peoples means 
its death, as it would for a human being.  
One’s life is related to a land and to a history, and as in the case of the 
Palestinian peoples; it is related to a specific land and history, 
continuously and without interruption. As such, the Palestinian Arab 
peoples forged its national identity throughout history, in its constant 
relationship to a land and to a history, despite external invasions that 
deprived it of its political independence. This identity is related then, to 
the Palestinians battle to liberate the Palestinian homeland. The idea of 
‘a land without people’ was a mere pretence, since a people did exist - 
the Palestinians - who are the (original) Jewish, Christian and Muslim 
residents of Palestine.  
The UNGA 181 Resolution is a historical injustice – in terms of the 
Declaration - because it deprives Palestinians of their right to self-
determination. Still, it does provide international legitimacy for their 
enjoyment of sovereignty and national independence. The International 
Charter in fact, recognizes – in terms of the Declaration - Palestinian 
national rights that include the entitlement to return and to 
independence.  
The precise reference that Palestinian national rights are related to 
sovereignty over ‘territory (ard) and homeland (watan)’, made by the 
PNC, is not mere rhetoric. It means that Palestinian national rights are 
not related to any land (any Arab land for example) but to a specific 
one, their homeland/fatherland. This relationship to a specific territory - 
the Palestinian homeland - is emphasized here, since some people in 
recent history, suggested that Palestinians could establish their State in 
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one of the other Arab countries (such as Jordan!); but the Palestinians 
(and the Arab countries) categorically refused these proposals.  
The various battles, wars, and occupation of the Palestinian territories, 
enhanced and consolidated the identity of the Palestinian people. Their 
identity and the awarness of that identity, were given full support 
through the Palestinian popular uprising (Intifada), and the resistance of 
the Palestinians living in refugee camps.  
This national identity forged itself in a political embodiment known as 
the PLO: the Palestinian people’s sole, legitimate representative. This 
immanent role of the PLO was related to the Palestinian people’s 
inalienable rights; Arab national (qawmi, linked to pan-Arabism) 
consensus; and international recognition. Palestinian national rights, in 
terms of the Declaration, are natural and historical.  
Their rights are as such legal, and are related to international 
recognition consolidating their rights on these different bases, the 
Palestinian people, represented by the PNC, declared the independence 
of the State of Palestine on Palestinian territory. However, this 
Declaration does not specify which territory, and Palestine remains a 
State without a specified territory, without citizens and without its own 
jurisdiction.  
The realization of these entitlements necessitates the end of the Israeli 
occupation. International law is clear on that point, but still incapable 
imposing its will on Israel. The only solution that Palestinian would be 
prepared to consider was a bilateral negotiation with Israel. This led to 
secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel, which culminated in 
the Oslo Agreements. The key result of these Agreements was the 
creation of the PA, a non-sovereign Palestinian entity over parts of 
WBGS.  
- The Declaration of Principles  
The Palestinian people were mentioned indirectly in the Declaration of 
Principles, signed in Washington DC on 13 September 1993. The 
recognition of PLO by Israel and the decision to commence 
negotiations between the two were the main Palestinian achievements 
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of the Declaration (in fact, PLO recognized Israel indirectly, in the 
Declaration of Independence of 1988).  
The PLO represents the Palestinian people, and as such, constitutes a 
legitimate partner in the negotiations with Israel in resolving the 
question of the ‘disputed territories’ (an Israeli term), or the occupied 
Palestinian territories, that is, WBGS (Jerusalem will be considered in 
the final negotiations). The parties to this Declaration (PLO and Israel) 
decided that bilateral negotiations, and not violence, would be the best 
option in order to resolve the conflict.  
After the Declaration of Principles, a fragmentation occurred, not only 
in the Palestinian territories, but also in the concept of Palestinians as a 
united and one people. In fact, Palestinians were now divided, and the 
PLO negotiations with Israel were limited during the transitional period 
of transfer of powers in the WBGS, where some of the Palestinians 
were living. The Palestinians of Jerusalem were partially included in 
that process, and the Palestinian refugee problem was left for final 
agreement’s negotiations. Besides, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship 
were indirectly excluded from any PLO and Israeli negotiations.  
Now, this division of the Palestinian people aggravated the problem. If 
it was clear that the PLO (especially the PNC, in the guise of a 
Parliament acting on behalf all Palestinians) represented the Palestinian 
people wherever they lived, the question is not clear after the Oslo 
Agreements. Still, theoretically nobody had put the PLO status (as the 
only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people) under question. 
Nevertheless, it seemed clear that the PLO was rendered practically 
void of its prerogatives, especially as the PA apparatus was continually 
being given an increasingly powerful role with institutions, government 
and departments, assuming a state-like aspect.  
The PLO remained the only representative of the Palestinian people, 
when they were considered as one and united. It gradually lost this 
position, especially regarding the Palestinians in WBGS, who 
increasingly found themselves under the jurisdiction of the PA, 
although neither members of the PA institutions nor the people living in 
the WBGS would doubt or attack the liaison with the PLO. Rather, 
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most PA institutions source their legitimacy in the PLO rather than in 
the Oslo Agreements (at least, before the 1996 elections).  
The liaison (overlap or confusion) of PA with PLO is still clear, at least 
through its president, who is the Chairman of the PLO’s Executive 
Committee (EC) and the President of the Palestinian State. We must 
stress here that these three positions would not necessarily be held by 
the same person, in the future.546  
Israel recognizes that the Palestinians do have some rights; this was 
mentioned when considering the election as a step towards the 
realization of Palestinian legitimate rights. Now, what are those rights? 
The parties agreed to negotiate the details. Actually, the method 
followed by the parties in the Oslo Agreements provoked the comments 
of numerous critics. For many Palestinians, it consisted of negotiating 
Palestinian rights, rather than how to render them effective. It should be 
noted here, that those same rights were already recognized and 
legitimized by International Law and UN Resolutions.547  
- The Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority  
The BL would regulate the relations between the powers in the PA 
during the transitional period. It was approved by the PLC, and its 
implementation would also be applicable to the Palestinian autonomous 
territories. A Constitution for the State would replace it and would 
regulate many arguments that BL could not – and cannot - because they 
are out of the competency of the authority from which they emanated. 
The BL was passed by the Legislative Council on 2 October 1997, and 
ratified on 29 May 2002. It was further amended by the PLC on 18 
March 2003, in order to include the office of PM and to regulate its 
duties and powers.548  
                                               
546  With the election of Mahmoud Abbas as president of the PA, Palestinians have 
opted for unity rather than separation of the two institutions representing the 
Palestinians: the PLO and the PA. 
547  The criticisms appeared to be logical and reasonable; in fact, the collapse of 
negotiations with Israel in 2000 proved their validity. 
548  The Articles mentioned here are those of the BL as endorsed by the President of the 
PA in 2002, unless otherwise specified.  
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In its first article, the BL declared that the Palestinian people are part of 
the Arab nation, without specifying who is to be considered Palestinian. 
The Israeli-Palestinian agreements granted the election of a Palestinian 
council (the PLC), whose duty was to prepare a BL. This clause was 
also mentioned in the same election law. The PLC rejected that it had it 
origins in the Oslo agreements, and refused to consider the PA 
authorities as originated by the transfer of powers from the Israeli 
military governor or civil administrator. In fact, in its second article, the 
BL declared that the Palestinian people are the source of authorities.549  
The concept of a Palestinian people usually refers to all Palestinians, 
However, in the BL, this same concept sometimes refers to the 
Palestinians of WBGS only.  
For example: in Article Nos. 5 and 51, the BL states that the President 
shall be elected by the people;550 in this case, those who elected the 
president were the Palestinians of WBGS and East Jerusalem. The 
same president would swear to preserve the rights and interests of the 
people and the nation (Art. 36). The people here refer inevitably to the 
Palestinians of the WBGS, since he is their President, elected to 
represent and govern them; and what of nation: does it mean all 
Palestinians considered as a nation?  
The same thing occurs when the BL states that the police and security 
forces must serve people; they already do so in the Palestinian 
territories, and their powers extend to the Palestinians in the WBGS. 
Article 88 states that the rulings shall be announced and executed in the 
name of the Palestinian Arab people; the source of jurisdiction, of 
judicial authority, is the Palestinian people (Art. 2). Now those powers 
                                               
549  A reference to recent German history can be made here, wherein the state did not 
incorporate all members of the German nation, and as such, it adopted a Basic Law; 
a constitution would only be adopted when all Germany was united; this occurred in 
the 1990s, and the Basic Law became applicable to all Germans. The same case 
seems to apply in the Palestinian context, the only difference being that Palestinians 
state (in terms of the various proposals to a final agreement) shall sign the end of the 
Palestinian claims and the end of the conflict with Israel.  
550  References to articles are made in the order of the originally adopted BL, that is 
before the amendments made by PLC in 2003. 
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are exercised in the name and for the benefit of the Palestinians of 
WBGS.  
A further example is: the Attorney General assumes public office in the 
name of the Palestinian people (Art. 98), and the laws shall be 
promulgated in the name of the Palestinian Arab people (Art. 107).  
In brief, the consideration of the Palestinian people switches from a 
‘people’ as an ethnos (Volk), that is, a community based on the belief in 
a common descent or culture, to a ‘people’ as a demos (Staatsvolk), that 
is, citizens in their entirety.551  
 In this instance, the Palestinians of WBGS are considered as one unit, 
as they are in the drafts of the Palestinian Constitution. This 
‘theoretical’ unity is challenged by the legal and administrative division 
between the WB and the GS that followed the war of 1948; Gaza, in 
fact, was under Egyptian control, which left the situation almost as it 
was in the Mandate period, while WB was controlled by ‘Transjordan’, 
and united with it in the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. These legal 
divisions and differences were maintained after the Israeli occupation in 
1967. Moreover, the WB cities were under Israeli siege from 2000 and 
were divided in to different zones and sections. The wall/fence under 
construction by the Israel, in the name of security, further divided and 
disintegrated the WB in to various cantons and ghettos.  
The PA’s first challenge was to unify the legal systems of WBGS, a 
task not without complications. In fact, the unification of the legal 
systems of WBGS into one was done by adopting laws that would be 
applicable to both WB and GS; however, this unification through the 
law was not sufficient. Geographically speaking, GS is separated from 
the other Palestinian territories, and the Israeli occupation aggravated 
its isolation. This isolation of GS meant a consolidation of the division, 
which some critics consider as also being cultural, social, and 
economic! This is partially mistaken, since there are real differences 
between the WB and GS, but they were produced by accidental 
circumstances and did not respond to ethnic divisions; in fact, the 
                                               
551  For an in-depth explanation of the concept of people as ethos and demos, see 
TÖPPERWIEN N., Op. cit., p.4.  
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 186
Palestinians, wherever they lived, had always believed that they 
constituted one people. 
An observer of Palestinian society may notice that it is like a multi-
colour mosaic. Its unity is challenged by the distinction between 
outsiders and insiders Palestinians; between refugees and non-refugees; 
between townspeople and country people; between Gaza inhabitants 
and West Bankers, between Christians and Muslims. This heterogeneity 
of the Palestinian population means that any future Palestinian entity 
would have to respect this diversity in its entirety, including religion, 
the legal systems, the social and economic situation, customs, 
traditions, and recent history.  
This Palestinian entity –a perpetually limited, autonomous authority or 
a State- will be challenged by this existing diversity among the 
Palestinian people. At the same time, its unity may be reinforced by this 
diversity. It is clear that we are speaking about a unity that is based on 
heterogeneity and not on homogeneity; a unity that respects these 
differences and diversities without attempting to assimilate them in one 
amalgam. The politics of the future new entity will have to respect this 
diversity in the Palestinian society.552  
- The Draft Palestinian Constitution  
A special Palestinian committee, within the framework of the PLO 
institutions and with a high PA implication, prepared three drafts for 
the Palestinian Constitution. The first was ready on 14.2.2001, the 
second on 09.2.2003, and the third on 14.5.2003.553 The concept of 
‘people’ in the Draft Constitution is the same as that adopted in the BL: 
‘people’ refers to that portion of Palestinians living in the Palestinian 
territories and/or those who will enjoy citizenship of the State of 
Palestine. The same examples and arguments made above can be 
                                               
552  As for Christian Palestinians, they are not different culturally than other Palestinians 
who are Muslim, since they enjoyed and constructed the same Arab culture together. 
This argument will be treated in detail later on. 
553  The context in which these different drafts were prepared, and the changes made, 
will be considered in a different chapter. Here, we will limit our research to the 
concept of ‘people’ in the third draft, with reference to previous drafts in the case 
where there are drastic changes. 
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repeated here (election of the State President, the swearing-in on behalf 
of the Palestinian people, rulings and laws in the name of the people of 
Palestinian).  
Now, the concept of segmentation of the ‘Palestinian people’ in the BL 
can be tolerated, since the BL is a temporary document. On the other 
hand, a Palestinian State will mark the end of the conflict and the end of 
Palestinian claims, and as such, the concept of a people previously 
divided, will be consolidated within the State; this would be 
unacceptable.  
The State of Palestine will be the State of its citizens. Now, Palestinian 
nationals (according to the PNCh definition) will not necessarily 
coincide with Palestinian citizens (according to the Constitution); as 
such, the state of Palestine will represent only its citizens.554 In this 
sense, it seems clear that the PLO role will always be necessary since it 
represents all Palestinians.  
In the terms of the draft Constitution, the Palestinian State would 
incorporate the PLO and the PA. Palestinian nationals who are not 
citizens will be represented by (150) members of the Advisory Council 
and their duties will be specified in the Constitution. Now, does the 
PNC approval of the Constitution equivalent to its automatic self-
relinquish? There are good reasons to believe that this shall not happen, 
for a simple reason: the constitution needs to be legitimized by popular 
approval directely or through their rappresentatives (PLC). Now, this 
needs time and the PNC cannot relinquish itself before the constitution 
is adopted. Besides, there is always a chance that the constitution is not 
accepted and may necessitate to work on a new draft; accordingly, the 
two moments shall be distinguished.  
12.1.2. International Recognition of the Palestinian People 
After considering the Palestinian self-awarness of their identity as a 
people, we will consider some documents produced by non-Palestinians 
which demonstrate the progress in the consideration of the Palestinians. 
                                               
554  The way the draft Constitution treated the question of citizenship will be detailed 
later on.  
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We will reflect on some documents written before the establishment of 
the UN and some written after. As examples of the first category we 
will consider the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate over Palestine. 
As examples of the second, we will consider the Partition Plan, 
Resolution 242 and others which recognize the Palestinian people’s 
right to self-determination. These changes in the international 
consideration of the question of Palestine and the Palestinians will 
explain the invitation extended to the President of the PLO to make a 
speech to the UNGA in 1974.555  
- The Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917 
The so-called Balfour Declaration was made by the British Foreign 
Office in the name of ‘His Majesty’s Government’ and approved by the 
Cabinet. This declaration was the object of the letter to Lord 
Rothschild, signed by Arthur James Balfour on 2 November 1917.  
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious' rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country. 
It is clear that this declaration ignores the rights of Palestinians as 
indigenous inhabitants of Palestine; however, it does not adopt Zionist 
propaganda about Palestine being a land without a people. In fact, in 
the same declaration of sympathy towards the Zionist request to 
establish their homeland in Palestine, it is confirmed that the rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities will not be prejudiced by this 
declaration, nor by its execution. The Palestinians mentioned in the 
declaration are mentioned in negative, they are simply referred to as 
existing non-Jewish (Muslim and Christian) communities.  
                                               
555  The selection of these documents among many others was motivated by being 
representative of a shift in the consideration of the Palestinian people, following an 
extraordinary event (such as a war). This selection intends to show the changes and 
the progress in the international awarness of the Palestinians as a people. These 
documents can be found in the United Nations Information system on the question 
of Palestine http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/  
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- The Mandate over Palestine 
Article 22 of the League of Nations (28 June 1919) provided that some 
nations would be under a temporary Mandate: “peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world”. The Palestinians were indirectly recognised to establish a 
community or as a part of those communities mentioned in the same 
Article; in other words, those communities formerly belonging to the 
Turkish Empire which 
have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they 
are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal 
consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.  
In the Mandatory text and in the different reports made by the British 
Mandatory power, Palestine was regarded as a territorial unit, set apart 
from others. Its inhabitants where called the Arabs of Palestine and 
were considered as being part of, or a community within, the 
inhabitants or population of Palestine. Each time the Mandatory 
mentioned the Arabs of Palestine it did so in relation to the Jewish 
community in Palestine; this can be explained by the fact that the 
Mandate over Palestine was established in order to fulfil the Balfour 
Declaration and the creation of a homeland for Jews in Palestine. 
Palestinians as a people, whose identity is distinct from other Arab 
peoples, was not yet clear, in the terms of the Mandate. 
- The Partition Plan of Palestine of 1947 
The British government sent a letter to the UN, on 2 April 1947, 
requesting the question of the future of Palestine, to be included in the 
agenda of the General Assembly. Later on, many Arab governments 
(Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia) sent letters to the 
Secretary General requesting the question of termination of the 
Mandate and the independence of Palestine, to be included in the 
agenda. A hearing was granted to the Jewish Agency and the Arab 
Higher Committee in the first session of the GA.  
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The terms used by the special committee on Palestine and in the 
General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 were no 
different from those in previous documents. In fact, the above-
mentioned Resolution refers to Palestinians as ‘those Arabs of 
Palestine’. Moreover, the Resolution opted for the partition of Palestine 
in to two States: Arab and Jewish. 
- The Security Council Resolutions 242 of 1967, and 338 of 
1973 
Following the war of 1967 the the Security Council of the UN (UNSC) 
asked the Israeli armed forces to withdraw from territories occupied in 
the recent conflict. In the English version, these territories were 
mentioned in indefinite form (the text does not use ‘the’ to indicate the 
Palestinian territories occupied after the 1967 war).  
The Resolution required parties to respect the integrity and sovereignty 
of every state; it did not mention the Palestinians or the Arabs of 
Palestine, but asked for a just solution for the refugees. The same 
occurs in the SC Resolution that followed the 1973 war, in which the 
same Council calls upon parties to cease-fire, without any reference to 
the Palestinians.  
- The General Assembly Resolutions 3070 of 30 November 
1973, and 3175 of 17 December 1973  
Based on the UN Charter, the UNGA Resolution 3070 underlined the 
importance of a universal realization of the right of a people to self-
determination and the rapid granting of independence to colonial 
countries and their peoples, for the effective guarantee and observance 
of HR.  
It also reaffirmed the legitimacy of a peoples' struggle, by whatever 
means, for liberation from colonial and foreign domination, including 
armed struggle, and condemned all Governments which did not 
recognize the right to self-determination and independence of their 
peoples, notably the peoples of Africa still under colonial domination, 
and the Palestinian people.  
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The UNGA Resolution 3175 mentioned the terms Palestinians of the 
Occupied Territories, and affirmed the right of the Arab States and 
peoples whose territories were under foreign occupation, to permanent 
sovereignty over all their natural resources.  
- The General Assembly Resolution 3210 of 14 October 1974 
A shift in the UN consideration of the Palestinian question was 
observed in Resolution 3210, when the UNGA invited the PLO as ‘the 
representative of the Palestinian people’ to participate in the plenary 
sessions of the GA, on this question. This invitation was motivated by 
the realization of the same Assembly to the fact that the “Palestinian 
people is the principle party to the question of Palestine”. The 
Palestinians are considered as distinct from other Arabs, and the PLO 
was their legitimate representative in the General Assembly.  
Yasser Arafat made his speech in the UN general plenary meeting of 13 
November 1974. He spoke “in the name of the people of Palestine and 
as the leader of its national struggle, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization”. Yasser Arafat outlined the fact that  
neither the Palestinian's allegiance to Palestine nor his determination to return 
had waned; nothing could persuade him to relinquish his Palestinian identity 
or to forsake his homeland. The passage of time did not make him forget, as 
some had hoped he would. 
Then he explained the source of the PLO legitimacy, as the 
representative of the Palestinian people:  
The PLO has also gained its legitimacy by representing every faction, union 
or group as well as every Palestinian talent, either in the National Council or 
in the people's institutions. This legitimacy was further strengthened by the 
support of the entire Arab nation, and it was consecrated during the last Arab 
Summit Conference, which reiterated the right of the PLO, in its capacity as 
the sole representative of the Palestinian people, to establish an independent 
national State on all liberated Palestinian territory.  
In Resolution 3236 of 22 November 1974, the UNGA reaffirmed the 
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) 
the right to self-determination without external interference; and (b) the 
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right to national independence and sovereignty. Later on, the UNGA 
Resolution 3237 of 22 November 1974 invited the PLO to participate in 
the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of 
observer.  
- The General Assembly Resolution 54/152 of 17 December 
1999 
The right of a people to self-determination, when it means a right to 
statehood, is controversial. The right of Palestinians as a people to 
statehood was clearly mentioned in the above Resolution: “the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the option of a 
State”. The same Resolution expressed the hope that the Palestinian 
people would soon be able to exercise their right to self-determination, 
which would not be subject to any veto, in the current peace process. 
12.2. Those entitled to Constituent power  
As we have concluded in first part, the question of those entitled to 
constituent power is relevant for jurists and cannot be considered in a 
simplistic way as a pure fact since it may give a justification of the 
supremacy of the constitution itself. Although the predominance of the 
Constitution is accepted as axiomatic,556 one may ask: is it really 
justifiable to consider supreme the modern Constitutions because they 
elevate themselves to a position of predominance?557 Is it necessary to 
go back to the genesis of the constitutional document and in the 
authority of its authors?558 Since it can be considered the higher power 
of the State, constituent power invests those entitled to sovereignty.559 
                                               
556  Presuming that predominance means that there is no higher juridical norm in the 
state than the constitution. VENTER F., Op. cit., p.9. François Venter is a professor 
of Law, Potcheftsroom University for Christian Higher Education, Potcheftsroom, 
South Africa. 
557  This constitutional superiority, any way, becomes entirely theoretical in the absence 
of judicial review. KLEIN C., A Propos Constituent Power: Some General Views in 
a modern Context, p.34.  
558  VENTER F., Op. cit., p.10.  
559  SHIBA I., Op. cit., p.107.  
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In democratic countries, people are those entitled of sovereignty,560 this 
is why the concept of constituent power is an important part of the 
doctrine of popular sovereignty.  
Constituent power can be considered as the internal phase of self-
determination, as opposed to the imposition or the revelation of an 
order. Modern Constitutions, in fact, can only be understood as 
institutional devices that embody the self-binding capacity of a group. 
Self-determination and self-binding are by no means incompatible.561  
The meaning of Constitution is the guarantee of rights and the 
separation of powers, and this is why only the non-constituted, namely 
the people, can own constituent power.562 There is still a paradox that 
has to be resolved in the coming two chapters; this paradox is very well 
presented by Hanna Lerner,  
the question of constituent power and the legitimacy paradox it incorporates: 
can a Constitution be regarded as legitimate only it if reflects a pre-
constitutional shared identity or is the making of the Constitution tantamount 
to the construction of ‘the people’? 563 
Lerner continued her analysis, with special regards to deeply divided 
societies. In fact, contemporary States had to face the challenge of 
diversity: cultural, ethnical, linguistic and religious. She wrote:  
The difficulty of making a legitimate Constitution is especially evident in 
cases of deeply divided societies, which are characterized on the one hand by 
lacking the preconditions of national homogeneity that facilitate unified 
action and enable the manifestation of sovereignty through the realization of 
constituent power. On the other hand, segmented polities, which are still 
struggling over their shared identity, lack the capability of individualistic 
                                               
560  PACTET P., Op. cit., p.70.  
561  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.156. Constitutions represent a mechanism of self-binding, 
but they also serve as an expression of self-determination. A Constitution, in this 
sense, is a “technique for the creation of durable, viable and civilized polity”. 
LERNER H., op. cit., p.7. 
562  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.160. 
563  LERNER H., Op. cit., p.3.  
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societies to act together on the basis of their civil commonalities and to write 
a liberal identity-neutral Constitution.564 
Sheldon Wolin contends that “[a] Constitution not only constitutes a structure 
of power and authority, it constitutes a people on a certain way. It proposes a 
distinctive identity and envisions a form of politicalness for individuals in 
their new collective capacity”. However, the fundamental problem of divided 
societies is exactly that they lack consensus regarding their shared identity 
and their ultimate ideals and values. Thus, how can a Constitution constitute a 
people under circumstances of acute disagreements and profound cleavages? 
In other words, who is "the people" who is making the Constitution in divided 
societies?565 
12.2.1. The Palestinian Concept of Nation  
The Palestinian case is similar to the German one in that the nation and 
the culture justify the state; the state here would be related to the nation 
as is the accident to the substance. The state is an accident in an 
historical moment of the nation; the nation exists with or without a 
state; a state enhances and reinforces a nation. Thus, the cultural liaison 
which includes a common Palestinian history, language and traditions 
will be an important element in the future State.  
However, according to the agreements being negotiated between the 
Palestinians and Israel, the self-awarness of the Palestinians and their 
vision of their own state is changing, leaning towards the possible 
adoption of the civic concept of nation, similar to the French one, 
which consists of creating its own national culture, and suppressing 
diverse ones. The problem here is that the same French concept of 
nation is no better: in fact, modern states, including new-born states, are 
facing real challenges in relation to diversity and multiculturalism. This 
challenge is not different in the Palestinian case. 
Although the Palestinian State will have many things in common with 
other Arab countries, it remains a particular case for different reasons 
that we will present here below. As such, the concept of nation will be 
                                               
564  Ibidem.  
565  Idem, p.10. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 195 
influenced by these particularities: first, the Palestinian people are the 
only Arabs without their own State yet; second, the Israeli occupation 
gave them an identity connected to their struggle for independence; 
third, the Israeli occupation and the sense of injustice and delusion by 
Arab and Western countries; fourth, the huge number of refugees living 
abroad or in refugee camps.  
Sovereignty is the original, supreme, and unconditional power of 
absolute authority that, together with the people and the territory, 
represents one of the constitutive elements of a state. The Constitution 
of the future Palestinian State will not be much different from other 
Arab States constitutions, which are an imitation of western 
constitutional documents. Sovereignty, as provided in most 
Constitutions (included some Arab ones), belongs to the people. The 
people are part of the Arab and Muslim nations, and as such, have their 
particular way of understanding sovereignty. Sovereignty, therefore, 
belongs to the Palestinian people. The problem is to know who makes 
part of this ‘people’.  
At this point, we have to consider an important concept: that is, what 
makes Palestinians different from other Arab peoples? I will argue that, 
with time, Palestinians changed their concept of ‘nation’ or ‘people’. In 
fact, this switch from people or nation as ‘ethnos’ to people as ‘demos’ 
is necessary in order to justify the Palestinian State, and to establish it 
on parts of historic Palestine to be the homeland of the Palestinian 
people. This concept of nation or that determines the content, and those 
entitled to Constituent power.  
Now, what makes Palestinians different from other Arab peoples, and 
what makes them one people? The answer to those two questions is 
inevitably the same: what makes Palestinians different is what makes 
them one distinguished people, although they are not homogeneous. In 
fact, Palestinians can be Muslim, Christian or Jewish, according to the 
1968 PNCh (religious diversity); Palestinian territories experience 
different legal systems which reflect the actual distinction between the 
Gaza system - rooted in the Anglo-Saxon one; Egyptian tradition and 
the WB system - rooted in French civil law; and the Jordanian tradition 
(legal diversity). Besides, Palestinians live in villages, cities or in 
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refugee camps; refugees are dispersed in WBGS and in Lebanese, 
Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian camps, with different legal status and 
rights (social and economic diversity).  
According to the non-official Geneva Accord, the Palestinian State will 
signify the end of Palestinian claims (Art.7.7); this means that the 
struggle for liberation, which legitimated Palestinian nationalism for 
almost a century, will face serious crises. This is without doubt, related 
to Palestinian (and Zionist?) identity, as we will show in the next 
paragraphs.  
In fact, Palestinians distinguished and sharpened their own identity 
through their struggle with the Zionists in order to liberate their 
homeland. Still, Palestinian nationalism existed independently and long 
before. Rashid KHALIDI, in his book ‘The Palestinian Identity’, 
dedicated many paragraphs to defend this position and wrote:  
Although the Zionist challenge definitely helped to shape the specific form 
Palestinian national identification took, it is a serious mistake to suggest that 
Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism… As part of 
this universal process, moreover, Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians, Iraqis and 
Jordanians all managed to develop their respective nation-state nationalisms 
during the same period without the dubious benefit of a Zionist challenge.566 
…most elements of Palestinian identity – particularly the enduring parochial, 
local ones - were well developed before the climatic events of 1948, although 
they continued to overlap and change both before and after that date…. These 
local loyalties served as the bedrock for an attachment to place, a love of 
country, and a local patriotism that were crucial elements in the construction 
of nation-state nationalism.567  
Still,  
The trauma of 1948 reinforced pre-existing elements of identity, sustaining 
and strengthening a Palestinian self-definition that was already present. The 
shared events of 1948 thus brought Palestinians closer together in terms of 
                                               
566  KHALIDI R., Palestinian Identity, the Construction of Modern National 
Consciousness, p.20. 
567  Idem, p.21. 
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their collective consciousness, even as they were physically dispersed all over 
the Middle East and beyond.568  
When this image of other as ‘enemy’ disappears, once there will be a 
permanent resolution, other elements shall be encouraged to replace it; 
in other words, the fact that the ‘enemy’ of yesterday would be the 
‘friend’ and ‘neighbour’ of tomorrow will have serious effects on 
Palestinian self-identity.  
According to Helena SCHULTZ, nationalism differences do not lead 
necessarily to conflict, on the contrary, it is only in relation to an 
‘Other’ that it becomes meaningful to identify a ‘Self’.569 The Israeli-
Jewish / Palestinian conflict is  
ultimately a clash between two nationalist movements colliding on the same 
territory. One, Zionism, has been able to create a strong state on part of that 
territory and the other, Palestinianism is struggling to do so, implying a 
grossly unequal relationship and struggle.570  
This struggle has become almost an ‘archetype’ of modern 
national/nationalist conflict. It has plagued the peoples of both sides for 
almost a century.571 The consequence is evident:  
Israeli and Palestinian societies and identities are mirror images of each other, 
and part of each other, although it needs to be pointed out that Zionism was 
initially formed as a European phenomenon, i.e. as a reaction against 
nationalism in Europe, anti-Semitism and pogroms, persecution and 
annihilation. There is today no Israeli society which ‘exists’ completely 
independent of the Palestinian and vice versa. It is as though both societies 
carry with them the other, as a perceived burden but also a potential asset.572  
                                               
568  Idem, p.22 
569  SCHULZ H. L., Identity Conflicts and Their Resolution: the Oslo Agreement and 
Palestinian National Identities, p.231. 
570  Idem, p.229.  
571  Idem, p.233. 
572  Ibidem. 
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Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian identities thus in fact constitute twin concepts 
and mirror images in a very concrete sense. Both are centred around the poles 
of victim-warrior/struggler… perhaps this is one of the most crucial aspects 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as such, i.e. the way that identities are 
manifested through the duality of insecurities and strain.573 
For the author, what distinguishes Palestinians is: homelessness, 
insecurity, catastrophes narratives and (armed) struggle:  
Homelessness and insecurity constitute the main representations of 
Palestinian identity, and it seems reasonable to claim that politicized 
identities, in general terms, arise out of peril and anxiety.574  
Catastrophes have become crucial is structuring Palestinian narratives of 
identity… Armed struggle has been a basic foundation of Palestinian nation-
building.575  
It is in the action, in participation in resisting the occupation, that one 
becomes Palestinian. Palestinians perceived themselves as having inherent 
right in their resistance.576  
The same author considers the DOP, as a “mutual expression of 
peaceful intention”. The most important gain for Palestinians was that 
“Palestinian identity was recognised, that in the eyes of the world the 
Palestinians had become somebody”.577 This process – and any other 
future peace agreements - would have an affect on Palestinian identity:  
One of the main effects of the peace process was thus the beginning of a 
deconstruction of enemy images… Israel was now to assist in Palestinian 
institution-building and to create economic bases for the agreements, and the 
Palestinians were to defend Israelis from violence and terror… when the 
                                               
573  Idem, pp.236-237. 
574  Idem, p.235. 
575  Ibidem. 
576  Idem, p.236. 
577  Idem, p.239. 
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stereotype change in character, it might actually provide problems since it is no 
longer as clear how to act and behave vis-à-vis the ‘Other’.578  
12.2.2. Palestinians and the Arab Nation  
The Palestinian people are a part of the Arab nation. In Arabic, Arab 
states (al-duwal al-arabyya) are always used in the plural, while Arab 
nation (al-umma al-arabia) is always in the singular. The same word is 
used to indicate the Muslim nation (al-umma al-eslameyya). 579 
So, if we consider people, with the Italian jurist Vergottini, as “insieme 
della generalità dei cittadini” (the gathering of the generality of 
citizens) and the Nation “in quanto persona giuridica unitaria”580 (as a 
legal and unitary personality), sovereignty shall belong to the 
Palestinian Nation, since the Palestinian refugees living abroad 
(excluded from Palestinian citizenship) will be represented by a 
National Council (first DPC, Art.70) or by a type of second Chamber. 
In the light of this consideration, some constitutional Articles will have 
to be reformulated.  
The DPC follows in the steps of other Arab countries considering the 
Palestinian state as ‘Arab’. For example, the Egyptian Constitution is 
entitled: ‘the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt’, followed in 
the first article by: “Egyptian people are part of Arab Nation and work 
for the realization of its comprehensive unity”. In Art.1 of the Jordanian 
Constitution it states: “the Jordanian people form a part of the Arab 
Nation”. 
The same applies to Syria (Art.1). Special attention should be drawn to 
Lebanon and Tunisia: in Lebanon, the Constitution refers to the Arabic 
language as being the official language (Art.11) without any reference 
                                               
578  Idem, pp.240-241. 
579 However, nation is used in the plural since the article speaks about Arab and Muslim 
Nations. To prove this, we can take a look at the Articles previously mentioned. We 
notice that Arab Nation is always considered in the singular, in the Arab 
Constitutions. 
580  VERGOTTINI G., op. cit., p.100 
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to an Arab Nation, and according to the Tunisian Constitution, the 
people are part of the great Arab Maghreb (Art.2). 
Furthermore, the DPC considers Arabic as being the official language 
of the state, which is the case in all Arab countries: Egypt, (Art.2); 
Syria, (Art. 4); Tunisia, (Art.1), Lebanon581, (Art.11). In different drafts 
of BL and Constitutions, some state: “Islam is the official religion of 
Palestine and Arabic is its official language”. This article is similar to 
articles 2 and 1, respectively of the Egyptian and Tunisian 
Constitutions.  
Now, what makes a state an Arab one? Is it the language? The English, 
French, and Spanish languages are common spoken in different 
countries; this does not mean that those countries constitute or are part 
of a single nation. Although important, language then is not sufficient. 
If we consider different elements such as history, culture, language, 
traditions…they suggest the existence of an Arab nation. To some 
extent, religion is also relevant, since the majority of Arabs are Muslim 
(mostly Sunni). Nevertheless, not all Arabs are Muslims, nor are all 
Muslims Arab.  
The existence of such an Arab nation means that it is one divided in to 
different Arab States (not the first time it has been historically so); 
consequently, Arab States would simply be a transitory experience on 
their passage to the consolidation of an Arab Nation. Nevertheless, this 
assertion contradicts the reality of Arab peoples who are attached to 
their states and to their individuality, even though they may not be 
happy with the achievements of their rulers. This can be one of the 
effects on the existence of single Arab States. The dream of Arab unity 
switched to a new sense: it does not call for the establishment of one 
centralized state that eliminates all particularities; rather it means a 
tendency towards collaboration and harmonization of their positions. 
Unity in this sense -similar to that in Europe- becomes the future, when 
the future is intended to be prosperous, secure, and progressive. 
                                               
581  It is interesting to note that the law determines when the French language should be 
used, in the Lebanese Constitution.  
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In the approved BL the two provisions are mentioned in different 
paragraphs in the same Article (BL Art.4.1 and 4.3). In the first DPC it 
is divided into two Articles (Arts. 5 and 6). Nevertheless, the same DPC 
introduced a new concept of ‘Islamic nation’, providing that the 
Palestinian people would be a part of the Arab and Islamic nations. 
This connection between the Arab language (as the official language) 
and Islam being the State religion should not create confusion. As 
previously mentioned, not all Arabs are Muslims and not all Muslims 
are Arabs. On the other hand, it is true that the Arab-Muslim culture is 
the heritage in the hand of all Muslims (including non-Arabs) and all 
Arabs (including non-Muslims). To say it with GABBUR, “Most Arab 
intellectuals consider the Arabic language the foundation of Arab 
Nationalism (al-Qawmyya al-arabyya)… Islam encompasses many 
nationalities, including Arab Nationality”.582 
12.2.3. Constituent power and the Right to Self-Determination  
Self-determination is a relatively recent phenomenon with dubious 
historical origin. This also explains the fact that this right is potentially 
easy to manipulate and suffers from a high degree of practical and 
normative confusion.583 In fact, sometimes self-determination can refer 
to the outside (related to colonization) and at other times to the inside 
(related to democratization). Self-determination of the Palestinian 
people refers to the former, with the intention of liberation from foreign 
and hostile occupation.  
Nevertheless, the right to self-determination as a general principle of 
international law is no longer seriously disputed; in fact, it can, without 
hesitation, be confirmed that it is also recognized as ius cogens.584 The 
problem begins when it is necessary to know who has the right to self-
determination and how. In other words, the question is to know who 
forms a people, and which of them can assert the right to a State. This 
                                               
582  GABBUR G., Arabism and other Aspects of Belonging in the Constitutions of Arab 
Countries {Arabic}, p.32.  
583  DREW C., Self-Determination, Population Transfer and the Middle East Peace 
Accords, p.120. 
584  Ibidem. 
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contradicts another fundamental principle of international law: the 
sovereignty of States, which forms the basic pillar of the so-called 
‘international community’. 
The principle of self-determination becomes a legal right the moment it 
is called upon, by a group recognized as constituting a people, and in 
relation to a territory which can be deemed a unit for self-
determination; according to DAJANI, the Palestinian people meet these 
two criteria.585 The same author specifies Palestinians were, at the 
beginning, defined by what they were not (non-Jewish communities of 
Palestine); later, and following the nakba, the Palestinian question was 
particularly regarded as a question of refugees, in other words, as 
individuals who have rights and not a community. During the 1960s, 
multiple factors played an essential part in the recognition of 
Palestinians as a people, well distinguished from others.586  
It is thus, not a question of States accepting recognition to the right of 
self-determination for all those who pretend to form distinct people. 
Nevertheless, self-determination was the legal principle on which the 
fight for national independence of the Palestinian people is completely 
based.587 In fact, the definition of colonization - in the first paragraph of 
the Declaration of Colonization 1960 - is extensive and can easily 
include the two sui generis situations: Palestine and South Africa.588 
Moreover, it can be seen that there is international recognition of the 
existence of the Palestinian people, and an acknowledgment of the fact 
that these people are entitled to inalienable rights. For this reason, 
States enter into relationships with those who represent these people, in 
this case, the PLO, who is able to negotiate with Israel to participate in 
a final agreement, and thus, put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  
                                               
585  DAJANI B., Stalled between Seasons: the International Legal Status of Palestine 
during the Interim Period, p.33. Omar M. Dajani, at that time was Law Clerck to 
Judge Dorothy Nelson, United States Court of Appels for the Ninth Circuit. He is 
now teaching at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
586  Idem, pp.33-45. 
587  Idem, p.29. 
588  DREW C., op. cit., p.125. 
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The Palestinian people believe in their right to practice self-
determination. In the case that the DPC will be adopted after the 
creation of the Palestinian State, some may consider this principle 
superfluous. It is not so, since the actual political situation requires this 
proclamation to be considered on every occasion in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding: the Palestinian people cannot accept eternal self-
government without total sovereignty. The right to this claim by the 
Palestinian people should not be at the expense of anyone else; they 
claim equality with every other people.589  
In the DOP, there is no mention of the Palestinian people’s right to self-
determination, although Isaac Rabin recognised the PLO as the 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; we read in the DOP: 
“The Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations 
with the PLO within the Middle East peace process”.The DOP was 
entitled: ‘The Declaration on Self-government Arrangements’. It was 
the first step in the following agreements which led to the creation of 
the PA.  
In the PNCh, this right to self-determination was continuously repeated 
in different forms. It considered the right of the Palestinian people to 
their homeland, and therefore, the right to determine their own destiny. 
Based on the right to self-determination, the Palestinian people also 
have the right to sovereignty of their land; we need to point out that 
Israel is the only state in the world without defined borders; 
consequently, the territory which is to make up part of the Palestinian 
State has not yet been defined and will be the object of future political 
negotiations. 
According to the DPC, sovereignty belongs to the Palestinian people; 
they are the source of authority and their will is the basis for the 
Constitution. A similar principle is present in the Constitution of Egypt 
(Art.3§73), Syria (Art.2§2), Libya (Art.1) and Tunisia (Preamble, 
                                               
589  See Yasser Arafat’s Speech at UN General Assembly, Geneva, General Assembly 
13 December 1988.  
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Art.3). The Constitution of Turkey, on the other hand, declares that 
sovereignty is for the Turkish Nation (Preamble, Art.6) 
The sovereignty of people is pitched in two directions: first, towards the 
outside, that is, independence within the international community; 
second, towards the inside, that is, originality. The sovereignty of the 
Palestinian people shall be exercised through permanent representatives 
and must be the source of legitimate, political power. 
12.2.4. The Constitution and Citizenship  
In the PNCh (Art.5), a Palestinian was every Arab who normally 
resided in Palestine until 1947; this Article was included in earlier 
drafts of BL but the approved BL and DPC did not define who was a 
Palestinian. For this reason, we believe that the PNCh definition 
regarding Palestinian nationality should sill be considered valid.  
We would point out that several Arab Constitutions leave the task of 
considering who is part of the nation, to the law; for example, Egypt, 
Art.6: “The Egyptian Nationality is defined by the Law”; Jordan, Art.5: 
“Jordanian Nationality shall be defined by law”; Lebanon, Art 6 
(nationality in this Article appears to be synonymous with citizenship): 
“The Lebanese Nationality… shall be determined by law”; Syria, 
Art.43: “The law regulates Syrian Arab citizenship”.  
The DOP is also tacit on this question. In fact, we find recognition of 
the Palestinian people in their ‘totality’, without providing a definition 
of who is to be considered Palestinian. This can be explained by the 
difficulties encountered in the problem of refugees, which will be 
resolved during the final negotiations for a Palestinian State. Now, this 
can be accepted as the ‘logic’ consequence of a simple fact: the 
question of Palestinian nationality is out of the hands of the DOP (and, 
as such, of the BL); nevertheless, the Constitution cannot ignore 
resolving this point, since theoretically, it is the second step to 
statehood, and achievement of statehood means that certain arguments, 
such as the refugees, should have already been discussed.  
The first DPC established who had the right to Palestinian citizenship, 
within the Palestinian State (first DPC, Art.25): “Palestinian citizenship 
is secure and permanent for any Arab who lived in Palestine before 
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May 1948”. While the BL provided that the question of Palestinian 
citizenship shall be regulated by law (BL, Art.7).  
According to PNCh Art.5,  
The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided 
in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or stayed there. 
Anyone born after that date to a Palestinian father –whether inside Palestine 
or outside it - is also a Palestinian. 
According to the first DPC, Art. 25 states:  
Palestinian citizenship is secure and permanent for any Arab who lived in 
Palestine before May 1948. It is passed down from father to child. It endures 
and is not cancelled by the passage of time. The law shall determine the ways 
of gaining and losing it and the rights and duties of multinational citizens.  
If we compare the Article relating to Palestinian nationals, and the one 
relating to Palestinian citizenship, we notice the following:  
First, in the first DPC the year-limit is extended to May 1948, the 
month of the proclamation of the State of Israel, and not 1947 (as in 
PNCh), the year of the UN Repartition Plan. This apparently 
meaningless change totally alters the concept of Palestine: in the PNCh, 
Palestine is only synonymous with historical Palestine, since Israel had 
not yet been created by 1947 (in other words, Palestine here is 
synonymous with Israel + the occupied territories of WB and GS in its 
totality). In the DPC, on the contrary, Palestine could be considered 
simply the rest of historical Palestine, excluding the State of Israel. This 
could have been the resolution to the question of Palestinians with 
Israeli citizenship; but in reality, those Arabs, contrary to what may be 
deduced from the PNCh, would not have the right to Palestinian 
citizenship. Nevertheless, this argument is dangerous since it excludes 
all those Palestinians who had been living within the territories since 
May 1948 (the new date applied in the Article), which then became part 
of the newly created State of Israel, and they were forced to leave it. 
Those Palestinian nationals would not have the right to the Palestinian 
citizenship.  
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Second, in various Articles, the PNCh called for the destruction of 
Zionism and the liberation of Palestine (that covers also the actual 
Israel), considered by then as the Palestinians’ exclusive homeland; 
nevertheless, it established that “Jews who had normally resided in 
Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion would be 
considered Palestinians” (Art. 6). This Article can be considered as 
superfluous in the DPC, since the Palestinians now recognize the 
existence of the Israeli State; in fact, the State of Israel, in harmony 
with Zionist beliefs, decided to give Israeli citizenship to every Jewish 
man or woman who requested it, as they would be considered members 
of the Israeli nation.590  
In order to understand the problem, we offer the following example: 
The Old City of Jerusalem was occupied only in 1967; the Jews there 
were an indigenous population, who had been living in Palestine before 
1947. According to the terms of PNCh those Jews would be considered 
Palestinians, but according to DPC they would not have the right to 
Palestinian citizenship. They would be excluded simply from any 
possibility of obtaining Palestinian citizenship, blatant discrimination. 
This is only hypothetical, as those Jews enjoy full Israeli citizenship 
and would not be interested in a Palestinian one. 
Third, according to the first DPC the right to citizenship is transferred 
from father to son. All sons of Palestinian women and daughters of 
Palestinian fathers would be excluded. This further limitation on who 
had the right to Palestinian citizenship was limited to those Arabs who 
lived in Palestine before May 1948. After that date, Palestinian sons or 
daughters of Palestinian fathers and mothers would be considered 
Israeli or Palestinian citizens, according to their place of birth. This 
citizenship permanent, and cannot be cancelled with to passage of time. 
Ways of losing or gaining Palestinian citizenship would be determined 
by law. The Palestinian refugees living abroad have the same right to 
participate in designing national public policies as the Palestinians 
living in the Palestinian State. 
                                               
590  The same thing is for sons and daughters of Jewish parents. In case of mixed 
marriages, the sons and daughters of a Jewish woman are considered to be Jewish.  
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Fourth, according to the first DPC, not all Palestinians would 
automatically be considered Palestinian citizens. They would only be 
considered such, subject to two conditions: 1) they had to be Arab, 
regardless of sex or religion; 2) they would have to have lived in 
Palestine before 1948. When the DPC refers to ‘Arab’, would it include 
national minorities; according to the strict interpretation of that Article 
they would have no right to Palestinian citizenship.  
These points were put before the committee in charge of re-drafting the 
Constitution. The 2nd and 3rd DPC took in to consideration some of 
these and have reformulated the relevant Articles as follow:  
Art. 12: Palestinian nationality shall be regulated by law without prejudice to the 
rights of those who legally acquired it prior to May 10, 1948 or the rights of the 
Palestinians residing in Palestine prior to this date, and who were forced into exile, 
or departed from there and denied return thereto. This right is passed on from 
fathers and mothers to their progenitor. It neither disappears nor lapses unless 
voluntarily relinquished. A Palestinian cannot be deprived of his citizenship. The 
acquisition and relinquishment of Palestinian citizenship shall be regulated by law. 
The rights and duties of citizens are founded in the Constitution and governed by 
law.  
Art. 13: Palestinians who left Palestine after 1948 and who were denied return 
there to shall have the right to return to the Palestinian State and bear its 
nationality. It is a permanent, inalienable, and irrevocable right.The State of 
Palestine shall strive to apply the legitimate right of return of the Palestinian 
refugees to their homes and villages, and to obtain compensation, through 
negotiations and political and legal channels, in accordance with the 1948 United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, and the Principles of International 
Law. 
12.2.5. Who is/are that/those entitled to Constituent Power? 
Self-determination can be expressed in statehood; a Palestinian State 
may exist when the organs that represent the indigenous people practice 
sovereign powers over a territory. Now, constituent power is related to 
popular sovereignty. As such, it is not possible to practice it without the 
existence of the State, which is the only way to express popular 
sovereignty. When a state exists, popular sovereignty refers inevitably 
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to the people as demos, who effectively have the political rights, and 
practice them through the state’s institutions:  
In the context of the legitimacy issue, a paradox of constituent power is 
evident: Constitutions on the one hand draw their legitimacy from the 
sovereign power of the people, yet on the other hand define who "the people" 
is and how its will is to be expressed. If constitutional legitimacy stems from 
the principle of popular sovereignty, then the source of political legitimacy of 
a democratic constitution is not clear: Is it prior to the constitution, resting on 
the factual will of a presumably homogenous political entity which has the 
capacity to act as a collectivity; or does constitutional legitimacy derive from 
the constitution itself, i.e. from the legal order which itself serves as the 
source of the shared identity, so that ‘the people’ are in effect formed through 
the making of the constitution?591 
The dilemma that arises here is the following: A People (as ethnos) has 
the right to self-determination; the right to self-determination may lead 
to sovereignty; sovereignty is the prerogative of the people (as demos); 
the last is entitled to constituent power; and constituent power has to 
decide on who makes part of the people (as demos and as ethnos):  
 
People (as ethnos)  has the right to Self-determination 
  ???????  
 Constituent Power: shall decide who makes 
       part of 
Entitled to  
m
ay lead to 
People (as demos) is the prerogative of Sovereignty 
 
Accordingly, those entitled to constituent power, being that they reflect 
the totality of the Palestinian nationals, cannot be the same as those 
who effectively will exercise constituent power. Nevertheless, most 
local observers of the constitutional movement in the Palestinian 
territories, asked the Palestinian leadership to include all national 
                                               
591  LERNER H., op. cit., pp.12-13. 
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factions and authorities: social, political and civil, including those 
representing the Palestinian people from the inside and the outside, in 
their attempts to elaborate and adopt a constitution.  
According to Sieyès, constituent power is distinguished from 
constituted power, in that constituent power is permanent since the 
people cannot be limited in his right ‘to want’. We distinguished also 
between original and derived constituent power through the context in 
which each is exercised, their function, those entitled to it, the content 
and the ways in which they are exercised. Original constituent power 
can be enacted in a legal void that existed or is created. Derived 
constituent power is exercised within the limits provided by the 
constitution itself.  
However, there are different cases, which cannot be classified by either 
definition. The Palestinian being one: the constitution-making is 
conceived as a step towards statehood, not a consequence of it. 
Statehood is no more the outcome of a factual reality but rather the 
summation of a negotiated solution of a conflict between Israel and 
Palestinians. Moreover, a legal vacuum can be the result of a regime 
change; now, in the Palestinian case, there is no new regime, but there 
would be a new State for a pre-existing people that had been subjugated 
to occupation. On the other hand, it is not a derived constituent power, 
since there is no precedent constitution in force. The draft constitution 
is an original one for a new state which has no prior existence.592 
                                               
592  The Palestinian case proves that classical theory of constituent power does no more 
fit new realities in the twenty first century states. Indeed, this was one of the reasons 
that justified this thesis.  
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§13 Constituent Power and the Territory 
In the Palestinian case, there is a rich history of constitution-making 
which resulted in confusions and overlaps in different texts. At the 
moment of writing, there is an approved BL and a non-approved 
Constitution being prepared by a committee (three different drafts), as a 
step towards statehood; the PNCh is still valid unless abrogated by the 
same authority that emanated it. A statehood that is non-evident or 
seems in doubt of ever being realized in the near future, but in which 
the Palestinians, with international approval, seem to see a step towards 
the resolution of the Israeli -Palestinian conflict and the attainment of 
peace in the Middle East.  
In this context, the history of Palestinian constitution-making can 
provide an insight in to how Palestinians view their right, as a people, 
to existence and to self-determination. This right of self-determination 
requires a State wherein the Palestinians, as a people, may exist as a 
sovereign entity, where every Palestinian may have shelter.  
13.1. Palestinian Constitutional Developments  
13.1.1. The Constitutional History of Palestine 
During the Ottoman period,593 Palestine was part of the empire, 
although not an administrative unit but part of different administrative 
units called Sanjaks.594 Within the extensive reform movements, the 
Ottoman Sultan, Abd al-Hamid I, adopted a written Constitution, 
influenced by those of the West; a second Constitution was adopted, 
after the revolution of young Turks in 1908, and was not explicitly 
abolished but suspended implicitly.595  
                                               
593  For more details about the Palestinian legal system within the Ottoman Empire, see 
KASSIM A., Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, p.19-20; AL-QASEM 
A., Commentary on Draft Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority in the 
Transitional Period, p.188; The Draft Basic Law for the Palestinian National 
Authority, p.102. 
594  See SHEHADEH R., From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories, p.74.  
595  NATALONI C., Per una Analisi del Concetto di Popolo nell’Islam, pp.44-45. 
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The League of Nations adopted the Mandate for Palestine that included 
Balfour Declaration. Britain accelerated legal changes. Under the 
British Mandate, for the first time, Palestine became a unique entity, 
with legislative, judicial and executive powers, concentrated in the 
British High Commissioner. In 1922, the British government issued the 
Palestine Order-in-Council, also known as the Constitution for 
Palestine, but it was not a rigid Constitution, since the same authority 
whence it emanated (the High Commissioner) had the authority to 
amend it. 596  
The period that followed the British Mandate was the beginning of the 
division of Palestine in to three zones (Israel, WB and Gaza), which 
explains, the legal differences which now exist in these areas. The WB 
was annexed to Jordan, and the Jordanian parliament, including an 
equal number of representatives from the two banks of the Jordanian 
River, adopted a new Constitution in 1952 which replaced the Palestine 
Order-in-Council of 1922. This unity between the two sides of the 
River continued theoretically after 1967 also, until the two banks were 
officially separated in 1988.597  
GS fell under Egyptian administration but was never really annexed to 
Egypt as it was always considered a separate entity.598 The Egyptian 
government adopted BL for GS in 1955 but did not abolish the 
                                               
596  For more details about the Palestinian legal system under the British rule, see 
KASSIM A., Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, pp.21-24; AL-QASEM 
A., Commentary on Draft Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority in the 
Transitional Period, pp.188-190; AL-QASEM, The Draft Basic Law for the 
Palestinian National Authority, p.102-103. 
597  For more details about the Palestinian legal system in the West bank for the period 
1948 to 1967, see KASSIM A., op. cit., pp.27-28; AL-QASEM A., Commentary on 
Draft Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority in the Transitional Period, 
p.191; AL-A’SALY W., The Legal System in the West Bank 1948-1967 {Arabic}, 
pp.11-20. 
598  For more details about the legal system in Gaza strip from 1948 to 1967, See 
ALAGHA R., The Legal System in Gaza Strip 1948-1967 {Arabic}, pp.21-26; 
ASSORANY R., The Legal System in Gaza Strip 1948-1967 {Arabic}, pp.27-32; 
KASSIM A., op. cit., pp.28-29; AL-QASEM, Commentary on Draft Basic Law for 
the Palestinian National Authority in the Transitional Period, pp.190-191. 
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Palestine Order-in-Council, unless it was in direct contradiction to the 
BL but was replaced by a second BL issued in 1962.  
The Palestinians, who convened in Gaza, under the auspices of Egypt, 
in September 1948, refused the division of Palestine which they 
expressed through their self-declared All-Palestine Government. 
Nevertheless, this government had not had real jurisdiction over the 
land and soon forgotten after the death of its PM, Ahmad Hilmi Abdul 
Baqi, in 1963. 599   
In 1964, some Palestinians were invited to convene in Cairo to establish 
the PLO and declare the PNCh; this was amended twice: once, in 1968 
after defeat in The Six Day War and again in 1996, following the Oslo 
Agreements. The Arab League (in 1964) and the UN (in 1974) 
recognized the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. 600  
The years that followed the war of 1967 was (and still is) the period of 
WBGS occupation. Israel is the occupying power and as such, has the 
obligation to practice its authority by respecting the international laws 
of occupation. Nevertheless, Israel maintained – and intensified - the 
division between WB and GS, and established distinct military 
governments and civil administrations for each. All three powers were 
concentrated in the Military governor, and used them for the benefit of 
Israel and not necessarily the benefits of the local population.601  
The PNC declared the independence of the state on 15November 1988, 
without creating any particular authority over the land. Although 
considered favourably and recognized by a large number of States, it 
                                               
599  For more details about the All-Palestine Government, see: SHLAIM A., The Rise 
and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza, p.37.  
600  For more details about PLO origins and status, see KASSIM A.F., The Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis under International 
Law, pp.1-33. 
601  For more details about the legal system after Israeli occupation, see QUBTY M., 
The Military Orders in the West Bank 1967-1994 {Arabic}, pp.33-43; U’AIDA N., 
The Military Orders in Gaza Strip 1967-1994 {Arabic}, pp.45-51. 
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was only a political recognition since it did not effect or create any 
legal changes towards the land.  
At this point, we may outline some of the characteristics of Palestinian 
legal and constitutional history:  
First, most of the time, Palestinians were excluded from the process of 
constitution- and law -making. This was the case with the British 
Order-in-Council of 1922, and the Egyptian BL for Gaza in 1955 and 
1962, for example. As for the Ottoman Constitutions, they were the 
consolidation of a previous legal and constitutional system, imposed by 
the Sultan, within a larger process of reforms in the Ottoman Empire. 
We have to take in to consideration that some Palestinian notables 
participated in the activities of the ‘Ottoman parliament’. Palestinians 
of WB participated partially in the legislation and adoption of the 
Jordanian Constitution of 1952 as numerically equal representatives in 
the Jordanian institutions. Many expressed serious reserves regarding 
the unification of the two Banks, considering it an annexation rather 
than the expression of the will of WB Palestinians. This may be true, 
and as such may have influenced the legitimacy of such unification. 
Nevertheless, this does not exclude the fact that Palestinians did 
participate in the efforts of constitutionalization of the new state. 
However, it was the Jordanian parliament, together with the king, 
which had the authority to frame a new constitution.  
Second, the origin of these constitutional documents is related to 
specific events in Palestinian history, or to drastic changes to the State, 
by those exercising authority on Palestinian territories.  
For example, the British Palestine Order-in-Council was related to the 
Mandatory system established by the League of Nations; the 1952 
Jordanian Constitution was necessary after the unification of the two 
Banks of the River Jordan; the 1962 Egyptian BL for Gaza was related 
to Egyptian internal problems, after the dissolution of the United Arab 
State.  
Nevertheless, most constitutional documents did not completely abolish 
previous legislation; this was the case for example, with the two 
Egyptian Basic Laws for Gaza. Nevertheless, they were intended to be 
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the highest laws of the land: former legal documents which 
contradicted them were considered null and void. On the hand the 
Jordanian Constitution totally substituted the Palestine Order-in-
Council.  
Third, the first and second Declarations of Independence (1948 and 
1988) did not have a direct or immediate influence on the constitutional 
system of the Palestinian territories, although they did express the big 
lines and major principles that guided the Palestinians in their struggle 
for independence; consequently, they would influence any constitution-
al efforts regarding the Palestinian territories.  
Fourth, the PNCh is not a constitution since the PLO, as a liberation 
movement, is not a state but rather a subject of international law. It 
influenced, and was in its turn influenced by the situation in the 
Palestinian territories. This means that Palestinian efforts to establish 
their own constitution would be related to the State rather than to the 
PLO; as such, the PLO Charter would remain in force until it was 
amended, suspended or abrogated by the same authority which adopted 
it, the PNC. 
Fifth, Israeli military orders and declarations became the sovereign 
‘law’ in the land, following the occupation of the WBGS in 1967. They 
do not abrogate former laws, unless they are contradictory to the 
military occupation orders and declaration. Those orders and 
declarations were indirectly accepted by Palestinians through the Oslo 
Agreements, since they agreed to postpone some arguments until the 
final negotiations; furthermore, the PA declared that any current law 
would continue to be in force unless amended or abrogated; according 
to the Oslo Agreements, Palestinians would have to submit any draft 
legislation made by the PLC, during the transitional period, to their 
Israeli counterparts for their approval.  
In sum, the constitution, as a formal written document, do not make 
tabula rasa of the precedent legal documents in act in the Palestinian 
territories. The constituent power (as the principle author of the formal 
constitution) is then limited by the constituent power (as the author of 
the material constitution) that is nothing else but a comprehensive 
system of laws, in complete evolution in time and in space.  
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13.1.2. The Israeli-Palestinian Agreements 
Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians began on 30 October 
1991 at the Middle East Peace Conference held in Madrid, Spain, 
sponsored by the United States and Russia. The U.S.-Soviet letter of 
invitation to the Madrid Conference included the agenda and terms of 
reference for the talks: “Negotiations will be conducted in phases, 
beginning in talks on Interim-Self government arrangements”. In a 
joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, Dr. Haidar Abdul Shafi headed 
the Palestinian delegation.602 
Palestinians elaborated different drafts and proposals that reflected the 
way in which they imagined their negotiated Interim Self-Government 
Authority to be. The key issue for Palestinians was to extend its juris-
diction to all territories occupied in 1967, that is, a single territorial 
unity.603 The Israeli side proposed different drafts for their discussions. 
They insisted that negotiating territorial jurisdiction “starts from the 
premise that issues relating to the exercise of sovereignty are outside 
the scope of the Interim status negotiations”.604  
Negotiations between the two delegations continued in Washington 
while others were held secretly in Oslo, between Israel and PLO. The 
Government of Israel and PLO, ‘the representative of the Palestinian 
people’, signed the DOP on Interim self-Government in Washington 
D.C on 13 September 1993 (better known as Declaration of Principles, 
or simply Oslo I). The Israeli Knesset ratified the agreement by a vote 
of 61-50 with 8 abstentions, on 23 September 1993. The PLO Central 
Council (CC) approved the DOP on 11 October 1993, at the meeting in 
Tunis, 63-8 with 8 abstentions (27 out of the 107-member council did 
not attend). This gave birth to a phased ‘peace process’: the interim 
                                               
602  Some may consider the Oslo Peace Process as dead. They may be right. 
Nevertheless, the consequences of this uncompleted process are still evident, in 
particular, the PA, the main creation of those agreements, as the administrative 
authority – within geographical, functional and personal limits – over the so-called 
‘autonomous territories’ that were re-occupied. Thus the reference to Oslo is still 
relevant.  
603  For more details about early negotiations see SHEHADEH R., Op. cit., pp.103-131.  
604  Idem, p.114.  
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period and the permanent status settlement. It may be useful to mention 
here that the first time projected, was in the Camp David Agreement 
between Egypt and Israel.605 
13.2. Preparing a Basic Law and Drafting a Constitution  
When the PNC declared the State of Algiers in 1988, it also decided 
that the new State would require a Constitution or a BL; the first 
attempts to prepare a BL, then, were related to the state. The situation 
changed after the Oslo Agreements when the attempts to prepare a BL 
were related to the PA, a temporary authority administering the 
autonomous territories until a final agreement was reached. A 
committee was appointed and given the responsibility of preparing the 
first drafts of BL in December 1993, February and December 1994; 
these drafts were the object of public discussions inside and outside the 
Palestinian territories but they were not submitted to the CC. The PA 
began to operate and commenced exercising some authority on land 
and people. Many changes occurred after the election of the PLC; the 
committee prepared four other drafts which were not immediately 
considered by the president of the PA. The PLC approved the BL draft 
in its third reading (Law No.1/96) on 2nd October 1997. The BL was 
approved almost unanimously; according to Article 111, amendments 
to the BL required a qualified PLC majority of two thirds. Here we 
need to outline the following:  
First, the BL contains provisions similar to most of the Arab world 
Constitutions; nevertheless, some considered the BL as being the most 
liberal of Arab world Constitutions, especially the list of rights and 
freedoms that it contains. Second, the PLC’s main preoccupation was to 
approve a BL which would define the relations between the Council 
and the Executive, and the transparency of PA members on the one 
hand, and the protection of HR, the implementation and respect for the 
RL, and the independence of the judiciary, on the other.606 Third, 
                                               
605 We dedicated parts of our thesis for Dottorato in Utroque Iure at the University of 
Lateran to Israeli Palestinian Agreements: See Khalil, A., Which Constitution for the 
Palestinian Legal System, pp. 34f.   
606  For more details about the PLC election and its significance, see ABDUL HAMID 
R., Legal & Political Aspects of Palestinian Elections, IPCRI, 1995. 
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drafting a BL was possible under the IA; in fact, those Agreements 
furnished, in detail, most of the provisions that the BL had to include; 
besides, the validity of the BL shall not contradict the DOP and other 
agreements, otherwise it would be rendered null and void. Fourth, the 
preamble to the Election Law confirmed that this was the PLC’s main 
task. The President of the PA refused to sign the law, creating more 
tension between the PLC and the Executive Authority in general, and 
the President of the PA in particular.  
The President of the PA had endorsed the BL for the Transitional 
Period on 28 Mai 2002, which came into force on the date of its 
publication, 7 July 2002, in the official Gazette. Signing the BL came in 
a very controversial political context, as a step towards reforms, 
according to the 100 days reform plan. Meanwhile, the PLO EC created 
a legal committee in 1999, to draft a Palestinian Constitution in 
preparation for statehood, and Yasser Arafat appointed Minister Nabil 
Sha’th as its Chairman. The Draft of the Palestinian Constitution was 
completed on 14 February 2001,607 while negotiations with Israel 
totally collapsed. The same text was the object of revision in 2003 (a 
second and third draft were subsequently published) and of interest in 
the international arena, as important groundwork towards statehood.608  
The preparation of the Palestinian Constitution was part of the reforms 
requested by the internationally-backed Road Map for Peace, which 
called for reforms and the establishment of a Palestinian State by 2005 
                                               
607  The English version is on the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research 
(PSR) website: http://www.pcpsr.org/./main.html, in cooperation with the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation. The first and second chapters of the Constitution are 
respectively in: http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2001/conste1.html and http://www. 
pcpsr.org/domestic/2001/conste2.html  
608 As mentioned in the introduction to the 3rd DPC “This draft was submitted and 
expounded to the Palestinian Central Committee on March 9 2003. In response to 
the queries of the participants, Dr. Nabeel Sha’ath, head of the drafting committee 
gave complete clarification. The Council approved the draft and voiced apprecia-
tion for the work of the committee, its experts and advisors. It extended gratitude to 
the personalities and countries that participated in support of this project and effort. 
It advised the committee to pursue its work and discuss with the legal committee of 
the Central Council and other committees to discuss this draft in view of its final 
discussion and approval at the next Central Committee meeting”.  
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(later on postponed). The following table shows similarities and 
differences between BL and DPC609:  
 BL FOR THE PA DPC 
Prepared 
by 
Revised by Legal Commission of the PLC, 
based on different drafts of different 
commissions. 
Committee created by 
the PLO EC, and 
presided by Mr. Nabil 
Sha’ath. 
For The PA The Palestinian State 
Period Transitional period, until adoption of the 
Constitution. “This BL is enforced in the 
Interim Period, and can be extended until the 
introduction of the new constitution for the 
Palestinian state”. (106) 
Once adopted it will 
replace the BL and 
will remain in force 
until amended.  
Competent PA (PLC + President).  PNC + PA (PLC + 
president) 
Status - The PLC had approved the draft of BL in its 
third reading (Law No.1/96) on October 2, 
1997.  
- Mr. Arafat endorsed it on Mai 28, 2002. 
- Enforced the date of its publication in the 
official Gazette, on July 7, 2002 
- Amended twice: in 2003 and 2005.  
- The draft was 
completed on 
14/2/2001. 
- The draft is revised 
on 2003 in preparation 
for statehood.  
Different points can be outlined here: 
First, Palestinians began to prepare a BL in relation to the ‘State’, after 
the Declaration of Independence in 1988. During the transitional period 
after the DOP, and within the limits of the Israeli-PLO agreements, 
these efforts were switched from the focus on the State in favour of the 
preparation of a BL for the Palestinian Authority. This groundwork for 
                                               
609  References done here to BL and to DPC refer to the BL before its amendments and 
to the first DPC, unless specifies differently.  
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the Constitution was conducted by the PLO institutions, with 
remarkable influence on those of the PA.  
Second, as a step towards preparation for statehood, the first DPC was 
prepared by a CC committee under the auspice of the PLO. It was 
completed in 2001 but almost immediately forgotten by the end of the 
transitional period because of the bloody conflict between Palestinians 
and Israel. Since then, the Palestinian State has not been established and 
the conflict with Israel rendered the situation complex for the PA.  
Third, the violent conflicts in the Palestinian territories augured the end 
of negotiations between the parties. The status of the Israeli-Palestinian 
agreements was uncertain and the provisions established were once 
again violated. Criticisms to the Oslo agreements were made both from 
the inside and the outside. However, it should not be forgotten that the 
PA and the ‘Autonomous Territories’ exist and remind of those 
agreements considered as already died, especially in the light of 
international consensus on the necessity to resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, based on the two-States solution.  
Fourth, reform in the PA was a condition imposed for the resumption 
of negotiations. Although this reform was initially requested by the 
Palestinian people, it was not the real reason for conflict, as some may 
think. In this context, the PA began the changes according to the 100-
Days Plan for Emergency Reform, presented on June 23rd, 2002 by the 
Ministerial Committee for Reform, appointed by the Palestinian 
president.  
Fifth, formulating a Constitution for the Palestinian State (still to 
create) and in the meantime amending the BL, recently endorsed by the 
President, would be necessary to guarantee the respect of the above 
principles. The first step was to create the office of PM, not provided 
for in the BL. The creation of that office was in response, first of all, to 
Palestinian popular demand, and secondly, to the International press to 
reorganize the PA.  
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 220
President Arafat nominated Mr. Mahmoud Abbas as PM on 10 March 
2003.610 The PLC voted 64-3 (with 4 abstentions) in favour of creating 
the office of PM, an amendment to the BL which did not include this 
office, and the number of ministers was extended to a maximum of 24, 
not 19 as originally stated in the BL. He resigned from the post less 
than six months later and Ahmad Qure’i (Abu Ala) was designated PM.  
At this point of the analysis, it seems important to outline the 
distinguishing elements of both constitutional documents:  
First, the Declaration of Independence followed two events: the 
Intifada, the popular insurrection against occupation, on the one hand, 
and the declaration of separate administration of the two Banks by King 
Hussein. In this sense, the constitution was intended to accompany the 
birth of the new State; the constitution would be enacted in the name of 
the Palestinian people the legitimate entitled to sovereignty, and in the 
name of their inner right to self-determination. BL, on the contrary, was 
not the fruit of a sovereign act; it consisted of a law of a higher level 
than others, but subordinate to the agreement between PLO and Israel. 
Theoretically, it would be the highest law of the land, on an internal 
level, since judges would apply only the BL and any other laws, 
decrees, decisions and regulations subordinate to it. Discordance with 
the Oslo agreements would be considered unlawful and as a violation of 
a treaty or agreement. 
Second, the BL is a temporal law that designed to govern the 
relationships between the authorities during the transitional period; it 
was approved by the PLC, which represented only Palestinians in 
WBGS, including Jerusalem. The destiny of the constitution was to 
substitute the BL, which would remain in force until revised by the 
empowered body as provide the same draft constitution.  
Third, adopting the constitution for the Palestinian State is not a matter 
that would involve only Palestinians of WBGS, and as such, the PA 
institutions (PLC and the Presidency) as they are not empowered to 
                                               
610  Mr. Abbas was the Secretary General of the PLO Executive Committee. He headed 
the PLO’s Negotiations Affairs Department created in 1994 to oversee permanent 
status negotiations. 
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adopt it. On the contrary, the BL’s interest would be the Palestinians 
who would be governed by it, that is, the Palestinians of WBGS. 
Fourth, the constitution is intended coincide with the birth of the new 
State of Palestine. With a delegation from the CC, a commission was 
appointed to prepare a constitution, in complete accordance with the 
PNC Declaration of Independence and its new policy of a Two-States 
solution. The PNC is not an elected body although, since the PLO was 
created, it always represented most of the political parties and 
commercial unions reflecting the different Palestinian classes. All 
Palestinians have the right to participate in the framing power, since it 
is inner to the Palestinian people, those entitled to self-determination, 
although not all Palestinians, as part of an inevitable compromise, 
would have the right to Palestinian citizenship. As such, the PLO, since 
it represents the Palestinian people, is competent to participate in the 
constitution making and adopting process for the Palestinian State. The 
PLO remains the only representative of the Palestinian people. The 
PNC is empowered to adopt the constitution for the State of Palestine, 
already declared in 1988.  
13.2.1. Is There an Emerging Palestinian State? 
In an article published in the European Journal of International Law, 
Professor Francis BOYLE of the University of Illinois, presented his 
point of view on the Palestinian State, following the Declaration of 
Independence made by the PNC. He said that four elements: territory, 
people, government, and capacity to establish relations with other 
States, must operate together in order to create a state and that these 
four elements should be co-functional with regard to the State of 
Palestine. The author remarked that one hundred and fourteen countries 
had recognized, at that time, this new State, and that UNGA, by its 
Resolution 177/43 of 15 December 1988, had recognized ‘the State de 
Palestine', conferring upon it the status of Observer, with a majority of 
one hundred and four votes against two hundred and forty absten-
tions.611  
                                               
611  BOYLE F. A., The Creation of the State of Palestine, pp.301-306. 
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This opinion was criticized by Professor James CROWFORD of the 
University of Sidney in his article in the same Journal: ‘The Creation of 
a Palestinian State: too much, too soon?’ He concluded –rightly- that 
the arguments presented by BOYLE were weak and unconvincing.612 
There are several definitions of the State, but the simple legal definition 
is the following: “A state has cumulatively - as constitutive elements - a 
people, territory, and sovereignty and they must be interrelated”.613 
Accordingly, the existence of the PLO, the Palestinian people, and the 
territory (WB + GS) are not enough individually, There must be a direct 
inter-relationship between them. This condition did not exist before the 
Proclamation of Independence, nor did Proclamation make any signify-
cant changes to this established fact.614  
Besides, the recognition of other countries does not represent a 
component of Statehood: it is only an expression of the desire (or 
refusal) of the other countries to collaborate with the new State (in so 
far as it exists); in fact, the majority of the countries recognized the new 
State of Palestine more as a legitimate aspiration than an existing 
reality. It is true that GA took note of the proclamation of the 
Palestinian State by the PNC, and agreed to replace the designation 
‘PLO’ to that of ‘Palestine’. However, this change of name did not alter 
its legal status as Observer, since the adherence to the UN system is 
reserved for States only.  
In the Palestinian case, the nation therefore, existed prior to the State 
and independently of it, and can therefore justify the creation of a State. 
The Declaration of Independence remains a reflection of the mental 
attitude of the people, their sufferings, their vision of a state which they 
want to create, and the engagements that they would to undertake, in 
order to become members of the international community.615 At this 
                                               
612  CARRE DE MALBERG R., Op. cit., p.484. 
613  This was the definition made by the German jurist Georg J. JELLINEK (1851-
1911). TÖPPERWIEN N., op. cit., pp.20-21. 
614  DAJANI B., op. cit., p.60.  
615  AL-QASEM A., Declaration of State of Palestine: Backgrounds and 
Considerations, p.327.  
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point, the importance of such a declaration did not lead to the 
independence of the State of Palestine, but contributed towards it.  
Moreover, one needs to put the Declaration in its context: it should be 
considered as a concrete gesture in support of the Intifada which, by 
that time had celebrated its eleventh month,616 and as an epic symbol of 
affirmation that the Palestinian cause was reasonable and attracted 
international legitimacy.617  
Throughout the twentieth century, the Palestinian people made 
considerable attempts to obtain national independence, by seeking 
international recognition of their right to freely determine their political 
status in the territories which they claim to be theirs.618 Despite all the 
sacrifices, the Palestinians did not succeed in establishing a State.619 
The reason behind this failure is the Israeli military occupation of the 
Palestinian territories which has lasted from 1967. Palestine is not yet a 
State, but it remains the homeland of millions of Palestinians who 
continue to consider themselves as such.  
The State of Palestine does not exist indeed (because of Israeli 
occupation); however, this fact does not diminish the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination, since the exercise of this right 
is not limited to those who make a part of a State, nor does it 
necessarily lead to the establishment of a State.  
Now, if Palestinians are asked their opinion on the State they wish to 
have, many answers are given, together with all conceivable solutions 
(and even contradictions). The Palestinians have not been able to decide 
in favour of any defined objective for their national fight. Some want a 
Palestinian State extending to all the territory of historical Palestine; 
some do not want a Palestinian State at all, but aspire to the 
establishment of an Arab or Islamic State; some would be satisfied with 
a Palestinian State within the framework of the 1967 borders, even if a 
                                               
616  DAJANI B., op. cit., p.58. 
617  Idem, p.59. 
618  Idem, p.27.  
619  KHALIDI R., op. cit., pp.208-209.  
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few of those consider that this solution is only a strategic and transitory 
solution, whilst awaiting the recovery of all of historical Palestine; and 
others think that a State which would be completely dependent on the 
Jewish State, would be acceptable. 
Nevertheless, there is one common issue: the desire to establish a State. 
This has always been of extreme importance to the Palestinian national 
movement; besides, for the movement, the State has always represented 
- and continues to do so - the only means by which Palestinians are able 
to preserve their territory, and continue to exist as a [united] people. 
According to AL-QASEM, the Palestinian people have never abandon-
ed the idea of having their own independent State, which has been their 
demand since the British Mandate period.620 
This explains the changes in the position of the Palestinian leadership in 
relation to the State. Initially, it evoked a democratic Palestinian State 
(a government for all Palestine, as in the Palestinian Charter). Follow-
ing the war of October 1973, they started to speak about a fighting 
national authority, as the first strategic step towards a democratic State; 
and when the PNC proclaimed the independence of the State of 
Palestine in 1988, the State had become synonymous with ‘The WB, 
GS, and Jerusalem East as the capital’.  
Within the framework of the Oslo Agreement, the Palestinian leaders 
returned to the idea of an autonomous (National) Authority, as a 
transitional solution, even if the intentions of the two parties differed in 
regard to the contents of such transitional period and its objectives. This 
explains the current contradiction: on one hand, the continuing 
Palestinian preparation for Statehood -within the framework of the ‘two 
States solution’ adopted by the Quartet in the ‘Road Map’, which was 
applauded by the UNSC and UNGA. On the other, Israel continues to 
construct the wall and multiplicate colonies that make it impossible to 
have a viable Palestinian State in the future.621  
                                               
620  AL-QASEM A., op. cit., p.315.  
621  Now, let us imagine that one gives Palestinians the possibility to choose between 
living in ghettos created by the Separation wall and the return to the project of bi-
national State: it is almost certain that good majority would prefer this second 
solution. Of course, if that means their return to their homes, from where they were 
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13.2.2. The legal Status of the Palestinian Territories  
Notwithstanding Judge Dillard’s assertion in the Western Sahara Case: 
“It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the 
territory the destiny of the people”.622 The territory, however, has 
proved to be significant in determining whether and how a given people 
will exercise self-determination - as put forward by DAJANI623. 
Consequently, it is necessary to qualify those territories that constitute 
the core of Palestinian claims. What is, therefore, the status of the 
Territories conquered by Israel in 1967? The answer to this question is 
important because it determines, in the short term, the applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and in the long term, it can 
decide the entitlement to sovereignty of these territories, since the right 
of the people to self-determination depends also on the status of the 
territories to which they lay claim. According to BASSIOUNI: 
                                                                                                       
driven out, and their accession to equal rights as other citizens, without 
discrimination related to the ethnicity or religion, in relation to voting system, social 
rights and of health care, that would be guaranteed for them and for their children. It 
is a simple assumption, since the logic of the separation wall goes completely in 
opposite direction!  
In his article published in Yedout Ahronot, Uri Avnery had quoted Marwan 
Barghouthi, who declared in front of the Israeli judges: “If Israelis do not adopt the 
two-state solution soon, Israel will disappear. The whole country will become one 
state, and in this state the Palestinians will soon constitute the majority”. See: one 
State solution Ploy too dangerous, in: Yediot Ahronot, 9 Jan. 2005. La version 
anglaise disponible sur internet sur http://www.palestinechronicle. 
com/story.php?sid=20031002151855765   
Thus, the creation of the Palestinian State is not considered as priority of only 
Palestinians, but also of interest for those who believe in the right to the existence of 
Israel, and in the fact that Israel must be the national homeland for Jews. As if they 
were saying: who loves Israel must support the creation of a Palestinian state! The 
separation wall ‘condemns to death’ the viable Palestinian State in the very short 
term, but will sign for the long term the ‘death certificate’ of the State of Israel, as 
national homeland for Jews. This conclusion is curious, but it is not stripped 
completely of logic. It is clear, that there is no doubt that the creation of the State of 
Palestine answers, first of all, to the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination on its own territory. 
622  DAJANI B., op. cit., p.31. 
623  Ibidem. 
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In the abstract, people determine their goals regardless of geographic 
limitations; however, realistically, [self-determination] is exercisable only 
when it can be actuated within a given territory susceptible of acquiring the 
characteristics of sovereignty.624 
In other words, it is not enough that there is a Palestinian people; that 
people are entitled to self-determination, it is also necessary that the 
occupied territories are able to form a viable unit for the exercise of that 
right; Israel’s intention was to place obstacles in the way, the opposite, 
illustrated by Israeli policy towards the settlements in the occupied 
territories, and more recently, to the policy behind the Separation Wall.  
For the Palestinians, the territories conquered by Israel in 1967, are 
occupied territories; the UN Resolutions and the States official 
statements, had adopted this position. The only protagonist who refused 
-and still refuses- this concept is the State of Israel, which considers 
these as disputed territories! However, it is the status of these territories 
which is disputed rather than the territories themselves, which are 
indeed occupied territories, following the Six Day War, and recognized 
as such, by the international community. In fact, a territory is 
considered occupied - according to The Hague Regulations Article 42 - 
when it is placed under the authority of a hostile army.625 On 22 
November 1967, the UNSC adopted Resolution 242 which called for 
the withdrawal of Israel from ‘occupied territories’ without the definite 
article ‘the’; Israel regards this omission as an adoption of its own 
version in relation to the status of the occupied territories, following the 
Six Day War. Though, it is necessary to read this Resolution in the light 
of all other UN Resolutions, including the SC Resolutions. 
By way of example, SC Resolution 338, adopted on 22 October 1973, 
calls upon parties to stop fighting, to respect the cease-fire and to apply 
Resolution 242. In these two Resolutions, SC underlines the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by the war.  
                                               
624  DAJANI B., op. cit., p.45. 
625  GASSER H.P., The Geneva Conventions and the Autonomous Territories of the 
Middle East, pp.291-292. 
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In 1979, SC joined a conclusion regarding the establishment of the 
settlement colonies in the occupied Palestinian territories: in 
Resolutions 446 and 452, it condemned the Israeli policy and the 
practice of establishing settlements in the ‘occupied Arab territories’ 
and  
Calls once more upon Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously 
by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, to rescind its previous measures and 
to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal 
status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic 
composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, 
and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
occupied Arab territories. 
The GA dedicated most of its Resolutions to the question of Palestine.  
Suffice to mention here, by way of example, Resolution 3236 of 22 
November 1974, where the GA “reaffirms the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) The right to self-
determination without external interference; (b) The right to national 
independence and sovereignty”. 
Moreover, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
confirmed, on several occasions, the applicability of the 4th Geneva 
Convention (4th GC) in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. At the 
time of the 24th International Conference of the Red Cross (Manila 
1981), a Resolution was passed in which it reaffirms the applicability of 
4th GC to the occupied territories in the Middle East.  
On different occasions, the ICRC confirmed that the conditions for the 
application of 4th GC were fulfilled in the case of the territories 
occupied by Israel, including the WB, East Jerusalem, The GS and 
Golan. This was also the case in the ICRC reports of 1988, 1989 and 
1991, for example.  
From 1997 to 2001, a multilateral process was set up, on the initiative 
of UNGA. The purpose was to convene a Conference to decide the 
measures to be taken in order to impose the 4th GC on the occupied 
Palestinian territory, and to ensure that it would be respected. 
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Following the Report of the UN Secretary-General, during meetings 
attended by experts, the process was led, by a Conference of Member 
States to the 4th GC, which was held in Geneva on 5 December 2001. 
The ICRC participated actively in this process, and in particular, made 
a declaration that was annexed to that formulated by the High 
Contracting Parties at the end of the Conference, in accordance with 
various Resolutions adopted by the GA, SC, and the ICRC, reflecting 
the position of the international community:  
Le CICR a toujours affirmé l'applicabilité de jure de la IVe Convention de 
Genève aux territoires occupés depuis 1967 par l'Etat d'Israël, y compris 
Jérusalem Est. Cette Convention, qui a été ratifiée par Israël en 1951, reste 
pleinement applicable et pertinente dans le contexte de violence actuel. En sa 
qualité de Puissance occupante, Israël est également lié par d'autres règles de 
droit coutumier relatives à l'occupation, qui sont énoncées dans le Règlement 
annexé à la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 concernant les lois et 
coutumes de la guerre sur terre.626  
In an official declaration, the humanitarian organization condemned the 
suicide attacks and recognized the need for Israel to take measures to 
protect its population; however, these measures - in terms of the ICRC - 
must respect the IHL.627 Besides, the IHL, either customary or 
conventional, is applicable in a situation which is, by definition, serious 
and critical; in case a State or armed groups unilaterally decide to 
excuse themselves from applying them each time they think it is 
necessary, then the IHL would be useless.  
In fact the 4th GC envisaged only one exception to the general rule – 
military necessity (the application of the 4th GC Regulations during 
international or civil war, or during a military occupation). This clause 
derogates from the general rule because it was intended to create a 
balance between the sense of justice and humanity from the one side, 
and the necessary adherence by States to the terms and conditions of 
the general rule, on the other.  
                                               
626  The declaration can be consulted online http://www.aidh.org/Droit_Humanitaire/ 
actu01-decla-finale.htm  
627  Published on the official site of the ICRC.  
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In its Resolution ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003, the GA decided to 
submit a request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an 
advisory opinion on the legal consequences of construction by Israel of 
a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories. The ICJ issued an 
advisory opinion on 9 July 2004 on the request of the GA regarding the 
‘legal Consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. According to ICJ,  
The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and 
its associated régime, are contrary to international law. 
Accordingly, it can be confirmed without hesitation, that it was not a 
question of justifying the Separation Wall in the name of military 
necessity, nor was it necessity, tout court.  
13.2.3. The Israeli/Palestinian Borders  
A number of commentators use the expression ‘the occupied territories’ 
to indicate those territories which were occupied by Israel in 1967 (The 
WB, Jerusalem East, The GS and other Arab territories), undoubtedly, 
because they are territories which were conquered manu militari, by the 
war.  
The only official borders of the State of Israel -according to 
International Law- are those which the Partition Plan declared (the 
Jewish State would cover, on Palestinian territory, a surface slightly 
larger than that of the Arab state, and Jerusalem would remain as an 
international city) and not the `Green Line' -which merely indicated the 
line of cease-fire -in which case Israel would cover 77.5% of territory 
of the historical Palestine. The war could not in any case, create 
territorial rights and modify borders, whatever the time lapse since the 
conflict.  
In his article, ‘The Legal Boundaries of Israel in International Law’, 
Professor Anthony d’AMATO, a specialist in International Law, stated 
that the Mandate is a concept close to that of ‘Trust’, in the Anglo-
Saxon system. He went on to quote Article 22, in which it stated that 
although Palestine was considered as one of those Mandates which was 
‘provisionally’ recognised as an independent nation, it would, 
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nevertheless, require the “administrative advice and assistance” of a 
Mandatory Power on its road to statehood, and also that this would be 
in the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine. Great Britain was 
appointed for this purpose in the capacity of Mandatory Power – 
Trustee.628  
On the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, its mandate 
responsibilities were transferred to the UN, founded in the previous 
year. In the case of a Trusteeship, the mandated territory remains intact, 
following the replacement of the League of Nations and the subsequent 
withdrawal of the Mandatory Power (Great Britain). The administration 
ends only when the goals fixed by the Mandate have been achieved, 
that is, when the people of Palestine are (considered) competent to 
govern themselves. Consequently, the withdrawal of Great Britain from 
Palestine meant only that the Mandate on Palestine was, de facto, once 
more entrusted to the UN, or more precisely, to the UNGA, which had 
adopted the Partition Plan for Palestine, in its Resolution No. 171, of 29 
November 1947.629  
The Jewish State was proclaimed a month later. No Arab State has ever 
been established in Palestine (this should have been the concern of 
various Arab countries and by their omission therefore, are to some 
extent responsible). Hence, the Mandate never actually ended in 
Palestine, since its objectives were never realized. Palestinian 
leadership seems to ignore this point or maybe they avoid referring to 
it, as it was the case when Arafat spoke in front of UNGA, in 1974 for 
example. In fact, Arafat did not formulate any request to create a 
Palestinian State, and did not require the General Assembly to assume 
its responsibilities as a Mandatory Power.630  
                                               
628  D’AMATO A., The Legal Boundaries of Israel, in: Jurist official Web site. Anthony 
d'AMATO is the Leighton Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of 
Law. 
629  Our analyses here are related to international legality and not legitimacy. We refer to 
the legal borders of Israel according to International Law, and not to the legitimacy 
on which the Partition Plan was based. It is not our intention to discuss here the 
legitimacy of the UN institutions in adopting such a Resolution. 
630  As pointed out by Salafeh Hajawi in her comments published in Majallatu-d-
dirâsâti-l-filistîniyyah – n° 53, Beyrouth, 2003. 
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After the Six Day War, Israel proceeded with the occupation of the 
remaining Palestinian territories, and it commenced to colonize them, in 
spite of this action being considered illegal by the UN and the majority 
of countries. Some suggested that the Israelis were only defending 
themselves; for them, the aggression of the Arab countries was the 
cause of the Six Day War and consequently, of the expansion of the 
State of Israel; but, as outlined by professor d’AMATO, 
the undeniable fact that the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928, as 
definitively glossed by the International Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1948, has 
abolished forever the idea of acquisition of territory by military conquest.631 
The war itself was illegitimate; and if self-defence is legitimate, it 
cannot exceed self-defence as, by doing so, it then becomes a new 
military aggression, by definition. If self-defence had continued until 
this military aggression, the occupation of territories during a certain 
period (the conflict) by no means confers on the attacker the right to 
retain these territories, nor, a fortiori, to annex them. D’AMATO 
concludes his analysis in these terms: “The legal boundaries of Israel 
and Palestine remain today exactly as they were delimited in 
Resolution 181”.632 However, it is also true that the PLO, on several 
occasions, considered the WB (including Jerusalem) and Gaza, as the 
territories forming the objective of its territorial claims, that is, the 
future Palestinian State; a position officially adopted by the Declaration 
of Algiers in 1988.  
13.2.4. The constitution: the End of Revolutionary Justification?  
If the Palestinians are a people, and if they are those entitled to the right 
of self-determination until the establishment of an independent State, 
and if this right is not in fact satisfied because of an Israeli military 
occupation, how can the Palestinians carry out this right? Some 
Palestinians believe that force is the only solution. Some do not rule out 
force, but think it has to be a last resort. Others still reject violence on 
principle.  
                                               
631  D’AMATO A., op. cit.  
632  Idem. 
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Law does not exclude the use of force, but it attempts to keep it within 
certain bounds. On the domestic level, the State appropriates the use of 
violence against those who break the law or harm others. On the 
international level, the use of force can only be carried out by the 
international community as a whole, within the framework of existing 
organisations, especially the UNSC. A state, while having a natural 
right to self-defence, has to exercise this right according to the UN 
Charter and through UN organisations, or in coordination with them. 
The right of self-determination for nations under occupation means, 
above all, the right to resist. Force is permissible, but resistance comes 
in other forms as well. The use of force should be within the framework 
of commitments to IHL. In other words, self-determination does not 
grant those living under occupation the right to violate humanitarian 
principles. On the contrary, the use of force should be based on these 
principles and should draw from them much needed strength and 
legitimacy. Alternatively, when the occupying state, acting on grounds 
of security, military necessity or self-defence, resorts to force, it has to 
do so within the bounds of IHL. The end does not justify the means. 
Israel's breach of IHL (the violations committed by the Israelis, during 
the occupation) does not entitle the Palestinians to commit breaches of 
that law (suicide attacks against unarmed civilians). The opposite is 
also true. Suicide operations do not absolve Israel from the provisions 
of humanitarian international law.  
For example, Israel does not have the right to bomb civilian areas, use 
civilians as human shields, attack ambulances, and kill without trial). 
These legal principles are binding on everyone, irrespective of the 
situation, ius cogens. 
Many believe that the Palestinian cause is just, and that force is the only 
option. But the Palestinians have a primary duty not to undermine their 
own cause. They are those entitled to fight for freedom, but only within 
the law, particularly IHL. However, it shall be reminded that Israel is 
the one occupying Palestinian lands. The occupation imposes facts on 
the ground and is an illegal and unjustified state of affairs. Israel's 
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occupation of Palestinian lands is at the heart of the conflict, not 
religion, culture, or ethnicity, as some claim.  
Many believe that the use of force may not be the most appropriate 
option for the Palestinians at present, and accordingly call on 
Palestinians to confine themselves to peaceful expression. This position 
is called pragmatic by some and capitulation by others. Regardless of 
how one looks at it, however, the Palestinian cause belongs to the 
Palestinian people as a whole. Their right to self- determination is the 
only reference point worth considering. It is impermissible for any 
Palestinian group to hijack the cause and ‘excommunicate’ (takfeer) the 
others. The Palestinians need to put their house in order, according and 
agree on a common plan of action for all national and Islamist 
factions.633  
Now, the Palestinian Constitution will have to take in to consideration 
all these questions and issues, since the constitution cannot simply 
ignore the conflict with Israel, the necessity for peace, the internal 
divisions among the Palestinians regarding the methods used in 
achieving the objectives of their struggle.  
Among some Palestinians, there are those who consider that using 
force, in international and internal contexts, is an erroneous choice 
because of the significance of force. They prefer non-violent means, 
diplomatic and political.  
                                               
633 Moreover, following the attacks of September 11, and the successive total war 
against terrorism, there is confusion at the international level, between two concepts 
which should well be distinguished: resistance and terrorism. In fact, there is a 
serious risk which falls on the Palestinians, that is the risk to be converted, in the 
eyes of the world, from a people who seek his independence to cruel gangsters and 
‘terrorists’. Now, the suicide attacks contribute to diffuse and worsen this confusion; 
consequently, we can confirm that such acts are also to consider as counter-
productive with regards to legitimate aspirations of the people Palestinian and its 
national interests. In an article published in March 2004 (On… Resistance), Dr. 
Eyad Sarraj, a Palestinian humanitarian activist, wrote: “The real victory over evil is 
not by killing; but rather, through the victory of moral values that we adopt and are 
set in all religions… Our duty should be to unmask the Israeli practices and its HR 
violations and its determined attempt to destroy peace… but we have to be careful 
not to slide into their shoes”. The article of Dr. Eyad Sarraj (On… resistance) was 
published in the Webpage www.amin.org following the assassination of Dr. Al-
Rantissi.  
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Palestinians take part in the activities of UNGA (as an observer) which, 
on several occasions, condemned the Israeli military occupation. 
However, its resolutions are not legally binding. The UNSC, the only 
UN institution able to take measures against a State which threatens 
international peace and makes serious violations of HR, is easily 
blocked because of its voting system which affords permanent members 
the possibility of blocking resolutions that they may consider as 
‘inappropriate’, according to their national interests. That explains the 
existing double measures: rapid reaction of the SC following the 
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, while Israel continues to occupy 
Palestinian territories since 1967.  
While the ICJ has two competences: a) to make judicial decisions on 
disputes that are subject to interested States and, b) on request of GA, 
SC, and other institutions and specialized agencies of UN, to provide 
advisory opinions. The advisory opinions are, by definition, non-
binding neither for the States nor for the UN institutions; historically 
however, the UN institutions had always treated the advisory opinions 
of the ICJ with great respect, similar to the higher international legal 
institution; but this is not enough to ensure the application of 
international law to the Palestinian case, and thus, recourse to the ICJ 
will not lead to satisfaction of the aspirations of the Palestinians.  
The development of the IHL led to the creation of the International 
Penal Court (IPC) which signalled perhaps, the beginning of a 
centralised system of international penal justice, intending to persecute 
those suspected of committing international crimes. However, its 
jurisdiction is limited by: a) the nature of the crimes: only international 
crimes stipulated in the statute of the IPC can be considered; b) the time 
factor: only crimes committed since 1 July 2002, the date when the 
Treaty of Rome was enforced can be considered, and especially, c) the 
recipients of such norms who are Member States.  
Israel did not sign or ratify the Treaty of Rome; it is thus outside the 
jurisdiction of the IPC. The status of IPC envisages the possibility of 
citing, under the premise of justice, a state which is not a member: but 
only on the request of SC. Then again, the procedure can be blocked by 
the SC voting system. The IPC does not represent, therefore, an 
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interesting option for the Palestinians. It is not at all clear how Israel 
can be obliged to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories 
(OPT) and to stop putting obstacles in front of the realization of the 
Palestinians’ right to self-determination; however, it is clear that it 
would not be possible through the current international institutions. 
What are, therefore, the alternatives that can be proposed? Palestinians 
should not underestimate the role of Israeli public opinion: its power to 
exert enormous pressure over the Israeli government; its power to 
encourage the application of IHL; and its power to end occupation of 
Palestinian territories. An important role can also be played by the 
Israeli Supreme Court, which could change its passive position.  
Here the problem remains in the way the Israeli Supreme Court apply 
international law, especially the Humanitarian Law. According to Anis 
Kassim, Article 35 of Order No 3, issued by the Israeli military 
governor on 7 June 1967, states that  
the Military Court… must apply the provisions of the Geneva conventions 
dated 12 August 1949 relative to the protection of civilians in time of war 
with respect to judicial procedures. In case of conflict between this Order and 
said Convention, the Convention shall prevail. 
According to Kassim, this article was deleted by virtue of Order No 144 
of 22 October 1967, hence stripping the Palestinian population of the 
protection of the 4th GC of 1949.634 
Following the common law tradition, Israeli courts distinguish between 
customary international law, considered part of domestic law –binding 
without transformation by statute, unless in conflict with existing 
statute– and treaty-based law, which has no legal effect unless 
incorporated by statute. As such, the Hague regulations of 1907 are 
enforced by the Israeli Supreme Court with respect to governmental 
action in the occupied territories, whereas the 4th GC, of 1949, deemed 
a constitutive treaty, is not enforced by the court. At the same time, 
Israel’s official position of refusal to apply de jure the Hague 
                                               
634  KASSIM A., Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, pp.29-32. Dr. Anis 
Kassim, Attorney, Member of the Bar of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Member of Palestine National Council. 
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regulations in the “territories” of 1967 is explained by its assertion that 
the Israeli presence is not an occupation but an administration in 
absence of sovereignty.635 
Still, the Israeli Supreme Court recognises the necessity to apply de 
facto the humanitarian provisions of the 4th GC.636 The de facto 
application is different from de jure since there are no possibilities to 
persecute government violations of these acts judicially. In fact, the 
international community has through various resolutions and 
recommendations urged Israel to recognise the de jure applicability of 
IHL in the OPT in line with UNGA resolution 58/97 of 17 December 
2003. 
According to Eyal BENVENISTI, the Israeli Supreme Court’s rationale 
can be found in the same principle as the separation of powers.637  
The decision of the Supreme Court to invoke doctrine with respect to the 
status of the treaties, rather than with respect to the government’s ratification 
power, is a political decision aimed at granting the government more leeway 
in the international arena… The Supreme Court was quite willing in the early 
days to embrace international norms by adopting a monist approach to 
international law. Later, though, security considerations came to the fore, 
altering the court’s attitude.638 
We believe that Israeli courts may impose the applicability de Iure of 
IHL, including the Geneva conventions and their protocols, without 
necessarily renouncing its dual approach towards international law, at 
least for two reasons:  
First, while many treaties are binding only on states that take part, 
some treaties and conventions are the codification of customary 
                                               
635  DORNIER N., Rapport: Audience du 21 Novembre 1988 devant la Haute Cour de 
Justice de Jérusalem Relatif à la Fermeture de l’Association In’Aash El-Usra, 
pp.32-33. 
636  BENVENISTI E., The International Law of Occupation, pp.110-111. 
637  BENVENISTI E., The Attitude of the Supreme Court of Israel Towards the 
Implementation of the International Law of Human Rights, pp.207-221.  
638  Ibidem. 
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international law (CIL), which is applicable to all states, including 
those not participating. In other words, the codification of CIL aims to 
enhance its application rather than to excuse those states not 
participating. Still, the problem is how to distinguish between 
regulations that are part of CIL and convention-based regulations. It is 
of great importance not to leave this task to unilateral decision-makers 
in each state but rather to international law experts. 
Second, a (relatively) new phenomenon is the codification of 
international law in multilateral treaties that helps to spread and to 
enhance certain international regulations to the point that they are 
considered binding by almost all states, for a period of time, 
independent of the treaty. In other words, the codification of 
international law may include customary international law and may 
create new laws. This is happening with the application of IHL on 
civilians during armed conflicts.  
13.2.5. Legitimate Palestinian Representatives  
The Declaration of Algiers is not the first Declaration of Independence. 
Since 1 October 1948, some Palestinians brought together in Gaza, 
have proclaimed independence and the establishment of a so-called 
government of ‘All Palestine’ (hukumat umum falasteen). The above-
mentioned declaration did not lead to the establishment of a Palestinian 
State because The historic Palestine, following the nakba (the 
Independence, for the Israelis) was divided, de facto into three parts: 
first, the territory of the new State of Israel; second, the WB 
(hereinafter called), unified with (or rather, annexed to) the Emirate of 
Transjordan, thus forming the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; and, 
third, the GS, even though it was never officially annexed, was 
administered by Egypt. 
The Declaration of Algiers is not even meant to be the last declaration 
of independence! The date of 4 May 1999 (five years after the IA) was 
fixed as the date for the Declaration of the Palestinian State. Yasser 
Arafat’s decision to postpone this Declaration to an unspecified date 
was not only related to Israeli protests and her threats to stop the 
negotiations, but also because the IA had not been implemented and no 
final arrangements had been agreed. Nevertheless, the deterioration of 
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the situation in the Palestinian territories was accompanied by an 
increasing international conviction for the need to find a peaceful 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; ‘two peoples, two States’ 
was the magic formula presented by the international actors, later 
adopted as the Road Map.  
The international community shares -by general consent- the conviction 
that a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is necessary for 
stability in the region. The so-called Peace Process, started at the 
beginning of the nineties between the Israeli Government and PLO, and 
formalized through several agreements, in particular the Declaration of 
Principles, should not be considered as a peace agreement, but rather, 
as a declaration of peaceful intentions by the legitimate representatives 
of the two entities. This means a recognition by one of the existence of 
the other, and of its right to existence, and thus to security and 
development.  
The failure of the Oslo Peace Process added confusion to the already 
complicated situation. One of the most important -but least considered- 
effects of the Oslo Agreement was the stressing of the distinction 
between the Palestinians of the WB and GS on the one hand, and the 
other Palestinians dispersed throughout the Middle East, especially 
those who still live in the refugee camps, and the rest of the world. This 
is the inevitable consequence of a distinction between transitional and 
permanent.  
On the other hand, there is a quasi-unanimous recognition of the 
Palestinian people (through the recognition of the PLO as a liberation 
movement) as subjects of International Law, in spite of the fact that a 
Palestinian State does not exist. This recognition is expressed in 
different ways: for example, through the exchange of diplomatic 
delegations or representatives and through the stipulation of 
international agreements. However, the only legitimate body that is 
entitled to represent the Palestinian people remains the PLO and its 
institutions even if –admittedly- the PA is playing an increasing role in 
the international arena.  
Thanks to the agreements with Israel, but legitimated first by the PLO 
Mandate and then by the popular elections of 1996, the PA was created 
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and exists and functions as a quasi-State, even though it is deprived of 
real sovereign jurisdiction. This caused a certain overlapping between 
the institutions of the PA and those of the PLO. Confusion arose, which 
meant an increased authoritarianism in the territories under Palestinian 
jurisdiction and a lack of transparency. This confusion was also 
reflected in the way the BL for the PA was approved and the 
elaboration of the Palestinian Constitutional Drafts.  
In fact, adopting a constitutional document in the Palestinian case was 
seen to be a complicated task. As for the international community, it 
had shown an exceptional interest with regard to these efforts; an 
interest that meant financing these efforts or simply providing 
consultations with highly qualified constitutional specialists. The 
international community desired an active part in the efforts to 
construct a transparent and qualified administration in the Palestinian 
territories, which would respect the PNCh, Humans Rights, account-
tability, democracy and good governance.  
These principles are in harmony with the aspirations of the Palestinian 
people who took part in the efforts to constitutionalize the Palestinian 
entity, through numerous conferences organized by the public and, 
especially, through the work of many different international and local, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), that are present in the 
Palestinian territories, either preparing BL for the PA, or the 
Constitution for the Palestinian State.  
13.2.6. Who Exercises Effective Constituent Power? 
In the classical theory, the people are those entitled to constituent 
power. The people exercise that inner power through legitimate 
institutions. It can be a council constituted ad hoc, or the same 
legislative body also empowered to practice constituent power, or 
directly, through referenda. Sometimes a constituency prepares and 
debates a constitution, and then presents it to the people for approval. 
Nevertheless, the way the constitution is adopted, and the level of 
popular participation reflects the degree of democracy in those 
procedures, and provides legitimacy for the text that has been approved.  
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In addition, the elaboration and redaction of the same constitutional text 
is normally left to a group of specialists or to a commission, as it did in 
the Palestinian case. In fact, the task of preparing a Constitution for the 
Palestinian State was given to a commission composed of highly 
qualified individuals. It included academics, jurists, politicians, various 
specialists and some international constitutionalists.  
The way the constitution is elaborated is important, but the way it will 
be adopted is also important; for this reason, the way constituent power 
is exercised, and the organs doing so, is in reality much more important 
than knowing, theoretically, who is/are that/those entitled to that power. 
In fact, the ‘temporary government’ who organizes the enactment of 
constituent power, usually exploits the situation for its own benefit. For 
these reasons, the way the committee in charge of preparing the 
Palestinian Constitution was established (full executive control) may 
affect the same constitution. 
In fact, many criticized the Constitution because they think it reflected 
an alien will, rather than that of Palestinians. For some Palestinians, the 
Constitution did not answer Palestinian needs, but reflected the interests 
of other States.639 The participation of the Palestinians from WBGS in 
the process of drafting the BL and the constitution is also relevant. 
Palestinians showed -at least in the beginning- enthusiasm in that they 
would be contributing to the BL through their participation in the public 
conference, which had been organized. This was a matter of course, 
since the BL -and also the Constitution– would be of interest in the first 
instance, to all the Palestinians of WBGS, whence the PA was 
operating and in which the Palestinian State would be established.  
                                               
639  Palestinian jurists from Al-Haq Institute (Palestinian NGO) presented the possible 
‘dangers’ of an elitist executive: the content of the constitution would reflect the 
executive interest as having more authority; objectivity and neutrality are 
impossible, since the committee would inevitably reflect the group in government; 
the committee may refuse to include suggestions which do not correspond with its 
ideals; citizens would have the last word, but they would judge what the constitution 
would offer, rather than what it has to be; in order to adapt the constitution, the 
executive authority would use mass media to influence citizens effectively. This 
paper was presented to the ‘Palestinian Conference on the Constitution and 
Sustainable Human Development’, organized by Development Studies Program of 
the University of Birzeit www.birzeit.edu/dsp  
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An important question would inevitably arise: will Palestinians, through 
the PLO institutions, continue to have constituent power regarding 
amendments to the Constitution, in the process of creating the State? 
Will it be the competence of Palestinians of WBGS and citizens of the 
future Palestinian State (new arrivals included), will the PLO 
participate in the legislation, whose principle objective must be the 
inhabitants of the WBGS?640  
                                               
640  It is of great importance to keep in mind that the PLO Charter remains a document 
in force, but would officially cease to be effective if or when the same power which 
endorsed it (the PNC) declared its suspension. It has had an influence on BL and the 
Constitution but remains separate since those who intend to regulate power relations 
within the PA or the Palestinian State, are distinct entities of the PLO. These and 
other questions will be addressed in the following sections. 
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§14 Constituent Power and Sovereignty 
In the final decade of the twentieth century, and mostly due to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, 29 new countries gained independence 
and became states. Up until 1990, member states of the UN were 159. 
After the independence of East Timor in 2002, member states rose to 
191; this means that there was a 20% increase in 12 years.641 This vast 
number of new states gave constitutionalism renewed significance and 
importance.642  
According to Prof. Nicolas MAZIAU643, there is a modern phenomenon 
that consists in transferring constituent power to international 
organizations, leading to a kind of internationalization of constituent 
power. Prof. MAZIAU distinguished between two types of sovereignty, 
to the inside and to the outside:  
La théorie du droit enseigne qu’il existe deux formes de souveraineté: la 
souveraineté interne dont le détenteur est le monarque, ou dans les formes 
modernes de démocratie, le peuple ou la nation; la souveraineté internationale 
qui est la capacité dont jouit l’Etat de s’engager par un acte de volonté 
internationale, c’est à dire de “n’obéir qu’à des règles à l’effet desquelles 
(l’Etat) a consenti, expressément ou par acquiescement".644  
                                               
641  The following States became members of the UN: 1990, Liechtenstein, Namibia; 
1991 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Estonia, Federated states of 
Micronesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshal Islands, Republic of Korea; 1992 Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Republic of Moldavia, San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan; 1993 Andorra, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Monaco, Slovak Republic, The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 1994 Palau.  
642  VENTER F., Op. cit., p.9 
643  Nicolas Maziau is a professor at the University of Nancy II. The article cited here 
was the reproduction of a course given in January 2002, in the seminary of Prof. 
Tania Groppi, at the University of Siena, in Italy. The article is published in Agorà 
online Review of the Research Centre of Comparative Constitutional Law of the 
University, and can be consulted at the following address: http://www.unisi.it/ 
ricerca/dip/dir_eco/COMPARATO/maziau.doc  
644  MAZIAU N., Op. cit., p.2. 
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Accordingly, nothing prevents a state from renouncing part of its 
internal sovereignty but it can never give up its international 
sovereignty. Therefore, transferring constituent power to an 
international organization does not contradict the principles of 
sovereignty of states. The same author suggested that there are multiple 
reasons that would warrant internationalization of constituent power. 
According to D. MAUS, there are three hypotheses in which 
contemporary international law influences constituent power:  
D’abord, des situations où il y a désormais une véritable obligation de 
conformité entre les règles du droit international public et les constitutions 
nationales, donc une très forte intégration… deuxième hypothèse: la nécessité 
d’une compatibilité entre des règles internationales et les constitutions 
nationales… troisième situation: une incitation à l’harmonisation entre des 
règles internationales et les constitutions.645  
The reasons behind this, according to Prof. MAZIAU, are the 
following: first, the evolution of international law and international 
society and the relationship between states altered the notion of 
sovereignty; second, the weakness of Third World States and the 
burgeoning crises, both political and economical, and the resolve of 
developed countries to act against these crises, led to the changing of 
the raison d’être of peace keeping operations. Previously, it was 
intervention between parties in conflict, with their consent and in 
deference to their domestic affairs; latterly, it is in line with creating 
stable political regimes which are also democratic.646  
The consequence of this was that the UN and international laws in 
general, were indifferent to the political nature of the states. This is in 
contradiction to the Declaration of Friendship relations entered into 
between the states, which confirmed the constitutional autonomy of 
states in their internal affairs. According to Thomas FRANCK, This 
was an irreversible evolution of international law: 
                                               
645  MAUS D., Le nouveau constitutionnalisme, mélanges en l’honneur de Gérard 
Conac, Economica, 2001, p.87, cited in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.5, footnote 20. 
646  MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.3. 
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This emerging law – which requires democracy to validate governance, is not 
merely the law of a particular State like the United States under its 
constitution. It is also becoming a requirement of international law, applicable 
to all, and implemented through global standards with the help of regional or 
international organisations.647  
The ‘internationalization of constituent power’ is related to another 
phenomenon: the ‘constitutionalization of international law’; in fact, 
any international commitments that contradict constitutional law 
necessitate the amendment of the constitution. This means an 
increasing demand of states to apply international law in their internal 
order, which would give it a constitutional value. According to 
SCHMITT, 
Si le contenu de certains accords internationaux est reçu par les lois 
constitutionnelles d’un pays en vertu d’obligations internationales, cela 
n’implique pas nécessairement une suppression ou une diminution de 
l’indépendance politique de l’État qui par ce moyen garantit des obligations 
internationales par la forme de lois constitutionnelles relevant du droit public 
interne. (…) Le contenu de ces traités internationaux est protégé en droit 
public interne par la rigidité constitutionnelle. (…) Mais ces dispositions ne 
sont pas des actes constituants d’un peuple. Elles ne suppriment pas la 
souveraineté d’un État et n’utilisent, dans l’intérêt d’une obligation 
internationale, que la notion relative de loi constitutionnelle comme un 
moyen technique et formel d’obtenir une validité accrue à l’intérieur de 
l’État.648 
Now, the problem is the substitution of the people or the nation, 
considered as those entitled to constituent power, in the elaboration and 
the adoption of an instrument of government, led to a heteronymous 
constitution; an imposed constitution rather than voluntarily adopted, 
which leaves a question of legitimacy of such enactments. In the 
international law, there is no dilemma, but in constitutional law, this is 
                                               
647  FRANCK Th., The emerging right to democratic governance, in: AJIL, 1992, vol. 
86, no 1, p.47; cited in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.4.  
648  SCHMITT C., Théorie de la Constitution, PUF, coll. Léviathan, 1993, p.208; cited 
in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.5. 
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not acceptable since the people, or a constituent assembly, does not 
participate effectively in the preparation and adoption of such a 
constitution, causing a setback regarding internal sovereignty of the 
state. S. PIERRE-CAPS noticed that:  
C’est précisément (la) création radicale de la constitution, en vertu d’une 
décision du pouvoir constituant de la nation, qui tend à être remise en cause 
aujourd’hui. Et, paradoxalement, cela tient aussi au succès rencontré par la 
conception normative de la constitution. (…) En privant ainsi le pouvoir 
constituant de son caractère dynamique et volontaire, et sans pour autant 
remettre en cause l’idée même du pouvoir constituant du peuple ou de la 
nation, cette intrusion normative dans le pouvoir constituant laisse entrevoir 
la possibilité d’une constitution détachée de son substrat national, 
désincarnée, ‘dénationalisée’ en un mot, pur engrenage de normes 
hiérarchisées…649  
Now, to resolve the question of the legitimacy of such constitutions, the 
international constituent continues to refer to the people and the nation. 
The reference to the people, who may have limited participation in the 
process of constitution making, seems to be indispensable to obtain 
internal legitimacy for that text.  
La fiction juridique par le mode de raisonnement dérivé sur lequel elle 
s’appuie (…) remplit une fonction de légitimation idéologique (…) et traduit 
(…) le jeu des rapports de puissance au sein de la Société internationale (…) 
on objectera peut-être que seules les grandes puissances peuvent user du 
procédé fictif avec quelque chance de succès et modeler ainsi la règle de droit 
à leur convenance en la dotant d’une nouvelle positivité.650 
                                               
649  PIERRÉ-CAPS S., Le constitutionnalisme et la nation, in: Le nouveau 
constitutionnalisme, mélanges en l’honneur de Gérard Conac, Economica, 2001, 
p.72; cited in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.6. 
650  M-F. LABOUZ, L’ONU et la Corée: recherches sur la fiction en droit international 
public, PUF, 1980, pp.21, 314; cited in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.7. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 246
La fiction est une technique (…) remplissant une certaine fonction dans le 
rapport de forces: elle peut le consolider ou le renverser.651 
According to MAZIAU, those archaic concepts of constituent power 
which a nation considers the only justification and legitimacy of the 
constitution, ignore the fact that that legitimacy can also be found in the 
international community, based on the priorities of the UN charter 
whose legitimacy is universally accepted; in principle, nothing prohibits 
the internationalization of constituent power.652  
Now, the interference of the international law in questions related to the 
constituent power can be of two types: 1) the internationalization of 
derived or instituted constituent power; 2) the internationalization of 
original constituent power.  
There are many examples of the first type of influence: the treaties of 
minorities of 1919-1920 in central and oriental Europe; the 
Agreements of Gasperi-Gruber signed in 1946, between Austria and 
Italy; the agreements of Northern Ireland in 1998.653  
On the other hand, we are assisting in a relatively recent phenomenon 
regarding a constitutional movement, which is related to its continuous 
development being adapted to new circumstances: how? This is 
possible through what VERGOTTINI calls “potere constituente guidato 
o assistito”.654  
                                               
651  CHEMILLIER-GENDREAU M., Origine et rôle de la fiction en droit international 
public, in: Archives de philosophie du droit, Le droit international, Tome 32, Sirey, 
1987, p.160; cited in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.7. 
652  The authors cited here seem to be fervent defendors of international law and 
international involvement in the constitution-making process. All the examples 
presented here reflect more the reasons that may justify such intervention rather than 
covering the problem from all its aspects, especially in terms of equilibrium between 
internal and international legitimacy of the constitution.  
653  MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.10. 
654  VERGOTTINI G. de, Le transizioni constituzionali, sviluppi crisi del 
costituzionalismo alla fine del XX seculo, Il Mulino, 1998, p.164; cited in: MAZIAU 
N., op. cit., p.10. 
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According to MAZIAU, the number of internationalized constitutions 
multiplied following the substitution of international law by 
constitutional law. The international legislator(s) may control the 
process of elaborating and adopting the constitution, or simply impose 
conditions to its content or form. The conditions on the structure may 
be by imposing a special vote on the constituent assembly guaranteeing 
the rights of minority groups; this is necessary for constitutional 
legitimacy. The conditions in substance are related to the wish of the 
international community to impose principles that would guarantee 
democracy. However, sometimes western democracy does not 
necessarily correspond with local cultures and political traditions.  
While conversely, totally internationalized constitutions imposed limits 
on the amending power in order to guarantee its observance. This was 
the case in the peace treaties. Some may regard this phenomenon with 
suspicion, nevertheless, as confirmed by MAZIAU:  
Toutefois, comme nous avons tenté de le montrer, la fiction de l’affirmation 
de la souveraineté de l’Etat, ou celle du consentement du peuple, ne sont que 
des techniques juridiques de justification d’une démarche politique de la 
communauté internationale qui sollicite la normativité internationale en appui 
au droit constitutionnel.655 
14.1. The Partial or Total Internationalization of Original 
Constituent Power  
The guidance role is played by international organizations, universal or 
regional. The internationalization of original constituent power is either 
complete or partial. It is complete when constituent power is exercised 
by an international authority; it is partial when an international 
community assists the state in respecting certain principles. In the next 
two sections, we will present some examples of partial and complete 
internationalization of original constituent power.656 657  
                                               
655  MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.35. 
656  MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.11. The following cases are mostly those mentioned in the 
study prepared by Nicolas MAZIAU. The limit of my approach is that, although it 
may give a panoramic vision of new constitutional developments in contemporary 
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14.1.1. The Partial Internationalization of Original Constituent 
Power as a Result of a Treaty or an Act of International Law 
This occurs as a result of a treaty or an act of international law, or as a 
result of a de facto situation. There are different examples that show 
that international law increasingly covers affairs that are usually those 
of constituent power. This is because it is based on a more activist 
conception of international law; and it reflects the specific situation of 
states and territories that were compelled to accept international 
intervention.  
Here we may distinguish between the territories that were being granted 
independence, and which the international community had judged 
opportune to decide their self-determination (Palestine in 1947, 
Namibia in 1990, East Timor in 2001); and States that in a specific 
moment in their history, found themselves obliged to put their 
sovereignty under custody. This is the case of Cambodia in 1991 and 
Macedonia in 2001.658  
 
                                                                                                       
and new-born states, it lacks first-hand information and sometimes is at risk of being 
superfluous. 
657  Iraq’s recent constitutional developments can also be considered as an interesting 
case study, but we will not examine it here for two reasons: first, the situation is still 
unstable; second, the subject needs much more in-depth exploration than a simple 
reference can make. Nevertheless, we may just recall some of the elements: On 
1/3/2004, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) announced that it had completed and 
approved a ‘Transitional Administrative Law’, an interim Constitution to govern 
Iraq, following the restoration of sovereignty on 30 June 2004, until a permanent 
one is adopted. That date was the deadline established by the agreement between the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the IGC on 15/11/2003. According to 
that agreement, the election for a constituent assembly would follow in 2005. That 
assembly would promptly draw up and seek ratification of a permanent Constitution; 
elections would be held, under the terms of the new constitution, by the end of 2005. 
That constitutional document took a considerable time to prepare and amend, and 
the signing of it was postponed many times. Elections were held in January 2005 in 
a particularly unstable environment. The source of the above information is mainly 
based on a commentary and analysis made by Nathan BROWN, Professor of 
Political Science and International Affairs, at the George Washington University, 
and Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. 
658  Nevertheless, the examples will be presented in a chronological order.  
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- The Case of Palestine in 1947 
This is the first example in which international law intervenes directly 
in the original constituent power of a state, on its road to independence. 
In fact, the GA adopted Resolution No. 181 (II), on 29 November 1947. 
Under section “B”, the Resolution proposes some preparatory steps 
towards independence. Under Part 10, there are a series of principles 
which the constituencies of both Palestine and Israel shall observe. It is 
written that:  
The constituent assembly shall redact a democratic constitution and elect a 
provisory government to succeed the interim government named by the 
commission; 
Every Constitution shall include Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration that is 
mentioned in section C of the Resolution (related to Holy sites, and religious 
and minority rights); 
The Constitutions shall include other dispositions that the new regimes shall 
respect such as: the obligation to create a legislative chamber elected by 
universal suffrage and by secret ballots based on proportional representation, 
and an executive council, responsible to the legislative assembly.  
The obligation of the two states to guarantee equal rights for every person in 
civil, political, economic and religious affairs, without discrimination, and the 
enjoyment of HR and fundamental freedoms. 
The resolution imposes on the new states the requirement to establish and to 
maintain the freedom of circulation and visits for the residents and the 
citizens of the two states, in Palestine and Jerusalem.  
- The Case of Namibia in 1990 
The case of Namibia is also an example of partial internationalization 
of constituent power; in fact, the constituent assembly was obliged to 
follow the principles imposed upon it by foreign powers, with the 
support of the UN. Those principles were already expressed by the 
representatives of Germany, Canada, USA, France and the United 
Kingdom, in the UN. Those principles were binding on the constituent 
assembly and inspired the Constitution of independent Namibia. 
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According to the Secretary General of the UN, these principles are 
obligatory. 
The Constitution was to be adopted with a majority of two-thirds of the 
members of the constituent assembly, and it should endorse the eight 
principles that ensure the state of law. These principles were 
transmitted to the South-African General Administrator governing 
those territories, in order to guarantee their implementation. Those 
principles are: respect of the principle of free elections; the 
responsibility of the government to parliament; the recognition of 
fundamental rights, especially the right to constitute political parties, 
the right to hold meetings, and the write to workers’ syndicates; the 
principle of non-retroactive punishment for crimes; the recognition of a 
unitary and sovereign state; and the necessity to establish police and 
defence services that represent the population. 
However, the foreign powers imposed limitations to the amending 
power; in fact, Art. 131 forbade the amendment of the constitutional 
dispositions which guaranteed the respect of fundamental rights. Art. 
132 provided complicated amending procedures. Some may question 
the obligatory effect of those clauses today, since they were imposed by 
foreign powers. According to MAZIAU, it should be considered in that 
light, since they are included in the constitution, which leaves the 
problem of their validity, as they were imposed by foreign powers.659  
- The Case of Cambodia in 1991  
Sometimes, states require international assistance in order to return to 
their normal exercise of sovereignty, and in this case, Cambodia can be 
cited as an example. Here also, the intervention of international powers 
on arguments related to the constituency intends to ensure the return to 
peace, through the RL.  
The Cambodian factions entered into negotiations and accepted the 
sharing of power, in accordance with the Paris Agreement of 
23/10/1991, between the different Cambodian political factions and the 
nineteen States which participated in the peace process.  
                                               
659  MAZIAU N., op. cit.,, p.12. 
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Annex V of the Agreement contained the general principles which 
would inspire the Cambodian constituent assembly. Those principles 
are: formally establishing a political regime, subject to constitutional 
norms; the protection of HR and fundamental freedoms, such as the 
right to life, personal freedom, freedom of movement, religion, 
association, the freedom to freely constitute political parties and 
syndicates, and so on. Art. 4 imposed a system of liberal democracy, 
based on pluralism and the respect of free and periodic elections. 
According to article 5, the independent judiciary shall guarantee the 
respect of fundamental rights. And in addition, the agreement stipulates 
that the constitution shall be adopted by two-thirds of the members of 
the constituent assembly.660  
- The Case of East Timor in 2001  
Since UNSC Resolution 1272 of 25/10/1999, East Timor was placed 
under a transitory international administration which received a 
mandate to exercise executive and legislative powers, and to ensure 
justice and public order (UNTAET). It also had the task of controlling 
humanitarian aid and ensuring the reconstruction of the country. It also 
had another important role: to create democratic institutions for the 
future. The international administration took over power, after the 
Indonesian administration had left East Timor in anarchy, following the 
referendum for self-determination on 4/9/1999. The Secretary 
General’s Special Representative headed the administration of East 
Timor until the Declaration of Independence.  
The international administration rendered self-determination possible 
for that population, in strict consultation with the local independence 
movement (FRETLIN).661 The international administration took the 
necessary measures in organizing the election of constituent assembly. 
The international administration adopted Regulation 2001/2 of 
16/3/2001 to a constitution for an independent and democratic East 
Timor. In accordance with that Regulation, the constitution could be 
                                               
660  Idem, p.18. 
661  FRETLIN: Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent Timor) 
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adopted with at least 60 out of 88 members of the constituent assembly 
( considerably more than a two-thirds majority), in order to ensure the 
respect of minorities. In addition, the Regulation provided for the 
constituent assembly to take in consideration the results of the 
consultations conducted by all the specialized constitutional 
commissions. Regulation 2001/11 of 13/7/2001 continued in the same 
vein, providing more conditions in the way the elections to the 
assembly shall be held.  
Accordingly, the international administration did not substitute the local 
population; It is a transitory administration that is guiding that territory 
towards independence. According to CAHIN,  
L’administration directe du territoire par l’ONU affecte (…) notablement la 
portée internationale de l’exercice du pouvoir constituant. (…) L’assistance 
constitutionnelle fournie dans le cadre de cette administration permet (…) 
d’opérer avec une efficacité certaine la constitutionnalisation de l’acquis 
démocratique de l’ordre juridique transitoire (…).662 
- The Case of Macedonia in 2001 
During the dissolution of Yugoslavia between the years 1991-2, 
Macedonia suffered considerably on an internal level. The crisis in 
Kosovo and the persecution of the Albanese population in that Serbian 
province were fatal to its fragile political balance. This necessitated an 
active involvement of the international community, especially the 
European Union and the North Atlantic Territorial Organization 
(NATO), in order to disarm the Albanese militia, and to make 
constitutional arrangements for better representation of the Albanese 
community in the central institutions.  
The participation of those international organizations in the constituent 
process was limited to proposing solutions to the problem of 
communitarian cohabitation and leaving the Macedonian parliament to 
make the necessary adaptations to the Constitution. In fact, the 
representatives of the Macedonian government and the Albanese 
                                               
662  CAHIN G., L’action Internationale au Timor Oriental, AFDI, 2000, CNRS éditions, 
Paris, p.165, cited in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.16. 
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community, under the international auspices, joined a framework 
agreement in 13/8/2001. The Macedonian parliament adopted some 
amendments to the Constitution, touching on fifteen dispositions, 
including suppressing the reference to the Macedonian people, in the 
preamble, the suppression of the reference to the privileged status of the 
Orthodox Church, in the Article dedicated to the freedom of religion, 
and the equal recognition of Albanese and Macedonian as the official 
language. However, the parliament did not recognize the Albanese 
community as equal to the Macedonian people, and they did not 
establish a federal state, as requested by the Albanese parties.663  
14.1.2. The Partial internationalization of Original Constituent 
Power by a de facto Situation  
In this case, it was different from the preceding examples. The partial 
internationalization of the constituent power did not follow any 
agreement or the decisions of some international authorities, but was 
the direct result of the will of the ‘powers’ which participated directly 
in the constituent process of the defeated countries. The classical 
examples are those of Germany and Japan after World War II. In this 
case, the winning powers (USA, France and the United Kingdom in 
Germany; USA in Japan) controlled the Constitution-making process, 
and imposed new Constitutional norms in a regime of occupation; less 
pressure was made on Italy, in relation to the exercise of constituent 
power.  
- The Case of Germany 
Nazi Germany lost the war in 1945, and the allies decided to de-Nazify 
Germany; the Constitution would have served this purpose. As outlined 
by I. STAFF,  
Between 1945 and 1948 the three western occupying forces embarked upon 
creating democratic administrations, starting at the local level. Having 
remodelled the western territories of the former Reich into the Länder, they 
                                               
663  Idem, p.19. 
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instructed their Land prime ministers to draw up a constitution, which would 
join together the three western zones on a federal basis.664.  
In 1948, a parliamentary council was established; the Parlementarische 
Rat was composed of 65 members from the different Landtage, and 
was charged with adopting a new democratic and Federal Constitution 
for Germany. Under the authority of the allies, the parliamentary 
council adopted a draft BL on 8 May 1949 that was first presented to 
the Allies Council and then to Landtage.  
Their approval was required because, while the allies had consciously 
refrained from annexing German territory in 1945, their Berlin declaration of 
5 June 1945 clearly stated that Germany’s sovereign rights had been forfeited 
with capitulation. The Basic Law received indirect democratic legitimisation 
when accepted by the necessary majority in the Land parliaments (…).665 
According to MAZIAU, the strict control of the allies in the process of 
redacting the constitution did not forbid the German people from 
exercising its constituent power. In fact, the same preamble of the BL 
for the Federal Republic of Germany enforced on 23/5/1949, provided 
that the German nation had adopted this BL. The treaty was signed on 
12/9/1990, gave a definitive regulation for the statute of Germany, 
followed by its full sovereignty, and reunification was re-established.666  
- The Case of Japan 
In Japan, the situation was again, slightly different; in fact, it was only 
the USA, as an occupying power, which exerted pressure. In fact,  
sa base a été préparée en une courte période par le ‘Grand Conseil Général 
Allié’ sous la direction du Général Mac-Arthur. (…) Le gouvernement et les 
                                               
664  STAFF I., The Basic law: genesis, scope and international context, in: Basic law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Introduction, Press and Information Office of the 
Federal Government of Germany, Bonn, 1999, p.12; cited in: MAZIAU N., op. cit., 
p.22. 
665  Ibidem. 
666  MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.21. 
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parlementaires, élus directement au suffrage universel, n’ont que peu 
retouché ce projet.667 
The result was that demilitarization was imposed on Japan and the 
establishment of a mono-parliamentary regime in which the emperor 
had no real power. Besides, a very complicated revision system was 
imposed which forbade the revision of that constitutional pacifism. This 
remedy used by the Americans in Japan, realized its objective since the 
Constitution had never been amended since its adoption.  
- The Case of Italy  
The case of Italy is particular, as it had lost the war, but the victorious 
allies did not want to be involved nor participate directly in the 
constituent process, although they observed its developments. In fact, 
Article 15 of the Peace Treaty signed in 1947 provided that:  
L’Italia prenderà tutte le misure necessarie per assicurare a tutte le persone 
soggette alla sua giurisdizione, senza distinzione di razza, sesso, lingua o 
religione, il godimento dei diritti del l’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, ivi 
compresa la liberta d’espressione, di stampa e di diffusione, di culto, 
d’opinione pubblica e di pubblica riunione.668 
This resulted in some influence to but not really internationalization of 
the constituent power, which follows a treaty or as a result of a de facto 
situation;  
Con riferimento all’esperienza italiana prevale la convinzione che la nuova 
costituzione sia comunque rimasta il frutto di scelte dei costituenti nazionali 
in quanto gli indirizzi e i condizionamenti degli occupanti stranieri potevano 
essenzialmente ricondursi a forme di condizionamento politico della 
decisione costituente.669 
                                               
667  YAMAMOTO H., Constitution, pacifisme et droits fondamentaux au Japon, in: 
Revue française de droit constitutionnel, no 24, 1995, p.824; cited in: MAZIAU N., 
op. cit., p.22. 
668  VERGOTTINI G., Diritto Costituzionale Comparato, p.21. 
669  Idem, pp.21, 23. 
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14.1.3. The Total Substitution of National Constituent Power by 
International Actors  
The total internationalization of constituent power means that the 
elaboration process of the constitution is entirely left to international 
actors, since the same constitution makes part of an international treaty. 
In all the following cases that will be mentioned below, international 
intervention in constituent power is total, although sovereignty may not 
always be contested, such as the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, 
or it can be considered as a preamble to the effective exercise of 
sovereignty, such as the case of Trieste in 1947, and Cyprus in 1960. 
Finally, the example of Kosovo, and its particular statute will be 
presented. 670 
- The Case of Trieste in 1947  
The UNSC adopted Resolution 16 10/1/1947 related to the free territory 
of Trieste, in order to resolve the territorial dispute between Italy and 
Yugoslavia. The solution of that question was through the 
internationalization of the city and placing it under the surveillance of 
the SC. According to A. GRAVIS, the idea was to create  
Une entité autonome d’apparence étatique mais étroitement soumise à des 
normes internationales et à une intervention directe de l’autorité 
internationale (…) pour la transformer en Service public international de 
paix.671 
The City-State of Trieste, in fact, would have all the appearances of a 
state (borders, nationality, national assembly…) but it would be limited 
by the SC and its representative, the Governor of Trieste, who would 
supervise the application of the statute. It was envisaged that the 
adoption of a constitution would have completed the statute.  
The question of Trieste is interesting because the internationalization of 
the city was not put into effect, because of the opposition of the two 
most important countries involved, Italy and Yugoslavia. The 
                                               
670  Here also, the cases are presented in chronological order. 
671  GERVAIS A., Le statut du territoire libre de Trieste, AFDI, 1947, CNRS éditions, 
p.138; cited in MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.26.  
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international community had envisaged a binary internationalization: 
territorial and functional. The territory would have been put under 
international surveillance with an international status, and the local 
institutions would have to adopt a constitution, which would have been 
within the limits of the above mentioned statute; as such, it would be 
considered as a material constitution that would have limited the 
exercise of constituent power by the people of Trieste.672  
- The Case of Cyprus in 1960 
The Constitution of Cyprus was elaborated under the supervision of the 
United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and the representatives of the two 
principle communities, Greek and Turkish. The Constitution was an 
element of a treaty between all the interested parties, under the 
direction of the United Kingdom, which had sovereignty over the island 
at that time.  
The agreement of Zurich of 11/2/1959, completed by the Lancaster 
House Agreement of 19/2/1959, included a document regulating the 
basic structures of the Republic of Cyprus; it included the principles 
that would have served as a reference for when a constitution was 
adopted. A subsequent treaty between the Republic of Cyprus, the 
United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey was agreed, in which every party 
was committed to respect the treaty, and the independence of Cyprus 
and its Constitution. 
According to D.G. LAVROFF, “L’Etat cypriote n’a pas pu choisir sa 
Constitution qui a été définie par un traité international”.673 In fact, the 
Lancaster House Treaty imposed 27 principles, including the 
Constitution of Cyprus,674 whose intention was to organize the sharing 
of power between the two communities, on a constitutional basis. The 
agreements were adopted by the Parliaments of the United Kingdom, 
Greece and Turkey, without associating the representatives of the two 
                                               
672  MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.26. 
673  LAVROFF D.G., Le statut de Chypre, in: RGDIP, 1961, no 3, p.527-545; cited in: 
MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.28. 
674  As confirmed in principle 27: All the above Points shall be considered to be basic 
articles of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
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communities, although it is stated in the preamble of the agreement that 
it was accepted by them.  
Les représentants des communautés ne pouvaient qu’accepter ou refuser en 
bloc le projet de règlement sans avoir la possibilité de présenter des 
amendements. La procédure suivie constitue incontestablement une anomalie 
au droit international.675 
According to that agreement, the State was limited by the clauses 
sanctioned the revision of the Constitution. In fact, the agreements 
distinguished between ordinary dispositions and fundamental articles. 
The ordinary clauses could be amended by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of a Greek and Turkish assembly, while the fundamental 
articles could not be amended.  
The exclusive source of the Constitution of Cyprus was in an 
international deed. It was not elaborated by a constituent assembly but 
in the forum of international negotiations in which the representatives 
of the two communities were formally associated. The United Kingdom 
signed the Constitution on 6/4/1960, and it was adopted on the day of 
independence, 1/10/1960.  
- The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 
This is an example of total internationalization of the original 
constituent power, with the preservation of the fiction that is the 
implication of constituent that is the people. In fact, following the 1995 
war, Bosnia-Herzegovina was put under custody of the international 
community. The constitution was part of the Agreements of Dayton 
(annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement) that were signed in 
Paris, on 14 December 1995. In order to elaborate the new constitution, 
the international community substituted the sovereign peoples. The 
origins and power of the constitution, therefore, have a direct source in 
international law. The Dayton negotiations which were held between 
the parties were in conflict with the direct implication of the powers 
which participated in the resolution of that conflict; nevertheless, it was 
                                               
675  LAVROFF D.G., op. cit., p.28. 
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the foreign powers that decided the modalities of that international 
treaty.  
The treaty stressed the legal continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Art.I.1), 
and that the new constitution should revise and replace the previous one 
(Art. XII.1). Signing the treaty of Dayton meant the end of a preceding 
constitution and a kind of legal revolution. Despite the fact that the 
constitution itself declares that it amends and supersede the 
Constitution of the Reublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina676, the way the 
constitution was adopted, as rightly shown by Sienho YEE, a member 
of the New York Bar, is not the normal amendment procedures 
provided by the old constitution. Accordingly all the old institutions are 
gone and new ones (political and legal) operate under the authority of 
the new constitution. The same author presents the two possible 
justifications of such an abandonment of the old constitution: i) the 
revolutionary theory (the people can always change their government in 
order to meet the needs of the nation) and ii) the theory of necessity 
(where the niceties of normal procedures may be scarified. For him, 
each in itself is sufficient to legitimize it.677  
The constitution of the Dayton treaty set the basis for a new regime, 
and the new constitution provided new mechanisms for its amendment 
and the provision that it would be established by the constituent 
peoples: a notion that would assist the grant of legitimacy, which in 
reality, was in opposition to that imposed by the treaty. In fact, it was 
an international ‘constituency’ which imposed the constitution, in rare 
consultations with local representatives. Some may justify this clear 
‘undemocratic origin’ of the new constitution simply recalling a kind of 
de facto blessing of the people that would probably sanitise it. For 
them, this blessing is expressed by the ‘gratuitous’ approval of the new 
constitution by the legislatures of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzogovina and Republika Srpska.678  
                                               
676  Art.XII (1). 
677  YEE S., The New Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp.176-192. The article 
is also consultable on line: http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol7/No2/art3.pdf  
678  Idem.  
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According to Paola Gaeta, professor at the European University 
Institute in Florence, the constitution that was adopted was partly-
internal and partly-international: 
It is beyond dispute that the constitutional law-making process was 
unmistakably anomalous. For in this case the constitutional Charter of an 
existing State was drafted and agreed upon in an international forum and 
subsequently entered into force by virtue of international transactions:(…) the 
Constitution was negotiated at international level by the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with on one side, two insurrectional groups, and on the 
other, a group of foreign States. 
The Constitution is not the outcome of an internal constitution-making 
process. Nor has it been the upshot of a totally external process either, as it is 
often the case with those States that have forfeited their sovereign rights 
following de bellatio, as well as with many colonial countries acceding to 
independence. 
The new Constitution originates from a law-making process in which the 
authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina did participate. Nor 
can the hammering out of the Constitution at issue be equated with the 
conclusion of an international treaty setting out the Constitution of a federal 
State.679  
In fact, as outlined by the same author, there are two political factors 
behind the Dayton Agreement:680  
[O]n the one side, the will of all the parties concerned to put an end to 
bloodshed and devastation and, on the other side, the keen desire of the 
United States Government to exercise its political leadership in a serious 
European crisis thus achieving a resounding diplomatic success.681 
The reasons behind this ‘anomaly’ -GAETA concludes- are the political 
factors and practical difficulties that have found their reflection at the 
                                               
679  GAETA P., The Dayton Agreements and International law, in: European Journal of 
International Law, pp.147-163 (section V). 
680  The Symposium title was ‘The Dayton Agreements: A Breakthrough for Peace and 
Justice?’ The papers were published in the EJIL vol. 7 (1996), n.2.  
681  GAETA P., op. cit.. 
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legal level.682 The international involvement to strengthen the 
agreements concluded at Dayton, can be justified by the engrained 
hatred among the conflicting parties, as well as the inherent difficulties 
of a lasting political settlement.683 Nevertheless, the success of such 
agreements depends on the will of the interested populations that may 
turn those legal potentialities into reality.684  
- The Case of Kosovo in 2001 
In mid 1998, In mid-October 1998, NATO threatened to attack 
Yugoslavia unless it withdrew its police and security forces from the 
Serbian province of Kosovo, the population of which is more than 90 
percent ethnic Albanian. By then, Kosovo was legally a province of the 
Republic of Serbia within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia of 1974 specified 
that the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was a ‘constituent 
part’ of the republic (Art. 1), and the Constitution of Kosovo of 1974 
similarly stated that the province was a "constituent part of the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" 
(Art. 1). Finally, the Yugoslav federal Constitution of 1974 also 
characterized Kosovo as a ‘constituent part’ of Serbia (Arts. 1 and 2). 
Slobodan Milosevic’s regime eliminated Kosovo's autonomy through 
amendments to the Serbian Constitution in 1989, which were then 
consolidated into the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 1990.685 
                                               
682  For detailed analyses (i) on the role of the NATO (especially in military related 
issues): FIGÀ-TALAMANCA N., The Role of the NATO in the Peace Agreement 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, in: EJIL, vol. 7 (1996) No. 2, pp.164-175; and (ii) on 
the delicate question of repartition: ANDERSON E., Promoting Safe and Peaceful 
Repatriation under the Dayton Agreements, in: EJIL, vol. 7 (1996) No. 2, pp.193-
206.  
683  GAETA P., op. cit..  
684  Idem. mainly see the Conclusion.  
685  For complete analyses: Hayden R.M., American proposals for the constitutional and 
political status of Kosovo, the State as a legal fiction, in: East European 
Constitutional Review, Fall 1998, n°4, pp.83-92. The article is consultable online: 
http://www3.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num4/index.html  
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Passive resistance of the Kosovo Albanians emerged between 1989 and 
1997. In February 1998, the army of the liberation of Kosovo declared 
the beginning of the struggle for the independence.686 Political 
repression by the government of Belgrade, forced the international 
community to intervene through NATO. The war declared by NATO 
which ended by adopting the Peace Plan presented by UNSC 
Resolution 1244, put an end to the Kosovo crisis. In agreement with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Resolution 1244 decided on an 
international military and civil presence. The Secretary General was 
that entitled to enforce military power in order to establish a transitional 
administration which would guarantee substantial autonomy for the 
province of Kosovo, those entitled to sovereignty in that territory, 
within the Yugoslav federation. Resolution 1244 also provided that, in 
the attempt to adopt a definitive statute for the province, it should take 
the Rambouillet Agreement of 27/5/1999 in to consideration. The latter 
agreement, largely inspired by a peace plan presented by the USA, was 
not enacted as it was found to be unacceptable by Belgrade; 
nevertheless, it constituted a reference in the search of a definitive 
solution for Kosovo, and would influence the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General (SRSG) in the endeavour to elaborate the 
constitutional framework for an autonomous Kosovo.  
The new Constitution of Kosovo was presented in the form of a 
Regulation promulgated by the SRSG on 15/5/2001, which was based 
on UNSC resolution 1244; according to that Regulation, a decentralized 
autonomy would be established, with large portions of power allocated 
to lower levels, whilst some competences would be retained by the 
SRSG. It was hoped that this transitional administration would prepare 
the province towards complete sovereignty. The status of that country 
at the time was that sovereignty had been transferred to an international 
body, with the presumed consent of the Republic of Yugoslavia.  
                                                                                                      
Robert M. Hayden is associate professor of anthropology, associate professor of law, 
and director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University 
of Pittsburgh. 
686  MAZIAU N., op. cit., p.30. 
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The Regulation imposed some principles that were binding on the 
lesser authorities in order to promote the state of law, the respect of HR, 
the rights of the communities and their members, and the separation of 
powers. Moreover, the Regulation was made by the SRSG on behalf of 
the people of Kosovo; it was transitional and a higher law than the 
others. Nevertheless, the SRSG could use his discretion in revising the 
Constitution at any given moment. Accordingly, it may be argued that 
the transitional, constitutional act is not a true constitution; in fact, it is 
not hierarchically the highest norm of Kosovo.  
In an attempt to take control of international relations, public security 
and judiciary-related issues, the Kosovo parliament discussed proposals 
to amend the province’s Constitution, in July 2004. Furthermore, they 
would have enabled local authorities to hold a referendum on 
independence from Serbia. According to the UN Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), the parliament was not competent to make changes to the 
constitutional framework, since only the UNSC had the authority to do 
so (based on Resolution 1244 of 1999). Accordingly, the UN 
administrators rejected those proposals.687  
14.2. Constituent power and the Dilemma of Legitimacy  
For the Palestinians, the Constitution must reflect their history, identity, 
and struggle to gain liberation-independence; this inclusion is necessary 
to give the document the legitimacy it needs. In fact, it is the people 
who justify the state; popular sovereignty justifies the constitution and 
gives it the required legitimacy. The Constitution in this sense, intends 
to consolidate principles of self-rule and shared rule, between central 
authority and local authorities, in such a way that it will secure a direct 
relationship between state authority and the citizens’ needs, and the 
good use and fair sharing of state resources and experiences between 
central authority and local level.  
It is clear that this legitimacy remains theoretical lest the state 
institutions and citizens do not consider and follow the provisions of the 
Constitution, in other words, if the Constitution is not effectively 
                                               
687  See http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-128620-16&type=News  
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applied. Furthermore, the Constitution requires international legitimacy 
or recognition; for this reason, modern constitutions provide long lists 
of individual and community liberties and freedoms. In other terms, 
modern constitutions have to take seriously the diversities within a 
society, accepting them and encouraging them, provided that they are 
not detrimental to the unity of the state.  
14.2.1. Adopting a Written Constitution for Palestine 
14.2.1.1. Opting for a Written and Rigid Constitution  
Modern society is characterized by the occurrence of many new 
constitutions and of certain similarities and differences between them. 
From the juridical point of view, modern constitutions surpass classical 
democratic traditions of constitutionalism and its techniques although 
the constitution remains as the fundamental law; they contain juridical 
norms which seek to offer legal guarantees and judicial protection. In 
the political sense, modern constitutions institutionalize power and 
political relations, establish rules that are binding on everyone, and 
ensure institutional continuity. They are deemed the highest law of the 
country and aspire to set –though not always achieved - the principles 
of the RL (contrary to political opportunism).  
The written form and the innovation in the structure of the constitution 
itself, characterize modern constitution. Modern constitutions are 
longer than those written in the nineteenth century; they not only 
express the organization of power, but also the political and social 
philosophy of a given society. Besides, there is no unity between 
theory, ideology of the normative, and the real in modern society and 
constitutions.  
The relation between the ‘visible’ and the ‘invisible constitution’ raises 
not only the question of its value and its influence, but also the question 
of unavoidable changes and correction of theoretical and ideological 
principles. The modern constitution contains many innovations such as 
the introduction of economic regulations (property and planning 
structures), the expansion of the classical scale of human freedoms and 
rights (socio-economical and cultural), the protection of its 
constitutionalism and legality, and the revision of procedure for 
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changes to the constitution (more concise and simpler).688 Generally, a 
constitution contains three types of clauses: (i) those governing the 
machinery of government; (ii) those controlling the assignment of 
rights; and (iii) procedures for amending the constitution itself.689  
Most modern states have a written constitution, and almost all of them 
adopt the system of rigid constitution:690  
A formal constitution has become a requisite condition – a democratic 
credential– for new nations and new regimes that seek recognition by 
international political, financial, aid and trade organizations. Hoping to 
benefit from the advantages of the West, many states adopt the notions of 
popular sovereignty, citizenship and rights, influenced by American liberal 
constitutional thought. American scholars and consultants tend to dominate 
the “constitution advice business” and to promote the liberal constitutional 
ideal around the world.691 
The diffusion of written and rigid constitutions has different sources: 
first, the American source: colonies could adapt charters that did not 
contradict British statutes and customs; second, the philosophical and 
French source: it was necessary to initiate a new order, considering the 
constitution as the initial act of the national sovereignty and the renewal 
of the social contract, in order to distinguish between ordinary and 
constitutional laws; third, the federal source: in order to organize 
relations between the federal state and federated states and to protect 
the pact from arbitrary changes in the future, without unanimous 
approval of all those concerned, and following precise procedures.692 
14.2.1.2. The Way Modern Constitutions are adopted  
There are different forms of exercising framing power: first, the non-
democratic or authoritarian way, which excludes the people’s 
                                               
688  DJORDJEVIC J., The Modern Constitution, pp.25-28. 
689  ELSTER J., Op. cit., p.58.  
690  JOSEPH-BARTHÉLEMY, DUEZ P., Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, p.188.  
691  LERNER H., Op. cit., p.8. 
692  JOSEPH-BARTHÉLEMY, DUEZ P., op. cit., pp.188-191.  
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participation; and, second, the democratic way. The first can be openly 
authoritarian: the charters granted by (a) Louis XVIII in 1814, and (b) 
by Nicolas II to Russia in 1905, or veiled such as when the people 
apparently participate in ratifying a constitution that has been prepared 
by a non-elected group of people appointed by the executive, that 
continues to exercise political pressure on that designated committee. 
Democratic ways are those which confer the election of the constituent 
assembly upon the population, and may request their ratification.693 The 
distinctive point here is the existence or absence of a consensus by the 
people who will be governed by that same Constitution.  
Others proposed different types of constitutions, which were the results 
of a transaction or compromise between strong political forces, as for 
example, the 1830 charter negotiated by M. Thiers (who represented 
Parliament) and Louis Philippe, or the Belgian Constitution of 1831 
that was a modus vivendi between republicans and monarchists.694  
People exercise this sovereignty through representatives, a special 
assembly or referenda.695 The constituent assembly can then be specific, 
created ad hoc, or generic, with constituent and legislative powers.696 In 
certain circumstances, the executive claims or makes it possible to 
recognize it as having the right to draw up a constitution, in order to 
solicit different opinions, but mostly to submit it to the people for 
ratification, through referenda or plebiscites.697 In the case of a 
hypothetical democracy, the framing power is effectively in the hands 
of the autocracy, which can be one person, or a group of people.  
                                               
693  PACTET P., Institutions politiques Droit Constitutionnel, p.70 
694  HAURIAOU A., GICQUEL J., Droit Constitutionnel et Institutions Politiques, 
pp.334-335.  
695  SHIBA I., op. cit., p.107 
696  HAURIAOU A., GICQUEL J., op. cit., pp.335-337.  
697  In the case of a Plebiscite, the text submitted is only a formality. The main point 
here is that people manifest confidence in and allegiance to the person who 
represents them, and not to confirm the constitution itself. HAURIAOU A., 
GICQUEL J., op. cit., p.337. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 267 
The constituent assembly usually has full dominance of internal 
procedures in order to elaborate the constitution.698 By definition, the 
constituency is not linked to precedent laws, but rather has enough 
margins of liberty which justifies using the term ‘originaire’699 to 
qualify it:  
Du passé faisons table rase, chant l’Internationale. Il en va de même mutatis 
mutandis, quand, pour une raison quelconque, une constitution est élaborée. 
Le pouvoir des constituants, en d’autres termes est inconditionné. Il se situe 
dans une perspective de rupture par rapport à l’ordre juridique déchu. Il est 
sensé, en bref, se déployer sur un terrain vierge.700 
Some may argue that the constituent assembly may be limited by its 
electoral law,701 but others may protest confirming that the electoral law 
is the expression of constituted powers, or the provisionary executive 
itself; as such, these organs cannot limit the origin of their own 
authority. At the same time, it is true that in exceptional circumstances, 
the constituent assembly may limit itself, under political duress.702  
Now, there is no universal modality in adopting a constitution.703 It 
depends mostly on the economic, social and political development of 
the country in question on one hand, and the governing regime and the 
strength of the relationship between classes and categories, on the 
other.704 Nevertheless, a number of decisions have to be made in the 
convocation and constitution of the constituent assembly: there shall be 
a call to create the assembly; a procedure for selecting and/or electing 
delegates must be adopted; the mandate of the assembly and of the 
delegates must be defined in terms of constraints on what needs to be 
included, and what cannot be included, in the final document; once the 
                                               
698  PACTET P., op. cit., p.70 
699  HAURIAOU A., GICQUEL J., op. cit., p.332.  
700  Ibidem. 
701  Idem, pp.335-337. 
702  Idem, p.334.  
703  CETERCHI I., MURARU I., Le Pouvoir Constituant, p.80.  
704  Idem, p.81.  
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delegates have convened, their credentials have to be verified so that 
the assembly can be formally constituted; an internal decision-making 
procedure for the assembly, must be specified; a mode of ratifying the 
constitution must be specified.705 
When considering the authority that invokes, defines, and limits the 
constituency, a paradox arises. On one hand, it seems to be a general 
principle that: if X brings Y into being; then X’s authority is superior to 
that of Y. On the other hand, if Y is brought into being to regulate, 
among other things, the activities of X; then Y would seem to be 
superior.706 
In modern terms, constitution means the active making of a new order, 
as opposed to its gradual emergence in the course of a continual 
historical development. Constitution making involves the idea of an 
authority and a creator whose willpower is the ultimate cause of the 
polity.707 
The will of the constituent power aims at transforming itself into an 
objective and enduring incarnation: a constitution, but it cannot 
simultaneously submit itself to its own creation without losing its 
character as the supreme secular power.708 The experience of the last 
two hundreds years has proved that the leading forces of the revolution 
endeavour to congeal the achievements of the revolution, particularly 
the new distribution of political power, in a constitution - a legal 
document which bears the unequivocal authority of a written text 
superior to all other laws of the land. However important the character 
of the constitution as a written text may be… its lasting authority 
depends on the persistence of its authority of its creator.709 By making a 
constitution, the revolutionary forces are digging their own graves; the 
                                               
705  ELSTER J., Op. cit., p.66.  
706  Idem, p.66.  
707  PREUSS U.K., Op. cit., p.143.  
708  Idem, p.144.  
709  Ibidem. 
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constitution is the final act of the revolution.710 Constitution-making is 
an act of self-liquidation of the revolution.711  
14.2.1.3. The Way the Palestinian Constitution will be Adopted  
The way the constitution will be adopted in the Palestinian context, is 
of extreme importance.712 According to Article 185 of the Third Draft 
of the Palestinian Constitution, there are different steps necessary to 
take, before adopting the Constitution: the PNC (or the CC if the PNC 
were unable to convene) would approve the Draft Constitution, before 
the establishment of the State; the approval of that Draft by a two-thirds 
majority in the first elected House of Representatives, after the creation 
of the State; In the case where the absolute majority decided to submit 
the Constitution to a referendum, the constitution will be adopted if it 
obtains the simple majority of votes. Nathan BROWN commented:  
There are three glaring omissions from this article. First, it is not clear if any 
amendments can be made in the draft, and if so, how and by whom. The 
second omission is a provision for possible rejection at any of these stages. 
The third omission is of any body to review the draft.713  
According to Article 186 of the third Draft of the Palestinian 
Constitution, there are no substantial limits to the amending power but 
only formal and procedural limits, such as: the legitimate persons who 
may propose an amendment are the President, the PM, or one-third of 
the House of Representatives (HoR); two-thirds of the HoR shall 
                                               
710  Idem, 145. 
711  Ibidem. 
712  Normally, it is the constituent assembly that decides on its internal procedures but 
also it decides on the way the constitution will be adopted (Iraqi case can be cited as 
an example). In the Palestinian context, there was no constituent assembly but a 
nominated committee that decided, within many other things, the way the 
constitution will be adopted, and it did that through the same draft constitution. This 
present a clear contradiction: the draft constitution contains the procedures of its 
own adoption; accordingly, its provisions are considered binding before being 
adopted! Where can we trace the origin of its superiority and obligatory, before 
being in act? The draft constituoin contains the germs of its superiority to other laws 
before being in force.  
713  Comments to the Third Draft that Nathan Brown made, can be consulted on his 
page: www.geocities.com/nathanbrown1/  
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approve the request for amendment; the HoR shall discuss the request 
within 60 days of approval; the approval of two-thirds of the HoR (it is 
not clear whether the endorsement of the President, and publication in 
the official Gazette, would be necessary); in the event that an absolute 
majority of HoR accepts the submission of the Draft to a Referendum, a 
simple majority of participants is necessary.  
It is curious to notice that the Draft mentions the possibility of 
amending an article or some articles, but do not consider the hypothesis 
of totally changing the Constitution or of creating a ‘constituent 
assembly’, once the situation is stabilized. In other words, the Draft is 
not considered to be a temporary Constitution, but permanent and 
excluding the possibility of change to all or part of it.  
This was not the case for example, in a divided Germany, after the 
Second World War, when the Federal Republic of Germany adopted a 
BL on 23/5/1949. That Constitution was intended to be a temporary 
“constitution” (for this reason it was called BL, in order to distinguish it 
from the Constitution) until the unification of Germany and of the 
German people. Once the unification became effective on 3/10/1990 
(through the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the 
Federal Republic of Germany) the BL became applicable to all German 
people, without adopting new Constitution. Article 146 provides that 
“The Basic Law, which, since the achievement of the unity and freedom 
of Germany, applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply 
on the day on which a constitution freely adopted by the German 
people takes effect”.  
14.2.2. The Constitution and Islam 
The principles of Islamic shari’a, we read in the approved BL and 
DPC, are a primary source for legislation in Palestine, wherein Islam 
shall be the official religion, and for that reason, shari’a principles 
should be considered as one of the foundations of the state-in-waiting, 
or at least, the most important one. In the BL we read similar 
provisions. Why did constitutionalists introduce these clauses? Why in 
these words? Where is the originality here? What does this mean?  
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Islam is considered the State religion (al-islam din al-dawla), in most 
of the Constitutions of the Arab States (Egypt Art.2, Jordan Art.2, 
Tunisia Art.1). In the Constitution of Syria it is mentioned only that 
“the religion of the President of the Republic shall be Islam” (Art.3 §1), 
whilst the Constitution of Lebanon, because of the unique relations 
between the communities, makes no reference to Islam.  
The reference to a religion of state is not particular to the Arab or 
Muslim world; until very recently, some western democracies declared 
Christianity or Catholicism as the official religion of the state, without 
necessarily infringing the sensibilities and rights of others.714 On the 
other hand, Arab States have shown different ways in assimilating 
Islamic principles, depending on their particular geographical, 
historical, and political context. Besides Arab States, including Saudi 
Arabia and Oman who actually pretend that they exercise exclusively 
administrative governmental activities, do have the power to 
legislate.715 Nevertheless, it is obvious that the degree of ‘Islamisation’ 
changes considerably from one state to another.716  
There is no mention of Islam as the “religion of Palestine” in the PNCh 
(1968), nor in the Declaration of Independence (1988). This was also 
the case in earlier drafts of the BL. It was the 7th Draft BL that stated 
for the first time that Islam is the official religion of State.717 As 
previously mentioned, the BL included this Article, which was 
approved by the PLC, but not promulgated or ratified by President 
Arafat until 2002, as we already mentioned. In Art.5 §A of the 7th Draft 
Basic Law (DBL), in fact, we read: “Islam is the official religion of 
Palestine…”  
                                               
714  For the confessional states in Europe in the beginning of the 20th century, see 
CARDIA C., Manuale di Diritto Ecclesiastico, II° ed., Il Mulino, Bologna, 1996, 
p.139-141.  
715  CASTRO F., op. cit., p.14.  
716  Islam (L’) Religion de l’Etat, p.1.  
717  Drafted by the Legal Committee of the PLC, 9 July 1996. It was published and 
commented on by the European Commission for Democracy through Law.  
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Similarly, in the BL article 4.1 and the in the (first) DPC article 6, not 
only the Palestinian constitutionalists added the concept of Muslim 
nation, which most Arab Constitutions had avoided because of its 
ambiguities; in fact we read the Palestinian State is “part of the Muslim 
nation”. In the last few decades we have noticed a growing tendency of 
conversion to shari’a, in Muslim and Arab legal systems. Nevertheless, 
shari’a is imposed legally by the State and not by doctrinal models.718  
We may refer here to the Islamic Council of Europe, which in 1983, 
proposed a model for an Islamic Constitution in which the substance of 
Islam “Religion of State, din al-dawla” was clearly reflected in most of 
its articles, although not explicitly.719 In fact we read: Art. 1.a. “All 
power is for God only… sovereignty belong only to His Divine law”; 
Art.1.b.: “Divine law… is the source of legislation and the rule of 
power”; Art.1.c.: “Authority is a sacred deposit: people shall exercise it 
in accordance with the dispositions of Divine law”.720 
In 7TH DBL (Art.5.b. of 1996), we read: “Principles of the Islamic 
shari’a are the main source of legislation in Palestine”. It is interesting 
to read the comments that European experts made about that provision: 
It is questionable, or even dangerous, to set out explicitly that the principles 
of Islamic shari’a are the main source of legislation in Palestine. The terms 
used here are also ambiguous. Do they mean that the principles of shari’a are 
as such, the basis of the law in Palestine or do they simply mean that these 
principles should inspire the Palestinian legislators? In case the first option is 
true, then how can we determine exactly those principles, and what is their 
precise significance? In fact, shari’a is both theological and jurisprudential, 
consequently, to determine those principles would be difficult and uncertain.  
Moreover, it would be incumbent upon the High Constitutional Court to 
examine whether a law challenged before it, is in conformity with the 
principles of shari’a or not. However, the Court competent in interpreting 
                                               
718  CASTRO F., op. cit., p.14. 
719  Islam (L’) Religion de l’Etat, pp.9-41. 
720  English version is mine; see the Arabic and French version in: Idem, p.13 
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constitutional texts, would probably be unable to interpret constitutional ones, 
which appear to have a “supra-constitutional” value.721 
The Palestinian constitutionalists, seriously worried about the real 
implications of such constitutional provisions, took into consideration 
all these issues. In fact, as provided in BL Art.4.2 and DPC Art.7: “The 
principles of Islamic shari’a are a primary (or major) source for 
legislation”. 
Instead of article 5.b, of the 7th DBL: “Principles of the Islamic shari’a 
are the main source of legislation”. I believe that those formal changes 
were made in order to remove the ambiguities and to answer to the 
misconceptions expressed by western academics and organizations who 
had analyzed these constitutional documents. Nevertheless, the 
substance of the problem stays unresolved: what is the superior law of 
the land, the constitution, or shari’a? In other words, in the case of a 
contradiction, what should prevail, the constitutional provisions or 
shari’a? Let us take the example of women rights and duties. The 1st 
DPC (Art. 63) stated that “Women are the full sisters of men. They have 
rights and duties as guaranteed by the shari`a and established in law”.  
Now, in case of a conflict between shari’a and Constitution, according 
to the DPC, the principles of shari’a would have priority.722 This 
confirms that there is an internal conflict in the DPC that, once adopted, 
must be resolved. Nevertheless, we may need to wait the birth of a 
Palestinian State, the promulgation of the Constitution, the institution of 
a Constitutional Court - and their jurisprudential activities - to discover 
how the relationship - or conflict - between the principles of shari’a the 
Constitution, will be resolved. The case of Egypt can be cited as an 
example of such conflict.723  
In previous study, we have commented those articles as follows:  
                                               
721  See comments made by Political Affairs Committee (Doc.7636), and approved by 
the Committee on Legal Affaires and HR on 23 September, of the Council of 
Europe, on the basis of observations by C. Economides (Greece), J. Helgesen 
(Norway), and JU. Robert (France).  
722  This article was changed in the 2nd and 3rd DPC. 
723  DUBRET B., A propos de la Constitutionalité de la Shari’a, pp.91-98. 
All rights reserved for Institute of Federalism For academic and personal use only
Suggested Citation: Asem Khalil. 2006. The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case. PIFF, Etudes et Colloques 47, Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
 274
I believe that these formal changes (Principles of Shari’a are the or a main 
source of legislation) were made as an attempt to take off ambiguities and 
embarrassments that Western academics and organizations may express when 
they try to study the DPC, while the substance of the problem is unresolved: 
for example, in reference to women rights, DPC, art. 63 states that “Women 
rights are those guaranteed by the shari’a”. In case of a conflict between 
Shari’a and the Constitution, according to the DPC, the principles of shari’a 
have the priority. This confirms that there is an internal conflict in the same 
DPC that must be resolved once adopted. On the other hand, we need to wait 
the birth of a Palestinian state, the promulgation of the Constitution, the birth 
of the Constitutional Court, and their jurisprudential activities to discover 
how the relationship -or conflict- between Shari’a principles and 
constitutional principles, will be resolved. The case of Egypt can be an 
example.724 
In the 2nd DPC, we read:  
Art. 19: Citizens are equal in general rights and duties before the law, without 
discrimination on the basis of sex, ethnicity, religion, color, political views or 
any other reason.  
Art. 22: Women shall have their own legal personality and independent 
financial assets. They shall have the same rights, liberties, and duties as men. 
The term Palestinian or citizen refers to females and males. 
Art. 23: Women shall have the right to participate actively in the social, 
political, cultural and economic aspects of life. The law shall strive to abolish 
restraints that prevent women from contributing to the building of family and 
society. The Constitutional and shari’a rights of women shall be safeguarded; 
and any violation of those rights shall be punishable by law. The law shall 
also protect their legal inheritance. 
While in the 3rd DPC we read: 
Art. 19: All Palestinians are equal before the law, and enjoy same civil and 
political rights and have the same duties without discrimination. The term 
Palestinian or citizen refers to females and males. 
                                               
724  This was part of our dissertation for Licenza in Utroque Iure: The Palestinian 
Constitutional System, 2002 (non published document), subchapter §16.  
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Art. 22: Women shall have their own legal personality and independent 
financial assets. They shall have the same rights, liberties, and duties as men.  
Art. 23: Women shall have the right to participate actively in the social, 
political, cultural and economic aspects of life. The law shall strive to abolish 
restraints that prevent women from contributing to the building of family and 
society.The Constitutional and Shari’a rights of women shall be safeguarded; 
and any violation of those rights shall be punishable by law. The law shall 
also protect their legal inheritance. 
Those can be considered as positive changes but not enough to take of 
the ambiguity in relation to the superiority of constitutional provisions 
over the shari’a in case of conflict regarding women rights or duties.  
14.2.3. Freedom of belief or Freedom to Practice Religion? 
In article 7 of the first DPC there is an innovation: after confirming that 
the principles of Islamic shari’a will be a primary source of legislation, 
the Constitution admits that “the legislative power shall determine 
personal status law under the authority of monotheistic religions, 
according to their denominations”.  
The 3rd DPC made some changes to that text: 
Civil and religious matters of the followers of monotheistic religions shall be 
organized in accordance with their religious teachings and denominations 
within the framework of law, while preserving the unity and independence of 
the Palestinian people. 
In fact, the DPC’s intention was to guarantee monotheistic religions 
their authority and jurisdiction in relation to personal status law, already 
established by the Status Quo since the Ottomans. Nevertheless, 
nothing remains as before, in fact, the source of monotheistic authority 
and jurisdiction is no longer any of the previous powers that dominated 
Palestine, but rather that of the Palestinian legislators.  
The fact that Islam is proclaimed as the official religion in Palestine 
does not raise problems as such.725 The only question that arises is 
                                               
725  As was confirmed by the Political Affairs Committee (Doc.7636), referred to in 
above note.  
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whether, under such constitutional provisions, individuals would enjoy 
freedom of conscience and religion.726  
Indeed, if one reads Art. 5 of the 7th DBL in the light of Art.22 of the 
same draft:  
Freedom of belief and performance of religious rituals are guaranteed, in 
accordance with observed customs in Palestine, as long as that does not 
violate public order and public morals.  
The same two articles are repeated in the BL (Art. 4 and 18). In the 
DPC, on the contrary, there is an important change, since we read 
immediately after stating that Islam shall be the official religion: “The 
monotheistic religions shall be respected”. In addition, in the DPC the 
freedom of belief is no longer mentioned but simply: “freedom to 
practice religion” (Art.44). Freedom of belief is essential for the 
realization of a democratic society that Palestinians intend to construct. 
For the question why Palestinian constitutionalists took a step 
backwards, some may answer it was due to the influence of the 
principles of shari’a in the Arab world in general, owing to the actual 
conflict and the influence of Islamic movements on Palestinian society, 
in particular.  
In fact, some Arab countries mentioned that the Constitution guarantees 
the ‘freedom of belief’. This is the case for Egypt (Art.46) for example. 
In the Arab world this constitutional provision has a stricter content, 
similar to that in most of the western democracies. Practically, 
‘freedom of belief’ means ‘freedom to practice religion’, exactly as it is 
proclaimed in the DPC. Consequently, we may consider the DPC as 
more logical since it tries to reflect a material constitution in the 
constitutional text. How can this be accepted? We believe that 
democracy and other concepts shall be understood, not in their western 
connotations, but in their concrete understanding, acceptance and 
application in Arab and Muslim societies.  
                                               
726  In that sense, see analysis made by Law Institute, ALHAQ - BIRZEIT UNIVER-
SITY LAW CENTER, Human Rights in the Proposed Palestinian Basic Law, p.30, 
in relation to HR standards.  
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Nevertheless, we believe that freedom of conscience and religion has a 
particular importance in Palestine, for the existence of the Holy Places 
of the monotheistic religions.727 This fact was totally ignored by the 
Palestinian constitutionalists in writing the BL and the DPC which of 
course, needs to be reconsidered.  
The PNCh, already since 1968, confirmed in Article 16 that the war 
against Israel is not a religious one, but a political one: 
The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the 
Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquillity, which in turn will 
safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of 
worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race, colour, language, 
or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in 
the world, for support.  
In the Declaration of Independence we also read: 
Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-
discrimination in public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, religion, 
colour or sex, and the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law 
and an independent judiciary. 
In the first DPC, in fact, all these principles were expressed in many 
articles: “The Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice religion 
and to arrive at the place of worship” (Art.44); “Public order and 
defamation of monotheistic religions are the only limitations for that 
freedom” (Art.44); “These are the same two limits for freedom of public 
and private education” (Art.58, 59).  
We have to refer to the question of religious minorities in Palestine. 
Before that we have to outline that Christians, although numerically 
reduced, are part of Palestinian society, and together with Muslim 
Palestinians, participate in the process of nation and state building. The 
fact that Islam is the religion of Palestine does not necessarily 
contradict the rights and freedom of religion. We can say it differently: 
                                               
727  As confirmed in both agreements that the Holy See has stipulated Basic Agreements 
with Israel (1993, and 1997) and with the PLO (in 2000). 
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not stating that Islam is religion of state does not mean necessarily that 
freedom of religion will be secured.  
In fact, the constitutional article that refers to Islam as the religion of 
state provides that: respect and sanctity of all other monotheistic 
religions shall be maintained. Besides, the constitution provides that 
freedom of belief and the performance of religious rituals are 
guaranteed and that the religious authorities will continue to rule 
personal status in respect of jurisdiction of religious tribunals and status 
quo. Equality between Palestinians intends to be substantial and not 
only formal, factual and not only theoretical.  
For example, eight seats of the 1996 PLC where dedicated to religious 
or nationalistic minorities in order to secure the non-exclusion of 
minorities members from political and social life.728 In the second PLC 
elections, six seats were reserved for Christians.  
Let us take for example, the Palestinian Christians who shall not be 
considered as foreigners in Palestine or a ‘third’ part in the actual 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as if Palestinians mean only Muslims. 
Palestinian Christians are one hundred per cent Palestinians; they suffer 
the same as other Palestinians from the Israeli occupation, the 
destruction of homes, the siege of cities and the limitation of liberties; 
they suffer imprisonment and poverty. Accordingly, they participate in 
the struggle for the liberation of their land, and for freedom, and for the 
establishment of their own state on their land.  
They do so not in contradiction to their religious beliefs, but rather, 
based on their national and religious feelings of belonging. This does 
not mean that we need to convert the conflict into a religious one; it is 
not. The conflict remains a political one, a conflict for the land, and for 
freedom. Nevertheless, Palestinian Christians and Muslims do not (and 
should not have to) live their beliefs remote from the time and the 
place; their belief is converted in social participation, based on their 
solid political and moral commitments.  
                                               
728  In the first PLC elections, six seats were dedicated for Christians, one for 
Samaritans, and one for Charkas; in the second PLC elections, only Christians had a 
quota of six seats.  
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Communities’ relationships in Palestinie were characterized sometimes 
by reciprocal misunderstandings that may be the result of some 
ignorance and a lot of prejudices. This can be explained by a history, 
characterized by communitarianism (the system of milla) and a present, 
characterized by the increase of religious fundamentalism, in response 
to the weakness of secular powers and their legitimacy, and a future, 
full of obscurities and doubts in the possibility of establishing states: 
states respectful of the various religions, which do not distinguish 
between citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs. Naturally, the 
best way to avoid such situations is dialogue, both on the popular and 
institutional level, in order to secure a national unity that is 
indispensable and vital for Palestinians at this particular moment. 
Historically, Arab Christians –although reduced in number- participated 
in the construction and diffusion of Arab nationalism. It was that 
concept that put them, together with other Arabs who are Muslim, in 
the same camp. Once the project of creating one Arab state collapsed, 
and the attachment to territorial Arab states was deepened, Arab 
Christians, through political parties and different institutions, 
participated in the construction and development of their own states.  
Christian Palestinians were a vital example of such participation in the 
process of creating and promoting Palestinian nationalism and identity, 
through the struggle for the liberation of their occupied territories, the 
return of refugees and the establishment of a Palestinian State. 
Palestinian Christians are not foreign elements in the Palestinian 
society: a common culture, language and history associate them with 
other Palestinians. Nevertheless, some believe that Palestinian 
Christians may suffer two complexes: one of inferiority (due to their 
reduced numbers), the other of superiority (considering their 
particularity as being synonymous with supremacy).  
Both these complexes are unconstructive regarding peaceful 
coexistence of the religious communities in Palestine. Resolving them 
depends on two things: first, Palestinian Christians always need to be 
conscious of their identity; second, other Palestinians should not 
exclude them, legally or otherwise. Palestine is also the country of 
Palestinian Christians, as much as it is for all other Palestinians, 
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irrespective of their religious leanings. Besides, the presence of 
Palestinian Christians can be cited as an instance of peaceful 
coexistence between different religious communities, and may be an 
example to the international community the other side of Islam; an 
image based on historical coexistence rather than prejudice.  
Few people do doubt effectively of the belonging of Palestinian 
Christians. Nevertheless, there were many discussions within 
Palestinian society regarding the religious question, following the 
adoption of the clause “Islam as religion of the state” in the BL and in 
the DPC. The position of an authoritative Christian leader, Msgr. 
Michel Sabbah, expresses very agreeably our personal position. In a 
religious manifestation celebration in fact, he asserted:  
It is useless to discuss this question if different communities, Muslim or 
Christian, have the mentality of winning or losing, at the expense of the other, 
as if we are in different teams, each trying to catch the ball and take to their 
side or camp, as the victor. Daily life pushes us to be in the same camp, and 
no one wins if the other loses. We both win if a new Palestine, with a new 
face, is born, that inspires mutual trust and security for Muslims and 
Christians… if we nurture this mentality, and we will find the best 
expressions that reflect this new culture, for the Constitution.729  
14.2.4. The Constitution and Democracy 
Democracy means literally ‘people’s rule’. Constitutions normally 
express this principle in the following way: sovereignty belongs to the 
people and is exercised within the limits of the constitution. The 
democratic system means giving individuals the freedom of action in 
various fields, but this liberty is not absolute; one’s liberty sphere ends 
when the others sphere starts.  
Legally speaking, democracy means providing all necessary measures 
that guarantee the possibility of participating in political decision-
making. This participation can be direct (through referenda) or indirect 
(through ordinary or extraordinary representatives). Of course, these 
                                               
729  The speech was made at the University of Bethlehem, and published in Arabic on 
the Web. The translation is mine.  
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measures are not exclusive; new, more appropriate measures can be 
adopted for certain states, particular and culturally different. On the 
other hand, these measures can be misused when they do not actually 
reflect the real will of the people, but are employed in order to 
consolidate extant rulers. Consequently, democratic practices become a 
weapon in the hands of dictators.  
Now, most Arab countries are ruled by one person or a group of people. 
Some Arab States have do not have elections; more recently, others 
have held elections and/or included women in this process. Some Arab 
States permit elections, but void it from its content. Most Arab States 
have adopted constitutions, but they can freely amend them to suit the 
will of the ruler.  
Many commentators explain these phenomena as being related to Arab 
cultural particularities! Democracy is not exclusive to Western 
countries, and Arab culture does not totally exclude democratic 
practices; on the contrary, since the earlier centuries of Islam (already 
mentioned in previous sections), Arabs, and Muslims in general, have 
practiced different democratic systems, when Europe was in the midst 
of the dark Middle Ages.  
It is true that Islamic history is based on the deposition and replacement 
of rulers, in a constant desire for power, through various bloody 
revolutions, uprisings, and military coups d’état and this situation did 
not change until recently. Democracy mean the peaceful exchange of 
those in power, based on free and honest contests for all those having 
the right to participate; this liberty should also include the freedom of 
speech, without persecution.  
Nevertheless, we have many reasons to believe that democracy is a 
two-sided coin. Without the respect of HR, democracy can result in 
serious crimes to humanity (Hitler and Mussolini were elected by their 
people and for a while, enjoyed immense popular support!). For us, true 
democracy, although realised in different ways and through various 
practices, should be based on key principles: first, democracy is not a 
goal but a means to the realisation of a higher ideal: the respect of 
individuals’ rights and freedoms; second, democracy remains a mere 
formality if the ruler and the governed do not respect the RL which has 
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been officially sanctioned by a constitution; third, democracy does not 
mean tyranny by the majority, but is a political organisation of 
mechanisms which have to guarantee the rights and freedoms of ethnic, 
political and religious minorities.  
Democracy should not be a weapon in the hands of the majority to 
impose its will on minorities, and nor shall it be an excuse for 
minorities to exclude themselves from applying laws adopted according 
to the procedures provided by the constitution. Accordingly, a 
constitution shall reflect the interests of both minorities and majorities 
in the state; and in the interests of a stable state, everyone should be 
represented, and his/her interests reflected in the constitution. 
Democracy, formalised in the light of these principles, can steer 
citizens towards prosperity and the stability of the state.  
Palestinians showed flexibility and will to cooperate in the creation of 
democratic institutions in the Palestinian territories. Those intentions 
were not followed usually by concrete acts. It was sometimes related to 
outside circumstances, mainly the Israeli occupation. Nevertheless, the 
Israeli occupation was used other times only as a justification to cover 
corruption and misuse of authority by some individuals. The 
international pressure on Palestinians on creating accountable authority 
were clear. They usually presented the financial aids in exchange of 
such institutional reforms.  
14.2.5. Human Rights 
The Oslo II agreement limits the PLC, and as such (at least 
theoretically) limits the provisions that the PLC can make to guarantee 
the respect of HR and RL. Indeed, article 19 of the above mentioned 
agreement states: “Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers 
and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to 
internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the 
rule of law”. Some consider this provision ambiguous: “The military 
occupation, indeed, is ruled by international law according to the 1907 
Convention of the Hague and the IVth Geneva Convention (about 
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civilian protection in war-time)”.730 According to such reasoning, Israel 
will continue to be responsible of the respect for HR in the Palestinian 
territories ensure its respect by the PA, especially supervise that the 
PLC respects these provisions in the areas under the jurisdiction of the 
same council.731  
Others may go a little bit further, considering that Israel is not only 
accountable under International HR’s laws for any violation of 
Palestinian HR in areas under its direct jurisdiction, but also sharing 
responsibility with PA in other zones under PA direct jurisdiction, since 
Israel remains the ultimate authority unless final negotiations are 
terminated and full sovereignty is recognized. Indeed, while BL reflects 
the concrete absence of effective sovereignty during the Transitional 
Period, it is out of discussion in the DPC –since it presumes creation of 
the Palestinian State- that Israeli supervision would be accepted. On the 
contrary, the DPC as most of constitutions of Arab countries served as 
an important marker of sovereignty.732 In the new circumstances and 
context, it is indispensable that the DPC provides legal mechanisms to 
guarantee HR and RL, and their respect and application.  
Meanwhile, many NGO and independent centres and associations, such 
as the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), dedicate a lot of 
their activities and reports to encouraging respect for RL, and 
promoting development of democracy and democratic institutions in 
Palestinian society, which are the most efficient guarantees to respect 
and defend HR.  
According to the Palestine Human Rights Monitor (May – June Issue 
n°3, 1997), the PA public undertakings to respect HR can find 
expressions in different sources: undertakings made to HR NGO’s, 
such as Amnesty International;733 public decrees and declarations made 
                                               
730  CHARVIN R., SCHALLER R., DANNA P.P., Occupied Territories and Law, p.37. 
731  ALHAQ - BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Human Rights in the Proposed 
Palestinian Basic Law, p.17. 
732  BROWN N.J., Resuming Arab Palestine, p.45. 
733  According to the Palestine Human Rights Monitor just cited, Mr. Arafat would have 
said in a radio broadcast of December 31, 1993,: “We want the Palestine that is 
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by the PA undertaking to comply with HR norms;734 provisions of the 
Oslo accords, undertakings under the DBL of the PA; and 
Responsibilities under International HR law and Humanitarian Law.735  
The accelerated preparation for a BL that proceeded and followed the 
creation of the PA was in part the result of the desire that jurists and 
constitutionalists had to ensure the protection of HR. In fact, the 
relations between the President and the Legislative Council were very 
difficult since the PLC has prepared and approved the BL, which has 
been ignored by Mr. Arafat for a long time as already mentioned. 
Actually, the PLO already confirmed in the declaration of 
independence in 1988, that the  
State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the principles and purposes of 
the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights… It 
will join with all states and peoples in order to assure a permanent peace 
based upon justice and the respect of rights so that humanity's potential for 
well-being may be assured, an earnest competition for excellence may be 
maintained, and in which confidence in the future will eliminate fear for those 
who are just and for whom justice is the only recourse. 
The BL provides that basic HR and freedoms shall be binding and 
respected (BL, Art.10.1) and that the PA shall work without delay to 
join regional and international declarations and covenants which protect 
HR (BL, Art.10.2). As a guarantee the BL provides the necessity to 
establish by law an independent commission for HR (BL, Art.31) that is 
already established as mentioned above.  
The PA minister Mr. Nabil Sha’th stated, after first meeting of an Arab 
League committee to draft a constitution for the coming Palestinian 
                                                                                                       
being revised anew to be… democratic, an oasis in which our people will enjoy 
freedom, democracy, political pluralism, security and safety, the independence of 
judiciary, the preservation of public freedoms, stability, prosperity, human rights 
and equality between men and women”.  
734  Such as the PLO decree issued in Tunis on October 30, 1993, right after the Israel-
PLO declaration of Principles.  
735  Since the PA, although does not have the character of an independent state, exercises 
‘state-like’ power and authority within its jurisdiction under the May 1994 (Cairo 
Agreement) and September 1995 (Oslo II) IA.  
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state that Palestinians are looking forward to having “a constitution that 
supports political freedoms, accepts the sovereignty of Law and a 
multi-party system in an independent Arab Palestinian Republic”.736  
The DPC, indeed, states that the principles of justice, liberty, equality 
and human dignity –on which the Palestinian people believe (DPC, 
Art.2)- shall be the basis of governance and the motivation of the work 
of governing authorities (DPC, Art.14). These same authorities have the 
constitutional obligation to defend public and individual rights and 
freedoms (DPC, Art. 12). In the DPC there is a continuous reference to 
HR, in strict relation with good governance, RL, and independence of 
judiciary, with respect to the International law standards. 
HR and basic freedoms, according to international laws, charters, and 
treaties, will not be immediately applicable in the Palestinian state. In 
fact, the 1st DPC makes vague reference to those rights and freedoms 
according to international laws, charters and treaties. It may suggest 
that Palestinians adopt a dualist approach in relation to international 
law (similar to Israel). International law provisions, including those 
including rights and freedoms, have to be absorbed by the Palestinian 
legal system, constitution, or ratified by the legitimate legislative 
power, in order to make them part of domestic law. 
Art. 27: Human rights and basic freedoms according to international laws, 
charters, and treaties that become part of domestic law are binding and must 
be respected.  
In case of reception by an ordinary law, the HRs and basic freedoms 
may be changed by successive similar range ordinary law, or special 
law. The Constitution will guarantee HR and freedoms (DPC, Art.26), 
that is the right of every person (DPC, Art. 28). The respect of those 
rights and freedoms should be in accordance with the constitution, the 
laws issued in application thereof, and the principles of justice (DPC, 
Art. 28). In case of violation of those constitutional rights and 
freedoms, any person can pursue a request directly to the Constitutional 
Court (DPC, Art. 201).  
                                               
736  SAAD R., State in the Making, in: Al-Ahram Weekly 17-23 June 1999, Issue n° 434.  
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There is a remarkable change in relation to the applicability of HR and 
basic freedoms. In article 18 of the 2nd and 3rd DPC switch the tendency 
in favor of more responsible Palestinian state that shall seek to join 
international covenants and charters in order to safeguard HR. This 
article may suggest rather that international law will be applicable once 
regularly ratified by competent authorities, in accordance with 
constitutional provisions.  
Art. 18: The state of Palestine shall abide by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and shall seek to join other international covenants and 
charters that safeguard human rights.  
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§15 Conclusion to Part Three 
There is no constituent power if there are no people. Not necessarily in 
its ethnic sense, but in the sense of a community, a group of persons 
that live under the same rules and laws; (this is the moment of the 
present). Nevertheless, a people lives normally on specific territories or 
at least, refer to a homeland that is common to those who are now 
living and to those who had lived before them (the moment of the past). 
Now, this past and this present may determine the future of the 
members of that people and especially those who continue to live on 
the territories that form the people’s homeland.  
Constituent power for us is that which has the power to frame a 
document with particular sanctity that is the constitution in its formal 
sense. Now, this happens normally when there is already a community, 
organized into a state. This means that the enactment of constituent 
power is possible only in the framework of a previous constitution (in 
its material sense). There is then no problem of who is/are that/those 
entitled to constituent power, how it is enacted or who is effectively 
exercising it, since the same fact that it is already enacted presupposes 
that, actually, someone already holds the power in his/her hands, and 
has already decided who should do what, in this complicated process of 
framing a constitution.  
For this reason, it was of importance to know the law in force and the 
way the power is shared and contained, besides considering the status 
of the people under international law, and the institutions that represent 
them. The last question we considered was directly related to 
sovereignty and legitimacy. All those are presuppositions for the 
enactment of constituent power: a comprehensive and hierarchical 
system of laws in the territories, the existence of a people and the 
existence of political institutions that are representative and express 
legitimate aspirations.  
A state effectively exists when there are organs that exercise sovereign 
powers over a territory and a people. Now, if those organs are formed 
by foreigners or imposed by an alien country, we have an occupied 
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territory or country; if they are formed by co-nationals, but find their 
origin in the will of a person of group of persons rather than by the 
people, we have a tyranny. In the case that those organs express the 
people and are formed in the concurrence of all the members, then we 
have a democratic state. Although very important, the last point did not 
interest us here directly. What interested us is the existence of a state, 
and thus of an effective sovereignty over a territory and a people, that is 
exercised by the organs of the state and not by an alien state.  
One may notice that those three elements (people, territory, and 
sovereignty) necessary for the enactment of constituent power are the 
same as for the establishment of a state. Nevertheless, these elements 
all together are not sufficient; they need to have a connection with each 
other. In the Palestinian case, the three elements for a state exist but are 
not connected to each other; in other words, there is no element of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is simply the other face of statehood. We may 
say it differently. There are material elements for statehood that have to 
exist: a group of persons; a territory; and organs. Now, those elements 
are not sufficient alone to obtain statehood. They need to be sovereign. 
Sovereignty means that those elements need to convert into: a people 
are those entitled to self-determination; a territory that forms a viable 
unit of self-determination; and political institutions that govern these 
two preceding elements and base their legitimacy on them.  
Now, constituent power may be enacted before the establishment of a 
state but the constitution of the state has no existence outside the state. 
In other words, the enactment of constituent power may start before the 
creation of a state but the adoption of the constitution needs to follow 
the creation of the state. Said differently, the enactment of the 
constituent power does not depend necessarily on the establishment of a 
state but the result of that process, that is, the (formal) constitution has 
no existence outside the state.  
Now, there were several examples of constitutions adopted by 
occupying or mandatory powers, for the territories under their juris-
diction. Nevertheless, the independence of that state, once achieved, 
necessitated changes since a real shift of the bearer of sovereignty 
occurred. This idea can be proved by the phenomenon of the 
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internationallization of constituent power as already presented in 
previous sections.  
*** 
Palestinian constitution-making attracted the attention of international 
actors and states.737 It also had the focus of local and foreign media, 
although on many occasions they took one or two articles and forgot all 
the rest (mainly, questions related to shari’a or “Islam is the religion of 
the state”).  
Preparing a constitution was part of the steps imposed on the 
Palestinians by the Quartet’s Road Map,738 endorsed by UNSC 
resolution 1515 in 19 November 2003. In Phase I, the Palestinians had 
to prepare a draft constitution before May 2003.739  
In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately implement an unconditional cessation of 
violence according to the- steps outlined below. Palestinians and Israelis resume 
security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and 
incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. The PA 
undertakes comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including 
drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair, and open election upon that 
basis. Israel takes all possible steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel 
withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two 
sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and 
cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity consistent with the 
Mitchell report.740  
Not only has it delimited most of its contents:  
                                               
737  The fact that the DPC (and not the BL, for instance) with many related analyses 
published in Arabic and English on the official Web Page of the PA’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is very significant. 
738  The Road Map was amended many times. Texts cited here are taken from the 
December 2002 version 
739  It is important to take into account that most of the deadlines included in the Road 
Map where postponed by an American decision, taking into consideration the 
developments in the Palestinian territories following the Second Intifada.  
740  Cursive is mine. See http://www.mofa.gov.ps/key_documents/road_map3.asp  
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Credible process for drafting of constitution for Palestinian statehood. As soon as 
ready. Constitutional Committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on 
strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for 
public comment/debate. Constitutional Commission proposes draft document for 
submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.741 
As for the second phase, the transitional Palestinian state will be 
governed by the new constitution until there is a permanent status 
settlement. The second phase was to be extended from June 2003 to 
December 2003.  
In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating a Palestinian 
state with provisional borders, based on the new constitution, as a way station 
to a permanent status settlement… 
New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized 
and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if 
required, should follow approval of the new constitution.742 
Many studies are made to present the BL or the DPC, by Palestinian, 
Arab and international specialists. The constitutional committee was 
headed by Dr. Nabil Sha’th, and included many Palestinian academics, 
assisted by Arab and foreign personalities. It was accompanied by a 
large popular participation and was the object of various workshops. 
We read in the introduction to the 3rd DPC, interesting elements 
regarding Palestinian constitution- making:  
After great effort, with over two hundred meetings, workshops and discussions, 
the committee for the preparation of the Constitution, in cooperation with the civil 
society, academics and politicians, had achieved by the end of December 2000 the 
first draft of the Constitutional project of the State of Palestine. It was published in 
February 2001. 
This is the third draft, which has been compiled by amending and reformulating 
the first and the second draft, having taken into consideration comments and 
                                               
741  Ibidem.  
742  Ibidem.  
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suggestions from Palestinian, Arab and international legal experts, in addition to 
academics and personalities from the civil society in Palestine and the Diaspora. 
This third draft will be widely distributed to enable a greater number of persons to 
study it and participate in improving the drafting thereof by suggesting 
amendments, deletions or additions to obtain a valid draft that would be presented 
to the Palestinian BL when conditions will enable it to convene.743 
Similar attention was given to the BL, already approved by the PLC 
since 1997, and endorsed by the president in 2002. Nevertheless, there 
are many differences between the two texts as we have shown in 
previous chapters. We would like to recap here only one of those 
principle differences: the BL is in force for the transitional period while 
the DPC will be adopted after the establishment of the state. From here 
we start: in fact, if few people doubt the importance of a BL for the 
transitional period, in order to ensure the separation of the three powers 
(or better still, to avoid executive interference), to protect liberties and 
basic rights of individuals, and ensure their equal and non-
discriminatory participation of decision-making in the public sphere, 
many can find dissuasive argumentations against the DPC. In fact, in 
most of the studies treating the DPC, we find an answer to the first 
simple question: ‘why a constitution?’ On the contrary, those studies do 
not satisfy our curiosity if we go further into our analyses and ask 
another simple question: ‘why now?’ In other words, why draft a 
constitution for the state of Palestine when the state does not exist yet? 
Here there are two ways to resolve this issue:  
First, some may consider that the Palestinian state exists already, 
although without sovereignty because of the Israeli occupation; 
consequently, adopting a constitution is necessary also now.744 This 
position is weak since the same constitutional text provides that the 
constitution shall be adopted only after the establishment of the state!  
                                               
743  See http://www.mofa.gov.ps/arabic/key_decuments/constitution_new2.asp  
744  Dr. Ahmad Mubarak al Khalidi, the vice president of the constitutional committee, 
head of the drafting committee, was of this point of view, for example. See his 
intervention published in Arabic at the official link of FATAH, http://www.fateh.net 
/public/newsletter/2000/151000/5.htm   
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Second, others refer to the constitution as any other step towards 
statehood. If others insist on investigating this to be true, they cannot 
provide convincing answers. They may finish up by admitting that the 
constitution was imposed on the Palestinians, within the many other 
conditions of the package called “Road Map”. This position is also 
weak since it does not provide why and how the constitution may 
contribute to those massive efforts of the international community, 
especially the Quartet, in a joint agreement between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians.  
We believe that those solutions remain partial and unsatisfying. 
Considering the Palestinian constitution shall be made within the 
general context of the constitutional movement worldwide, where the 
constitution is increasingly becoming a legal instrument to consolidate 
political agreements, and where power-sharing is strictly assigned to 
different constituent groups, by the constitution. The international 
community – sometimes including universal and regional organizations 
or single states - is becoming principle actors in the constitution-
making process. The constitution is becoming the most discreet but 
direct way, through which the international community intends to 
‘impose’ certain rules on new states, in which they will be a part of the 
community of states, while asserting always that the people choose it 
freely. This legal fiction can be justified by the defenders of such 
interference in domestic affairs; by other values, such as protecting the 
new state succumbing to the risk of chaos, civil war or serious 
violations of the basic rights or freedoms of individuals or groups.  
The so called ‘internationalization of constituent power’ is related to 
another phenomenon, the constitutionalization of international law. In 
fact, international law is binding on states, but there are few instruments 
to impose it. It depends mostly on the adherence and will to apply it, of 
single states, or on the community of states, or part of them, to impose 
it on others. Accordingly, the internationalization of constituent power 
can be considered as a natural development of international law and/or 
relations, but also of constitutional law itself.  
It is thus normal that the international community shows an interest in 
constitution- making, and supports its preparation as a step towards (or 
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as a condition of?) statehood. In other words, if a Palestinian state is to 
exist one day, the international community wishes to contribute to those 
efforts of establishing a viable and democratic state that respects 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Besides, the international community 
is interested in ensuring a legal apparatus that reflects a peace 
agreement with Israel. The constitution may be of great help in the 
realization of those two objectives. Finally, the constitution defines how 
the Palestinians conceive themselves, and what the intentions are as to 
how their rights will be realized, similar to other peoples of the region. 
The danger here is that the constitution is becoming a big bag in which 
everyone puts something totally different. This is risky since it may 
finish up, as many other documents have, to be totally perfect to the 
point it is no longer useable.745  
                                               
745  Some consider the efforts to prepare a constitution for the Palestinian state, or 
approving a BL for the PA in the transitional period as superfluous, meaningless or 
ridiculous; for them, the first obstacle to Palestinians now, in their efforts to state-
building is the Israeli occupation. For others, the BL and the DPC are one of the 
steps that will conduct Palestinians through the transitional period and the very 
beginning of the Palestinian state, guided by the principles of good governance and 
respect of HR, towards the realization of their right to self-determination. Only the 
future will show who was right and who was wrong. 
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Following the passing of Yasser Arafat (11 November 2004), some 
started to refer to Max WEBER's phases of legitimacy: traditional, 
charismatic, and institutional. According to such analyses, traditional 
leadership is that of Palestinians before 1948 while charismatic 
leadership no longer existed after Arafat, and the Palestinians began to 
prepare for a new phase of institutional leadership.746 In fact, on 9 
January 2005, the Palestinians of WB, East Jerusalem and GS, elected 
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the second president of the PA, 
ending pacifically the process of power transfer that began with the 
demise of Yasser Arafat. The election was and has been the focus not 
only of a great deal of diplomatic and media attention from the 
international community, but also from ordinary Israelis and 
Palestinians.  
Though not necessarily contradictory, the interests shown in the 
presidential election are multiple. For the international community, 
popular elections are a necessary step for the establishing democratic 
and accountable institutions governing the Palestinians of WBGS, and 
contribute to state-building efforts. While according to regular 
statements made by Israel, the election of a partner for peace would be 
a priority, yet a partner already exists: the PLO; in fact, according to 
international law it is the PLO which is authorized to negotiate and sign 
international treaties. The PA, created by the Oslo agreements, is a 
purely administrative authority with limited competence in time, space 
and persons (the interim period; the autonomous territories; and only 
regarding Palestinians). According to Oslo Agreements, the interim 
period would have ended by 1999 without joining a permanent status 
agreement; besides, most of the autonomous territories were re-
occupied by Israel after the second Intifada.  
However, it is obvious that the centre of Palestinian political gravity is 
slipping from the PLO to the PA. Simultaneously, a transition has 
occurred: from a cause concerned with liberation, to that of a quasi-
state, which administers the population of occupied territories. The 
Palestinian cause, which once revolved around the rights of a people -
                                               
746  For complete analyses, see SAFIEH A., End of ‘Charismatic’ Era, in: Palestine-
Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, Vol. 11, Nos 3&4, 2004/2005. 
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the majority in Diaspora- to self-determination, has increasingly been 
reduced to a question of territory and/or autonomy.  
The developments in the Palestinian territories following the 2006 
legislative elections, show how internal Palestinian challenges related 
to problematic issues we treated in this thesis: who represent the 
Palestinians? What are the limits and legitimacy of their mandate and 
power? The answers to those questions have great influence on the 
Palestinian concept of constituent power.  
Mainly, there are two challenges that need to be resolved by the 
Palestinians themselves: the Fatah/Hamas dilemma that reflects a larger 
one related to the objective of national struggle, the concept of state, 
and the methods of resistance.747 Another internal challenge, 
completely connected to the first, is the dialectic between PLO and PA 
institutions.   
In addition to its negative effects related to the overlapping of his 
prerogatives, the fact that Yasser Arafat was simultaneously the leader 
of Fatah (since its foundation in 1957), chairman of the executive of the 
PLO (since 1969), president of the State of Palestine (since the 
Declaration of Independence in Algiers in 1988) and ra'ees of the PA 
(since its creation; he was initially nominated then elected in 1996), had 
direct consequences on Fatah because it gained, at the same time, the 
grace and the disgrace of being Arafat’s party. Fatah enjoyed the 
success and failures of its leader.  
When Arafat entered the cities in the ‘Palestinian Autonomous 
Territories’, making the victory sign to the excited crowds, he was not 
alone. A whole team of old companions (largely belonging to Fatah) 
settled with him, and headed the Palestinian institutions newly created, 
following the agreements with Israel (and thus, with its indirect 
approval, either for their return, or for their participation in the new 
                                               
747  To start with, it shall be outlined that the antagonism between Fatah and Hamas 
seems no longer satisfactory. It does not reflect the richness and the variety of the 
Palestinian society, their history, and their long struggle for independence. In fact, 
the population seems wanting changes but also requires an alternative or a third 
option. Why shall Islamism be the only serious alternative to nationalism? Why 
shall Islamist movements be the only to claim more democracy and reform? This 
‘third movement’ would have positive effects on the legitimacy of political 
decisions. Otherwise, Palestinians may risk being captives of the actual 
bipolarisation. 
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administration). Those people were known by the WBGS Palestinians 
(the ‘insiders’) as the Palestinians of the exterior/outside (or the 
‘outsiders’). Arafat’s policy was to have direct control of everything, 
either personally or through his faithful ‘followers’, in particular the 
‘old companions’. That especially meant the marginalisation of the 
local leaders who emerged with the first Intifada.  
The PLO-PA dialectic started since the creation of the later, following 
the Israeli-Palestinian agreements; the PA was conceived as its 
administrative arm in the territories evacuated by Israeli military forces. 
Nevertheless, the elections of 1996 of the President of PA and the PLC 
members had given to PA institutions popular legitimacy without 
cutting the liaisons with the PLO, which remained as the only 
representative of the Palestinian people. The confusion of the personals 
of PLO institutions and PA characterized that period, with inevitable 
overlaps and confusions of tasks, powers, competences, and 
responsibilities.  
Since PLO structures and personalities were not adapted to convert to 
an accountable and transparent administration, the first tensions 
between the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’ started to appear in the 
Palestinian political scene. Thus, a request for transparency, respect for 
the RL and democracy was gradually made by the ‘insiders’ -supported 
especially by a strong presence of NGOs- who began to express their 
deep concerns regarding the situation in the so called ‘Palestinian 
Autonomous Territories’.  
Another point needs to be outlined here: the Palestinian political/ 
resistance groups are characterised by their large fragmentation and 
generally poor degree of institutionalization. This can be explained by 
the conflict situation in which Palestinian national movement was born 
and developed. Nevertheless, it was mainly in the Second Intifada 
where Palestinian different factions had witnessed the emergence of 
local leaders that defied centralized decisions and complicated the 
decision-making of their leaders. The emergence of local leaders was 
strictly related to another phenomenon: the weakness of PA.   
It shall be outlined here that there had been no general elections inside 
different parties for a long time; this fact favoured individuals’ self-
proclamation as leaders of the Second Intifada and, at certain times, 
were seen to play a growing role in decision-making at local level that 
led to a certain popular legitimacy. Besides, during the second Intifada, 
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Palestinian classical groups had witnessed the emergence of armed 
groups with local leaders who were supposed to manage particular 
crisis and to make urgent decisions, which would not necessarily reflect 
the official position of the party and/or their leaders. This situation had 
embarrassed the leadership of different movements, including Fatah, 
who saw their authority undermined from the inside, by belonging 
groups without following necessarily the line defined by their central 
bureaus. 
Besides, the closure and sieges of Palestinian cities by the Israeli army 
factored the emergence of local leaders, who never had openly defied 
the authority of PA president, Yasser Arafat, considered by the 
population as the embodiment of the Palestinian fight. Arafat remained 
the bond that conciliated the multiple differences of the Palestinians 
and avoided conflicts between the different factions. Besides, an 
important negative effect resulted from the impotence of the PA, which 
became the target of Israeli attacks during the second Intifada, and 
especially the de facto prison in the headquarter (the Muqata’a) of 
Arafat. This may explain the fact that Arafat’s disappearance 
jeopardizes the unity of Palestinian national movement in general and 
Fatah in particular.  
Seen the circumstances, it becomes urgent to distinguish in a clear way 
between PA and PLO in a very precise legal instrument, in order to 
clarify their respective roles. Concerning the negotiation with Israel, it 
is necessary to return to PLO, and once more to give it the priority in 
the determination of policy guidelines. Here, there is a problem: the 
PLO, with its old and un-elected institutions, is no longer adaptable, 
especially since having transferring the seats of most of its institutions 
to OPT. This meant two things: first, it would be impossible for 
dissidents to participate in their sessions; second, this would depend on 
the goodwill of Israel that could obstruct, at any moment, the PNC to 
convene. However, returning to PLO will not be easily accepted, 
because that would be regarded as bypassing electoral or popular 
legitimacy; obviously, that is mostly Hamas’ position, but also new 
parliamentary blocs that are not represented in PLO institutions. 
Accordingly, Palestinians need to think of innovative ideas to ensure a 
fair representation of the Palestinians in the Diaspora, without crushing 
the legitimately elected representatives of the OPT Palestinians.  
*** 
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In the Palestinian context, the democratic process is at a crossroad 
between the need of stability and the need to change; the need of 
legality and the need of legitimacy; the need of internal adhesion and 
international recognition. Modern constitutions reflect the equilibrium 
between domestic and the international legitimacy of the state. There is 
a tendency to treat the constitution as a birth certificate of the new state 
that contains essential elements regarding the newborn actor in the 
community of states. In case the interests of the international 
community contradict local aspiration, it is most likely that the 
constitution is misused for the purpose of a group or the other.  
In the Palestinian case, the victory of Hamas in 2006 legislative 
elections showed how fragile that balance between local and 
international legitimacy was. The three elements that the International 
Community imposes as pre-conditions to international legitimacy (and 
the arrival of funds) are related to elements treated in this thesis: 
renouncing to terrorism, recognizing Israel and accepting the 
agreements joined until now by those representing the Palestinians. 
Those elements are inter-related: who make part of the Palestinian 
people? Who represent them? What are their territorial claims? What is 
the kind of state they intends to institute? Those elements are related to 
the nation-building, peace process and transition to democracy: to 
which extent it is related to Palestinian nationalism when their objective 
is the instauration of an Islamic state? To which extent they can join a 
lasting peace when they do not recognize Israel? How can they pretend 
recognition for their democratic election when they may end up treating 
Palestinians based on their religion rather than citizenship? 
Prior to Hamas victory, many have asserted that the participation of 
Hamas in legislative elections must be carried out. This position was 
defended, for two reasons at least:  
First, involving Hamas in the political process would have positive 
consequences, since the PNA may absorb this movement into its 
institutions.  
Second, the involvement of Hamas in a political life may limit its 
manoeuvrability, constraining it to make strategic choices that will 
finish up by weakening it. By then, the Palestinians were living a 
dilemma (and with them, the Israelis, and the international community): 
how can they become more democratic, by carrying out free elections, 
without having Hamas on the head of Palestinian institutions? The 
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same fear applies to Arab countries where democratization may lead to 
Islamic groups’ resurgence. 
However, involving a group in a political process cannot be carried out 
without conditions. It is of great importance then to find a national 
consensus on two points at least:  
First, participating in the political game means accepting its basic rule: 
decisions shall be taken only through legitimate institutions 
representing the Palestinians. Unilateral initiatives or decisions done by 
factions would certainly have negative affects on the Palestinian 
national cause.  
Second, no political party can be tolerated if it does not renounce the 
employment of violence to obtain rights, but rather accept to reclaim 
rights through law. Here is another dilemma: how could Palestinian 
factions pretend to play a political party-like role while they are still 
acting as resistance movements? How can they arbitrate to law in 
resolving the internal possible disputes while their basic rights as a 
people are still violated being under occupation? How can they 
institutionalize their organizations while they are still considered as a 
liberation movement? In fact, international law recognizes to people the 
right to resist occupation, in the name of people’s right to self-
determination. The resistance includes the use of force but is not 
limited to that. Nevertheless, in case violence is used, it is not exempt 
of all limits. The problem here is to understand what those limits are: in 
the absence of an international clarifying document, the IHL provisions 
may be used as a reference.  
*** 
States and international organizations become central actors in 
constitution-making, while the people, those entitled to sovereignty, 
remain at least theoretically, those entitled to constituent power also, 
and adopt the constitution in toto. The people are ‘free’ to accept that 
constitution with the political and economic system it represents. This 
legal fiction is necessary since popular adherence is necessary to ensure 
legitimacy for the state, and not only to provide a legacy for that text. 
The internationalization of constituent power means that this supreme 
national act is not, and cannot be, exclusively a domestic issue. The 
examples of the internationalization of constituent power are multiple. 
It may be partial as a result of a treaty or an act of international law, or 
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as a result of a de facto situation; it can be also total, where the 
elaboration process of the constitution is entirely left for international 
order and where the constitution makes part of an international treaty.  
Many explanations are given for this phenomenon:  
First, the evolution of international law and international society and 
the relations between states altered the notion of sovereignty;  
Second, the weakness of states in the third world and the multiplication 
of crises situations, and the will of developed countries to act against 
these crises, had led to the changing of the raison d’être of peace-
keeping and peace-making operations: the increasing number of states 
and the fact that the formation of most of them followed a conflict 
situation.  
Third, contemporary constitutions, when they are enacted following a 
conflict situation,  are often used to guarantee a peace treaty between 
new neighbours and to formalize a modus vivendi of various ethnic, 
national, religious, linguistic groups that are ‘condemned’ to live in the 
same state.  
Rich and democratic countries may confuse the indispensable 
Constitutionalism of newborn states, with the imposition of a particular 
constitutional model. Their foreign and cooperation policy may be 
determined partially by the adherence of new and weak states to such a 
model. The risk here is to suffocate local population, their 
particularities, and their culture. This may have a boomerang effect, 
with negative consequences, even as far as complete rejection, since the 
constitution may be considered as an ‘outside product’. 
In fact, nations, formed by human beings, have their individual history 
and the state should respect it, since it is never born ex nihilo, but a 
state of a people who may have their own history, language and culture 
and the state structure and institutions should inevitably reflect them. 
Nevertheless, once a state exists, it should not use those elements to 
discriminate citizens who are not part of its cultural heritage. The real 
challenge of contemporary states is their being ‘multi’ in terms of 
nations, cultures, languages and ethnicities, that live within their 
borders.  
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The constitution may create the common tent under which all citizens 
may have shelter. All constituent groups and individuals shall consider 
the state as their own and shall identify themselves with the document 
in order to preserve the unity of the state. In other words, the 
importance of the constitution lies not in its expression of political 
identity, but in its ability to transform it into a civic one. The remained 
problem is to understand if and within which limits the will of the 
nation shall be applied by the state and reflected in the constitution. Is it 
sufficient that a nation wants something for this will to be considered 
good? The problem of those who accept this option is that the guiding 
political status will lose all rationality. 
Accordingly, democratic measures (such as elections or the adoption of 
laws through a majority system), shall be given their valid weight, 
without being absolute; otherwise, from the oppression of one person 
(dictatorship) or a few (aristocracy), we may end up under that of the 
majority (apparent democracy). In other words, there shall be red lines 
drawn over which the people (or their representatives) shall not cross. 
These red lines shall be enumerated in a text, with particular legal 
sanctions that will be difficult (almost impossible) to amend without 
general consensus, that is not equivalent to majority (easy to realize) 
nor to unanimity (difficult to obtain).  
The constitution is still a necessary tool for the nation to express its will 
but also for the individuals and communities within the state to protect 
themselves from the nation itself and from its expression, the state. 
Modern constitution is the legal demarcation of political compromise to 
which entities and individuals composing the state adhere.  
*** 
The experience of the last two hundred years proved that the leading 
forces of the revolution endeavour to congeal the achievements of the 
revolution, particularly the new distribution of political power, in a 
constitution - a legal document that bears the unequivocal authority of a 
written text superior to all other laws of the land. By making a 
constitution, the revolutionary forces are digging their own graves; the 
constitution is the final act of the revolution. Constitution-making is an 
act of self-liquidation of the revolution. However, as important the 
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character of the constitution as a written text may be, its lasting 
authority depends on the persistence of its authors’ authority.  
Constituent power remains inherent in the people, and they may enact it 
through mass mobilisation that may be bloody sometimes, or pacific. 
The original constituent power is then enacted.  
The examples here are multiple: the Rose revolution in Georgia in 
November 2003, the Orange revolution in Ukraine in November 2004. 
The role of international actors and states was decisive to make these 
popular uprisings succeed and obtain the changes towards democracy.  
It is the case, to some extent, with the Cedar revolution in Lebanon in 
February 2005, following the assassination of Rafik Hariri. In those 
three ‘revolutions’, the Lebanon case is particular since it is the only 
‘federal state’ and the only Arab state. Besides, it was the only 
revolution against an outsider country’s interference in internal affairs, 
rather than against electoral irregularities. The challenge was how to 
permit the changes without returning to the nightmare of civil war. The 
pacification of the different communities that compose the Lebanese 
nation was possible thanks to Ta’ef agreements that guaranteed a kind 
of personal federalism, should be protected.  
Things are different when changes are made following a military 
intervention. The case of Iraq may provide an example where a lot of 
importance is given to the constitution in order to create a system that 
reflects the reality on the ground and represents all the communities, 
ethnicities and religions in Iraq. This is not an easy task in a country 
that was governed by a dictator for decades and where national 
resistance to occupation is manipulated and confused by religious 
fanatics. The risk here is that the constitution may be considered by 
local population as a product made in USA, a one-size-fits all item. In 
any case, many interrogatives remain to be resolved: what is the role of 
the constitution in accommodating ethnical, religious, and national 
diversities? To which extent the federal system is adapted for Iraq? 
What is the relationship between religion and state in the new Iraqi 
state? What is the role played by states and international organizations 
in the process of constitution making especially with the coalition 
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military presence, led by the USA? How were the constituent assembly 
composed and how the constitution adopted?  
*** 
This thesis intends to contribute to those efforts of self-understanding 
that Arabs are conducting, open to experiences of others. Reciprocal 
knowledge is the best weapon against prejudices, and the first steps 
towards trust and cooperation.  
Our analyses have many limitations; they do not pretend to be 
exhaustive although many points on the subject have been covered: 
going large sometimes means taking the risk of not going deep. 
Besides, the fast development of constitutional and international laws 
proves that the conclusions of this thesis are not -and does not pretend 
to be- absolute. Rather, they shall be always considered on the light of 
new experiences, since they reflect the understanding of the 
development of a state itself and the way it intends to conduct its 
relations with others.  
The most important development of the last century was to discover 
that the state has no originality or sovereignty on individuals’ and 
groups’ rights, consequently, modern states ended up admitting that 
they may have their sovereignty limited in certain areas since 
fundamental rights and freedoms owe their existence to a source that is 
outside the state. This source has nothing to do with an ideal, imaginary 
city but concerns individuals.  
The raison d’être of states was to protect humans from the violence of 
others, from their animal instincts and evil tendencies. These same 
states ended up by repeating the sins of their creators; like any social 
organization, the state a tendency towards evil. The modern state’s first 
enemy is itself; if left to itself, the paradise of a State’s legality may end 
up by being worse than the chaos of its absence.  
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